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A B S T R A C T 
The t h e s i s i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e l o g i c c f t h e l anguage o f 
p o l i t i c a l i d e o l o g i e s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o p o l i t i c a l and m o r a l c o n -
d u c t . F i r s t , t h e v i e w t h a t i d e o l o g y i s t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e ends 
o f p o l i t i c a l and m o r a l c o n d u c t , and t h e r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e 
v a r i o u s ' p h i l o s o p h i e s ' w h i c h t h i n k e r s have d e v i s e d , i s c o n s i d e r e d anrt ( 
a f t e r soma a n a l y s i s , r e j e c t e d . T h i s l e a d s t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a 
g e n e r a l s c e p t i c i s m c o n c e r n i n g i d e o l o g y , namely t h a t i d e o l o g y i s an 
e s s e n t i a l l y s p u r i o u s f o r m o f r e a s o n i n g and u n d e r s t a n d i n g . The n o t i o n s o f 
' r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 1 , ' f a l s e - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' and ' a b s t r a c t i o n ' a re t h o s e 
g i v e n p a r t i c u l a r s c r u t i n y . As a r e s u l t , t h e s c e p t i c a l v i e w o f 
i d e o l o g y i s r e j e c t e d . 
I n t h e s econd p a r t , a p a r a l l e l , o f t e n s u g g e s t e d , be tween 
i d e o l o g y and r e l i g i o n i s e x p l o r e d . I t i s a r g u e d t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l and 
r e l i g i o u s ra iders l a n d i n g i s e s s e n t i a l l y s u b j e c t i v e , i n a c a r e f u l l y 
s p e c i f i e d sense o f t h e t e r m , and t h a t b o t h a re v i e w s o f t h e w o r l d sub 
s p e c i e a e t e r n i t a t i s . These t w o f e a t u r e s e n t a i l t h e i r b e i n g u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g s c a t e g o r i c a l l y d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g l i k e 
h i s t o r y o r s c i e n c e . Buz r e l i g i o n s and i d e o l o g i e s a re n o t t h e same 
and t h e d i s t i n c t i o n be tween t h e t w o i s d rawn i n t h e c o n t e x t o f an 
e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e n o t i o n s o f e t e r n i t y and t e m p o r a l i t y . The p a r a l l e l 
i s c o n t i n u e d , howeve r , i n a c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e l o g i c o f i d e o l o g i c a l 
and t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n , where i t i s a r g u e d t h a t a c o r p u s o f a u t h o r i -
t a t i v e l i t e r a t u r e may a l l o w c o n c r e t e and r e a s o n e d r e f l e c t i o n . 
P a r t Three o f t h e t h e s i s i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e p l a c e o f 
i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i n c o n d u c t . I t i s c l a i m e d t h a t , i d e o l o g i c n l 
l i t e r a t u r e way s u s t a i n t h e . vocabu l a ry o f an e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n and 
t h e r e b y p r e s e r v e p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y . 
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I l l 
P R E F A C E 
T h i s t h e s i s i s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l e l a b o r a t i o n o f a c e r t a i n 
c o n c e p t i o n o f i d e o l o g y , o f p h i l o s o p h y and o f r e l i g i o n . I d e a l l y , I 
am i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k , a p h i l o s o p h i c a l work s h o u l d be w r i t t e n e i t h e r 
i n t h e f o r m o f a d i a l o g u e ( l i k e t h o s e o f P l a t o and B e r k e l e y ) o r a 
t r e a t i s e , c o n s i s t i n g i n a s e t o f s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e l a t e d p r o p o s i t i o n s 
( l i k e S p i n o z ' s E t h i c s o r W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s T r a c t a t u s ) • The f o r m e r r e v e a l 
t h e e s s e n t i a l l y d i a l e c t i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e a s o n i n g and 
t h e l a t t e r e n s h r i n e s s o m e t h i n g o f t h e c o m p l e t e c l a r i t y and cohe rence 
t h a t p h i l o s o p h y s t r i v e s a f t e r . B u t b o t h o f t h e s e ways o f w x i t i n g 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , i f t h e y a re t o be s u c c e s s f u l , r e q u i r e a g r e a t measure 
o f s k i l l and i n g e n u i t y . The argument I p r e s e n t h a r e i s n e i t h e r t h e 
one n o r t h e o t h e r , t h o u g h i t has s o m e t h i n g o f t h e appearance o f t h e 
t w o . My i n t e n t i o n has been , h o w e v e r , t o t h i n k as c l e a r l y and as 
c a r e f u l l y as I can abou t t h e n a t u r e o f i d e o l o g y , and t o do so i n t h e 
c o n t e x t o f a d i a l e c t i c a l exchange be tween a r a t i o n a l i s t and a s c e p t i -
c a l v i e w p o i n t and t h e p o i n t o f v i e w 1 w.i.sh t o advance . 
Though t h e q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d a r e f a r .tro;n. new, t h e p r o b l e m 
o f i d e o l o g y i s a r e l a t i v e l y r e c e n t c o n c e r n i n academic i n q u i r y . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s . I hcpe t h a t my i , h i n k i n g i s c e n t r a l l y KV.CI r e c o g n i z a b l y 
i n t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d i o m . As s u c h , i t owes e v e r y t i l i n g , i n a s ense , 
t o i t s p r e d e c e s s o r s . C e r t a i n l y , t h e r e i s n o t a s i n g l e m a j o r p h i l o -
sophe r whose work 1 have n o t r e a d vilh p r o f i t t h i s c o n n e c t i o n . 
i v 
S p e c i a l m e n t i o n may be made, p e r h a p s , o f t h e w r i t i n g s o f L u d w i g 
W i t t g e n s t e i n and M i c h a e l O a k e s b o t t . The degree t o v / h i c h t h e y have 
s t i m u l a t e d my t h o u g h t v / i l l be o b v i o u s i n what f o l l o w s . 
A t a r a t h e r more p e r s o n a l l e v e l , I owe a g r e a t d e b t t o a l l 
t h o s e who have t a u g h t me arid w i t h whom I have been t a u g h t . I n p a r t i -
c u l a r , I s h o u l d l i k e t o t h a n k my s u p e r v i s o r , Dr D a v i d Mann ing and my 
f r i e n d and sometime c o l l e a g u e , D a n i e l R a s h i d . My argument owes much 
t o i n n u m e r a b l e d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h them and t o t h e i r u n f a i l i n g i n t e r e s t 
i n my c o n c e r n s . Need l e s s t o say , they" a r e n o t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t s 
weaknesses . 
And I mast t h a n k my w i f e E l s p e t h , n o t o n l y f o r t h e s e v e r a l 
p o i n t s i n t h i s essay w h e r e , i n t h e l i g h t o f h e r comments, what i s 
s a i d i s e x p r e s s e d w i t h much g r e a t e r c l a r i t y t h a n w o u l d o t h e r w i s e be 
t h e case , and f o r h e r c o r r e c t i o n o f t h e t y p e s c r i p t , b u t a l s o f o r a 
sympathy w h i c h s p r i n g s , I t h i n k , f r o m k n o w i n g b e t t w v t h e n anyone , 
what p h i l o s o p h y has meant t o me. 
L a s t l y I s h o u l d l i k e t o m e n t i o n my baby s o n , M u r r a y , who, 
as my c o n s t a n t companion ond s o u r c e o f d i s t r a c t i o n d u r i n g t h e t i m e 
i n w h i c h 1 have p r e p a r e d t h i s t h e s i s , a l s o the f i r s t two y e a r s o f 
h i s l i f e , has c o n t r i b u t e d , i n ways he c o u l d n o t u n d e r s t a n d , t o t h e 
h a p p i n e s s o f my w o r k . 
I am v e r y g r a t e f u l t o ?>'.rs G i l l i a n G.ibfjon f o r a l l h e r c o -
o p e r a t i o n and a d v i c e i n t h e - t y p i n g o i : t h e s c r i p t . 
CHAPTER 1 
I n t r o d u c t i o n - The S t u d y o f I d e o l o g y 
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Not e v e r y s u b j e c t i s a d i s c i p l i n e . T h i s ; , I i m a g i n e , i s 
o b v i o u s . P o l i t i c s , f o r e x a m p l e , i s a s u b j e c t b u t n o t a d i s c i p l i n e . 
We may s t u d y p o l i t i c s i n a p h i l o s o p h i c a l , an h i s t o r i c a l o r e v e n , 1 
suppose , s o m e t h i n g a p p r o a c h i n g a s c i e n t i f i c manner . And when we do 
one o f t h e s e , t h o u g h o u r s u b j e c t i s p o l i t i c s , we are engaged i n t h e 
d i s c i p l i n e o f p h i l o s o p h y o r h i s t o r y o r s c i e n c e . My s u b j e c t i s 
i d e o l o g y and t h e q u e s t i o n I want t o ask i n t h e s e i n t r o d u c t o r y r emarks 
i s , w h i c h o f t h e s e d i s c i p l i n e s p r o v i d e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c o n c r e t e 
and an o n - g o i n g i n q u i r y i n t o i d e o l o g y ? I t i s n o t , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h i s 
c h a p t e r i s i n t e n d e d t o p r o v i d e d e f i n i t i v e answers on t h e p r o b I o c s i t 
r a i s e s . I n d e e d , i t w i l l a t b e s t t o u c h upon s e v e r a l l a r g e i s s u e s w h i c h 
i t w i l l l e a v e o n l y p a r t i a l l y e x p l o r e d . Nor can i t bs p r e t e n d e d t h a t 
t h e s e i n t r o d u c t o r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r c , i n soma way . an a c c o u n t o f t h e 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s w h i c h have p r e c e d e d t h e c h o i c e o f p h i l o s o p h y as an 
a p p r o p r i a t e i d i o m , f o r t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a re t h e m s e l v e s p h i l o u o p h i c a l 
and r e q u i r e some measure o.t p h i l o s o p h i c a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . The a r g u -
ments o f t h i s f i r s t c h a p t e r a r e , r a t h e r , p a r t l y a way o f d e n y i n g the 
i m p o r t a n c e o f some p o p u l a r b u t essent i a i l j r i m p l a u s i b l e s t u d i e s o f 
i d e o l o g y and p a r t l y a way o f i n t r o d u c i n g t h o s e p r o b l e m s c o n c e r n i n g the: 
n a t u r e o f i d e o l o g y w h i c h t h e main body o f t h e t h e s i s seeks t o r e s o l v e . 
As a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e t o p i c s theiuneJ v e s , t h e n , t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f 
t h i s c h a p t e r must be r e g a r d e d as t e n t s t i v e . 
The q u e s t i o n of. t h i s c h a p t e r i s - about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y and 
l i m i t s o f a p p r o a c h i n g t h e p r o b l e m o f i d e o l o g y s c i e n t i f i c a l l y , h i s t o r i c -
a l l y and p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y . I do n o t c l a i m t h a t t h e s e a re t h e oa ' iy 
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d i s c i p l i n e s , t h o u g h t h e y are t h e l e a s t c o n t e n t i o u s , t h e o l d e s t and 
t h e most f a m i l i a r . The t e r m d i s c i p l i n e i s i t s e l f h i g h l y ambiguous 
and open t o m i s u s e . \le may be agreed t h a t p o l i t i c s i s a. s u b j e c t and 
n o t a d i s c i p l i n e , b u t agreement i s l e s s l i k e l y i n t h e case o f s o c i o l o g y , 
p s y c h o l o g y , economics o r g e o g r a p h y . I do not; t h i n k , m y s e l f , t h a t t h e 
l a s t - n a m e d a r e i n d e e d d i s c i p l i n e s , b u t even i f we l e a v e a s i d e t h e s e 
modern a s p i r a n t s , t h e a g e - o l d case o f m a t h e m a t i c s m i g h t s t i l l be 
t h o u g h t t o be p r o b l e m a t i c . S i n c e , h o w e v e r , t h i s c h a p t e r does n o t 
c l a i m t o be a c o n c l u s i v e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s , b u t r a t h e r , 
as i t s t i t l e s u g g e s t s , t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o an a c t u a l p i e c e o f p h i l o -
s o p h i s i n g abou t i d e o l o g y and r e l a t e d m a t t e r s , i t i s , I t h i n k , r e a s o n a b l e 
t o i g n o r e t h e s e p e r i p h e r a l q u e s t i o n s . I s h a l l , t h e n , s i m p l y ask 
w h e t h e r s c i e n t i f i c , h i s t o r i c a l w i d p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t u d i e s o f i d e o l o g y 
a r e p o s s i b l e and , i f s o , what t h e l i m i t arid e x t e n t o f each i s . 
1 
1 . The q u e s t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o i l . sc ience i s v e r y l a r g e and v e r y 
o l d . I t can s c a r c e l y r e c e i v e adequate t r e a t r ae j . i t h e r e . I n d e e d , I . do 
n o t i n t e n d t o say much about t h e c h a r a c t e r o f s c i e n c e and w i l l 
r e s t r i c t ray d i s c u s s i o n t o one i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t . As I u n d e r s t a n d i t , 
c a u s a t i o n i s one o f t h e p r i n c i p l e c a t e g o r i e s o f s c i e n t i f i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 
A s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n , t h a t i s t o s a y , w i l l r e v e a l t h e p h y s i c a l l y 
(as opposed t o l o g i c a l l y , o r p r a c t i c a l l y ) n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e 
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o c c u r r e n c e o f a g i v e n phenomenon. And t o g i v e t h e cause o f s o m e t h i n g 
i n g e n e r a l i s t o g i v e t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s . 
The c e n t r a l i t y o f c a u s a t i o n t o s c i e n c e , h o w e v e r , i s n o t 
c r u c i a l t o my a r g u m e n t . I t m a t t e r s o n l y i n t h a t I t a k e a s c i e n c e o f 
i d e o l o g y t o c o n s i s t i n t h e r e v e l a t i o n o f such c o n d i t i o n s f o r i d e o l o g i -
c a l b e l i e f . Even t h i s I need n o t e s t a b l i s h , f o r many have c l a i m e d 
t h a t t h i s i s wha t t h e y have r e v e a l e d end i t i s w i t h c l a i m s such as 
theEe t h a t I am c o n c e r n e d . ' ' ' One w r i t e r has s k e t c h e d , so t o speak , 
t h e m e t a p h y s i c s o f such an i n q u i r y i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way. 
A t h e o r y o f t h e o r i g i n s , a c c e p t a n c e and p e r s i s t e n c e 
o f ' r e l i g i o u s ' b e l i e f s - w h a t e v e r t h a t t u r n s o u t t o 
i n c l u d e . . . w i l l s i m p l y s e t o u t t h e . s e v e r a l causes 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l and s o c i j ' . i w h i c h j o i n t l y accoun t f o r 
t h e o r i g i n s , a c c e p t a n c e and p e r s i s t e n c e o f t h o s e 
b e l i e f s . ^ 
E l s e w h e r e , he t e l l s u s : 
T h i s l i n e o f a rgument can o f c o u r s e be e x t e n d e d . . . 
b o t h more b r o a d l y i n t o t h e s o c i o l o g y o f knowledge 
and more d e e p l y i n t o i n d i v i d u a l p s y c h o l o g y . More 
b r o a d l y , t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t b e l i e f s are t h e p r o d u c t 
o f c i r cums tances . , ( o r , as Marx h i m c e l f p u t i t , ' s o c i a l 
b e i n g d e t e r m i n e s c o n s c i o u s n e s s 1 ) can. g e n e r a t e a m b i -
t i o u s g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s abou t t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e r e l i -
g i o u s . o n d t h e p o l i t i c a l i d e o l o g i e s o f d i f f e r e n t 
s o c i a l s t r a t a . More d e e p l y , t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t a 
p e r s o n may be unaware o f t h e i n f l u e n c e s a c t i n g on 
h i s a t t i t u d e s and b e l i e f s can g e n e r a t e e l a b o r a t e p s y c h o -
a n a l y t i c c o n j e c t u r e s abou t t h e u n c o n s c i o u s , These , 
1 Amongst t h e s e we may m u s t e r E n g e l s , Mannheim and Eysenck 
2 Vi' G Runc iman : S o c i o l o g y ' i n . i t s p l a c e Cambr idge 1970, p p . 82-83 
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h o w e v e r , l i e w e l l beyond t h e scope o f t h i s p a p e r . 
I have m e r e l y been c o n c e r n e d t o v i n d i c a t e t h e 
v i e w t h a t t h e r e can be a c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n be tween 
i n t e r e s t s (as I have d e f i n e d them) on t h e one hand 
and b e l i e f s on t h e o t h e r . . . ^ 
I t i s c l e a r f r o m t h i s t h a t a t l e a s t one v e r s i o n o f a ' s c i e n c e ' o f 
i d e o l o g y has c e n t e r e d a r o u n d t h e n o t i o n o f t h e causes o f b e l i e f s , and 
t h i s w o u l d , i f my I n i t i a l , r a t h e r b o l d , a s s e r t i o n i s c o r r e c t , be t r u e 
o f any s t u d y o f i d e o l o g y w h i c h c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y bo c a l l e d s c i e n t i f i c . 
I t i s p e r t i n e n t , t h e n , t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e n o t i o n o f cause . 
2. A c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p must be be tween two s e p a r a b l e e n t i t i e s . 
2 
T h i s i s n o t t r u e o f a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p s b u t i f we a r e t o c l a i m g e n e r a l l y 
t h a t 'A causes B ' and 'B i s t h e e f f e c t - o f A ' and are t o t e s t t h a t 
c l a i m , A and B must be s e p a r a b l e . That, i s , we must, lie a b l e t o i-so! &t« 
t h e two s i d e s i f we a re t o t a l k o f a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n between the.?.. 
How when we ask abou t t h e causes o f b e l i e f s i t i s n o t c l e a r t h a t t h e r e 
a r e two s i d e s w h i c h a r e i s o l a t a b l e . Suppose we advance t h e h y p o t h e s i s 
t h a t ' B e l o n g i n g t o t h e m i d d l e c l a s s i s t h e cause o f h o l d i n g l i b e r a l 
b e l i e f s ' . V/e s h o u l d be a b l e t o i s o l a t e two e l e m e n t s h e r e , one o f 
w h i c h b r i n g s abou t t h e o t h e r . These two e l e m e n t s must be ' B e l o n g i n g 
t o t h e m i d d l e - c l a s s ' and ' H o l d i n g l i b e r a l b e l i e f s ' . 
1 i b i d . pp.21S-~219. O r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d as ' i . -alse c o n s c i o u s -
n e s s ' i n P h i l o s o p h y 1969 . 
2 e g . L o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Ti ie convex and coucave s i d e s o f a 
c u r v e are d i s t i n c t b u t n o t s e p a r a b l e . 
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I t i s c l e a r t h a t o u r use o f t h e t e r m ' l i b e r a l b e l i e f s ' must 
n o t i n v o l v e any r e f e r e n c e t o m i c l d l e - c l a s s n e s s , f o r i f someone i s 
r e g a r d e d as b e l o n g i n g t o t h e m i d d l e c l a s s on t h e g rounds t h a t he s u b -
s c r i b e s t o l i b e r a l b e l i e f s , o u r ' h y p o t h e s i s ' t u r n s o u t t o be a t a u t o l o g y . 
B u t i n much o f t h e t a l k o f c l a s s e s and b e l i e f , l i b e r a l b e l i e f s and 
m i d d l e - c l a s s v a l u e s a r e one and t h e same t h i n g . I t i s d o u b t f u l , on 
t h e o t h e r hand , w h e t h e r any d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e t e r m ' m i d d l e - c l a s s ' w h i c h 
c o n t a i n e d no r e f e r e n c e t o b e l i e f s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f l i b e r a l i d e o l o g y 
c o u l d g e n u i n e l y c a p t u r e t h e r e a l i t y o f t h a t t e r m . T h i s i s why I say 
t h a t i t i s n o t c l e a r t h a t t h e two e l e m e n t s o f o u r h y p o t h e s i s a re 
i n d e e d s e p a r a b l e . 
B u t l e t us suppose t h a t such s e p a r a t i o n i s p o s s i b l e . I t i s 
s t i l l n o t c l e a r t h a t a c a u s a l h y p o t h e s i s i s p o s s i b l e . I n f a c t I want 
t o 3ugges t t h a t t h e l i n k be tween a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s and t h e h o l d i n g o f 
a b e l i e f can n e v e r be c a u s a l . 
I s a i d t h a t a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p must p e r t a i n be tween two 
s e p a r a b l e e l e m e n t s . These* e l e m e n t s , i t w i l l be c l e a r , must be e v e n t s 
i n space and t i m e . I t i s nonsense t o t a l k o f c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t -
ween s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s . The d r o p p i n g , t h r o w i n g , c r u m b l i n g , p r e s s i n g , 
r o l l i n g o f a s t o n e , t h a t i s , some movement o f a s t o n e , may be t h e cause 
o f an o c c u r r e n c e b u t n e v e r t h e s t o n e i t s e l f . F o r , by i t s e l f , t h e 
s t o n e canno t do a n y t h i n g and c a n n o t , t h e r e f o r e , cause a n y t h i n g . And 
s i m i l a r l y any e f f e c t must be on an ev r en t . Where , i n o u r f o r m u l a t i o n s , 
t h e e f f e c t has t h e appearance o f a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s , t h e e f f e c t i s 
a c t u a l l y the_ change t o t h a t s t a t e o f a f f a i r s . For e x a m p l e , an i n q u i r y 
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i n t o t h e cause o f ' a b r o k e n w i n d o w ' ( a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s ) i s r e a l l y an 
i n q u i r y i n t o t h e cause o f ' t h e w i n d o w ' s b e i n g b r o k e n ' ( an e v e n t ) . 
T h i s means t h a t i f we a re t o speak o f t h e causes o f b e l i e f s , 
t h e b e l i e f s o r a t l e a s t t h e b e l i e v i n g must be o c c u r r e n c e s . Of c o u r s e , 
t h e u t t e r a n c e o r a d v o c a t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f i_s an e v e n t ; i t 
t a k e s p l a c e a t a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t i n space and t i m e . B u t t h e s c i e n t i -
f i c t h e o r y o f i d e o l o g y w o u l d , we have been t o l d , p r o d u c e c a u s a l e x p l a -
n a t i o n s o f t h e h o l d i n g o f p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s by d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l s t r a t a 
1 
and t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e b e l i e f s h e l d . 
T h a t b e l i e f s and t h e h o l d i n g o f b e l i e f s a r e n o t o c c u r r e n c e s 
s h o u l d , 7. h o p e , r e q u i r e l i t t l e a rgumen t . S o m e t h i n g t h a t t a k e s p l a c e 
i n t i m e may t a k e a l o n g o r a s h o r t t i m e . I t can be i n t e r r u p t e d , 
p r e v e n t e d , r e p e a t e d . None o f t h e s e in t r u e o f b e l i e v i n g . I c anno t be 
i n t e r r u p t e d i n my b e l i e v i n g . I c a n n o t b e l i e v e s i x t h i n g s b e f o r e 
b r e a k f a s t . And so o n . T a l k o f t e m p o r a l d u r a t i o n c a n n o t bo g i n when 
we a re conce rned w i t h b e l i e f s and t h e s t a t e o f b e l i e v i n g . And i f 
t e m p o r a l d u r a t i o n has no p l a c e n e i t h e r has t a l k o f causes , I t i s t r u e 
t h a t we may speak o f h a v i n g b e l i e v e d and c e a s i n g t o b e l i e v e , b u t t h i s 
r e f e r s t o a. t i m e a t w h i c h t h e f a c t ' K b e l i e v e s V was t r u e and a t i m e 
a t w h i c h i t was n o t , and n o t t o an e v e n t w h i c h l a s t e d a c e r t a i n p e r i o d 
1 I am aware t h a t t h e r e a r e c i the r s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s w h i c h 
employ t h e n o t i o n o f h i s t o r i c a l s p e c i f i c i t y r a t h e r t h a n cause , 
b u t if'V c o n c e r n h e r e i s n o t w i t h t h e n . Mean lie i i i i ' s , i t j i d g h t be 
a r g u e d , i s one o f t h i a k i n d r a t h e r t h a n t h e k i n o Runci;nan e n -
v i s a g e s , A:-, i t happens , J. t h i . n l ; t h a t these a r c a l s o s u s c e p t i b l e 
t o i n s u r m o u n t a b l e lose J ccO. d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
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o f t i m e . I f I cease t o b e l i e v e s o m e t h i n g , my b e l i e v i n g does n o t s t o p . 
C e a s i n g t o b e l i e v e i s n o t l i k e t h e end o r even t h e f i n i s h i n g o f a 
p r o c e s s . 
3 . The u p s h o t o f my argument i s t h a t , on t h e r e s t r i c t e d v i e w 
o f a s c i e n c e we have been c o n s i d e r i n g , t h e r e can be no s c i e n c e o f 
i d e o l o g y . And t h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s b o r n e o u t , I t h i n k , i n t h e f a c t t h a t , 
d e s p i t e t h e b e s t i n t e n t i o n s and t h e g r e a t e s t i n d u s t r y , modern w r i t e r s 
who have assumed t h e c o n t r a r y have n o t , even i n t h e i r e y e s , met w i t h 
any s u c c e s s . 
T h i s may seem t o be r a t h e r a summary d i s m i s s a l o f what has 
been a p r o m i n e n t a n d , t o some, a p e r s u a s i v e , s t r a n d o f t h i n k i n g . B u t 
t h e c o n c l u s i o n s advanced h e r e a re advanced t e n t a t i v e l y . The p o i n t o f 
t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i s n o t t o d i s m i s s t h e s e w r i t e r s b u t t o e x p l a i n t h e 
absence o f r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i r work i n t h e body o f t h e t h e s i s . What I 
have t r i e d t o show i s t h a t t h e r e i s R g r e a t amount o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n n e c e s s a r y b e f o r e t h e m e r i t s and d e m e r i t s o f t h e v a r i o u s 
t h e o r i e s can be c o n s i d e r e d and f u r t h e r , t h a t i t i s at l e a s t a p o s s i b i -
l i t y t h a t such c l a r i f i c a t i o n w o u l d l e a d us t o t h e v i e w t h a t the} ' c anno t 
be s a i d t o have e i t h e r m e r i t o r d e m e r i t . 
I I 
1 . L e t us t u r n , t h e n , t c t h e q u e s t i o n o f how f a r , i f a t a l l , 
i t i n p o s s i b l e t o s t u d y i d e o l o g i e s h i s t o r i c a l l y . I t may seem so 
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o b v i o u s t h a t i f any s t u d y o f i d e o l o g y i s p o s s i b l e i t must be an 
h i s t o r i c a l o n e , t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n need s c a r c e l y be a sked . B u t I hope 
t o show t h a t i t i s n o t a t a l l c l e a r v/hat i t i s t h a t i s o b v i o u s h e r e . 
I do n o t wan t t o deny , o f c o u r s e , t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o r e c o u n t t h e 
h i s t o r y o f , s a y , t h e L i b e r a l p a r t y i n B r i t a i n , r e v o l u t i o n a r y i M a r x i s t 
movements i n B o l i v i a , o r t h e n a t i o n a l i s t l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e i n A l g e r i a . 
B u t i t does n o t seem t h a t h i s t o r i e s such as t h e s e a re a lways a l l t h a t i 
a imed a t by t h o s e who s e t o u t t o w r i t e , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e h i s t o r y o f 
N a t i o n a l i s m . And so i t seems p e r t i n e n t t o wonder how f a r t h e h i s t o r i -
c a l s t u d i e s we may s e n s i b l y u n d e r t a k e a r e n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t e d i n t h e i r 
s c o p e . 
2. H i s t o r y , i t seems t o me, i s e s s e n t i a l l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e 
p a s t , and w i t h t h e p r e s e n t as e v i d e n c e f o r t h e pa3t. The p r e s e n t i s , 
f o r t h e h i s t o r i a n , t h e outcome o f p a s t a c t i v i t y , hence t i r e i m p o r t a n c e 
o f t e m p o r a l sequence . Now w h i l e c l e a r l y t h e r i s e and f a l l o f 
i d e o l o g i c a l movements , o f g roups and p a r t i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h , some 
p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , do t a k e p l a c e i n a t e m p o r a l 
s equence , I canno t see t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s and d o c t r i n e s can be 
s a i d t o be i n t i m e a t a l l . I f t h i s i s t r u e , t h e n w h i l e t h e a c t i v i t i e s 
o f t h o s e i n t h e p a s t have d i r e c t l y p r o d u c e d t i r e e v i d e n c e o f t h e p r e s e n t 
t h e b e l i e f s and d o c t r i n e s o f t h e s e i n t h e pa s t canno t have done so . 
T h i s I hope can be made c l e a r e r by a b r i e f e x a m i n a t i o n o f 
t h e p l a c e o f e v i d e n c e i n t h e s t u d y o f h i s t o r y . When h i s t o r i a n s g i v e 
a c c o u n t s o f t h e p r . s t , t h e t r u t h and f a l s i t y o f what t h e y say c u i i u o t be 
u n d e r s t o o d t o l i e i n t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between t h o s e a c c o u n t s and i k e 
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f a c t s o f t h e p a s t , a s , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e t r u t h o r f a l s i t y o f t h e c l a i m 
t h a t t h e r e i s a t a b l e i n t h e room r e s t s upon i t s c o r r e s p o n d i n g o r 
f a i l i n g t o c o r r e s p o n d w i t h t h e s t a t e o f t h e room. F o r t h e p a s t i s n o t 
an e n t i t y ' o u t t h e r e ' o f w h i c h o u r s t a t e m e n t s are d e s c r i p t i o n s . What 
saves o u r c l a i m s about t h e p a s t f r o m t h e a r b i t r a r y d i r e c t i o n o f whim 
and f a n c y , t h e r e f o r e , i s n o t t h e f a c t s o f t h e p a s t , b u t t h e f a c t s o f 
t h e p r e s e n t . I n s h o r t , we do n o t have d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e p a s t 
because t h e p a s t i s n o t ' t h e r e ' t o be e x p e r i e n c e d . Bu t we do have 
d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e p r e s e n t and t h i s s e r v e s as e v i d e n c e f o r and 
a g a i n s t o u r c l a i m s abou t t h e p a s t . I t i s a g a i n s t t h e f a c t s o f t h e 
p r e s e n t t h a t c l a i m s abou t t h e p a s t a r e t o be t e s t e d . 
To say t h a t t h e p a s t i s n o t ' t h e r e ' t o be d e s c r i b e d , h o w e v e r , 
i s n o t t o say t h a t t h e a c c o u n t s o f t h e p a s t w h i c h h i s t o r i a n s p r o f f e r 
a re ' r e a l l y ' p e c u l i a r s o r t s o f d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h e p r e s e n t . They a r e 
i n d e e d a c c o u n t s o f t h e p a s t , b u t t h e y a re c o n s t r u c t i v e r a t h e r t h a n 
d e s c r i p t i v e . The u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e h i s t o r i a n l i e s i n h i s b e i n g 
a b l e , so t o speak , t o make an a c c o u n t o f t h e pa s t o u t o f h i s d i r e c t 
e x p e r i e n c e o f what i s i n t h e p r e s e n t . He sees Durham C a t h e d r a l , f o r 
e x a m p l e , as t h e outcome G f t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h o s e i n t h e p a s t , t h e 
b u i l d e r s , a r c h i t e c t s , mason K and so o n , r a t h e ] - t h a n , say, a p i e c e o f 
a r c h i t e c t u r e w o r t h y o f a e a t h e t i c c o n t e m p l a t i o n . And i t i s , so t o speak , 
t h i s p e c u l i a r eye w i t h w h i c h he l o o k s a t t h e p r e s e n t which, incites t h e 
p r e s e n t e v i d e i i c e . 
3. I f , t h e n , we want t o ask w h e t h e r a h i s t o r y o f i d e o l o g i c a l 
b e l i e f i s p o s s i b l e we s h a l l have t o ask w h e t h e r t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f 
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' i d e a s ' a d m i t s o f t h i s d i v i s i o n be tween p a s t and p r e s e n t , n a r r a t i v e and 
e v i d e n c e . And I t h i n k t h a t t h e answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n i s t h a t i t does 
n o t . 
H i s t o r i a n s o f i d e a s o f t e n speak o f t h e o r i g i n s , g r o w t h , s p r e a d , 
o r d e v e l o p m e n t o f i d e a s l i k e n a t u r a l l a w , t o l e r a t i o n , c i v i l r i g h t s 
a l i e n a t i o n , o r , more g e n e r a l l y , p r o g r e s s , e v o l u t i o n , s c i e n c e and so 
o n . Now t h e q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r an a c c o u n t o f s o m e t h i n g c a l l e d , lor 
e x a m p l e , 'The d e v e l o p m e n t o f M a r x i s t t h o u g h t ' can be u n d e r s t o o d as an 
h i s t o r i c a l sequence . I f i t i s t o be G O u n d e r s t o o d , i t i s d e a r t h a t 
what we must have i n t h e p r e s e n t i s t h e r e s u l t , t h e e f f e c t , o f t h a t 
d e v e l o p m e n t and n o t t h a t deve lopmen t i t s e l f . And t h e e f f e c t w i l l be 
o u r e v i d e n c e . 
Now I t h i n k we can see t h a t such a d i v i s i o n be tween p a s t and 
p r e s e n t , a c c o u n t and e v i d e n c e , in n o t i n v o l v e d when p e o p l e engage i n 
wha t i s c a l l e d t h e h i s t o r y o f i d e a s . F o r , when we t r y t o t r a c e 'The 
d e v e l o p m e n t o f M a r x i s t t h o u g h t ' we do n o t l o c k a t p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e and 
t r y t o c o n s t r u c t an accouxi t o f t h e p a s t , we l o o k a t t h e w r i t i n g s o f , 
f o r e x a m p l e , M a r x , E n g e i s and L e n i n and t r y t o show how t h e i d e a s o£ 
one a re a deve lopmen t upon t h e o t h e r . B u t i f t h e r e i n such- <•; d e v e l o p -
ment we a r e n o t d i s c o v e r i n g i t i n d i r e c t l y by means o f e v i d e n c e b u t 
d_i_rect ly by r e a d i n g t h e t e x t s . " " I n o t h e r w o r d s , what Mturx and E n g o i e 
1 In. a c l e a r sense t h e . 'student o f i r iear . doe;- n o t l o o k a t e v i d e n c e a t 
a l l . T h i s i s i n p a r t r e v e a l e d by t b « t f a c t t h a t , so l o n g as t h e 
t e x t xc c o m p l e t e , t h e a c t u a l h i s t o r i c a l e d i t i o n , t h e when and 
where o f p r i n t i n g , i r : n o t oi" i m p o r t a n c e t o him. 
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and L e n i n wrote i s not evidence f o r what they thought; i t i s what they 
thought. So to t r a c e a development i n t h a t thought can only be, i f i t 
i s anything, to t r a c e a l o g i c a l and not an h i s t o r i c a l development. 
The same point can be made i n another way. Suppose someone 
says 'When d i d M a c h i a v e l l i d i e ? ' T h i s i s a q u e s t i o n about the p a s t . 
I f we were to have or to d i s c o v e r i n the pr e s e n t a r e g i s t e r r e c o r d i n g 
the date of, s a y , M a c h i a v e l l i ' s b u r i a l and we were f a i r l y a s sured of 
i t s a u t h e n t i c i t y , we would be able to say 'He di e d on such and such a 
date'. Now t h i s l a s t statement i s not a d e s c r i p t i o n of what we have 
seen (the r e g i s t e r ) ; i t i s not a report of t h e evidence but a c o n s t r u c -
t i o n upon the evidence. Consider, i n c o n t r a s t , the case where someone 
says 'What was M a c h i a v e l l i ' s theory of p o l i t i c s ? ' T h i s too, looks 
l i k e a q u e s t i o n about the p a s t . But i n f a c t we could j u s t as e a s i l y 
ask 'What i s M a c h i a v e l l i ' s theory of p o l i t i c s ? ' F or the way we s e t 
about answering t h i s i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h a t i n which we t r i e d 
to answer the q u e s t i o n about h i s death. Vr'e read, ] e t us say, 'The 
P r i n c e ' and 'The D i s c o u r s e s ' and now we do not t r y to c o n s t r u c t an 
account of h i s theory out of what we read t h e r e , but we re p o r t what 
we f i n d t h e r e . I n s h o r t , the answer to the f i r s t q u e s t i o n w i l l be a. 
c o n s t r u e t i o n upon t h e evidence of the documents we have or f i n d ; the 
answer to the second w i l l be a report and, very f r e q u e n t l y , an 
a b s t r a c t i o n from the documents v/e have. 
4. 1' have suggested t h a t t h e r e i s no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t -
ween the q u e s t i o n s as to what M a c h i a v e l l i ' s theory was and what i t i; - : . 
T h e o r i e s , d o c t r i n e s , i d e a s , concepts, I wane to say, are not In t i n e 
at a l l , " a r e not, t h e r e f o r e , i u the past or i n the p r e s e n t and are not, 
t h e r e f o r e , s u s c e p t i b l e to h i s t o r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The famous 
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questi o n 'Where do i d e a s cor.ie from?' seems misconceived to me. But 
i f t h e o r i e s , d o c t r i n e s , i d e a s , concepts are not i n t i n e at a l l , i t 
does not nean t h a t they are i n a c c e s s i b l e . Many important f e a t u r e s of 
our l i f e cannot s e n s i b l y be spoken of as being i n time. One of t h e s e 
i s l o g i c and, as I have h i n t e d a l r e a d y , i f an h i s t o r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
i n t o i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f and argument (as opposed to b e l i e v e r s and 
a r guers) i s not p o s s i b l e , we should perhaps c o n s i d e r a l o g i c a l , or 
more g e n e r a l l y , a p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach. .Before t u r n i n g to t h a t , 
however, i t should perhaps be u n d e r l i n e d t h a t v/hat I c l a i m to have 
shown here ia not t h a t h i s t o r y i s a u s e l e s s d i s c i p l i n e i f what i n t e r -
e s t s you i s ideology, but t h a t an h i s t o r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n cannot 
i n c l u d e -an i n q u i r y i n t o the ideas and d o c t r i n e s of p a r t i c u l a r i d e o -
l o g i e s but must confine i t s e l f to the a c t i o n s of isen and women. v/ho.cte 
l o y a l t i e s and purposes wore i d e n t i f i a b l e v/i t h i n au i d e o l o g i c a l 
t r a d i t i o n . 
1 T h i s a s s e r t i o n i s i n d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h v/hat I regard as one 
of the most popular i n t e l l e c t u a l dogmas of the time, »amely, 
th a t i d e s s can only be understood i n t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l context, 
However, though t h i s often i s nere dogiua, i t r e c e i v e s s o p h i s t i -
cated treatment at the hands of, aric-rigst o t h e r s , Colllngwood, 
but I cannot deal d i r e c t l y with h i s argument here, S u f f i c e i t 
to say t h a t , though the context of tisac i s i r r e l e v a n t , the con-
t e x t of Ir-.nguaga may he c i ' j j o i i i l . 
2 Mao Tse Tung: Four EPSS.YS i n Philosophy 
I l l 
I have been as k i n g whether a s c i e n t i f i c study of ideology 
i s p o s s i b l e , and w i t h i n what l i m i t s the h i s t o r i a n may engage i n an 
i n q u i r y i n t o ideology, but i t would be disingenuous to suggest t h a t the 
q u e s t i o n ' I s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l study of ideology p o s s i b l e ? ' could 
genuinely be r a i s e d here. F o r the main body of t h i s t h e s i s p urports 
to be j u s t t h a t . What I propose to do then i s to s k e t c h , i f I can, 
the p r i n c i p a l f e a t u r e s of p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y as I understand i t , 
and to say what these imply f o r a study of ideology. 
When we look at the enormous amount of l i t e r a t u r e , the v a s t 
range of s p e c u l a t i o n s which go under the name of ideology, and when we 
look at the c o n f l i c t i n g c l a i m s of those who espouse Marxism, c r 
N a t i o n a l i s m , or Humanism,or E x i s t e n t i a l i s m , or whatever, i t i s n a t u r a l , 
i f a l i t t l e n a i v e , to ask which i s t r u e and which we are to b e l i e v e . 
Now i t i s at t h i s p o i n t t h a t the puzzlement, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the 
p h i l o s o p h i c mind, begin.'j. For i t i s not ?.t a l l c l e a r upon what c r i t e r i 
the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of tho s p e c u l a t i o n s of i d e o l o g i s t s i s to bo d e t e r -
mined. I t i s not even c l e a r t h a t such determination i s p o s s i b l e , t h a t 
i s , t h a t any t a l k of t r u t h and. f a l s i t y i s a p p r o p r i a t e . For t h e r e seems 
to be so much rnoro i n v o l v e d i n d i s p u t e s between i d e o l o g i e s , l i k e t h a t 
between Burke and P a i n e , or even c o n t r o v e r s i e s w i t h i n the ona ideoLogy, 
l i k e t h a t between L e n i n and the Noroduiks, t h a t they are q u i t e u n l i k e 
the r a t h e r q u i e t d i s p u t a t i o n s of h i s t o r i a n s or s c i e n t i s t s , where we are 
perhaps, a l i t t l e c l e a r e r about the-; appropriateness of t a l k of t r u e and 
f a l s e . 
The p h i l o s o p h e r ' s q u e s t i o n s about ideology, then, are i n -
d i r e c t . Philosophy cannot hope t o answer the qu e s t i o n 'Which d o c t r i n e s 
are t r u e and which l i a i s e ? ' 'What ought I t o b e l i e v e ? ' 1 but r a t h e r the 
q u e s t i o n of what counts as t r u t h and f a l s i t y , r a t i o n a l i t y and i r r a t i o n 
a l i t y . But even t h i s l a t t e r remark may be misunderstood. I t i s not 
as though philosophy can e s t a b l i s h the c r i t e r i a of t r u t h and f a l s e h o o d 
Nor does i t d i s c o v e r them. As I understand i t , philosophy i s n e i t h e r 
p r e s c r i p t i v e nor d e s c r i p t i v e , concerned n e i t h e r w i t h how t h i n g s ought 
to be nor how.things are. Philoso p h y ' s province i s the realm of 
p o s s i b i l i t y and not no r m a l i t y (how t h i n g s ought t o be) or a c t u a l i t y 
(how t h i n g s a r e ) . I n other words, the qu e s t i o n of what counts as t r u e 
and f a l s e , r a t i o n a l and i r r a t i o n a l , i s t h e qu e s t i o n "Under what condit 
ions does i t make sense to speak of t r u e and f a l s e , r a t i o n a l and 
i r r a t i o n a l ? What are the l o g i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y of such judgments?" 
Questions of philosophy a r e , i f I am r i g h t , q u e s t i o n s of 
l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y and n e c e s s i t y , and, s i n c e one claim s the l e x i c a l l y 
i m p o s s i b l e and denies the l o g i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y a t the c o s t of sense, 
what i s l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e and what i s l o g i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y i s d e t e r -
mined i n the sense and nonsense, coherence ami incoherence, o f what we 
1 ' P h i l o s o p h y can no more show a man what t o a t t a c h i m p o r t a n c e t o 
t h a n geometry can show him where t o s t a n d ' P e t e r Winch 
'Moral I n t e g r i t y ' i n E t h i c s and A c t i o n i>.191, London 1971 
sa3' and t r y t c say. 
p h i l o s o p h y . / must s e t l i m i t s to what cannot be 
thought by working outwards through what can be 
thought. 
I t w i l l s i g n i f y what cannot be s a i d by p r e s e n t -
i n g c l e a r l y what can be s a i d . l 
The t h e s i s which f o l l o w s t h e s e c u r s o r y , i n t r o d u c t o r y remark 
i s an atter.pt to p r e s e n t c l e a r l y what can be s a i d about ideology and, 
where the q u e s t i o n s converge, about r e l i g i o n and philosophy, and 
thereby to i n d i c a t e what cannot be s a i d . I t i s n e i t h e r a d e s c r i p t i v e 
r e p o r t of f a c t s d i s c o v e r e d , such as a geographer might oj:fer, nor i s 
i t a c o n s t r u c t i o n upon f a c t s d i s c o v e r e d such zzi h i s t o r i a n might o f f e r 
I t i s sn attempt to c o n s t r u c t c o h e r e n t l y a p i e c e of l o g i c a l space-. 
1 L u d v i g W i t t g e n s t e i n ; Tr a c t a t vsi L o g i c o -Phi l o s o p h i cus 
T r a i l s Pears and McGuanness. 4. .114.-4, 115 .London .1970 
P A R T O N E 
PHILOSOPHY AND IDEOLOGY 
"One must know when i t i s r i g h t to doubt, to 
a f f i r m , to submit. Anyone who does otherwise 
does not understand the f o r c e of reason. 
Some men run counter to those t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s , 
e i t h e r a f f i r m i n g t h a t e v e r y t h i n g can be proved, 
because they know nothing about proof, or 
doubting e v e r y t h i n g , because they do not know 
when to submit, or always s u b m i t t i n g because 
they do not know when judgment i s c a l l e d f o r . " 
PASCAL 
CHAPTER 2 
The P r o v i n c e of Ideology 
"A cook i s not a man who f i r s t has a v i s i o n of 
a p i e and then t r i e s to make i t ; he i s a man 
s k i l l e d i n cookery, and both h i s p r o j e c t s and 
h i s achievement. 1: s p r i n g from t h a t s k i l l . " 
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT 
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1. The word 'philosophy' has two q u i t e s e p a r a t e meanings. I n 
one sense 'philosophy' i s the name c f an academic d i s c i p l i n e , a form 
of i n q u i r y i n t o the nature o r l o g i c of, f o r example, time, space, mind, 
being, a c t i o n , language, meaning, m o r a l i t y , r e l i g i o n , p o l i t i c s , and 
the modes of i n t e l l e c t u a l understanding, h i s t o r y , s c i e n c e and philosophy 
i t s e l f . T h i s i s philosophy i n what we might c a l l the p r o f e s s i o n a l ' s 
sense, and i t i s what we could expect to engage i n i f we chose to pur-
sue a course i n philosophy at a U n i v e r s i t y . 
I n c o n t r a s t , we can begin to see how very d i f f e r e n t philosophy, 
i n what I s h a l l c a l l the layman's sense, i s by not i n g a few of tiro 
phrases i n which the term t y p i c a l l y o c c u r s , 'philosophy of l i f e ' 
' t h a t ' s my philosophy' 'the philosophy of l i b e r a l i s m ' . Roughly, i n 
the layman's sense, philosophy asks q u e s t i o n s of general e t h i c a l import 
( a t t h e i r most g e n e r a l , about the meaning of l i f e and of a l l t h i n s ? ) 
and to p h i l o s o p h i s e i s to r e f l e c t and s p e c u l a t e on the conduct of l i f e , 
at an a b s t r a c t e d l e v e l , i n order t h a t one's l i f e may be the b e t t e r l i v e d . 
The concern of * t h i s t h e s i s i s with layman's philosophy, w i t h 
how l i k e and u n l i k e i t i s to r e l i g i o n and to philosophy i n the profes-
s i o n a l ' s sense. I n p a r t i c u l a r , my concern i s wi t h t h e p l a c e t h a t 
s p e c u l a t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n have i n the conduct of moral and p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e , or, more p r o p e r l y , with the p l a c e t h a t r e f l e c t i o n could s e n & i o l f 
be thought to have. I s h a l l c a l l layman's philosophy 'ideology', not 
w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of a t t a c h i n g to th a t term any of t h e opprobriim which 
normally accompanies i t s use, b u t because, s i n c e the d i s t i n c t i o n bet-
ween the two kin d s of philosophy i s c e n t r a l to my arguMent, two d i f f e r -
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ent terms w i l l be u s e f u l . F u r t h e r , i t seems to me t h a t , however l i t t l e 
agreement there i s over the use of the term 'ideology', many of the 
w r i t i n g s and b e l i e f s r e f e r r e d to by t h a t term are of the k i n d upon 
which I wish to focus a t t e n t i o n . I do not mean t h i s term, however, to 
confine our a t t e n t i o n to those r e f l e c t i o n s and s p e c u l a t i o n s which have 
r i s e n to prominence c h i e f l y i n t h e sphere of p o l i t i c s , ' ' " though i t i s 
t r u e , of course, t h a t amongst the most prominent ideoldgj.es are those 
of Marxism and L i b e r a l i s m , and t h a t t h e s e , more than any o t h e r perhaps, 
have generated a corpus of t h e o r e t i c a l w r i t i n g s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , what 
I have to say about ideology i s meant to encompass such d i f f e r e n t 
b e l i e f s and d o c t r i n e s as those of Stoicism, Humanism and E x i s t e n t i a l i s m , 
no l e s s than the more f a m i l i a r p o l i t i c a l p e r s u a s i o n s . 
2. I have i n d i c a t e d some gen e r a l d i f f e r e n c e s between ideology 
and philosophy but I could s c a r c e l y c l a i m to have sh_cv-n_ them to be 
d i s t i n c t . Showing t h i s w i l l i n f a c t occupy me through most of the 
f i r s t p a r t of the t h e s i s and indeed at s e v e r a l other p o i n t s throughout. 
One way i n which t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n can be shown to hold good, 1 t h i n k , 
i s by showing t h a t to c o n f l a t e the two, to t h i n k t h a t ideology, though 
d i f f e r e n t , i s much the same sort_ of t h i n g as p r o f e s s i o n a l philosophy, 
leads to confusion and incoherence. I t i s t h i s , so to speak, r c d u c t i o 
1 I n f a c t v e r y few can be s a i d t o have been p u r e l y p o l i t i c a l . 
N a t i o n a l i s m ( e s p e c i a l l y i n I r e l a n d and I t a l y ) f o u n d wide-
spread e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e world o f l i t e r a t u r e and music. 
Marxism, o r so i t SOGES t o me, has had f a r more impact i n 
academic t h a n i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e , 
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ad absurdum approach, which I s h a l l adopt i n the f i r s t c h a pter. 
Laymen, and not l e a s t those who engage in layman's philosophy, 
o f t e n suppose t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s do f a l l w i t h i n the pr o v i n c e of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l philosophy and, very o f t e n , when they f i n d t h a t p r o f e s s i o n a l 
p h i l o s o p h e r s are not, by and l a r g e , much concerned w i t h q u e s t i o n s of the 
meaning of l i f e , or even w i t h the t r u t h and falsehood of the popular 
Y/eltanschauungen of the times, suppose t h a t they ought to be. T h i s i n 
i t s e l f i s not a very i n t e r e s t i n g e r r o r , i f , indeed, i t i s an e r r o r at 
a l l . But i t i s worth i n v e s t i g a t i n g , when the suggestion t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r 
should i n t e r e s t themselves i n i d e o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s s p r i n g s from the 
view t h a t , though philosophy and ideology are not the- same thing, ( f o r 
we can c l e a r l y see t h a t metaphysics and e p i s t e s o l o g y are not of ethical), 
import) n e v e r t h e l e s s the k i n d of c l e a r t h i n k i n g at which the p h i l o s o p h e r 
i s supposed to e;:cel i s of equal p e r t i n e n c e i n philosophy and i n 
ideology. I n s h o r t , sows people have thought and do th i n k t h a t , though 
t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n content between ideology and philosophy, 
there i s not much d i f f e r e n c e i n kind. 
T h i s e r r o r , f o r I s h a l l argue t h a t i t i s an error., i s o f t e n 
compounded by a supplementary account of the p l a c e of such r e f l e c t i o n 
i n the conduct of e t h i c a l l i f e , and i u what f o l l o w s I s h a l l t r y to 
expose thvse mistakes a l s o . 
T h i s account of the matter i s q u i t s a k i n , i t seems to me, to 
the R a t i o n a l i s t t r a d i t i o n i n philosophy. Perhaps because of the per-
v a s i v e and popular p l a c e of R a t i o n a l i s m i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l c l i m a t e of 
the times, the p r i n c i p l e v i r t u e of the theory l i e s i n i t s p l a u s i b i l i t y . 
But i n t h i s chapter I s h a l l show, i f I can, t h a t , however p l a u s i b l e , 
the commonplace model i s s e r i o u s l y d e f e c t i v e . 
I 
1. The view I am about to c o n s i d e r of the nature of ideology 
and i t s 2'elation to conduct can best be introduced by two q u o t a t i o n s 
Those great men, Pythagoras, P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e , 
t h e most consummate i n p o l i t i c s , who founded s t a t e s 
or i n s t r u c t e d p r i n c e s , or wrote most a c c u r a t e l y on 
p u b l i c government, were at the same time most acute 
at a l l a b s t r a c t and sublime s p e c u l a t i o n s , the c l e a r -
e s t l i g h t being ever n e c e s s a r y to guide the most 
important a c t i o n s . And, whatever t h e world t h i n k , 
he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human 
mind and the sununum bonum may p o s s i b l y make a 
t h r i v i n g earthworm, but w i l l most i n d u b i t a b l y make 
a s o r r y p a t r i o t and a s o r r y statesman. 1 
I have known men who, with s i g n i f i c a n t nods and 
p i t y i n g contempt of s m i l e s , have denied a l l i n f l u -
ence to the c o r r u p t i o n of moral and p o l i t i c a l 
philosophy, and with much solemnity have proceded 
to s o l v e the r i d d l e of the French R e v o l u t i o n by anec-
dotes! Yet i t would not be hard to show by an unbroken 
cha i n of h i s t o r i c f a c t s , to demonstrate t h a t the most 
important changes i n the commercial r e l a t i o n s of the 
world had t h e i r o r i g i n s i n the c l o s e t s or l o n e l y walks 
of u n i n t e r e s t e d t h e o r i s t s . ^ 
1 Bishop B e r k e l e y S i r i s :35.0 
2 S T C o l e r i d g e The Statesman's Manual, ed. F; J White 
Cambridge .1953, p . 15 
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The model which informs both of t h e s e q u o t a t i o n s goes 
something l i k e t h i s : -
A c t i v i t y must be understood to i n v o l v e two d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s , 
the purposive and the i n s t r u m e n t a l , the p u r s u i t of ends and the employ-
ment of means. Both of t h e s e are n e c e s s a r y to c o n c r e t e a c t i v i t y , f o r 
i t i s the d e s i r i n g of some end i n view which moves men to a c t i v i t y , and 
without some s u i t a b l e means t h e i r a c t i v i t y w i l l come to nothing. Never-
t h e l e s s , the two are q u i t e d i f f e r e n t and t h i s d i f f e r e n c e can be seen 
i n the d i f f e r e n t ways by which each i s determined and i n the r e l a t i o n s 
between them. Ends are primary; they a r e , . i f ycu l i k e , the i d e a l s 
towards which a c t i v i t y s t r i v e s , and t h s means we take are secondary, 
chosen because of t h e i r power to r e a l i s e the d e s i r e d end. 
Now the manner of choosing the ends, and the means of our 
a c t i v i t i e s , and the k i n d of knowledge involved, i n these c h o i c e s w i l l 
c l e a r l y be d i f f e r e n t f o r each. Knowledge of the means ap p r o p r i a t e to 
a given t a s k w i l l be a knowledge c u l l e d from p r a c t i c a l experience and 
w i l l be i n the nature of a p r a c t i c a l s k i l l , a knowledge of how b e s t to 
s e t about whatever i t i s we d e s i r e to do and to a c h i e v e . Knowledge of 
ends, on the o t h e r hand, w i l l c o n s i s t i n a knowledge of the u l t i m a t e 
or e s s e n t i a l n a t ure of t h i n g s . The proper end of i r o r a l conduct w i l l 
be r e v e a l e d i n a knowledge of the t r u e nature of man. The end to be 
pursued i n p o l i t i c s w i l l be d i s c o v e r e d i n a knowledge of the nature of 
government and s o c i e t y . The proper end i n education i s to be d e t e r -
mined by answering the q u e s t i o n of what education i s , And so on, Each 
of these i n q u i r i e s w i l l r e s u l t i n a knowledge of the u l t i m a t e nature of 
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t h i n g s and from t h i s we may d e r i v e c e r t a i n courses of a c t i o n and 
general p r i n c i p l e s governing t h a t a c t i o n . S t i l l , a l l t h i s w i l l not, 
by i t s e l f , ensure concrete and s a t i s f a c t o r y a c t i v i t y , f o r we s h a l l 
have to combine t h i s knowledge of ends and p r i n c i p l e s w i t h a hard won 
p r a c t i c a l s k i l l . As the author of the Magna M o r a l i a s a y s : 
We must t h e r e f o r e , as i t s e e m s , f i r s t say about 
v i r t u r e what i t i s and from what i t comes. F o r 
i t i s perhaps no use to know v i r t u e without 
understanding how or from what i t i s to a r i s e . 
We must not l i m i t our i n q u i r i e s to knowing what 
i t i s , but extend i t to how i t i s to be produced. 
For we wish not only to know but a l s o o u r s e l v e s 
to be such. ^ 
T h i s twofold scheme of t h i n g s encompasses and r e l a t e s , r a t h e r 
n e a t l y , two q u i t e d i f f e r e n t s i d e s to most of the a c t i v i t i e s with which 
we are f a m i l i a r . I n education, f o r example, we t r a i n our t e a c h e r s i n 
the philosophy of education and t h i s , according to the commonplace model, 
i s i n order t h a t they may know the end towards which t h e i r t e a c h i n g i s 
aimed. At the same time we t r a i n them i n the p r a c t i c a l b u s i n e s s of 
conducting a c l a s s , i n th?> technique of t e a c h i n g , so t h a t they may be 
able to r e a l i s e t h a t end. Again, i n p o l i t i c s and m o r a l i t y , the conduct 
of a moral l i f e begins with a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the v a r i o u s p h i l o s o p h i e s 
(what I am c a l l i n g i d e o l o g i e s ) which the great t h i n k e r s and w r i t e r s of 
our c i \ ' i l i s a t i o n have d e v i s e d and developed, and i t i s a study something 
1. T h i s work has been a t t r i b u t e d t o A r i s t o t l e , b u t i s now t h o u g h t 
t o have been w r i t t e n by one o f h i s s t u d e n t s . }'. q u o t e f r o m t h e 
Works o f A r i s t o t l e t r a n s } a t e d i n t o E n g l i s h , V o l IX. 
Magna M o r a i i a t r a n s . St G S t o c k , O x f o r d 1915, 1182a. 
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l i k e t h i s t h a t , very o f t e n , the layman expects to f i n d i n a U n i v e r s i t y 
philosophy course. 
I t should not be thought t h a t the formulation of an ideology 
i s a once and f o r a l l a f f a i r . The c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the proper end of 
man and of s o c i e t y , i n s h o r t m e d i t a t i o n upon 'God, the human mind and 
the sumiuum bonum' , i s a l i f e - t i m e ' s undertaking, and nothing l e s s , i t i s 
sometimes s a i d , than the p u r s u i t of wisdom. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the p r i n c i -
p l e s and ends of such a c t i v i t i e s as we engage i n must be, i n some sense, 
p r i o r to a c t u a l engagement i n those a c t i v i t i e s . And the b u s i n e s s of 
implementing those aims, of p u t t i n g i n t o p r a c t i c e the idesj.ls which our 
r e f l e c t i o n s have l e d us to pursue, i s - t h e b u s i n e s s of p r a c t i c a l a c t i -
v i t y . We can c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h , o r so i t w i l l be s a i d by those who 
advance some such view as t h i s , between the p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c i a n whose 
t a s k i s to b r i n g about, as best he can, the aims of h i s p a r t y and to 
r e j e c t what may be d e s i r a b l e on t h e grounds t h a t i t i s i m p r a c t i c a b l e , 
from the ' u n i n t e r e s t e d t h e o r i s t ' who determines the ends to be purused 
and r e j e c t s what may be p r a c t i c a b l e on the grounds that, i t i s not 
d e s i r a b l e . 
The f i r s t main f e a t u r e of the commonplace model then, i s t h a t 
i t holds the ends and the weans o i a c t i v i t y to be d i s t i n c t , though both 
are n e c e s s a r y to concrete and s a t i s f a c t o r y endeavour. " P e e l " , Hugh 
C e c i l t e l l s us, 
. . was an. example of the mistake o f supposing 
t h a t even the h i g h e s t p r a c t i c a l a b i l i t i e s are 
s u f f i c i e n t , without p h i l o s o p h i c i n s i g h t , t o 
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save a p o l i t i c i a n from e r r o r . 
2. As i t i s at the l e v e l of ends and i d e a l s t h a t the i d e o l o g i s t ' s 
r o l e , very o f t e n by h i s own account, i s to be understood, i t i s worth 
e x p l o r i n g the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h i s l e v e l a l i t t l e f u r t h e r . F i r s t , 
s i n c e i n order to prompt a c t u a l a c t i v i t y the end or i d e a l f o r t h a t 
a c t i v i t y must be d e s i r e d r a t h e r than merely thought, the ta s k of 
r e f l e c t i v e t h i n k i n g i s to d i s c e r n or determine the reasonableness or 
as some p r e f e r , the r a t i o n a l i t y , of the v a r i o u s ends t h a t are d e s i r e d . 
I d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n , on t h i s view, undertakes a, l i t e r a l l y , d i s p a s s i o n -
ate s c r u t i n y of the p o s s i b l e ends and aims which we might and do d e s i r e . 
The outcome of such s c r u t i n y i s v. knowledge of the t r u e nature o f , s a y , 
man, government, education,and a s e t of p r i n c i p l e s of a c t i o n by which 
our conduct may be guided to the r e a l i z a t i o n of t h a t nature. F o r only 
i n the l i g h t of such knowledge can the r a t i o n a l i t y of our v a r i o u s 
d e s i r e s be d i s c o v e r e d and demonstrated. These ' t h e o r i e s ' of man or t h e 
s t a t e or .j u s t i c e are the outcome of the e x e r c i s e of reason, and they are, 
w i t h i n l i m i t s , v e r i f i a b l e and f a l s i f i a b i e . The p r i n c i p l e s which we 
determine i n t h e i r l i g h t stand to a c t i v i t y as a guide, f o r as contingent 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s change, the p r i n c i p l e s i n which we b e l i e v e enable us to 
s t e e r a c o n s i s t e n t path, and, through the miasn;?, of chance and change, 
to purs lie u n f a i l i n g l y those goals which reason has shown to be r i g h t . 
Secondly, i t i s t h e general c u l t u r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l m i l i e u i n which 
Hugh C e c i l , L o r d Quickswood: Conner vat i s n London IU1Z, p ,08 
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such r e f l e c t i o n must take p l a c e and such t h e o r i e s be t e s t e d . J u s t as 
the p o i n t of a t e c h n i c a l education i s the provenance of technique, so 
the point of a g e n e r a l education i n the humanities l i e s i n t h a t , whether 
we become 'so c a l l e d s c e p t i c s or a g n o s t i c s or f r e e - t h i n k e r s ' , we may 
y e t be 'able r e v e r e n t men, t r u e t h i n k e r s s i n c e r e l o v e r s of and e a r n e s t 
i n q u i r e r s a f t e r truth'.'* 
T h i r d l y , s i n c e i t i s obvious t h a t not a l l men are i n c l i n e d to 
r e f l e c t i o n s of the k i n d i n v/hich we are i n t e r e s t e d , and s i n c e many of 
those who do not so r e f l e c t are n e v e r t h e l e s s of one ideology, one p e r -
s u a s i o n or another, the t h e o r i s t examines and determines i d e a l s which 
are taken up by men o t h e r than h i m s e l f . He g i v e s , i f you l i k e , a l e a d 
i n the f o rmulation and examination of d o c t r i n e s which are not p e c u l i a r l y 
h i s and which w i l l have and are intended to have t h e i r primary s i g n i f i -
1 The words quoted are from the w i l l of Lord G i f f o r t i by which he 
s e t up the subsequently famous G i f f o r d L e c t u r e s . G i f f o r d , T. 
fancy, thought very much upon the l i n e s of the commonplace model 
as, I t h i n k the whole i n t e n t i o n of the l e c t u r e s and t h i s 
^assape from h i s w i l l show. 
" I have f o r many years been deeply and f i r m l y convinced 
that t r u e knowledge of God ... and the t r u e and f e l t 
knowledge (not mere nominal knowledge) of the r e l a t i o n s 
of man and of the u n i v e r s e to IIim,and the t r u e foundation 
of a l l e t h i c s and morals, being, I say, convinced t h a t 
t h i s knowledge when r e a l l y f e l t and acted upon, i s the 
measure of man's h i g h e s t w e l l - b e i n g and the s e c u r i t y of 
h i s upward p r o g r e s s , I have r e s o l v e d to i n s t i t u t e and 
found . . . c l a s s e s for. the study of t h e s a i d s u b j e c t s and 
f o r the- t e a c h i n g and d i f f u s i o n of so mid views regarding 
them." 
Edinburgh Univ. Calendar 1888-89 
cance o u t s i d e h i 3 ' c l o s e t s o r l o n e l y w a l k s ' . 
I t i s sometimes s u g g e s t e d t h a t , a t t h e s o c i a l l e v e l , u n i v e r -
s i t i e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s o f h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n have t h i s r o l e . They a r e , 
i t i s s a i d , t h e p r o p e r p l a c e f o r t h e o r e t i c a l and d i s i n t e r e s t e d debate 
o f t h i s k i n d , f o r t h e r e , o u t o f t h e c o n f u s i o n c r e a t e d by p a s s i o n , minds 
s k i l l e d i n reasoned argument can d e t e r m i n e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e end o f a l l 
o u r p u b l i c endeavours, and many r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t s have been f u n d e d w i t h 
t h i s i d e a i n mind. I am n o t however g o i n g t o c o n s i d e r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
r a m i f i c a t i o n o f t h e commonplace model, b u t I t h i n k t h a t i f what I s h a l l 
say i s c o r r e c t , i t c a l l s f o r acme m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s s u g g e s t i o n no 
l e s s t h a n o f t h e m a j o r t h e s e s w h i c h I s h a l l examine i n more d e t a i l . 
T h i s , t h e n , completes my e l a b o r a t i o n o f , an I t h i n k , a common 
and p l a u s i b l e : model o f i d e o l o g y and a c t i v i t y , and I s h a l l now show, i f 
I can, t h a t on t h r e e d i f f e r e n t c o u n t s t h i s v iew o f t h e m a t t e r i s 
i n c o h e r e n t . 
I I 
1. The f i r s t m a j o r f e a t u r e o i t h e p i c t u r e I have p r e s e n t e d l i e s 
i n i t s assuming t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i n v o l v e s much t h e same .sort 
o f t h i n k i n g as p h i l o s o p h y , t h a t i s . t h a t wo can s e n s i b l y speak o f a 
r e l a t i v e l y u n i f o r r - ; k i n d o f r a t i o n a l s c r u t i n y w h i c h may d i s p a s s i o n a t e l y 
d i s c u s s t h e w:lderanging and d i s p a r a g e d o c t r i n e s p r e s e n t e d i n t h e 
w r i t i n g s and r e f l e c t i o n s o f t h e I arize nun-.ber o f a u t h o r s who can be 
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d e s c r i b e d as i d e o l o g i s t s . I n o t h e r words, i t i s supposed t h a t t o 
l e a r n t o engage i n p h i l o s o p h y i n t h e layman's sense, i s t o a c q u i r e t h e 
a b i l i t y t o t h i n k r a t i o n a l l y and c r i t i c a l l y and t h e r e b y t o assess t h e 
m e r i t s and d e m e r i t s o f t h e v a r i o u s i d e a s o f , f o r example, C o n s e r v a t i v e , 
L i b e r a l and S o c i a l i s t w r i t e r s . I s h a l l b e g i n my r e j e c t i o n o f t h e model 
by e x a m i n i n g t h r e e a c t u a l examples o f such w r i t i n g . The books I have 
i n mind were commissioned by t h e Hone U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y around t h e 
t u r n o f t h i s c e n t u r y and a r e C o n s e r v a t i s m by Hugh C e c i l , L i b e r a l i s m 
by L T Hobhouse and The S o c i a l i s t Movement by Ramsay MacDonald. These 
works were i n t e n d e d as t h e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s e l a b o r a t i o n s o f t h e i r r e s p e c -
t i v e i d e o l o g i e s by t h r e e w i d e l y r e c o g n i s e d e x p o n e n t s , and, as t h e name 
o f t h e s e r i e s s u g g e s t s , t h e y w e r e . d e s i g n e d t o e n a b l e t h e r e a d e r t o con-
s i d e r r a t i o n a l l y w h i c h , i f any, o f t h e t h r e e i d e o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e s 
c o u l d w i t h s t a n d c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n . For my p u r p o s e s , t h e f o . c t t h a t 
t h e y were a l l w r i t t e n about t h e same t i n e and w i t h t h e same i n t e n t i o n 
w i l l e n a b l e me t o a v o i d any q u e s t i o n s o f h i s t o r i c a l s p e c i f i c i t y , 
q u e s t i o n s w h i c h would i n any case, I t h i n k , be p e r i p h e r a l . 
2, I n L i b e r a l i s m Slobhouse, by d r a w i n g d i s t i n c t i o n s o f a s o r t 
f a m i l i a r t o p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s , a t t e m p t s t o d i s c e r n , t o e l a b o r a t e 
and e s t a b l i s h t h e p r o p e r end o f government and p o l i t i c : ; . I n So£i?J-i?_L 
Movement Ranis ay MacDon alcA, by t h e c i t a t i o n o f historic.}?-], f a c t ana 
1 T h i s , o f course,was t h e o r i g i n a l n o t i o n c f ' i d e o l o g y ' advanced 
by D e s t u t t rie T r a c y , i n h i s E;i;Smena_d' I deoJLojjie _ ( P a r i s , 1804) , 
namely a s c i e n c e o f i d e a s . 
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s o c i a l s t a t i s t i c s , t r i e s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e h i s t o r i c a l s t a g e o f d e v e l o p -
ment o f p r e s e n t day (1910) s o c i e t y i n o r d e r t o d e c i d e w h i c h p o l i t i c a l 
g o a l s are d i c t a t e d by t h e t i m e s . I n C o n s e r v a t i s m Hugh C e c i l a r t i c u -
l a t e s c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e s and p r i n c i p l e s and p r e s e n t s a defence o f t h e s e 
i n t e r m s o f an appeal t o r e l i g i o u s o r t h o d o x y and t h e E n g l i s h m o r a l and 
p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n . F or Hobhouse t h e t e s t o f t r u t h i s c o h e r e n c e , f o r 
MacDonald i t i s t h e f a c t s o f h i s t o r y , f o r C e c i l i t i s t h e Gospels. 
Hobhouse i s e s t a b l i s h i n g ends, MacDonald d e t e c t i n g a p r o c e s s , C e c i l 
d e f e n d i n g an a t t i t u d e and, p e r h a p s , a way o f l i f e . Viewed i n t h i s , 
l e t us say e m p i r i c a l , manner t h e c l a i m t h a t such w r i t e r s as t h e s e are 
engaged i n t h e same f o r m o f i n q u i r y i s nonsense, f o r n e i t h e r t h e aims, 
n o r t h e methods o f argument, n o r t h e k i n d o f e v i d e n c e deemed a p p r o p r i a t e , 
i s s h a r e d . For MacDonald, b o t h Hobhouse's l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s and 
C e c i l ' s appeal t o t h e Gospel3 are ' u n s c i e n t i f i c ' ways o f p r e c e d i n g , by 
which I t a k e him t o mean t h a t he f i n d s o n l y arguments based on f a c t ar.ti 
s t a t i s t i c s t o be cogent arguments. Mow I do n o t mean t o wonder whether 
t h i s i s i n d e e d so, b u t I want t o say t h a t where t h e grounds and manner 
o f argument are open t o q u e s t i o n and where, i n consequence ; t h e k i n d o f 
argument aud e v i d e n c e advanced changes w i t h each w r i t e r (and i n f a c t 
such a change i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f most d i s p u t e s between i d e o l o g i s t s o f 
d i f f e r e n t persuasions;) t h e n t h e o p p o s i t i o n r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e w r i t e r s 
cannot be t h e sajn© s o r t o f o p p o s i t i o n as t h a t which a r i s e n between 
c o m p e t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e s e s o r c o m p e t i n g h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e s . To 
suggest o t h e r w i s e would be l i k e s u g g e s t i n g t h a t one h i s t o r i a n c o u l d 
r e j e c t o r c o r r e c t t h e accounts o f a n o t h e r by i n t r o d u c i n g , n o t d i f f e r e n t 
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0 e v i d e n c e , b u t e v i d e n c e o f a ^ d i f f e r e n t k i n d . 
Of c o u r s e , I do n o t w i s h t o c l a i m t h a t t h e s e w r i t e r s are n o t 
engaged i n s o m e t h i n g o f t h e same s o r t ; t h a t when t h e y b e l i e v e t h e m s e l v e s 
t o be opposed t h e y a r e m i s t a k e n . I n d e e d i t i s c r u c i a l t o my argument 
t h a t t h i s i s a pa r a d i g m case o f a c o n t r o v e r s y between i d e o l o g i s t s o f 
d i f f e r e n t p e r s u a s i o n s . But because t h i s i s so, and because t h e i r 
r e a s o n i n g i s o f t h e k i n d i t i s , I want t o c l a i m t h a t , w h a t e v e r arena 
t h e y a re a l l a p a r t o f , i t i s n o t t h e arena o f an i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s c i p -
l i n e . For i f we are t o speak o f t h e i r b e i n g opposed, t h e c o n t e x t i n 
w h i c h they a re opposed cannot be one i n w h i c h t i r e mode ox r e a s o n i n g i s 
o f paramount i m p o r t a n c e . I t i s i n f a c t p r e c i s e l y i n t h e c h a r a c t e r of. 
t h e i r modes o f r e a s o n i n g t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between them emerge. I t 
i s p r e c i s e l y because C e c i l appeals t o r e l i g i o u s t r u t h and p o l i t i c a l 
t r a d i t i o n t h a t h i s i d e n t i t y as a C o n s e r v a t i v e i s c l e a r and bsf.suse 
MacDonald demands a ' s c i e n t i f i c ' r e a s o n i n g , a reasoning- baosd en h a r d 
.f a c t , t h a t he i s c l e a r l y a S o c i a l i s t o f a c e r t a i n s o r t . And where 
t h e r e are d i f f e r i n g canons o f r e a s o n i n g , d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a o f what i s 
t o count are e v i d e n c e and what i s t o count as a cogent argument, we 
cannot s o n s i b l y speak as though t h e c o n t r o v e r s y t o o k p l a c e w i t h i n t h e 
c o n f i n e s o f an i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s c i p l i n e . 
The f o r c e o f t h i s can be b r o u g h t o u t by c o n t r a s t i n g i d e o l o g y 
w i t h p h i l o s o p h y i n what I have c a l l e d t h e pro.fc-ssioaal sense. Whan we 
do p h i l o s c p h y we engage i n a d i s t i n c t i v e i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y , I mean 
t o say t h a t v/e r e a s o n , argue, o b j e c t a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n r u l e s and 
c r i t e r i a o f r e a s o n i n g and t h e s e rule.-s and c r i t e r i a d e t e r m i n e vrhat As» t o 
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count as a v a l i d argument, e n t a i l m e n t , o b j e c t i o n . The same i s t r u e o f 
h i s t o r y and o f s c i e n c e . Now t h e o b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e s e canons o f r e a s o n -
i n g i s a ne c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f our t h i n k i n g and a r g u i n g b e i n g p h i l o s o -
p h i c a l a t a l l . A p h i l o s o p h e r may, I t h i n k , s a f e l y d i s r e g a r d m a t t e r s o f 
e m p i r i c a l o r c o n t i n g e n t f a c t ; h i s conc e r n i s n o t w i t h f a c t b u t w i t h 
l o g i c . 1 I f he i s c h a l l e n g e d , t h e r e f o r e , and t h e o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t he 
has d i s r e g a r d e d t h e f a c t s on some m a t t e r , t h e o b j e c t i o n w i l l n o t be a 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l one. On t h e o t h e r hand, i f a man does n o t agree t h a t a 
pr o v e n c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n h i s argument i s a f l a w and i n v a l i d a t e s t h e con-
c l u s i o n ( a t l e a s t when based on t h i s a r g u m e n t ) , t h e n he s i m p l y ceases 
t o do p h i l o s o p h y . For i n i g n o r i n g t h e canons o f r e a s o n i n g w h i c h 
c o n s t i t u t e t h e a c t i v i t y o f p h i l o s o p h i s i n g , he ceases t o engage i n t h a t 
a c t i v i t y , j u s t as t h e man who i g n o r e s t h e r u l e s o f chess, though he may 
s t i l l move t h e p i e c e s around, i s no l o n g e r p l a y i n g chess. 
3. S c i e n c e and h i s t o r y and p h i l o s o p h y are i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t i e s 
so t h a t t h e r u l e s g o v e r n i n g t h e l e g i t i m a t e and i l l e g i t i m a t e e x e r c i s e 
o f t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e are o f paramount i m p o r t a n c e . To do p h i l o s o p h y j u s t 
i 3 t o t h i n k i n a c e r t a i n way, and what we may hope t o a c h i e v e , t h e 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t , r e f u t a t i o n o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f some p o i n t o f v i e w , i s a 
s i g n i f i c a n t achievement i n terms o f t h o s e c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s o f r e a s o n i n 
1 T h i s s h a r p d i v i d e between f a c t and l o g i c may be c o n t e n t i o u s . 
Here however, i t m e r e l y s e r v e s as an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f a p o s s i b l e 
p i e c e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e a s o n i n g . As i t happens, such a d i s -
t i n c t i o n can. I t h i n k , be m a i n t a i n e d . 
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P h i l o s o p h y , i f you l i k e , i s a sphere o f i t s own, f o r t h e r u l e s o f 
p h i l o s o p h y b o t h make i t what i t i s and d e t e r m i n e what i s t o count 
as p r o b l e m a t i c and what i s t o count as a s u c c e s s f u l r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e 
p r o b l e m a t i c . 
The i d e o l o g i s t , i n c o n t r a s t , when he w r i t e s and r e f l e c t s 
i d e o l o g i c a l l y w i s h e s t o say so m e t h i n g s i g n i f i c a n t i n a r e a l m w h i c h 
i n c l u d e s more t h a n h i s t h i n k i n g and w r i t i n g , namely t h e whole r e a l m 
o f t h e a c t u a l conduct o f m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . I f what he says 
i s t o have any i m p a c t , he must seek n o t so much t o pro v e as t o con-
v i n c e , h i s r e f l e c t i o n s must have cogency r a t h e r t h a n t h e completeness 
we mi g h t e x p e c t o f a m a t h e m a t i c a l theorem. For a t l e a s t p a r t o f t h e 
measure o f t h e i r success w i l l l i e i n theae w r i t i n g s h a v i n g o r f a i l i n g 
t o have some i n f l u e n c e on t h e l i v e s o f t h o s e who r e a d them. I do n o t 
mean t h a t i n i d e o l o g y w h a t e v e r i s a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e m a j o r i t y i s r i g h t . 
I mean t o say t h a t , i f a work o f r e f l e c t i o n w h i c h i s supposed t o h e l p 
and t o i n f l u e r . e e t h e conduct o f p r a c t i c a l l i f e , has no impact upon 
t h a t l i f e a t a l l , t h i s must, t o some degree, be a measure o f i t s f a i l u r e . 
I f t h i s were n o t so, i f t h e i d e o l o g i s t were t o c o n f e s s t h a t what he had 
t o say was o n l y o f i m p o r t a n c e i n a t h e o r e t i c a l r e a l m , t h a t h i s r e f l e c t i o n s 
do and must l e a v e t h e w o r l d o f mo r a l and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s u n a f f e c t e d , 
we s h o u l d r i g h t l y l o s e i n t e r e s t i n a n y t h i n g he s a i d . 
I t i s , I am s u g g e s t i n g , i n t h e p o l i t i c a l and m o r a l ( i n 
g e n e r a l t h e p r a c t i c a l ) w o r l d t h a t i d e o l o g i s t s debate and d i s p u t e , r e c o g -
n i s e f r i e n d s and enemies. And what makes them i d e o l o g i s t s i s n o t t h e 
k i n d o f p r o p o s i t i o n , argument, e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e y p r e s e n t , but t h e f a c t 
31 
t h a t , w h a t e v e r p o l i t i c a l o r m o r a l p e r s u a s i o n t h e y may b e l o n g t o , t h e y 
choose t o a r t i c u l a t e t h a t p e r s u a s i o n i n t h e f o r m o f t r e a t i s e s and 
arguments, i n g e n e r a l by v e r b a l e x p o s i t i o n . 
I n s h o r t , w h i l e one man may g i v e e x p r e s s i o n t o h i s p o l i t i c a l 
and m o r a l s e n t i m e n t s i n a p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l manner and a n o t h e r i n t h e 
a t t i t u d e s w h i c h i n f o r m day-to-day c o n d u c t , t h e i d e o l o g i s t chocses r e f l e c -
t i o n as h i s medium. T h i s means t h a t i d e o l o g i s t s are ' d o i n g t h e sar.13 
t h i n g 1 i n a d i f f e r e n t sense t o t h a t i n w h i c h p h i l o s o p h e r s a r e ' d o i n g t h e 
same t h i n g ' . V/hen p h i l o s o p h e r s argue one w i t h a n o t h e r t h e r e i s n o t h i n g 
o t h e r t h a n p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h t h e y can be s a i d t o be d o i n g . When p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t y agents o r g a n i s e on b e h a l f o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s under one des-
c r i p t i o n t h e i r e f f o r t s a r e i n o p p o s i t i o n , and under a n o t h e r t h e y a r e 
engaged i n t h e same a c t i v i t y . The i d e o l o g i s t ' s endeavour, 1 want t o say, 
i s i n t h i s r e s p e c t more l i k e t h e p a r t y agent's t h a n i t is l i k e t h e p h i l o -
sopher' s. 
What I &JQ t r y i n g t o d i s p e l h e r e i s a p a r t o f t h e commonplace 
view o f i d e o l o g y w h i c h w o u l d have us b e l i e v e t h a t i d e o l o g i s t s when t h e y 
d i s p u t e and d i s c u s s do so i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a u n i f y i n g d i s c i p l i n e o f i n -
t e l l e c t u a l i n q u i r y . I have argued t h a t i t i s i n f a c t p o s s i b l e f o r >.»„•.< t o 
t a l k o f i d e o l o g i c a l d i s a g r e e m e n t and c o n t r o v e r s y i n an i n s t a n c e where t h e 
k i n d s o f argument advanced by t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s are m a n i f e s t l y d i f f e r e n t . 
Though such a d i f f e r e n c e w o u l d mean t h e i n s t a n t demise o f any i n t e l l e c t u a l 
d i s c i p l i n e , i t w i l l , I t h i n k , be f o u n d t o be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f arguments; 
between i d e o l o g i s t s o f d i . f f e r e n t p e r s x i a s i o o s . The u p s h o t o f a l l t h i s i s 
t h a t , i f i d e o l o g i s t s o f d i f f e r i n g e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n s are n o t a l l p a r t o f 
a s i n g l e , u n i f i e d i n t e l l e c t u a l i n q u i r y , i t cannot be t h e case t h a t t h e i r 
task' o r r o l e i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e i s t o tost and t o t r y p o l i t i c a l and m o r a l 
32 
i d e a s ou what MacDonald c a l l s t h e ' a n v i l o f r e a s o n ' , f o r t h e r e i s no 
n e c e s s a r i l y s h a r e d s t a n d a r d o f what i s t o count as a good r e a s o n o r a bad. 
The element o f d i s p u t e and debate a r i s e s , t h e n , n o t f r o m t h e c o n f l i c t o f 
t h e s e s w i t h i n a s i n g l e mode o f argument, b u t o u t o f t h e c o m p e t i t i o n b e t -
ween t h e v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l and m o r a l p e r s u a s i o n s t o w h i c h t h e w r i t e r s be-
l o n g and o f w h i c h t h e i r w r i t i n g s a r e one f o r m o f e x p r e s s i o n . I t cannot 
be t h a t t h e i r w r i t i n g s a r e , o r c o u l d be, a means o f s e t t l i n g t h e d i f f e r -
ences between them. Taken t o g e t h e r t h e y g i v e t h o s e d i f f e r e n c e s and t h a t 
c o m p e t i t i o n an a r t i c u l a t e and. r e f l e c t i v e f o r m . We must abandon, t h e r e f o r e , 
t h e r a t h e r n a i v e view t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s such as t h e s e a r c p r e -
s e n t e d i n some v a s t arena o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s c r u t i n y and are t h e r e t e s t e d 
a g a i n s t some u n i t a r y Reason. 
I l l 
1. Someone m i g h t a s s e n t t o a l l t h i s b u t m a i n t a i n t h a t , t h ough t h e 
commonplace model r e q u i r e s m i n o r m o d i f i c a t i o n t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e remains 
i n t a c t . He mi g h t say t h a t w h i l s t i t i s t r u e t h a t l i b e r a l , c o n . s e r v a t i v e 
and s o c i a l i s t w r i t e r s and t h e o r i s t s do n o t combine i n any s i g n i f i c a n t 
manner t o g e n e r a t e a d i s c i p l i n e ox p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y w h i c h c o u l d e s t a b l i s h 
t h e p r o p e r end f o r p o l i t i c s as a who l e , t h e t h e o r i s t s o f p a r t i c u l a r p e r -
s u a s i o n s do s t a n d i n t h i s r e l a t i o n t o t h e p r a c t i t i o n e r s and a d h e r e n t s o f 
t h o s e p e r s u a s i o n s . Thus, a t h e o r i s t l i k e John S t u a r t M i l l does n e t d e t e r -
mine t h e p r o p e r end f o r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y b u t f o r l i b e r a l s i n p o l i t i c s . 
I n o t h e r words, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between end* and mean?;, aims and methods, 
t h e d e s i r a b l e and t h e p r a c t i c a b l e remainr. an a c c u r a t e account o f t h e r e l a -
t i o n s h i p between, f o r example, l i b e r a l p h i l o s o p h y o r i d e o l o g y and L i b e r a l 
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p o l i c y and p r a c t i c e . I n o r d e r t o examine t h i s m o d i f i e d v e r s i o n i t i s nec-
e s s a r y now t o c o n s i d e r more c l o s e l y t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between means and ends. 
2. F i r s t , i t can be s a f e l y s a i d , I t h i n k , t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f 'end' 
h e r e cannot be t h a t o f f o r m a l cause. I f a n y t h i n g i s t h e n a t u r a l end o f 
a n y t h i n g e l s e , as i t i s sometimes s a i d t h a t t h e o a k - t r e e i s t h e n a t u r a l 
end o f t h e a c o r n , and i f t h i s i s u n d e r s t o o d t o be, i n some way, an end o r 
f u n c t i o n d e t e r m i n e d by t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r o f t h i n g s , t h e n t h e end o f t h i n g s 
i n t h i s sense cannot be o f i n t e r e s t t o a c t i o n . The f a c t t h a t 'X i s t h e 
n a t u r a l end o f Y' no more i n v i t e s , p r e s c r i b e s n o r i s a l t e r e d by any human 
a c t i o n , t h a n doss t h e f a c t , t h a t 'X i s a n a t u r a l p r o p e r t y o f Y'. The r e a l m 
o f n a t u r e i s , i n i t s n a t u r e , u n a l t e r a b l e . No end i n t h i s sense can p r o v i d e 
scope f o r human a c t i v i t y , and cannot t h e r e f o r e p r o v i d e t h e k i n d o f end 
w h i c h i d e o l o g i s t s are s a i d t o d i s c u s s and c o n s i d e r , f o r t h e ends w h i c h con-
c e r n them a r e ends f o r a c t i v i t y , m o r a l , p o l i t i c a l o r o f some o t h e r s o r t . 
The ends i n w h i c h i t i s s a i d t h e i d e o l o g i s t i s i n t e r e s t e d , then., 
must be ends i u some such sense as aim o r o b j e c t i v e or a s p i r a t i o n . Now i t 
cannot be t h e case t h a t t h e t h e o r i s t ' s t a s k i s t o e s t a b l i s h o b j e c t i v e s RU 
o b j e c t i v e s f o r a l l t h e o t h e r n o n - t h e o r i s t s who share h i s i d e o l o g i c a l ad-
herence. F or any man's o b j e c t i v e must be h i s , i f i t i s t o be t h e m o t i v e 
f o r c e o f h i s a c t i o n and, though i d e o l o g i c a l argument may persuade, him t o 
adopt soma p a r t i c u l a r cause as h i s o b j e c t i v e , i t i s h i s a d o p t i o n and n o t 
th e argument, w h i c h makes t h a t cause t h e aim o f h i s a c t i v i t y . I n other-
words, o b j e c t i v e s a r e t h e s o r t s o f t h i n g we have and share and we cannot by 
t h o u g h t o r reason a l o n e e s t a b l i s h s o m e t h i n g an an o b j e c t i v e i n advance o f 
i t s b e i n g adopted as such. 
Keasor. o r r e f l e c t i o n , t h e r e f l e c t i o n i n w h i c h t h e i d e o l o g i s t on-
gagss, i f i t i s t o have any role a t f i l l i n t h e •aahtsr, B U S t , co. t h e .s t r e n g t h 
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o f t h e argument so f a r , come as a p r e l i m i n a r y t o t h e s e l e c t i o n o f t h i s 
r a t h e r t h a n t h a t as an o b j e c t i v e . I t i s , t h e n , t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e v a r -
i o u s p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i v e s w h i c h p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s and n o t t h e i r c h a r a c t e r 
as o b j e c t i v e s w h i c h i s t h e p r o v i n c e o f t h e i d e o l o g i s t . I t i s t h e q u e s t i o n 
o f t h e i r d e s i r a b i l i t y , r a t i o n a l i t y , l e g i t i m a c y o r w o r t h . Now i n o r d e r t o 
assess t h e w o r t h o f a t h i n g we need a c c e p t e d s t a n d a r d c r i t e r i a o f w o r t h i -
ness. The burden o f my e a r l i e r argument was t h a t p o l i t i c a l and m o r a l 
t h e o r i s t s p e r se have no sha r e d c r i t e r i a t h a t w o u l d make such judgments 
p o s s i b l e . I f t h e y do pass judgment i t cannot be on t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r b e i n g 
i d e o l o g i s t s b u t i n t h e i r c a p a c i t y as M a r x i s t s , l i b e r a l s o r wh a t e v e r . 
3. I t i s a t t h i s p o i n t , i t w i l l be s a i d , t h a t t h e proposed m o d i f i c -
a t i o n o f t h e commonplace model i s p e r t i n e n t . The l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t , f o r 
example, t e s t s 'for d e s i r a b i l i t y , r a t i o n a l i t y and l e g i t i m a c y t h e proposed 
p o l i c i e s o f l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a n s i n t h e l i g h t o f l i b e r a l d o c t r i n e and p r i n -
c i p l e s . H i s t a s k i s t o d i s c e r n w h i c h amongst t h o s e proposed p o l i c i e s nro 
i n d e e d l i b e r a l . He t h i n k s and he w r i t e s , i t w i l l be s a i d , w i t h i n t h e con-
t e x t and t h e c o n f i n e s o f a t r a d i t i o n o f m o r a l n o t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l doc-
t r i n e and h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a i n i n g g i v e s him g r e a t e r access t o t h e body 
o f l i t e r a t u r e w h i c h e n s h r i n e s t h e i n f o r m i n g p r i n c i p l e s o f t h a t t r a d i t i o n . 
Now t h e r e seems t o me t o be much'''in t h i s v i e w o f t h i n g s , and I 
s h a l l l a t e r g i v e reasons o f my own f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t we can o n l y s e n s i b l y 
speak o f r e f l e c t i o n w i t h i n one i d e o l o g y and n o t between i d e o l o g i e s . But 
as i t s t a n d s i t r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r m o d i f i c a t i o n and t h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n w i l l 
show, I t h i n k , t h a t i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e r e l a t i o n between i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f 
and p o l i t i c a l o r m o r a l a c t i v i t y , t a l k o f ends aud mean w i l l n o t h e l p and 
What 'wuch' t h e r e i s l t r y t o b r i n g o u t i n C hapters 7 and o 
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may m i s l e a d . 
The s u g g e s t i o n we have j u s t c o n s i d e r e d r e g a r d s t h e t h e o r i s t as 
r a t h e r l i k e t h e c o n s c i e n c e o f t h e p a r t y , b u t s o m e t h i n g more b e s i d e s . He 
i s t h e e t h i c a l l e a d e r o f h i s p a r t y as w e l l as b e i n g i t s c o n s c i e n c e , f o r 
h i s t a s k i s t o s e t o u t t h e t r u e i d e a l s t o w h i c h i t i s c o m m i t t e d . H i s ac-
q u a i n t a n c e s h i p w i t h and a b i l i t y t o d e v e l o p t h e d o c t r i n a l b a s i s o f t h e 
p a r t y i s t h e f o r m o f h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p o l i c y . Now I do n o t t h i n k 
t h a t we can s e n s i b l y speak as though t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p o l i c y were t h e 
p r o v i n c e o f t h e i d e o l o g i s t a l o n e , even t h o u g h we admit t h a t lie b r i n g s t o 
t h e q u e s t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y , c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t a r e p e c u l i a r t o 
him. And I t h i n k t h i 3 can be shown i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way. 
L e t us suppose t h a t a measure o r p o l i c y 'X' i s advanced by a 
l i b e r a l p o l i t i c i a n ; i t i s c o n s i d e r e d by t h e t h e o r i s t ; i t i s d e c l a r e d by 
hi m t o be p r o p e r l y l i b e r a l o r n o t so. Suppose t h a t t h e t h e o r i s t d e t e r -
mines i n t h e l i g h t o f h i s knowledge o f l i b e r a l d o c t r i n e , t h a t t h e proposed 
measure i s n o t t r u l y l i b e r a l . Two t h i n g s must happen b e f o r e t h e measure 
w i l l a c t u a l l y cease t o be among t h e a d v e r t i s e d p o l i c i e s o f t h e l i b e r a l 
p a r t y . F i r s t , h i s view t h a t t h i s measure i s n o t t r u l y l i b e r a l must s t a n d 
up t o t h e s c r u t i n y o f o t h e r l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s i n o r d e r t o become t h e p r e -
v a i l i n g view. T h i s i s a consequence o f t h e debate between t h e o r i s t s . 
S e c o n d l y , t h e measure must be r e j e c t e d by a v o t e o f t h e annual c o n f e r e n c e 
o f t h e p a r t y , o r w h a t e v e r t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p o l i c y - m a k i n g body may be. T h i s 
f o l l o w s as a consequence o f a debate and v o t e among a l l ( r e l e v a n t ) p a r t y 
members, t h e o r i s t s and n o n - t h e o r i s t s a l i k e . Now t h e second debate i s ended 
and t h e q u e s t i o n d e c i d e d by t h e p r o c e d u r e o f v o t i n g . I n t h e f i r s t debate 
t h e a t t e m p t in to c o n c l u d e t h e d i s c u s s i o n by r e a c h i n g a r e a s o n a b l e and 
a p p r o p r i a t e o p i n i o n , on t h e q u e s t i o n i n hand. A r e a s o n f o r a c c e p t i n g M»o 
p r e p o s i t i o n t h a t " 'X' i s no'; c o m p a t i b l e w i t h l i b e r a l d o c t r i n e ' w i l l be a 
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r e ason f o r c o n c l u d i n g , t h e r e f o r e , w h i l e a r eason f o r r e j e c t i n g 'X' as a 
l i b e r a l p o l i c y w i l l be a r e a s o n f o r v o t i n g . Now, t h e v i e w t h a t 'X' i s 
n o t c o m p a t i b l e w i t h l i b e r a l d o c t r i n e may be one r eason f o r v o t i n g a g a i n s t 
'X' b u t i t w i l l n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be t h e o n l y r e a s o n . i n o t h e r v/ords, a 
c o n c l u s i v e argument t h a t 'X' i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l doc-
t r i n e i s n o t a s u f f i c i e n t and n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f 'X's b e i n g r e j e c t e d 
as l i b e r a l p o l i c y . The f a c t t h a t i t i s i n c o m p a t i b l e i s n o t t h e o n l y 
r e a s o n t h a t may ( r e a s o n a b l y ) o p e r a t e . 
Suppose now t h a t t h e measure 'X' h e l d by a l l l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s 
t o be i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h l i b e r a l d o c t r i n e i s a c c e p t e d by t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 
body as p a r t y p o l i c y . Suppose, i n d e e d , t h a t s e v e r a l such p o l i c i e s are 
a c c e p t e d . Are we t o c o n c l u d e t h a t i n so d o i n g t h e l i b e r a l p a r t y has 
ceased t o be l i b e r a l and i t s members, o t h e r t h a n t h e t h e o r i s t s , have 
ceased t o be l i b e r a l s ? I t h i n k t h a t we are f o r c e d t o c o n c l u d e i n t h i s 
way i f we accept t h e commonplace model, even i n t h i s m o d i f i e d f o r m . 
To accept t h a t l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s are s o l e d e t e r m i n e r s c f t h e t r u e aims 
o f l i b e r a l s is to a l l o w t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a d i v o r c e between t h o s e vho 
d e t e r m i n e and t h o s e f o r whom t h e aims are d e t e r m i n e d . But such a 
d i v o r c e , as i n t h e example g i v e n h e r e , may a r i s e o u t o f a d i s p u t e b e t -
ween t h e o r i s t s and p a r t y as t c w h i c h aims and p o l i c i e s s h o u l d be 
p u r s u e d . The i n i t i a l account l e d us t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e o r i s t s d e t e r -
mined t h e ends f o r n o n - t h e o r i s t s . T h i s must be m i s t a k e n , f o r i t i s 
p o s s i b l e , as i n t h e example g i v e n , f o r a p a r t y p o s i t i v e l y t o r e j e c t 
t h e aims d e t e r m i n e d f o r them by t h e t h e o r i s t s , and y e t r emain t h e same 
p a r t y . The m i s t a k e o f t h e model l i e s i n s u p p o s i n g t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s can d e t e r m i n e o r d e c i d e an i s s u e . I n f a c t , i t i s »tid 
must be a p r o c e d u r e w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s , some p r o c e d u r e l i k e a v o t e . Wben 
q u e s t i o n s o f aims and ends are under d i s p u t e , i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
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may always be p e r t i n e n t and are perhaps t h e most i m p o r t a n t k i n d o f 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . We s h a l l have t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e s e q u e s t i o n s i n due 
c o u r s e . The p o i n t I want t o make h e r e i s j u s t t h a t d o c t r i n a l c o n s i d e r -
a t i o n s a r e o n l y one k i n d o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n and f u r t h e r m o r e are n o t t h e 
s o r t s o f t h i n g s w h i c h can d e c i d e o r d e t e r m i n e t h e i s s u e , t h o u g h t h e y 
may h e l p us on t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h i c h way t o d e c i d e { t h a t i s , i n t h i s 
case, t o v o t e ) . 
On t h e m o d i f i e d v e r s i o n o f t h e model i t was s u g g e s t e d t h a t 
o n l y t h o s e aims w h i c h l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s c o u l d endorse c o u l d r e a l l y be 
c a l l e d l i b e r a l . But t h i s i s n o t so. I f t h e r e i s a d i v i s i o n o f 
o p i n i o n between t h e t h e o r i s t s and n o n - t h e o r i s t s o f a p a r t y o v e r w h i c h 
p o l i c i e s t o adopt and whic h t o r e j e c t , i t i s mere p r e j u d i c e t o suppose 
t h a t t h e terr a l i b e r a l t r u l y a t t a c h e s o n l y t o t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e 
t h e o r i s t s . F o r l i b e r a l i s m i s as much embodied i n what p r a c t i s i n g 
l i b e r a l s do and have done as i n what l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s say and have 
s a i d . I f t h i s were n o t so we w o u l d have no grounds, i n d e e d no way, 
o f c a l l i n g someone a l i b e r a l who was n o t a t h e o r i s t , o f some s o r t . One 
v., 
aspect o i b e i n g a l i b e r a l ( o r a c o n s e r v a t i v e , s o c i a l i s t , n a t i o n a l i s t ) 
i s t h e a s s e r t i o n o f c e r t a i n d o c t r i n e s , b u t i f t h e s e d o c t r i n e s wore 
n o t r e l a t e d i n some way t o c h a r a c t e 3 . - i s t i c a t t i t u d e s and a c t i o n s w h i c h 
are n o t themselves; d o c t r i n e s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o know i n what sense one 
c o u l d be a l i b e r a l , o r v/hatevcr, as opposed t o m e r e l y a s s e n t i n g t o t h i s 
and t o t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n . I s h a l l e l a b o r a t e on t h i s p o i n t a t a l a t e r 
s t a g e . 
I n s h o r t , t h t commouplitce model o f t h e re.'i u t i o n bstweon 
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i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n and a c t u a l c o n d u c t , between t h e i d e o l o g i s t 
and t h e a d h e r e n t o f some i d e o l o g i c a l p e r s u a s i o n ends up by a r g u i n g 
e i t h e r t h a t t h e r e a r e o n l y i d e o l o g i s t s i n e v e r y t r a d i t i o n , i n w h i c h 
case i t cannot o f f e r an account o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between them and 
some o t h e r members o f t h e same t r a d i t i o n , o r by a r g u i n g t h a t i d e o l o g i s t s 
are t h e d e t e r m i n e r s o f ends f o r t h o s e who, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , are £ible t o 
d e t e r m i n e t h e i r own aims and o b j e c t i v e s . 
4. The i n c o h e r e n c e i n t h e commonplace account s p r i n g s , I t h i n k , 
f r o m s u p p o s i n g t h a t i d e o l o g i e s c o n s i s t i n d o c t r i n e s , so t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l 
i d e n t i t y (what someone i s i d e o l o g i c a l l y ) i s e s s e n t i a l l y a m a t t e r o f 
d o c t r i n a l p u r i t y . I t supposes, i n t h i s way, t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r and 
i d e n t i t y o f a man's r e f l e c t i o n s can be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e c o n t e n t o f t h o s e 
r e f l e c t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . * T h i s i s n o t so. I f i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s 
are t o have any w e i g h t i n a w o r l d o f p r a c t i c a l endeavour t h e y must, so 
t o speak, come w i t h p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i n them, t h a t i s , i n a 
language t h a t i s a l r e a d y p r a c t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , and cannot bestow 
p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e upon therars«lves by t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e i r own 
r e a s o n i n g . I n o t h e r words, t h e degree t o w h i c h t h e e x i s t e n c e o f some 
u n m i s t a k a b l y l i b e r a l a c t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s i s n e c e s s a r y t o t h e r e f l e c -
t i o n a o f a l i b e r a l h a v i n g sense iuid s i g n i f i c a n c e i s no l e s s g r e a t , and 
may be more so, t h a n the degree t o w h i c h t h e e x i s t e n c e o f some r e f l e e -
1 1 have h e a r d advanced t h o , t o 
t h e b a s i s o f h i s ' ;>bJ. i o ^ c p h y ' 
t i ve. 
me p r e p o s t e r e u n , c l a i m t h a t , on 
En g e l s ' r e a l l y ' a c o n s o r v a -
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t i v e l i t e r a t u r e i s n e c e s s a r y t o t h e c o n t i n u e d i d e n t i f i a b i l i t y o f 
t h o s e a c t s and a t t i t u d e s . I want t o say t h a t l i b e r a l i s m , s o c i a l i s m , 
c o n s e r v a t i s m , n a t i o n a l i s m , a r e a l l t r a d i t i o n s o f b e l i e f and p r a c t i c e 
and n o t t r a d i t i o n s o f b e l i e f , c o n t i n u a l l y b e i n g p u t i n t o p r a c t i c e . 
The r e f l e c t i o n s o f i d e o l o g i s t s , i f t h e y have any r o l e t o p l a y , must be 
u n d e r s t o o d t o be a p a r t o f t h e g e n e r a l l i f e o f an i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n 
and n o t t h e i n i t i a t o r o f t h a t l i f e . 
IV 
1. We have, I hope,now seen some r e a s o n t o doubt t h e vi e w 
f i r s t , t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i s r e f l e c t i o n w i t h i n some u n i f i e d 
d i s c i p l i n e o f r a t i o n a l o r i n t e l l e c t u a l s c r u t i n y , a n d s e c o n d l y , t h a t 
t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f such r e f l e c t i o n l i e s i n i t s b e i n g t h e n e c e s s a r y 
i n i t i a t o r o r d e t e r m i n e r o f p o l i t i c a l and m o r a l conduct. I t i s t r u e 
t h a t t h e s e two s u g g e s t i o n s f o r m t h e major p a r t o f what I have c a l l e d 
t h e commonplace model o f i d e o l o g y and t h a t w i t h t h e i r r e j e c t i o n t h e 
model must, I t h i n k , be seen t o f a i l as a p o s s i b l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f 
th e n a t u r e o f i d e o l o g y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e i s a t h i r d f e a t u r e o f 
t h i s model w h i c h can be e x p l o r e d t o some p o i n t and t h i s i s i t s use 
o f t h e n o t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e . 
As I e l a b o r a t e d i t , ' t h e commonplace model h e l d t h a t n o t 
o n l y d i d i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n r e s u l t i n a t r u e knowledge o f t h e ends 
o f a c t i v i t y , b u t a l s o i n a knowledge o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f a c t i o n con-
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d u c i v e t o t h e r e a l i s a t i o n o f t h o s e ends. The p r i n c i p l e s a r e , I t h i n k , 
t h o u g h t o f as e n t e r i n g i n t o m oral and p o l i t i c a l conduct i n t h e f o l l o w -
i n g f a s h i o n . I e n c o u n t e r a s i t u a t i o n A, w h i c h f a l l s under t h e scope o f 
a g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e o r maxim o f t h e f o r m 'Whenever A do B' o r ' A l l A's 
s h o u l d B', and I a c t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r i n c i p l e t o w h i c h I s u b s c r i b e . 
I n t h i s way m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s g u i d e m o r a l and p o l i t i c a l 
c o n d u c t . M o r a l i t y and p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f c o n s i s t s , t h e n , i n a s t o c k o f 
such p r i n c i p l e s , and t o a c t r a t i o n a l l y i s t o a c t i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e s one h o l d s and t o h o l d c o n s i s t e n t or c o m p a t i b l e 
p r i n c i p l e s . ^ 
2. I have two p r i n c i p l e o b j e c t i o n s t o t h i s view o f m o r a l and 
p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , i f we u n d e r s t a n d a man's moral 
b e l i e f s t o c o n s i s t i n a s t o c k o f p r i n c i p l e s and t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s t o be 
r e l a t e d t o a c t i o n i n t h e manner s u g g e s t e d , we cannot at t h e came t i m e 
make t h e c l a i m t h a t an i d e o l o g y ( m o r a l o r p o l i t i c a l ) c o n s i s t s i n 
p r o p o s i t i o n s about ends r a t h e r t h a n means. For i t t u r n s o u t , upon 
e x a m i n a t i o n , t h a t i f p a r t c f t h e outcome o f r e f l e c t i n g on, i d e o l o g i c a l 
q u e s t i o n s i s t h e development o f a s e t o f p r i n c i p l e s , i d e o l o g i c a l rsi'i.ec 
t i o n i s i n p a r t concerned w i t h t h e d i s c o v e r y o f means t o 
t h e r e a l i s a t i o n o f an end. T h i s p o i n t can be b r o u g h t out i n t h e f o l l o w 
i n g way. 
1 I t seows t o me t h a t t h i s i s a v i e w v e r y l i k e t h a t o f R M Hare 
b u t J. do n o t c l a i / ; i t o be o f f e r i n g a c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n o f 
Hare's m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y h e r e . 
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I f i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n . l e a d s us to the b e l i e f t h a t , say, 
government i s a l l about the 'uncovering of c i v i l l i b e r t i e s ' ^ and t h a t 
a worthwhile p o l i t i c a l l i f e , a l i f e t h a t i s not and has not been a 
waste of time, w i l l have been spent i n doing j u s t t h a t , then the general 
p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e ' A l l genuine c l a i m s to c i v i l r i g h t s should be 
supported' w i l l be a means t o s e c u r i n g a worthwhile l i f e of p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y . I s h a l l , l a t e r i n the t h e s i s . o f f e r an a l t e r n a t i v e v e r s i o n 
of the r e l a t i o n between b e l i e f and a c t i o n , but at t h i s p o i n t I am con-
cerned only to p o i n t out t h a t i f we were to accept t h i s notion of 
p r i n c i p l e and t h i s manner of d e r i v i n g p r i n c i p l e s as being an adequate 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of moral and. p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f and r e f l e c t i o n , we could 
not advance a general model of ideology and a c t i o n couched i n t e r n s of 
ends and means. For i t seems t h a t p r i n c i p l e s , i f they are to be the 
s o r t of t l i i Eg i n which moral b e l i e f , at least, i n p a r t , c o n s i s t s , and 
i f they are to be the s o r t s o f t h i n g which guide a c t i o n ;vuat both be 
d e r i v e d from t h i n k i n g about ends and. at the same time, c h i e f l y 
important as knowledge of the means of r e a l i s i n g t h e s e cuds. I n s h o r t , 
the manner of a r r i v i n g at means to any ;noral or p o l i t i c a l ends i s parr, 
find p a r c e l of, and not d i s t i n c t from,the manner of determining those 
ends. I n f a c t t h i s holds good g e n e r a l l y . 
Both the ends and the aims of our a c t i v i t i e s only snake flense, 
are only i n t e l l i g i b l e as ends and as means, i n the context of ongoing 
1 The phr-ise i n Hobliouse's. 
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a c t i v i t y . 
A c t i v i t y s p r i n g i n g from and governed by an 
independently premeditated purpose i s i m p o s s i b l e ; 
the power of prem e d i t a t i n g purpose, of f o r m u l a t i n g 
r u l e s of conduct and standards of behaviour i n 
advance of the conduct and a c t i v i t y i t s e l f i s not 
a v a i l a b l e to us. 1 
One of the mistakes made by those who advance a model l i k e t h a t we have 
been c o n s i d e r i n g i s t h a t they suppose such a d i v i s i o n t o be p o s s i b l e , 
t h a t ends are i n t e l l i g i b l e as ends independently of the context of the 
a c t i v i t y f o r which they are supposed to be the ends. But i n any event 
what I have t r i e d to i n d i c a t e here i s t h a t , however t h a t may be, the 
commonplace model, at l e a s t as 1 have e l a b o r a t e d i t , i s inc o h e r e n t 0:1 
t h i s matter of means and ends. 
3. My second o b j e c t i o n i s t h i s . The way i n which p r i n c i p l e s 
are s a i d to be r e l a t e d to a c t i o n p r e s e n t s moral b e l i e f a s , in some 
sense, a guide of w e l l t r i e d r u l e s which w i l l help us over the v a r i o u s 
o b s t a c l e s which contingent f a c t o r s p r e s e n t , i gnores the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of those p r i n c i p l e s themselves c r e a t i n g o b s t a c l e s and d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
I t i s supposed t h a t most moral d i f f i c u l t i e s c o n s i s t i n not knowing 
what to do next and t h a t a s e t of moral p r i n c i p l e s s u p p l i e s a ge n e r a l 
r u l e of the form ' I n circumstance A do E', Thin /nay, on o c c a s i o n s , 
1 Michael Oakeahott: ' R a t i o n a l Conduce' i n R a t i o n a l i s m i n P o l i t i c s 
London; 196:'., p. iOO 
I n h i s book Qn Human Conduct Oahcnhott ex p r e s s e s the 5suee 
point r a t h e r more s u c c l n t l y 'Of course*, d e s c r i p t i o n ir? terms 
of means and ends if; n et s e n s e l e s s , t u t i t s c o n d i t i o n a l i t y 
(JUCUUFI may become ends and en6a means) i s such -XL' to juako i t 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y w o r t h l e s s ' Loc c i t , p.40. 
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be so, but i t i s not always so, as the f o l l o w i n g example w i l l show. 
Imagine t h a t a policeman d i s c o v e r s t h a t one of h i s f r i e n d s 
has broken the lav; i n some r e s p e c t . L e t us suppose f u r t h e r t h a t i t 
i s i n h i s power to cover up the crime, or at l e a s t to f a i l to p r o s e -
cute . What i s such a man to do? On the one hand he t h i n k s t h a t 
h i s duty both to the p u b l i c at l a r g e and to h i s f e l l o w policemen i n 
p a r t i c u l a r demands t h a t he enforce the law, r e g a r d l e s s of who t h e law-
broaker may be. On the o t h e r hand, he sees t h a t one must have a 
s p e c i a l l o y a l t y to f r i e n d s and t h i s e n t a i l s an o b l i g a t i o n to a s s i s t 
them i n p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t , c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Such a mar. might con-
c e i v e of h i s d i f f i c u l t y as a c o n f l i c t of p r i n c i p l e , f o r he s u b s c r i b e s 
both to the view t h a t one must 'Always do one's duty i n liiw' and t h a t 
one must 'Ee l o y a l to f r i e n d s i n a] 1 t h i n g s ' . I n .ohort, h i s d i f f i c u l t y 
cannot be overcome by appeal to h i s moral p r i n c i p l e s , f o r i t i s those 
very p r i n c i p l e s themselves which are i n c o n f l i c t . 
•Someone might say: "Oh but i t was s a i d t h a t as w e l l f.s 
a c t i n g c o n s i s t e n t l y w i t h one's p r i n c i p l e s , one must a l s o h o l d coutvi&i&nt 
p r i n c i p l e s " . C o n s i s t e n t ir. what sense, though? There i s no l o g i c a l 
i n c o n s i s t e n c y between tha p r i n c i p l e s 'Always do your duty i n law' ruid 
'Be l o y a l to f r i e n d s i n a l l t h i n g s ' . I t if* conting£nt_ cir c u m s t aa cea 
which have brought jx'jcmt the c o n f l i c t between the two. How then are 
such p r i n c i p l e s supposed to help us over the cortingen.t c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? 
No r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 'the s t o c k of p r i n c i p l e s to which, wo sub-
s c r i b e , i i i advance of p a r t i c u l a r circusust&r.coc, cau s e r v e to e l i m i n a t e 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s which circumstances themnelvor. c o n t r i v e . I t mu« t be, 
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t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i f there i s to be any r e s o l u t i o n of the problem , the 
reasons we may have f o r ho l d i n g to one p r i n c i p l e and, at l e a s t tempor-
a r i l y abandoning the other, s p r i n g from the p a r t i c u l a r i t y of the c i r -
cumstances ; t h a t i t i s t h i s f r i e n d who i s i n v o l v e d r a t h e r than another. 
I t i s sometimes suggested t h a t the b u s i n e s s of moral r e f l e c t i o n 
j u s t i s the b u s i n e s s of ar r a n g i n g our p r i n c i p l e s i n order of importance 
so t h a t we may minimise o c c a s i o n s of the s o r t envisaged here. But I 
cannot see t h a t such an o r d e r i n g could be anything but a r b i t r a r y . 
When such p r i n c i p l e s as those I have s e l e c t e d f o r my i l l u s t r a t i o n are 
not i n c o n f l i c t , as i n general they a r c not, t h e r e i s nothing to choose 
2 
between them. And an act of w i l l , a determination to stand f o r t h i s 
r a t h e r than t h a t , w i l l not do the t r i c k , f o r when these favoured 
p r i n c i p l e s are brought i n t o c o n f l i c t by p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s the 
d i f f i c u l t y , i f i t i s affected at a l l . w i l l be compounded. I t i s only the 
f a c t s of some p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n which could p o s s i b l y o f f e r any reason 
3 
f o r h o l d i n g to t h i s and abandoning t h a t . 
1 I do not say t h a t there raust be some s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n , Some 
moral dilemmas a r e dilemmas j u s t i n t h i s , t h a t whatever we do, i t 
w i l l be wrong. 
2 I d e a l i s t p h i l o s o p h e r s , f o r example, Bradley or Green, might argue 
t h a t i n the cas e I have chosen there was a m i s a p p l i c a t i o n ol 
p r i n c i p l e , I am not concerned with t h i s o b j e c t i o n here, however, 
s i n c e i t l e a v e s u n a f f e c t e d the major p o i n t t h a t moral p r i n c i p l e s 
may c r e a t e r a t h e r than r e s o l v e moral d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
3 T h i s i s not, however, a v e r s i o n of the c u r r e n t l y popular ' s i t u a t i o n 
e t h i c s ' . 
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The g e n e r a l point i s t h a t moral b e l i e f s , which we may 
formulate i n p r i n c i p l e s , f a r from a c t i n g as a h e l p f u l guide through 
e x t e r n a l l y c r e a t e d and presented c i r c u m s t a n c e s , make those circum-
s t a n c e s what they are m o r a l l y . Moral and p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s are 
c o n s t i t u t e d r a t h e r than r e s o l v e d by t h e moral and p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s 
we hold. I t cannot be, then, t h a t moral and p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s are 
r e l a t e d to a c t i v i t y i n q u i t e the way suggested by the commonplace) model 
V 
I have r e j e c t e d the commonplace model on t h r e e counts. F i r s t 
r e f l e c t i o n of t h i s s o r t could not a r i s e in the context of a u n i f i e d 
d i s c i p l i n e of thought; secondly, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i d e o l o -
g i s t s and the adherents of any p a r t i c u l a r p e r s u a s i o n cannot bo thought 
of as t h a t between the determiners of ends and the i m p l o E j e n t e r s of ends 
determined; t h i r d l y , i f the l i n k between i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n and 
a c t u a l conduct i s supposed to be made by the formulatior. of p r i n c i p l e s , 
t h i s r e q u i r e s the dichotomy between means and ends to be abandoned and 
f u r t h e r , that i f such p r i n c i p l e s are t c be p a r t of moral and p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e and r e l a t e d to the conduct of t h a t l i f e , they must be understood 
to be p a r t of i t s f a b r i c and not an e x t e r n a l or independent guide. 
I t might be suggested t h a t I have s e t my arguments a g a i n s t 
straw men; t h a t no one lias ever advanced views of the s o r t that I have 
been r e j e c t i n g . I t j . a t r u e t h a t no one w r i t e r (of my acquaintance) has 
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e x p l i c i t l y espoused the commonplace model as I have e l a b o r a t e d i t . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s i t i s , as I t h i n k , a p l a u s i b l e one and i t s p l a u s i b i l i t y 
i n p a r t d e r i v e s from the l a r g e number of w r i t e r s who have w r i t t e n as 
i f the model, or something very l i k e i t , were an a c c u r a t e understanding 
of the matter. My i n t e n t i o n has been to d i s p e l a p e r v e r s i v e view of 
ideology which i s none the l e s s p e r v a s i v e because i t i s i m p l i c i t r a t h e r 
than e x p l i c i t i n many famous and popular w r i t e r s . 
The e r r o r s which I have claimed to d e t e c t s p r i n g , I t h i n k , 
from a f a i l u r e , i n P a s c a l ' s words,'to understand the f o r c e of reason'. 
Pure reason cannot i n i t i a t e , nor can i t . c o n s t i t u t e , nor, by i t s e l f , 
can i t B U S t a i n a moral or p o l i t i c a l l i f e , any more than, pace D e s c a r t e s . 
a world of f a c t and s e n s a t i o n can be based upon pure and indubit.'.ble 
thoughts. The man who w i l l not enjoy any aspect of h i s moral or 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e which cannot i n some nense be t e s t e d on the ' a n v i l of 
reason' i s not a man with a p u r i f i e d e t h i c a l l i f e , but a man with no 
e t h i c a l l i f e at a l l . 
I n c o n t r a s t , pure reason i s , I think-, the s o l e and moving 
p r i n c i p l e i n philosophy, f o r philosophy i s j u s t the b u s i n e s s of t h i n k i n g 
t h a t which can s e n s i b l y bo thought. And, i n genera]., we can a s s i g n a 
p l a c e to reason and reasoning i n t h e o r e t i c a l understanding which i t 
cannot hope to have i n p r a c t i c a l understanding. I, s h a l l e l a b o r a t e ta<s 
c a t e g o r i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the world.':, of theory and of pi?actio3 at 
l a t e r p o i n t s i n t h e t h e s i s . •Hero I h a v e been concerned nimply to a r r i v e 
at c eri-ain n e g a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s , i n g e n e r a l the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , what-
ever i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n Might look l i k e , i t cannot lock l i k e t i i * 
tile p i c t u r e which the commonplace mode], p r e s e n t s . 
CHAPTER 3 
Ideology and S c e p t i c i s m 
"The same p r i n c i p l e s which at f i r s t view l e a d 
to s c e p t i c i s m , pursued to a c e r t a i n p o i n t , 
b r i n g men back to common sense." 
BERKELEY 
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The g i s t of my argument a g a i n s t the commonplace account 
was t h a t i t overestimated the p l a c e t h a t reason and r e f l e c t i o n could 
p l a y i n the conduct of moral and p o l i t i c a l l i f e , or even i n the l i f e 
of an i d e o l o g i c a l p e r s u a s i o n . Someone might c l a i m now t h a t i n f a c t I 
have baulked at the l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n of my arguments and have stopped 
s h o r t of admitting t h a t t h e r e r e a l l y i s no p l a c e f o r reason and 
r e f l e c t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l and moral matters, or more p r o p e r l y , t h a t the 
reason t h a t i s i n v o l v e d has nothing to do with any t h e o r e t i c a l or 
p s e u d o - t h e o r e t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n . Such a c l a i m i s i t s e l f a r e c o g n i s a b l e 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n , t h a t of the s c e p t i c . 
I n t h i s chapter, I s h a l l be concerned to r e v e a l the mistake 
embracing a general s c e p t i c i s m about i d e o l o g i c a l understanding and 
r e f l e c t i o n , a mistake that i s e a s i l y made once the o v e r - c o n f i d e n t 
R a t i o n a l i s m of the view we have j u s t been c o n s i d e r i n g has beer, exposed 
S c e p t i c i s m of course may s p r i n g from d i f f e r e n t s o u r c e s arid take 
d i f f e r e n t forms. The sceptic?..! accounts of ideology I want 
to e?:.ajniae are t h r e e i n number, but I s h a l l c o n f l a t e the f i r s t two 
of t h e s e s i n c e they seem to me s u b s t a n t i a l l y of the same s o r t and 
open to the same ki n d of o b j e c t i o n . These f i r s t two combine to form 
a view of i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n which U s r i v e s c h i e f l y from the Marxis* 
and F r e u d i a n notions of ' f a l s e - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' and ' r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n ' . 
Again i t ceenic best to introduce them with two well-known q u o t a t i o n s . 
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1. I n h i s famous l e t t e r to Mehring, E n g e l s w r i t e s : 
The d e r i v a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l , j u r i d i c a l and i d e o l o g i -
c a l n o t i o n s ... i s a p r o c e s s accomplished by the s o -
c a l l e d t h i n k e r c o n s c i o u s l y indeed, but with a f a l s e -
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . The r e a l motives i m p e l l i n g him remain 
unknown to him, otherwise i t would not be an i d e o l o -
g i c a l p rocess at a l l . 1 
And i n a s i m i l a r v e i n Freud s a y s t h a t such i d e a s : 
which are given out as t e a c h i n g are not the p r e c i -
p i t a t e s of experience or the. end r e s u l t s of 
t h i n k i n g ; they are i l l u s i o n s , f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e 
o l d e s t , s t r o n g e s t and most urgent wishes of mankind. 
The f i r s t , s c e p t i c a l account of ideology which 1' wish to 
examine, t h e n , i s the view t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i s a r a t i o n a l i s i n g 
form of s p e c u l a t i o n which i s thrown up by the f o r c e of motives unknown 
to the w r i t e r . The model or p i c t u r e which u n d e r l i e s and informs t h i s 
s u g g e s t i o n goes something l i k e this-;: 
2. I n our day-to-day l i v e s we are moved to act :-;c we do by our 
impulses and d e s i r e s . 'Vb d e s i r e X and t h e r e f o r e we pursue X, Much of 
the c o n f l i c t i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e i s c r e a t e d not by c o n t r a d i c t o r y or 
opposed opinion but by incompatible d e s i r e s . The appearance t h a t such 
arguments of t e n have of being c o n f l i c t s over t r u t h i s mere appearance, 
1 E n g e l s to Mehring: Marx - Ex;gels S e l e c t e d Correspondence 
(ed) i) T o r r , London 13.% 
2 Freud: Future of an I f u s i o n , t r a n s . Robson-Scott, London 1962 
p. 26 " 
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f o r the w e l t e r of argument t h a t surrounds p o l i t i c a l and moral d i s p u t e s 
does not precede but foll o w s the determination of courses of a c t i o n . 
When, t h e r e f o r e , we are t o l d by a man th a t he d i d A because B, where 
B i s the e x p r e s s i o n of some p o l i t i c a l or moral theory, t h a t man o f f e r s 
not an e x p l a n a t i o n of h i s behaviour but a post festura j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
I t i s not that he has thought out the view B and t h e r e f o r e a c t e d i n 
the manner A, but t h a t , having done A, lie, when questioned or c r i t i c - , 
i s e d , has r e c o u r s e to B. The r o l e of i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s , then, i s as 
a defense of what we a c t u a l l y want and do and not as an i n s t i g a t i o n of 
such wants and deeds. The t h e o r i s t or s p e c u l a t i v e w r i t e r i s not an 
i n i t i a t o r of movements and ev e n t s , but an a p o l o g i s t f o r a given group 
of agents who do i n f a c t act i n a c e r t a i n way and want c e r t a i n t h i n g s . 
I d e o l o g i c a l t h e o r i s i n g , we could 3 a y , on t h i s view, i s the b u s i n e s s of 
p u t t i n g a g l o s s upon i n t e r e s t and d e s i r e t h a t would otherwise be naked. 
We should, I t h i n k , be very f a m i l i a r with t h i s vi r;w of th i n g s 
f o r i t i s almost as common as that, which I have c a l l e d the commonplace 
model, and perhaps t h i s "X.^_ due to the extennive i n f l u e n c e of Freud and 
Marx on our general c u l t u r a l outlook. However, d e s p i t e i t s c o n s i d e r a b l e 
p o p u l a r i t y and indeed p l a u s i b i l i t y , as a theory i t need not d e t a i n us 
long. That i t i s r i d d l e d with confusion, or more a c c u r a t e l y with 
ambiguity, s i n c e the e x p o s i t i o n I have given i s s c a r c e l y l c n g enough to 
admit confusion, i s , I hope, c l e a r . I s h a l l not t h e r e f o r e examine 
every d i f f i c u l t y i n h e r e n t i n . i t . I n f a c t I wish only to examine one 
r a d i c a l e r r o r which, I t h i n k , . i s of mere ge n e r a l i n t e r e s t . 
3. The q u e s t i o n I have to ask i n 'What kind of remarks ar« the 
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remarks t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f i s f a l s e - c o n s c i o u s b e l i e f and i d e o l o -
g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n ? ' I s h a l l t r y to show t h a t such 
remarks cannot be about th e l o g i c of ideology and t h a t , i f on the 
o t h e r band we take them to be contingent o b s e r v a t i o n s on ideology, they 
are s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d i n scope and, indeed, i n i n t e r e s t . 
To make a remark about the l o g i c of a p r o p o s i t i o n i s at 
l e a s t to give some of the c o n d i t i o n s under which i t makes sense. I f 
I say of the p r o p o s i t i o n "The square on the hypotenuse i s equal to the 
sura of the squares on the other two s i d e s " t h a t i t it) n o n - e m p i r i c a l , 
I i n d i c a t e t h a t the sense of the p r o p o s i t i o n i s not to be found i n 
t h a t area of our language where we l a y c l a i m to matters of contingent 
f a c t , so t h a t any s c r u t i n y , however c a r e f u l , of a c t u a l t r i a n g u l a r 
o b j e c t s would show t h a t the p r o p o s i t i o n had not been understood. I f , 
thee.,the c l a i m t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s are r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s i s 
to be a remark about t h e i r l o g i c , a remark about the 'grammar' of such 
p r o p o s i t i o n s , i t must amount to a c l a i m l i k o 'The statements " A l l 
h i s t o r y i s the h i s t o r y of c l a s s s t r u g g l e " "The proper end of govern-
ment i s the uncovering of c i v i l l i b e r t i e s " are r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s and 
any c o n s i d e r a t i o n of them as r e a l or e f f i c a c i o u s r e a s o n s * r e v e a l s a 
I drop the terra ' f a l s e - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' here because I do not 
understand what i t s c o n t r a s t ' t m e - c G i i s c i o u s i i e s s ' would be, 
and because i u general I • t h i n k the terminology of reason and 
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i s more fr-.ird.Iiar and e a s i e r to handle. In 
f a c t , t h e r e i s not much d i f f e r e n c e , i f any, between the two 
ways of t a l k i n g , so t h a t the omission does not amount to much. 
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f a i l u r e to understand thera' . 
Now t h i s seems very odd to me, f o r i t has the t h i n g , so to 
speak, the wrong way round. We cannot understand what i t i s f o r some-
t h i n g to be a r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n u n l e s s we understand what i t i s f o r i t 
to be a n o n - r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . The i d e a t h a t something i s a r a t i o n a l -
i s a t i o n i s dependent on the i d e a t h a t i t could have been the r e a l 
reason. T h i s r e q u i r e s t h a t the same account must be able, on d i f f e r e n t 
o c c a s i o n s , to be ' r e a l ' reason and r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . I f , t h e r e f o r e , 
something i s a r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n i t could never be b e s i d e the point to 
i n q u i r e what i t v/ould be l i k e as an e f f i c a c i o u s reason. An example 
may help t c make t h i s c l e a r e r . 
Consider the c a s e of a man who opposes the p o l i c i e s of a 
S o c i a l i s t p arty on the grounds that they t h r e a t e n to impinge on the 
c i v i l l i b e r t i e s of i n d i v i d u a l s . Suppose t h a t someone doubts t h i s and 
suggests t h a t , r e a l l y , he wants t c avoid h e a v i e r t a x a t i o n and t h a t a l l 
h i s t a l k of c i v i l l i b e r t i e s i s a mere gl o s s upon h i s ret:l motive, 
m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t . The*"crucial term here i s 'doubts'. vVhat i s 
happening i s t h a t the man's s i n c e r i t y i s being doubted. Hut i n order 
fo r t h i s to'happen t h e r e rous t be something which counts as s i n c e r i t y 
and which i s absent i n t h i s case. I n other words, it. must be p o s s i b l e 
fo r a man to t a l k of c i v i l l i b e r t i e s , i n t h i s context s i n c e r e l y i n order 
fo r him to do so i n s i n c e r e l y . Therefore the reason i t s e l f , by i t v. 
nature, cannot be s i n c e r e or- i n s i n c e r e ; i t i s the g i v i n g of i t t h a i 
can be t h e s e . T a l k of r a t i o n a l ! s p . t i o n , then, cannot be the c h a r a c t e r -
i s a t i o n of a type of reason or a type of reasoning. I t f o l l o w s that 
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remarks about ideology as r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n cannot be remarks about the 
l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r of i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f . The reason f o r t h i s , as I 
have a l r e a d y .implied i s t h a t r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , i f i t i s anything,* i s 
something we do and something we use statements to do. I t has to do 
w i t h the k i n d of act and not the k i n d of p r o p o s i t i o n i n v o l v e d . I n 
s h o r t , though people may r a t i o n a l i s e , b e l i e f s cannot. 
4. The view t h a t ideology i s r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , then, i f i t i s to 
say anything, must be a contingent c l a i m , t h e c l a i m t h a t i d e o l o g i s t s 
are r a t i o n a l i s e r s . Now there i s nothing l o g i c a l l y wrong with t h i s 
c l a i m . I f t h e r e i s any substance to the notion of r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , i t 
i s the k i n d of t h i n g t h a t people can'do and t h e r e i s no reason why i t 
could not be the case t h a t those who have been and are well-known 
i d e o l o g i c a l w r i t e r s were a l l i n v o l v e d i n t h i s kind of s e l f - d e c e p t i o n . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , though i t may be c l e a r t h a t t h i s could be the 
case, i t i s not at a l l obvious t h a t i t i s i'L^.?. 0-^. ^' 1 G c a s e - 1 1 1 a n v 
event, n e i t h e r Engels nor Freud, nor any of those who have advanced 
t h i s view with enthusiasm, have a c t u a l l y produced the v a s t q u a n t i t y of 
h i s t o r i c a l evidence which would be needed to support such a c l a i m . 
Not only has t h i s not boon done, i f indeed evidence on t h i s s c a l e i s 
1 I have assumed throughout t h a t 'rati.onH 1 i a a t i o n ' i s a 
coherent concept d e s c r i b i n g a genuine f e a t u r e of our exper-
i e n c e . I am not convinced thar. t h i s i s so. But my purpose 
i s to draw out what an examination of t h i s very cowmen view 
cpja c o n t r i b u t e to our f i n a l c o n c l u s i o n s and the s t a t u s and 
coherence of the concept does not a f f e c t t h i s purpose. 
a v a i l a b l e , but i t should be observed t h a t , s i n c e such a c l a i m i s a 
c l a i m about the contingent f a c t s of the p a s t , there i s no reason why 
someone i n the f u t u r e , or someone i n the p a s t h i t h e r t o undiscovered, 
should net formulate b e l i e f s which were unmistakably i d e o l o g i c a l i n 
c h a r a c t e r , and y e t indulge i n no r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n whatsoever. 
No doubt I have pursued t h i s l a s t p o i n t beyond what was 
s t r i c t l y n e c e s s a r y . C e r t a i n l y I know of no one who has a c t u a l l y 
advanced the p o s s i b l e but audacious c l a i m t h a t a l l i d e o l o g i s t s i n the 
past have been r a t i o n a l i s e r s . U s u a l l y any c l a i m such as t h i s i s modi-
f i e d and attenuated to the p o i n t where i t i s simply suggested that whe 
people take to the b u s i n e s s of a r t i c u l a t i n g and r e f l e c t i n g upon what 
they b e l i e v e i n morals and p o l i t i c s , what f o l l o w s , very o f t e n , i s a 
p i e c e of r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n and s e l f - e x o n e r a t i o n , and not l e a s t tho.se who 
go i n f o r moral and p o l i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n on a grand s c a l e . T h i s 
a t t e n u a t e d v e r s i o n has, no doubt, some t r u t h i n i t , but as an h i s t o r i -
c a l a s s e r t i o n s an a s s e r t i o n about the contingent f a c t s of the p a s t , 
i t makes no s p e c i f i c c l a i m , and as we saw, i t cannot be thought of as 
a c l a i m about l o g i c at a l l . I f i t i s t r u e t h a t i d e o l o g i s t s v e r y o f t e n 
r a t i o n a l i s e , i t i s no doubt t r u e of many be s i d e s them and i n s a y i n g 
t h i s we have not s a i d anything about i d e o l o g i s t s o r t h e i r work i n 
p a r t i c u l a r . 
5. T h i s theory i s now r e v e a l e d f o r what i t v e r y o f t e n i s , m e r e l ; 
an attempt to throw doubt on the i n t e g r i t y o f a c e r t a i n s o r t o f w r i t e r 
ond, as such, i t s c a r c e l y m e r i t s the- t i t l e ' theory' . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t . 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n has had some i n t e r e s t , p a r t l y because t h i s i s , more or 
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l e s s , t h e p i c t u r e which l i e s behind the use of 'ideology' as a term 
of abuse, and p a r t l y because we are now c l e a r e r , perhaps, over what 
i s i n v o l v e d i n s a y i n g something about the l o g i c of ideology. 
I I 
1. The second s c e p t i c a l view which I wish to examine, though 
i t bears something of a resemblance to the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n theory, i s 
s t r i c t l y a theory of the l o g i c of ideology. I t i s the view e l a b o r a t e d 
by P r o f e s s o r Michael Oakeshott i n h i s book R a t i o n a l i s m i n P o l i t i c s . * 
I n b r i e f , Oakeshott argues t h a t i d e o l o g i e s stand i n r e l a t i o n t o p r a c -
t i c a l l i f e a3 a b s t r a c t i o n s from a concrete manner of conduct, and as 
a ' c r i b ' to a c t i o n f o r the i n e x p e r i e n c e d . Oakeshott t e l l s us: 
I t i s supposed that a p o l i t i c a l ideology i s the 
product of i n t e l l e c t u a l p r e m e d i t a t i o n and t h a t , 
because i t i s i t s e l f a body of p r i n c i p l e s not i t s e l f 
i n debt to the a c t i v i t y of at t e n d i n g to the arrange-
ments of a s o c i e t y , i t i s able to determine find guide 
the d i r e c t i o n of t h a t a c t i v i t y . I f , however, we con-
s i d e r the c h a r a c t e r of a p o l i t i c a l ideology more 
c l o s e l y , we f i n d at once t h a t t h i s s u p p o s i t i o n i s 
f a l s i f i e d . So f a r from a p o l i t i c a l ideology being the 
q u a s i - d i v i n e parent of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , i t t u r n s 
1 Rome of the p o i n t s of view advanced i n t h i s work are, a:: i t 
seems to me, modified i n P r o f e s s o r Oakeshott' s? l a t e s t book 
On Human Conduct . However, s t r i c t l y speaking, I am not 
concerned with hf.s view, but with the coherence of a s e t of 
arguments which appear i n h i s e a r l i e r book. 
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out to be i t s e a r t h l y s t e p - c h i l d . I n s t e a d of an 
independently premeditated scheme of ends to be 
pursued, i t i s a system of i d e a s a b s t r a c t e d from 
the manner i n which people have been accustomed 
to go about t h e i r b u s i n e s s of a t t e n d i n g to the 
arrangements of t h e i r s o c i e t y . The pedigree of 
every p o l i t i c a l ideology shows i t to be the c r e a -
t u r e , not of premeditation i n advance of p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y , but of meditation upon a manner of 
p o l i t i c s . i 
Consider Locke's Second T r e a t i s e of C i v i l Govern-
ment , read i n America and France i n the e i g h t e e n t h 
century as a statement of a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s to be 
put i n t o p r a c t i c e , regarded t h e r e as a p r e f a c e to 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . But so f a r from being a p r e f a c e , 
i t has a l l the marks of a p o s t s c r i p t , and i t s power 
to guide d e r i v e d from i t s r o o t s i n a c t u a l p o l i t i c a l 
e x p e r i e n c e . Here, s e t down i n a b s t r a c t terms, i s a 
b r i e f conspectus of t h e manner i n which Englishmen 
were accustomed to go about the b u s i n e s s of a t t e n d i n g 
to t h e i r arrangements - a b r i l l i a n t abridgement of the 
p o l i t i c a l h a b i t s of Englishmen. ^ 
On t h i s r e a d i n g then, the systems of a b s t r a c t i d e a s 
we c a l l i d e o l o g i e s are a b s t r a c t s of some kind of con-
c r e t e a c t i v i t y . ^ 
As t h i s l a s t comment suggests, though Oakeshott haa here been 
concerned w i t h the p o l i t i c a l realm, t h i s i s not the only sphere i n 
which we may f i n d i d e o l o g i e B . The other realm which he d i s c u s s e s at 
l e n g t h i s t h a t of m o r a l i t y and we s h a l l have to c o n s i d e r some of h i s 
remarks i n that context s h o r t l y , But f i r s t I want to draw a t t e n t i o n to 
the p l a c e Oakeshott c o n s i d e r s t h e s e i d e o l o g i e s to have i n the conduct 
of p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s . They are, he t e l l s us, c r i b s f o r the i r t e s p e r -
1 ' P o l i t i c a l E d u c a t i o n ' i n R a t i o n a l i s m i n P o l i t i c s London 1962 
pp.118-19 
2 i b i d , pp.120-121 
3 i b i d , p.119 
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ien c e d . For the man of l i t t l e or no p o l i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , an ideology, 
which i s a s u c c e s s f u l abridgement of a s o c i e t y ' s p o l i t i c a l h a b i t s , 
v / i l l give him some i n d i c a t i o n as to how to r e a c t to and act i n the 
p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s with which circumstance c o n f r o n t s him. Compare 
cooking, where the man ignorant of cookery may have r e c o u r s e to a book 
of r e c i p e s . Such r e c i p e s , however, are merely a b s t r a c t i o n s from 
someone e l s e ' s a c t u a l experience i n cookery and can never hope to 
r e p l a c e the experience i t s e l f . Where perhaps the experience i s i n 
danger of being l o s t , such a c r i b may to a degree s u s t a i n i t and 
t r a n s l a t e i t . But only i n an a b s t r a c t form. Our mastery of the p r i n -
c i p l e s of cookery cannot supply the mastery of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
those p r i n c i p l e s and only the l a t t e r can produce concrete and s e l f - -
iaoved a c t i v i t y . 
I t might be supposed t h a t an ignorant man, some 
e d i b l e m a t e r i a l s and a cookery book together com-
p r i s e the n e c e s s i t i e s ox a telf-moveri ( o r c o n c r e t e ) 
a c t i v i t y c a l l e d cooking. But nothing i s f u r t h e r 
from the t r u t h . The cookery bock i s not, an indep-
endently p r e / i m i t a t e d beginning fro.n which cooking 
can s p r i n g ; i t i s nothing more than an a b s t r a c t of 
somebody's knowledge of how to cook: i t i s the 
s t e p - c h i l d , not the parent of the a c t i v i t y . The 
book, i n i t s turn, jr.ay help to s e t a man unto 
d r e s s i n g a dinner, but i f i t were h i s s o l e guide 
he could never, i n f a c t , begin: the book speaks only 
to those who know already the kind of t h i n g to 
expect from i t and consequently how to i n t e r p r e t i t . 
The burden of Oalceshott * c argument here seems to be that a 
p o l i t i c a l ideology i s not a n . e s s e n t i a l p a r t of the a c t i v i t y of p o l i t i c s 
1 i b i d , p.119 
being i t s e l f an a b s t r a c t i o n from concrete a c t i v i t y . But i t may p l a y 
a r o l e i n a c t i v i t y . However, when i t does so, i t p l a y s a s u b s i d i a r y 
r o l e to t h a t of a c t u a l h a b i t u a l conduct and not the e s s e n t i a l d i r e c t -
i n g p a r t the i d e o l o g i s t s o f t e n assume. T h i s view does not q u i t e 
square w i t h what Oakeshott has t o say elsewhere. I n h i s essay on 
p o s s i b l e forms o f moral l i f e , he appears to argue t h a t at l e a s t i n 
m o r a l i t y ideology i s e s s e n t i a l . Here he suggests t h a t only the moral 
l i f e which mixes the forms of h a b i t u a l behaviour w i t h t h a t of the 
r e f l e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of a o r a l r u l e s and the p u r s u i t o f moral i d e a l s 
caii be a r e a l i t y . He goes on to suggest, indeed, t h a t the i d e o l o g i c a l 
form, provided i t does not dominate, lends to t h i n moral l i f e c e r t a i n 
advantages which i t would not otherwi.se enjoy. 
T h i s mixed form of the moral l i f e may be supposed 
to enjoy the advantages t h a t s p r i n g from a r e f l e c -
t i v e m o r a l i t y - the power i;c c r i t i c i s e , reform, 
find e x p l a i n i t s e l f , and the power to propagate i t -
s e l f beyond the range of t h e custom o f a s o c i e t y . 
I t w i l l enjoy a l s o the a p p r o p r i a t e i.ntel'i a c t u a l 
confidence i n i t s mora] standards and purposes 
In s h o r t , t h i s form o f the cso.rGlJ.ifo w i l l o f f e r 
to a s o c i e t y advantages i s i i - i i l a r to those o f a r e l i -
gion which has taken to i t s e l f a theology (though 
not n e c e s s a r i l y a popular (heology) but without 
l o s i n g i t s c h a r a c t e r as a way o f l i v i n g . " 
But t h i s ambiguity as t o the e s s e n t i a l o r i n e s s e n t i a l nature 
of ideology n e e d net d e t a i n «r. at t h i s p o i n t . Vox the primary ousr.tio 
i s whether, . e s s e n t i a l o r not, Oakcshott'» underst aadin p o f v.-hnt 
"foe Tower of Babel' R a t i o n a l i s e i n P o l i t i c s , p. 70-71 
ideology ijs w i l l bear p r o t r a c t e d s c r u t i n y . To conduct such s c r u t i n y 
we must, I t h i n k , examine the notion of a b s t r a c t i o n . 
2. Oakeshott d e s c r i b e s ideology v a r i o u s l y as ' a b s t r a c t s from 
some k i n d of concrete a c t i v i t y ' , 'an a b s t r a c t of somebody's knowledge 
how', ' a b s t r a c t e d from a customary manner', 'an abridgement of h a b i t s ' , 
'an a b b r e v i a t i o n of some manner of concrete a c t i v i t y ' , 'a t r a d i t i o n a l 
manner of attending to the arrangements of a s o c i e t y Ebridged i n t o a 
d o c t r i n e of ends to be pursued'. Now a l l of t h e s e e x p r e s s i o n s are 
s i m i l a r but such v a r i e t y of terminology i s almost c e r t a i n to give r i s e 
to ambiguity about what e x a c t l y Oakeshott claims an ideology to be and 
what e x a c t l y i t i s r e l a t e d t c . The words he uses are not synonymous. 
A h a b i t , f o r example, i s something t h a t i s done u n c o n s c i o u s l y , but 
something done n e v e r t h e l e s s . A c t i o n s are h a b i t u a l . I n c o n t r a s t , a 
manner i s not an a c t i o n at a l l , or even a s e r i e s of a c t i o n s , but a 
s t y l e i n which a c t i o n s a r c performed. Again, a c t i v i t y i s a more 
ge n e r a l term than e i t h e r of t h e s e and r e f e r s to the whole sphere of 
doing(encompassing conscious and unconscious behaviour and the manner 
i n which t h a t behaviour appears. Ovor a g a i n s t a l l of these xs 
the knowledge how to do something, which i s not a c t i v i t y at a l l but 
stands i n an informing r e l a t i o n to and i s made manifest i n a c t i v i t y . 
Ideology, Oakenhott ban t o l d us, i s an a b s t r a c t i o n from some or a l l of 
t h e s e . Indeed, even here t h e r e i s some ambiguity as to i t s being an 
a b s t r a c t i o n or an abridgement' and these t e r n s are not synonymous. 
S i n c e , then, a l l of t h e s e are d i f f e r e n t we might expect abridgements 
and r.I.fit."actions from them to look d i f f e r e n t arid we s h a l l be i n c l i n e d 
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to ask which, i f any, of the s e i s p r o p e r l y ideology on Oakeshott's 
account. But c l o s e r examination w i l l r e v e a l , I t h i n k , t h a t we cannot 
abridge or a b s t r a c t from them a l l , f o r not a l l of them are the s o r t s 
of t h i n g s which admit of a b s t r a c t i o n . 
I n f a c t , I t h i n k the term 'abridgement' must be abandoned 
a l t o g e t h e r . An abridgement i s nothing o t h e r than a shortened v e r s i o n 
of t h a t which i s abridged so t h a t i t cannot be d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d . An 
abridged novel i s s t i l l a n o v e l , s t i l l , indeed, the very self-came 
novel by the same w r i t e r , but with some passages removed. In an 
abridgement t h e r e i s no metamorphosis; the abridgement of a poem, s a y ; 
does not r e s u l t i n a d i f f e r e n t poem but the Z'&KO poem shortened. 
Abridgement, then, cannot c h a r a c t e r i s e the r e l a t i o n between d i f f e r e n t 
t h i n g s of d i f f e r e n t k i n d s . 
F u r t h e r , i t should be c l e a r from t h i s t h a t , though Oakesbutt 
here and t h e r e suggests t h a t such i s the ca:se, n e i t h e r Imowledge nor 
experience are the s o r t of t h i n g which could admit of abridgement. An 
experience i s what i t is and though one man may have l e s s e x p e r i e n c e 
than another, what he has i s not an abridged v e r s i o n of the f i r s t 
man's ex p e r i e n c e , but d i f f e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e . E x p e r i e n c e i s j u s t what-
ever has been experienced and t h i s cannot be shortened or lengthened. 
N e i t h e r can the knowledge we possess be abridged. I f I dc not know 
as much as another man J. cannot have an abridged v e r s i o n of h i s knowledge. 
I n order f o r t h i s to be p o s s i b l e I should have to have known a l l t h a t 
he knew and then have had th a t knowledge shor-tensd, some parte of i t 
removed. But how i s t h i s to be acccrop 1 ighcd? And oven i f i t were, 
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th a t i s , even i f i t made sense to suppose t h a t i t could be, what 
would make my 'shortened' knowledge a shortened v e r s i o n of h i s ? I t 
seems, then, t h a t we must abandon the term abridgement i n our t a l k 
of ideology and focus our a t t e n t i o n on the, perhaps more promising, 
term ' a b s t r a c t i o n ' . 
3. An a b s t r a c t i o n i s something which i s l e s s complete and l e s s 
concrete than t h a t from which i t i s an a b s t r a c t i o n . But l i k e an 
abridgement, i t must be the same s o r t of t h i n g as i t s o r i g i n a l . We 
may a b s t r a c t the theme of a symphony and say ' I t goes something l i k e 
t h i s 1 but what f o l l o w s must be tho same s o r t of t h i n g as t h a t 
from which i t has been a b s t r a c t e d , i n t h i s c a s e m u s i c a l F.ouud3. Again, 
the a b s t r a c t of an argument i s l e s s complete than the o r i g i n a l : 
t h e r e are many d e t a i l s omitted. I t i s l e s s c o n c r e t e , or we might 
say, not concrete at a l l , f o r , as i t fitands, we cannot l o g i c a l l y 
a r r i v e at the c o n c l u s i o n from the premises s t a t e d . But the a b s t r a c t , 
l i k e the o r i g i n a l , c o n s i s t s i n such t h i n g s as premises and c o n c l u s i o n . 
The a b s t r a c t of an argument cannot be r e p r e s e n t e d i n g e s t u r e s jmy 
more than the a b s t r a c t of a symphony can be given i n p i c t u r e s . 
I t f o l l o w s from t h i s that any a b s t r a c t i o n from a c o n c r e t e 
a c t i v i t y must i t s e l f be a p i e c e of a c t i v i t y . And we can t h i n k of 
examples of t h i s . We ca» demonstrate how something i s done and when we 
do so we may omit much of I;bo d e t a i l which, would a c t u a l l y occur i n the 
performance. We reduce a dance, f o r example, to a fev; simple • .steps. 
The demonstration i s not concrete i n t h a t i f we execute the .steps out-
l i n e d alone, we w i l l not a c t u a l l y be d.'uiciug. But the point oi such 
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a demonstration, l i k e t h a t of any a b s t r a c t i o n , i s to give someone 
'an i d e a of the t h i n g ' . 
I t w i l l be seen from t h i s t h a t , s i n c e by Oakeshott's account 
i d e o l o g i e s are the s o r t s of t h i n g which may be w r i t t e n down, an ideo-
logy cannot a c t u a l l y be an a b s t r a c t i o n from concrete a c t i v i t y , or from 
a manner, or from h a b i t s , s i n c e i t i s not i t s e l f any of t h e s e t h i n g s . 
The b e s t , indeed the only, candidate we are l e f t w i t h , then, i s an 
a b s t r a c t i o n from somebody's knowledge how to do something. But even 
t h i s i s not q u i t e r i g h t . Rather, i f we f o l l o w Oakeshott's c h a r a c t e r i s a -
t i o n , an ideology must be an a b s t r a c t i o n from someone's account of 
t h e i r knowledge. 
T h i s can be seen more c l e a r l y i f we keep two f a c t s i n mind. 
Though a man may know how to do something he may not be able to a r t i -
c u l a t e t h a t knowledge. A s c i e n t i s t must be able t o reason s c i e n t i f i c a l l y 
and a b r i l l i a n t s c i e n t i s t must be able to no so with e x c e l l e n c e , but i t 
would be wrong to expect even the b r i l l i a n t s c i e n t i s t aa such to be 
able to a r t i c u l a t e the l o g i c of s c i e n c e , and of course we know very 
w e l l that o f t e n i t i s s c i e n t i s t s who, when amongst p h i l o s o p h e r s , are 
l e a s t c l e a r about the c h a r a c t e r of: s c i e n c e . Again, a wan way be an 
a s t u t e p o l i t i c i a n and have an i n t i m a t e and d e t a i l e d knowledge about how 
to s e t about doing t h i n g s i n the House of Co minor, u and s t i l l i t dooH not 
f o l l o w t h a t he w i l l be able to forwulate the r u l e s and conventions of the 
House, s t i l l l e s s s a y anything about t h e n a ture of p o l i t i c s . 
The knowledge o f t h e s c i e n t i s t and the p o l i t i c i a n can only 
be rever.Ied i n doing and communicated by i n j u n c t i o n . T h i s if? not t o 
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say t h a t knowing i.s_ doing here. A man may very w e l l know how some-
t h i n g i s done, but, f o r other purposes, keep h i s knowledge to h i m s e l f . 
But, at l e a s t i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , the only v e h i c l e f o r t h e e x p r e s s i o n 
of h i s knowledge w i l l be i n doing and i n demonstration. The knowledge 
t h a t i s formulated i n words, on the othe r hand, has speech as the 
v e h i c l e of i t s e x p r e s s i o n and i t s a r t i c u l a t i o n w i l l take the form of 
a d e s c r i p t i v e account. But again, the words and sentences do not con-
s t i t u t e the kncv/ledge i t 3 e l f , but are an account of t h a t knowledge. 
The view of ideology as a b s t r a c t i o n , then, must be e i t h e r 
the view t h a t a l l accounts of knowledge (B) are l e s s c o n c r e t e than 
any demonstration (A) of the same knowledge, or the view t h a t some 
accounts (C) are a b s t r a c t e d from complete accounts ( B ) . The f i r s t 
of t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e s I have suggested does not make sense. B cannot 
be an a b s t r a c t i o n from A s i n c e i t i s not the Fame s o r t o f t h i n g . That 
they stand i n some r e l a t i o n , of course. X aw not doubting, but t h i s 
r e l a t i o n cannot be one o f a b s t r a c t i o n s i n c e t h i s would i n v o l v e deeds 
being a b s t r a c t e d .into words, something which I have argued i s 
i m p o s s i b l e . 
I t must, then, be the c a s e t h a t any view of ideology as 
a b s t r a c t i o n amounts to the vicv; t h a t , t h e s e t of p r e p o s i t i o n s which 
comprise, an ideology c o n s i s t s i n l e s s thar; a complete account o f the 
r u l e s governing behaviour and t h e r e f o r e l a c k s the c o n c r e t e n e s s which is 
ne c e s s a r y to enable. Thus, f o r example, the statement of a 
u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e Never do X' , w i l l exclude r . I I the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
' except when Y, Z, e t c . ' , which r;ro noc'ssavy i r t h a t p r i n c i p l e i s t o 
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cohere w i t h a l l the other r u l e s o p e r a t i n g i n our s o c i a l l i f e . The f o r -
mulation 'Never do X', then, w i l l be an a b s t r a c t i o n from the a c t u a l r u l e s . 
No doubt i t w i l l be suggested at t h i s p o i n t , and perhaps with 
some j u s t i f i c a t i o n , t h a t a l l t h i s d e t a i l e d argument has l e f t Oakeshott's 
theory q u i t e u n a f f e c t e d . T h i s i s the theory t h a t knowledge of the ab-
s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e can never s a t i s f a c t o r i l y r e p l a c e knowledge of the a c t u a l 
o p e r a t i n g r u l e s . I t cannot t h e r e f o r e provide the p r a c t i c a l guidance 
which the l a t t e r would do and i s , t h e r e f o r e , a l e s s than s a t i s f a c t o r y 
source or r e s o u r c e f o r a c t i v i t y . Now of c o u r se I am not arguing a g a i n s t 
the view t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g and w r i t i n g cannot generate s e l f -
moved a c t i v i t y . Indeed, e a r l i e r my own arguments l e d me to a s i m i l a r 
c o n c l u s i o n . The q u e s t i o n t h e r e f o r e i s about the p l a c e t h a t such t h i n k i n g 
and w r i t i n g docs have i n a c t i v i t y and my argument i s t h a t t a l k of 
a b s t r a c t i o n cannot help us here. 
My o b j e c t i o n s to Oakeshott's account can, I thin!:, be r e v e a l e d 
e x p l i c i t l y be a s k i n g What £?orts of t h i n g s would an a b s t r a c t account of 
t h i s s o r t be an account of? Now the answer to t h i s q u e s t i o n must, at 
l e a s t i n p a r t , be the same as t h a t to e. s i m i l a r question about the 
( t h e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e ) complete account of which the ideology i f an 
a b s t r a c t i o n . Y.'hat could such an account c o n s i s t i n ? I t would, I suggest, 
have to r e v e a l the formative and r e g u l a t i v e r u l e s , conventions and pro-
cedures which govern our a c t i o n s i n thv.t sphere of p r a c t i c e w i t h which 
the ideology i s concerned. The only feasible"'" d e s c r i p t i o n of a way of 
I do not say that such an account l a a c t u a l l y p o s s i b l e . I n f a c t , i n 
Chapter '"•! I gi vc reasons f o r th i n k i n g t h a t 31 i s not. Here 1 merely 
want to argue that soiaa «uch account i s t h e on ly t h i n g t h a t could 
bo a b s t r a c t e d from arid t h a t svou i f we assume the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
t h i s , Oakeshott's t a l k of a b s t r a c t i o n can cot be sm^taiiiad. 
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l i f e would be t h a t which r e v e a l e d the c o h e s i v e p a t t e r n among a 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of v a r i o u s a c t i o n s . And, s i n c e what p a t t e r n t h e r e i s 
i s the r e s u l t of a l l these a c t i o n s being o b s e r v a t i o n s of the same 
r u l e s , the d e s c r i p t i o n would have to take the form of the r e v e l a t i o n , 
perhaps d e t e c t i o n , of those r u l e s . V,'e could not d e s c r i b e 'chess as 
such' except i n the terms of the formative ( c o n s t i t u t i v e ) r u l e s and 
general r e g u l a t i v e r u l e s observed by s k i l l e d chess p l a y e r s . An 
account at a simple o b s e r v a t i o n a l l e v e l would c o n s i s t i n the d e s c r i p -
t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l movements and would not r e v e a l what made them 
moves i n chess. 
An a b s t r a c t account of such a r e a l i t y , then,would be e i t h e r 
a shortened l i s t of the r u l e s which a c t u a l l y p e r t a i n i n a given p r a c -
t i c a l context or a shortened f o r m u l a t i o n of the r u l e s themselves. 
Os.kesh.ott does seem to have something of t h i s s o r t i n mind when he 
r e f e r s to ideology as an a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e or s e t of r e l a t e d fibstrr^et 
p r i n c i p l e s , f o r by p r i n c i p l e I understand a r u l e g e n e r a l i s e d o u t of a 
number of r u l e s . Thus 'Never eat mefit on F r i d a y s ' i s an a b s t r a c t f o r -
mulation of the r u l e s , c o n v e n t i o n s and b e l i e f s which not o n l y g i v e t h a t 
p a r t i c u l a r C a t h o l i c o b s e r v a t i o n i t s p o i n t , but admit o f i t s change, 
Q u a l i f i c a t i o n and e x c e p t i o n . 
Someone m i g h t argue here t h a t by Oukoshctt's account we 
©ust understand all a r t i c u l a t e d f o r m n l a t i o j i s as a b s t r a c t i n t h i s s a n s c 
and though we may c o n s i d e r some more o r l e s s complete t h a n o t h e r s t h e y 
are a l l , i n comparison t c t h e unforraulfvted p r a c t i c a l knowledge, a b s t r a c t 
and i n c o m p l e t e . T h i s suggestion has, I t h i n k , much i n syapathy w i t h 
Oakeshott's account and c e r t a i n l y i t i f ; a p l a u s i b l e * cvne. But i f my 
e a r l i e r argument i s c o r r e c t > we must "'eject i t because o f what i t 
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e n t a i l s . I f a l l a r t i c u l a t e d accounts a r c of t i i i s c h a r a c t e r then a l l 
of them must be i d e o l o g i c a l . But i d e o l o g i e s , we have been t o l d , are 
a b s t r a c t i o n s and to c o n f l a t e a l l the accounts l e a v e s us with nothing 
from which they could be a b s t r a c t i o n s . 
The d i f f e r e n c e between knowledge a r t i c u l a t e d i n words and 
u n a r t i c u l a t e d knowledge i s not t h a t the one i s more or l e s s complete 
than the other, but t h a t the manner i n which the same knowledge i s 
conveyed i s d i f f e r e n t . The q u e s t i o n of the s a t i s f a c t o r i n e s s or o t h e r -
wise of a p a r t i c u l a r manner of conveyance as opposed to another i s not 
a matter of i t s completeness. Knowledge of a p a r t i c u l a r dance may be 
conveyed by a demonstration of a l l the movements or j u s t the p r i n c i p a l 
movements, or by a diagram of a l l the movements or j u s t the p r i n c i p a l 
movements. The diagram i s not l e s s complete than the demonstration 
but simply a d i f f e r e n t means of t e a c h i n g and l e a r n i n g t h e dance. Of 
course, we may p r e f e r the demonstration as a h e u r i s t i c method because 
the diagram r e q u i r e s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and the demonstration does not. 
But such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s not n e c e s s a r y because o f i t s a b s t r a c t 
c h a r a c t e r but because i t i s not i t s e l f a s e r i e s of p h y s i c a l movements 
i n space. As a diagram i t may be q u i t e complete. I f i t be s a i d t h a t , 
some knowledge cannot be captured i n a formulated phrase ithat t h e r e 
are some t h i n g s w h i c h cannot be s a i d b u t must be shown, t h i s i s n o t t o 
say t h a t a r t i c u l a t i o n can o n l y convey them i n uu a b s t r a c t f o r m , b u t 
t h a t a r t i c u l a t i o n cannot .convey them a t ai'j . 
Perhaps t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s w i l l be c l e a r e r i f I p u t them !>•; t h e 
context o f an example. Consider i c e ci.se o f cookery agr.in. The 
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cookery book, we have been t o l d , i s an a b s t r a c t i o n from somebody's 
knowledge how to cook. Now I do not want to deny t h a t an ignorant 
man, some e d i b l e m a t e r i a l s and a cookery book are not s u f f i c i e n t f o r 
a self-moving a c t i v i t y . Indeed they may not be enough f o r any a c t i v i t y 
at a l l , f o r i t i s p l a i n t h a t , though we may know what i s to be done 
next, we may not be able to do i t ; though we may know t h a t here we are 
to c r a c k tv/o eggs, we may not have the d e x t e r i t y to do i t . Cut what I 
do deny i s t h a t the cookery book i s an a b s t r a c t i o n from someone's exper-
i e n c e . A man who composes a r e c i p e may w r i t e 'Add a pinch of mustard' 
because experience has taught him t h a t t h i s w i l l b r i n g out the f l a v o u r 
of beef. The i n j u n c t i o n i s a l e s s o n from h i s exper i e n c e and not an 
attempt, more or l e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y , to capture t h a t e x p e r i e n c e . 
E x p e r i e n c e i s something we have had or have not had and though we may 
l e a r n from the experience of others we do not do so by a c q u i r i n g some 
attenuated form of t h e i r experience o u r s e l v e s . And i f we have never 
had someone e l s e ' s e x p e r i e n c e we can never do anything t h a t r e q u i r e s 
our having done i t . E x p e r i e n c e stands i n r e l a t i o n to such injunction;:, 
as a t e s t of t h e i r a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s and not as t h e i r content. 
4. Let us apply a l l t h i s to i d e o l o g i e s then. I d e o l o g i e s , i t 
has been s a i d , are a b s t r a c t i o n s from a concrete a c t i v i t y . They are 
d i s t i l l a t i o n s of a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s we have necm cannot be so. 
I do not deny that the appearance of an ideology's being pre-iueditatod 
i n advance of any a c t i v i t y i s mere appearance. But the advice, exhorta-
t i o n s and p r e s c r i p t i o n s we p r o f f e r when we w r i t e irteologicfcJ l y are the 
r e s u l t s or lessons? of e x p e r i e n c e and not more c r l e s s .good accounts of 
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what t h a t experience has been. They cannot t h e r e f o r e be a c r i b f o r 
the i n e x p e r i e n c e d , i f by t h i s we are to understand a s u b s t i t u t e f o r 
the e x p e r i e n c e they have not had. There i s , i n t h i s sense, no sub-
s t i t u t e f o r experience. 
The impact of t h i s argument upon Oakeshott's view can be 
r e v e a l e d by c o n s i d e r i n g again a passage I quoted e a r l i e r . 
So f a r from a p o l i t i c a l ideology being the q u a s i -
d i v i n e parent of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , i t t u r n s out 
to be i t s e a r t h l y s t e p - c h i l d . I n s t e a d of an i n -
dependently pre-meditated scheme of ends to be 
pursued, i t i s a system of i d e a s a b s t r a c t e d from 
the manner i n which people have been accustomed to 
go about the b u s i n e s s of a t t e n d i n g to the arrange-
ments of t h e i r s o c i e t y . * 
Now, i f my argument i s correct,we must conclude t h a t i d e o l o -
g i e s are not systems of i d e a s a b s t r a c t e d from a customary manner, f o r 
t h e r e could, 1 have suggested, be nothing of t h i s s o r t . N e v e r t h e l e s s 
t h i s does not prevent us from agreeing with Oakeshott t h a t one who 
understands i d e o l o g i e s to be the b e g i n n i n g c f a c t i v i t y has got t h i n g s 
t h e wrong way round, t h a t h i s v i e w i s , l i t e r a l l y , p reposterous. \<o can 
a l s o agree t h a t t a l k o f independent p r o - m e d i t a t i o n here i s misconceived. 
Indeed I have argued i n favour o f both t h e s e c l a i m s a l r e a d y . But t c 
say t h a t i d e o l o g i e s cannot begin a c t i v i t y i s i t s e l f a misconceived 
remark. Ideology i s n o t t h e s o r t o f t h i n g t h a t c o u l d prompt o r f a i l 
to prompt a c t i v i t y , t h o u g h , f o r example, conv e r s i o n t o an. ideology c o u l d . 
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I d e o l o g i c a l conceptions and r e f l e c t i o n s do not stand o u t s i d e p r a c t i c a l 
l i f e i n the sense of being a p r e l i m i n a r y , coming before. But no more 
do they stand o u t s i d e by coming a f t e r , as Oakeshott suggests, by being 
a p o s t s c r i p t or a d i s t i l l a t i o n . Along w i t h other f e a t u r e s , i d e o l o g i e s 
are p a r t of the f a b r i c of p o l i t i c a l and moral l i f e and t h e i r r e l a t i o n -
s h i p to those ot h e r f e a t u r e s must be an i n t e r n a l one. Oakeshott, i n 
f a c t , as I noted e a r l i e r , i s ambiguous on t h i s very p o i n t . For on the 
one hand he suggests t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f and r e f l e c t i o n must have 
an i n t e g r a l p l a c e i n the form of any v i a b l e moral l i f e , and on the 
other maintains t h a t ideology has l i t t l e or no p l a c e i n p o l i t i c s . One 
p a r t of my argument i s t h a t t h i s ambiguity a r i s e s out of the ambiguity 
i n h i s use of the term a b s t r a c t i o n . 
I l l 
1. What i s the value of showing this?? F i r s t , I t h i n k t h a t 
Oakeshott's i s perhaps the only important p h i l o s o p h i c a l conception of 
ideology to have been e l a b o r a t e d at length and, s i n c e the e l a b o r a t i o n 
i s complex and s u b t l e , i t i s worth examining i n d e t a i l . Secondly, I 
think t h a t the o b j e c t i o n s I have made ag a i n s t i t can be g e n e r a l i s e d 
i n such a way as to b r i n g out the two major arguments which t h i s 
t h e s i s seeks to advance, and-which I s h a l l p r e s e n t i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l 
at a L i t e r s t age. 
I f we are agreed, as I t h i n k we must be, that the p r i n c i p a l 
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s i g n i f i c a n c e of i d e o l o g i c a l conceptions and r e f l e c t i o n s must l i e i n 
the realm of conduct, t h a t i t i s , i f anything, a p r a c t i c a l under-
standing t h a t i s s u p p l i e d or enhanced by the i d e o l o g i c a l conceptions 
we come to employ and the i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i n which we may from 
time to time engage, then we s h a l l have to agree t h a t t h e i r c h a r a c t e r 
i s to be understood not so much i n terms of the form of the p r o p o s i t i o n s 
i n which those conceptions are found or those r e f l e c t i o n s e x p r e s s e d * 
as i n terms of the p l a c e they occupy or could occupy i n the conduct of 
someone's l i f e . T h i s means th a t there i s some room, i n the form of 
i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s and the shape of i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n , f o r a 
discrepancy between the s u p e r f i c i a l appearance of such p r o p o s i t i o n s 
and what we might c a l l t h e i r l o g i c a l form, t h e i r a c t u a l c h a r a c t e r . 
One such i n s t a n c e of t h i s i s the case where what i s s a i d to be b e l i e v e d 
looks l i k e an a b s t r a c t aim or end i n view and which need not be any-
t h i n g of the s o r t . The f o l l o w i n g example, I t h i n k , w i l l help to make 
t h i s p l a i n e r . 
I f someone t e l l s me t h a t he in t e n d s to con t e s t a coming 
e l e c t i o n w i t h the aim of e n t e r i n g P a r l i a m e n t , h i s aim i s a concrete 
one. T h i s i s to say t h a t h i s aim, being e l e c t e d to P a r l i a m e n t , i s one 
where what counts as s u c c e s s and what counts as f a i l u r e i s q u i t e c l c a r -
1 'file f o r m o f p r o p o s i t i o n s w i l l be c r u c i a l i n , f o r example, 
h i s t o r y o r s c i e n c e . Tne p r o p o s i t i o n ' S t a l i n d i n not. d i e 
soon enough' i s , because of i t s f o r m , i n c a p a b l e o f i n v e s -
t i g a t i o n by h i s t o r i a n s qua h i s t o r i a n s . 
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cut and determinate. I f , by v/ay of c o n t r a s t , someone t e l l s me t h a t 
h i s aim i s the uncovering of c i v i l l i b e r t i e s , t h i s aim i s a h i g h l y 
a b s t r a c t one. For though we can and do use the term ' c i v i l l i b e r t i e s ' 
i n a f a i r l y c o ncrete way, i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r and d i s t i n c t 
f o r us to be sure what would count as s u c c e s s i n t h i s endeavour and 
to know when the aim had been accomplished. I n the f i r s t case the 
p r a c t i c a l s t e p s n e c e s s a r y f o r the attainment (though not the guarantee) 
of the aim are determinate; they are known and re c o g n i s e d . I n t h e 
second case, w i t h i n broad l i m i t s , a host of d i f f e r e n t a c t i o n s may 
f o l l o w and we cannot be s u r e whether these are ap p r o p r i a t e or not. 
Nov/ i f i t i s supposed that- t h i s end, 'the uncovering of c i v i l 
l i b e r t i e s ' i s to guide a c t i v i t y i n the way t h a t a purpose guides our 
a c t i o n s , then i t must make a very poor job of doing so. For, j u s t 
because a host of d i f f e r e n t a c t i o n s may reasonably f o l l o w , the c h i e f 
f u n c t i o n of a purpose, to enable us to s e l e c t a c e r t a i n course of 
a c t i o n i n p r e f e r e n c e to o t h e r s , cannot be s u p p l i e d . The a b s t r a c t n e s s 
of the aim prevents i t . But we should be mistaken i f we thought t h a t 
a l l those e x p r e s s i o n s l i k e 'the uncovering of c i v i l l i b e r t i e s ' were 
abstract, aims. I t need not be the case t h a t when a man says 'My aim 
i s l i b e r t y f o r a l l ' t h a t the notion of l i b e r t y stands i n r e l a t i o n to 
1 T h i s i s n o t t o su g g e s t t h a t t h e f i r s t t i l i n g t o be done i s 
t o c l a r i f y c r d i s t i n g u i s h i t , t o d e f i n e our t e r m s . There 
i s n o t h i n g 'wrong 1 w i t h t h e t e r m as i t i s . 
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h i s conduct as a r a t h e r cloudy and hopeless aim. I f someone t e l l s me 
th a t he w i l l f i g h t f o r l i b e r t y , I need not expect a s p e c i f i c s e t of 
a c t i o n s to f o l l o w at a l l . For what he has r e v e a l e d to me by speaking 
i n t h i s way i s not the purpose or end of h i s a c t i o n s but one of the 
v a l u e s or norms by which the worth of h i s a c t i o n i s to be a s s e s s e d . 
L i b e r t y i n t h i s case i s not the goal above a l l g o a l s , the aim not of 
a day's or a month's but of a l i f e - t i m e ' s a c t i o n s , but one of the v a l u e s 
which informs h i s a c t i o n s and i n terms of which they are to be made 
i n t e l l i g i b l e . I f we t a l k of a b s t r a c t i o n here v/e are mistalc.cn, I t h i n k , 
and our mistake l i e s i n our being m i s l e d by what has been c a l l e d the 
' s u r f a c e grammar' of the e x p r e s s i o n s be uses. For we must acknowledge 
t h a t b e l i e f s and conceptions may play a r o l e i n conduct not immediately 
id e n t i f i a b J e with t h a t which the s u r f a c e appearance of t h e i r d o c t r i n a l 
f o r m u l a t i o n s suggests. 
At t h i s point we may note a c u r i o u s c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n Cukesbott's 
account. Having acknowledged that the s i g n i f i c a n c e of i d e o l o g i c a l works 
has been.; and was intendco t o be, i n the realm of conduct, Oakeshctt 
argues t h a t they l o g i c a l l y cannot i n f l u e n c e conduct; t h a t they are t h e 
wrong ki n d of'thought f o r a c t i v i t y . b u t i f they cannot have any impact 
i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e , t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e cannot l i e i n e i t h e r tins bene-
f i c i a l or t h e d e s t r u c t i v e i n f l u e n c e they have had there?' 
1 T h i s is s i m i l a r to the m i s t a k e t h a t L u t h e r mates i n ' S e c u l a r 
A u t h o r i t y ' , where he argues t h a t t h e s e c u l a r a u t h o r i t y s h o u l d not. 
i n t e r f e r e i n s p i r i t u a l m a t t e r s on t h e grounds t h a t i t i f ; l o g i c -
a l l y p o w e r l e s s t o do . 
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I n s h o r t , i d e o l o g i c a l w r i t i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the n i n e -
t e e n t h century, has o f t e n been almost i n e x t r i c a b l y mixed with academic 
or t h e o r e t i c a l i n q u i r y . I n consequence the form t h a t t h a t w r i t i n g 
assumes i s o f t e n one which suggests a p l a c e i n conduct which i t l o g i c a l l y 
could not occupy. Both the r a t i o n a l i s t and the s c e p t i c , i n d i f f e r e n t 
ways, are m i s l e d by t h i s . The r a t i o n a l i s t takes these w r i t i n g s at f a c e 
value and supposes them to have the p l a c e t h a t they appear to have. The 
s c e p t i c r i g h t l y sees t h a t they could not have t h i s p l a c e and wrongly 
supposes them to have v i r t u a l l y no p l a c e at a l l . My argument i s t h a t 
such w r i t i n g s can have a p l a c e , but t h i s must be other than t h e i r 
appearance suggests. I s h a l l r e t u r n to t h i s q u e s t i o n l a t e r i n the 
t h e s i s . * 
3. The second g e n e r a l f a l l a c y which I should l i k e to c l a i m my 
o b j e c t i o n s to Oakeshott have brought out i s what might be c a l l e d the 
f a l l a c y of the e s s e n t i a l i s m of speech. S i n c e the whole of the next 
chapter i s concerned to e l a b o r a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n i t s e l f and the 
importance of the d i s t i n c t i o n which t h i s f a l l a c y f a i l s to draw, I K h a l i 
only touch upon one aspect of i t here. 
I t seems to me t h a t the accounts of ideology which we have 
considered i n the second chapter and i n thi:-: both t h i n k of speech and 
w r i t i n g as being the primary or most appropriate form of communication 
i n i d e o l o g i c a l matters. Oakeshott speaks of ideology as ' s e t s of p r i n c i -
p l e s ' and ' -jystenis of i d e a s 1 and appears to share w i t h fcho p r o t a g o n i s t 
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of the commonplace mode] the view t h a t what the i d e o l o g i s t says and 
w r i t e s , i n some sense, makes e x p l i c i t what i s only i m p l i c i t i n h i s 
actions.''' T h i s suggests t h a t words are more r e a d i l y i n t e l l i g i b l e than 
a c t i o n s , But t h i s need not be so, at l e a s t i n the realm of conduct. 
The b u s i n e s s of l e a r n i n g how to welcome somebody, f o r example, i s a 
matter of a c q u i r i n g , at one and the same time and i n the same way, an 
a b i l i t y to act and to speak a p p r o p r i a t e l y . We do not l e a r n to i d e n t i f y 
c e r t a i n a c t i o n s as 'welcomes' or 'welcoming' independently of l e a r n i n g 
how to welcome people, and indeed, could not do so. I t f o l l o w s from 
t h i s t h a t i f someone's a c t i o n s are u n i n t e l l i g i b l e to me, i t i s at l e a s t 
p o s s i b l e , and i should say on o c c a s i o n s probable, t h a t any v e r b a l 
' e x p l a n a t i o n ' of those a c t i o n s from him would be e q u a l l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
I f 1 cannot see anything r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n , say, students occupying the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b u i l d i n g of a U n i v e r s i t y , i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e i r 
' explanation', t h a t they are ' t r y i n g to overthrow the c c p i t a l i s t system* 
2 
w i l l mean much e i t h e r . 
1 Of course, what if- marie e x p l i c i t i s d i f f e r e n t f o r each. F o r t k a 
r a t i o n a l i s t i t i s tin? p r i n c i p l e s and en da of the a c t i o n s in ques-
t i o n , together with the grounds upon which the goodness or badness 
cf. thoce a c t i o n s i s to be arsyessed. For P r o f e s s o r Oak ©short v/hct 
i s r e p e a l e d i s a mistaken idon of a c t i v i t y wh:ich 'may cor.fuse 
a c t i v i t y by p u t t i n g i t on. thy wYoap scec.t * . However, perhaps i t 
i s worth emphasising again t h a t I have not been exa-.nini«g P r o c e s s o r 
Onkeshott's p e r s o n a l v.i.c-v/, but r a t h e r a certa.i:!. s e t of <u-guz>eciTS. 
2 As t h i n example shows, there a r c , of course, d i f f e r e n t l e v e l ; ; ci ' 
iden t i i ' i e a t i o n . Something may be iiitelJ.i.&ible at one l e v e l ar-cl 
not v.t another, .for oxamplo 'knee l i n g ' asicl 'praying', 
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The i d e a t h a t speech can always, by r e v e a l i n g the grounds of 
an a c t , make i n t e l l i g i b l e a c t i o n s which otherwise are not i n t e l l i g i b l e 
seems to me p a r t and p a r c e l of what 1 am c a l l i n g the f a l l a c y of the 
e s s e n t i a l i s m of speech. P r e c i s e l y how t h i s f a l l a c y works i n the context 
of t h i n k i n g about ideology and what the r a m i f i c a t i o n s of i t s c o r r e c t i o n 
are w i l l occupy me i n the next chapter. 
4. Before t u r n i n g to t h a t q u e s t i o n , I should perhaps say something 
about my use of the term s c e p t i c . I t might be s a i d t h a t I have not i n 
f a c t presented any genuinely s c e p t i c a l account of ideology and t h a t , 
though those I have c r i t i c i s e d are no doubt c r i t i c i s a b l e , I have not 
shown that s c e p t i c i s m i s an i m p l a u s i b l e and i n d e f e n s i b l e view of i d e o l o -
g i c a l b e l i e f and argument. The f i r s t t h i n g to be s a i d i n r e p l y i s th a t 
there i s indeed reason f o r c a l l i n g the t h e o r i e s I have examined s c e p t i c a l . 
I should l i k e to argue t h a t the gr e a t wealth of e t h i c a l w r i t i n g and 
r e f l e c t i o n which goes by the name ideology c o n s i s t s , f o r the most p a r t , 
i n a genuine and p o s s i b l e attempt to s u s t a i n , and perhaps provide, some 
element of cohesion and coherence i n the realm of human conduct. The 
t a l k of r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n and f a l s e c o n s c i o u s n e s s , i t seems to me, denies 
t h i s and t h a t i s why I have c a l l e d i t s c e p t i c a l . P r o f e s s o r Oakeshott's 
view I have c a l l e d s c e p t i c a l p a r t l y because he in t r o d u c e s i t as the 
remarks of a s c e p t i c himself"'" and p a r t l y because of i t s a f f i n i t y to 
.1 See the i n t r o d u c t i o n to 'Pol5 t i c a l E d u c a t i o n ' i n 
R a t i o n a l i s m i n P o l i t i c s , p. 110 
75 
some of the opinions of the most reputed of s c e p t i c s , . Hume. 
Ne v e r t h e l e s s , i t must be admitted that to have shown tv/o 
p a r t i c u l a r s c e p t i c a l accounts to be mistaken i s not to show s c e p t i c i s m 
about ideology to be a mistake. I n the remainder of t h i s t h e s i s I s h a l l 
t r y to e l a b o r a t e a p o s i t i v e view of ideology and one which w i l l , I hope, 
show the s c e p t i c a l account to be misconceived. I n the course of doing 
t h i s I s h a l l at p o i n t s address myself to o b j e c t i o n s from 'the s c e p t i c ' . 
I do not mean to imply by t h i s t h a t those o b j e c t i o n s have been or ever 
would be r a i s e d by those whose w r i t i n g s I have s p e c i f i c a l l y c onsidered. 
The s c e p t i c who o b j e c t s to my argument i s , ' i f you l i k e , an i d e a l i s a t i o n . 
We have seen reason J t h i n k , both to abandon the attempt to 
understand ideology on the model of philosophy and to r e j e c t the 
s c e p t i c i s m which t h i s might prompt us to. I s h a l l t h e r e f o r e l e a v e the 
comparison of philosophy and ideology l o r the moment and t u r n to another 
comparison, which has, i f anything, been more popular, namely the i d e n t i -
f i c a t i o n of ideology as ao?.\e v a r i e t y of r e l i g i o n . The e x p l o r a t i o n of 
the e x t e n t raid the l i m i t s of t h i s p a r a l l e l w i l l occupy me throughout 
P a r t Two. 
P A R T T W O 
IDEOLOGY AND RELIGION 
"The realm of f a i t h i s not a c l a s s f o r numskulls 
i n the sphere of the i n t e l l e c t u a l , or ?ni asylum 
f o r the feeble-minded. f a i t h c o n s t i t u t e s a 
sphere a l l by i t s e l f ... " 
KIERKEGAARD 
CHAPTER 4 
The Transcendence of F a i t h 
"V/hat i s mirrored i n language, I cannot use 
language to e x p r e s s " 
WITTGENSTEIN 
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1. Both the commonplace and the s c e p t i c a l accounts of ideology 
have turned out, upon p r o t r a c t e d s c r u t i n y , to mistake the product of 
an ideology f o r i t s essence. That i s to say, both accounts understand 
i d e o l o g i e s to c o n s i s t i n s e t s of p r i n c i p l e s or d o c t r i n e s , the one h o l d i n g 
such p r i n c i p l e s to be n e c e s s a r y to and p r i o r to p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y , the 
other c o n s i d e r i n g them s u p e r f l u o u s a d d i t i o n s , of one s o r t or another, 
to concrete p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . T h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of i d e o l o g i e s as 
s e t s of formulated d o c t r i n e s cannot be s u s t a i n e d , p a r t l y f o r the reasons 
I have already given, and p a r t l y because i t ignores a d i s t i n c t i o n which 
I take to be fundamental to any p h i l o s o p h i c a l t a l k about ideology. T h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n can, I t h i n k , b e s t be made c l e a r i n the context of a compar-
is o n between ideology and r e l i g i o n , a comparison which t h i s p a r t of the 
t h e s i s w i l l seel; to explore. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n I have i n mind it? t h i s . I n one sense the 
word 'ideology' r e f e r s to p e r s u a s i o n s ( p h i l o s o p h i e s ) , p o l i t i c a l and moral 
o f t e n , l i k e P u r i t a n i s m , N a t i o n a l i s m , E x i s t e n t i a l i s m , i d e o l o g i e s which 
lend a comsion i d e n t i t y to groups of people o t h e r w i s e enfe&ged i n q u i t e 
d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s , a r t i s t s , t h e o r i s t s , p o l i t i c i a n s , pamphleteers, 
party agents, and so on. Xn the second sense of the term,'ideology' 
r e f e r s to a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y , the a c t i v i t y of 
r e f l e c t i n g us?on and fo r m u l a t i n g the d o c t r i n e s of an ideology i n the f i r s t 
sense. Pnine's j } i g b t s of Man , M i l l ' s Oa L i b e r t y , Marx's C a p i t a l 
and J.-ippiaan' s The P u b l i c Philosophy are a l l pieceo of ideology i n the 
second sens** of the term. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n f i n d s a p a r a l l e l i n t h a t 
betv/esu r e l i g i o n and theology. For s i m i l a r ? y . w h i l e a r e l i g i o n , 
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C h r i s t i a n i t y say, i s t h a t which binds together those whose p a r t i c u l a r 
a c t i v i t i e s are d i f f e r e n t , the p r i e s t , the t h e o l o g i a n , p a s t o r , e v a n g e l i s t , 
worshipper, theology i s an i n t e l l e c t u a l e n t e r p r i s e , namely the attempt 
to formulate and s t a t e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y the d o c t r i n e s of a r e l i g i o n . But 
i t i s not an i n t e l l e c t u a l e n t e r p r i s e which stands o u t s i d e the f a i t h to 
which the t h e o l o g i a n adheres; each t h e o l o g i a n speaks from w i t h i n a 
community of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e v e r s and i t i s nonsense to t a l k as though 
h i s t a s k i s to r a t i o n a l l y a s s e s s or s e c u r e 1 the t r a d i t i o n of which he i s 
a p a r t , r a t h e r than give p a r t i c u l a r e x p r e s s i o n to i t s b e l i e f s and con-
c e p t i o n s . S i m i l a r l y , each i d e o l o g i s t speaks from w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
p e r s u a s i o n and h i s t a s k i s to a r t i c u l a t e t h a t p e r s u a s i o n , not to judge 
i t . I f he does o f f e r , as i d e o l o g i s t s almost always do, j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
of h i s views, t h e s e are not to be understood as p r o o f s , f o r they are i n 
1 I cannot understand those t h e o l o g i a n s , T F Torrance, f o r example, 
who speok of ' e s t a b l i s h i n g modern theology on a sound s c i e n t i f i c 
b a s i s ' ( S c o t t i s h J o u r n a l of Theology). I can only suppose them 
to mean th a t t h e r e i s no le3S c e r t a i n t y about what they have to 
say than about what s c i e n t i s t s have to say. I f t h i s i s the case 
the c e r t a i n t y t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e to t h e o l o g i a n s i s of q u i t e a 
d i f f e r e n t s o r t from t h a t of s c i e n t i s t s , as I hope to br i n g out 
l a t e r i n P a r t Two, and t a l k i n g i n t h i s way w i l l only confuse. 
I t i s sometimes supposed t h a t t h i s view s p r i n g s from K a r l E a r t h ' s 
t h e o l o g i c a l w r i t i n g s . But Barth say;; 'The Church must not w i t h -
hold from the world, nor must i t confuse or c o n c e a l , the f a c t 
t h a t God isi knowable to us i n His grace, and because His grace, 
only i n H i s grace. For t h i s reason i t can make r.o use of n a t u r a l 
theology with i t s d o c t r i n e of another kind of fcnowability of God.' 
Church Dogmatics Edinburgh 1957, Vol 2 : i , p.172 
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no sense e x t e r n a l to the p e r s u a s i o n . To show the Tr u t h of Marxism or 
C h r i s t i a n i t y i s not l i k e proving i t s d o c t r i n e s to be t r u e . Only p a r t i c -
u l a r d o c t r i n e s can be s a i d to be t r u e or f a l s e , coherent or incohe r e n t . 
I d e o l o g i e s , l i k e r e l i g i o n s , are n e i t h e r t r u e nor f a l s e but l i v i n g or 
de ad. 
Thi3 d i s t i n c t i o n between i d e o l o g i e s i n the f i r s t sense (what I 
s h a l l c a l l f a i t h s ) and ideology i n the second sense (what I s h a l l c a l l 
r e f l e c t i o n and d o c t r i n e ) i s easy to b l u r . When a man t e l l s us t h a t he 
i s , say, a Swedenborgian or a C h r i s t a d e l p h i a n , the most n a t u r a l and 
immediate q u e s t i o n i s about what he b e l i e v e s . And the answer he w i l l 
supply w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y take the form of a d o c t r i n a l e x p r e s s i o n of 
h i s f a i t h . But both he and we are mis talc en i f we suppose t h a t , by answer-
i n g i n t h i s way, he has giv e n us the essence of h i s f a i t h , or i t s founda-
t i o n , What he s a y s , the d o c t r i n e he r e l a t e s , i s not the e x p r e s s i o n , 
but one e x p r e s s i o n of t h a t f a i t h . The f a i t h i t s e l f i s transcendent. I t 
can only be made manifest i n the t i l i n g s he says and does,and cannot be 
d i s t i l l e d . 
2. The f u l l e x t e nt of the mistake of supposing t h a t i d e o l o g i e s 
can be reduced to s e t s of d o c t r i n e s , the M i s t a k e of i d e n t i f y i n g ideology 
ir. the f i r s t sense w i t h ideology i n the second, of i d e n t i f y i n g a 
r e l i g i o n w i t h a theology i t has generated,can be brought out i n the 
f o l l o w i n g way. Suppose we were to ask the question. 'What do C h r i s t i a n s 
b e l i e v e ? 1 How would we s e t about answering thi.v? V.'e would most natu.ra.lly, 
I suggest, survey a l l those who have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been .regarded aa th ft 
g r e a t e s t C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r s and attempt to d i s t i l l what balisf.-s thc-y 
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shared. Amongst these t h i n k e r s would undoubtedly be St P a u l , Origen, 
Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, C a l v i n , K i e r k e g a a r d and Bart h . Now i n t h i s 
b r i e f l i s t t here i s a c o l l e c t i o n of w r i t e r s so d i s p a r a t e t h a t . t h e 
attempt to d i s t i l l t h e i r shared d o c t r i n e s would, i f i t r e s u l t e d i n any-
t h i n g , produce a very s m a l l number of d o c t r i n e s indeed. Of the s e t h e r e 
would almost c e r t a i n l y be none which was not e i t h e r , not d i s t i n c t i v e l y 
C h r i s t i a n ( f o r example, God i s omnipotent) or, was not disputed by some 
C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r or group excluded from the l i s t . Even i f t h i s were 
not so, even i f t h e r e were one or two d i s t i n c t i v e l y C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e s 
which were denied by no one, t h i s s h o r t l i s t could s c a r c e l y be co n s i d e r e d 
an answer to the q u e s t i o n 'What do C h r i s t i a n s b e l i e v e ? ' f o r no a c t u a l 
C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r could be s a i d to have b e l i e v e d j u s t these d o c t r i n e s . 
F u r t h e r , i t i s doubtful whether these b r i e f d o c t r i n e s by themselves, i n 
vacuo, would be b e l i e v a b l e . 
I t should be c l e a r by now th a t t h e r e i s se.niething wrong wi t h 
the q u e s t i o n 'What do C h r i s t i a n s b e l i e v e ? ' and something r a d i c a l l y wrong 
with t h i s way of t r y i n g to d e a l with i t . And s i m i l a r l y , the q u e s t i o n s 
'What do S o c i a l i s t s b e l i e v e ? ' 'What are the b a s i c d o c t r i n e s of Marxism? 1 
'What i s L i b e r a l i s m ? ' are a l l s u b j e c t to the same d i f f i c u l t i e s . The 
source of these d i f f i c u l t i e s l i e s , I t h i n k , i n the f a c t of a f a i t h ' s 
being transcendent and, as I hope to show, r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s f a c t can 
avoid many of the t r o u b l e s c u s t o m a r i l y encountered by those who t r y t c 
write, about i d e o l o g i e s , 
The f i r s t , t h i n g wrong wi t h attempts, l i k i ; t h a t I have o u t l i n e d , 
to answer qu e s t i o n s .'i :i ke 'What do C h r i s t i a n s b e l i e v e ? ' i s t h a t i t i s , so 
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to speak, s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g . The f i r s t move i s to draw up a l i s t of 
widely r e c o g n i s e d C h r i s t i a n s and to survey t h e i r d o c t r i n e s . But t h i s 
supposes t h a t v/e can i d e n t i f y C h r i s t i a n s i n advance of our determining 
what C h r i s t i a n s b e l i e v e . Of course we can do t h i s , but my poi n t i s th a t 
having drawn up the l i s t and given an account of the d o c t r i n e s of those 
on the l i s t , we have al r e a d y answered, i n so f a r as t h a t i s p o s s i b l e at 
a l l , the q u e s t i o n w i t h which we began. To go on to a b s t r a c t from those 
d o c t r i n e s , or to g e n e r a l i s e them, i s , n e c e s s a r i l y , to give an incomplete 
account of what those w r i t e r s b e l i e v e d , f o r t h a t i s what we are 
a b s t r a c t i n g and g e n e r a l i s i n g from. And the dangers are g r e a t e r than 
t h i s . I f , f o r example, we d i s c o v e r t h a t of the w r i t e r s we have chosen 
to c o n s i d e r , a l l but Aquinas b e l i e v e d i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n by f a i t h a l o n e , t h e 
temptation is to say th a t h i s i s a d i f f e r e n t v a r i e t y of C h r i s t i a n i t y , or 
even that Aquinas i s not ' r e a l l y ' a C h r i s t i a n . But the l i s t v/e drew up 
i n the f i r s t p l a c e was a l i s t of we11-known C h r i s t i a n s ! ^  
T h i s approach to the study of ideology and r e l i g i o n l o s e s 
whatever p l a u s i b i l i t y i t had when we see t h a t i t cannot even begin to 
cope w i t h some o f the most important t h e o l o g i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l d i s -
putes ox a l l . I suggested e a r l i e r that t h e o l o g i a n s and i d e o l o g i s t s are 
not t h e o r i s i n g between f a i t h s but each w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r f a i t h . I t 
1 C o n s i d e r a p a r a l l e l h e r e I n a l l t h e r e c e n t d i s c u s s i o n s 
which suggest t h a t E n g c l s was n o t ' r e a l l y ' a M a r x i s t . 
I s n o t t l i i c t h e i r v>i s t a k e a l s o ? 
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i s a p e c u l i a r i t y of many of the c o n t r o v e r s i e s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between one t h e o r i s t and another are d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n 
the one f a i t h , so t h a t w h i l e what each b e l i e v e s i s to be c h a r a c t e r i s e d 
by i t s o p p o s i t i o n to the other, these opposed b e l i e f s must, i n some 
sense, both be p a r t of the one f a i t h . Thus both C a t h o l i c and P r o t e s t a n t 
theology must be C h r i s t i a n . The b e l i e f s and d o c t r i n e s of t h e i r r e s p e c -
t i v e t h i n k e r s , then, are to be understood i n terras of o p p o s i t i o n to 
each other. The d o c t r i n e s of C a l v i n and Loyola, f o r example, can only 
be recounted as incompatible, and y e t c l e a r l y they are both C h r i s t i a n 
w r i t e r s . And t h i s i s not as odd as i t seems, f o r we should remember 
t h a t , though opposed i n d o c t r i n e , they shared the same f a i t h . I f 
d o c t r i n e s a r c c o n t r a d i c t o r y t h i s does not destroy the f a i t h . I t i s 
d o c t r i n e s t h a t are t r u e and f a l s e , c o n s i s t e n t and i n c o n s i s t e n t . F a i t h s , 
as I have a l r e a d y suggested, are l i v i n g or dead. Indeed i t may be a 
mark of the l i v i n g and burning q u a l i t y of a f a i t h t h a t i t generates 
d o c t r i n a l o p p o s i t i o n s . 
From t h i s l a s t remark v/e can see the profound e r r o r i n as k i n g 
and t r y i n g to answer the qu e s t i o n 'What do C h r i s t i a n s b e l i e v e ? ' f o r i t 
presupposes t h a t C h r i s t i a n i t y i s p r i m a r i l y b e l i e v e d . But t h i s may not 
be so. The c e l e b r a t i o n of the E u c h a r i s t or Holy Communion, though a 
d i s t i n c t i v e l y C h r i s t i a n p r a c t i c e and undertaken, by C h r i s t i a n Beets almost 
without e x c e p t i o n i n a v a r i e t y of forms, i s not a matter of b e l i e f but 
p r a c t i c e . I do not mean to suggest t h a t b e l i e f i s not i n v o l v e d but v e r y 
o f t e n . i t iik b e l i e f s about the sacrament which d i v i d e or at l e a s t d i s -
t i n g i i i t i h between C h r i s t i a n s and the a c t u a l p r a c t i c e which u n i t e s thisis;. 
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The point I want to make i s th a t r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e s may 
ser v e to provide the i d e n t i t y which C h r i s t i a n s share and d o c t r i n e s may 
serve to ch a l l e n g e or modify t h i s i d e n t i t y . P r a c t i c e s are not b e l i e f s , 
but they a r e a s much a p a r t of a man's r e l i g i o u s or e t h i c a l f a i t h as 
any d o c t r i n e . Again, to take a p o l i t i c a l example, many adherents of 
the Labour p a r t y are d i s a g r e e d about the t e n e t s of s o c i a l i s m , about the 
d o c t r i n e s to which they can and cannot s u b s c r i b e . But the common ide n -
t i t y which they share as members of the labour party can and does (though 
not always) t r a n s c e n d t h i s disagreement. T h e i r mutual p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
and l o y a l t y to the maintenance of the s t r u c t u r e s and l i f e of the p a r t y , 
together w i t h the much l e s s e a s i l y s p e c i f i a b l e a t t i t u d e s and common 
opp o s i t i o n s which they s h a r e , combine to inform the p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n 
which makes i d e n t i t y one wi t h the other p o s s i b l e . 
I n s h o r t , then, when we i d e n t i f y Christian:-.: as C h r i s t i a n s , 
S o c i a l i s t s as S o c i a l i s t s , L i b e r a l s as L i b e r a l s , we i d e n t i f y those who 
share a f a i t h . Our q u e s t i o n 'What do C h r i s t i a n s , or S o c i a l i s t s , or 
L i b e r a l s b e l i e v e ? ' , being about d o c t r i n e s , can only be about the t h e o r e t -
i c a l e x p r e s s i o n of t h o s e . f a i t h s . But what they share i s a common f a i t h , 
not a common d o c t r i n e , so t h a t the only p o s s i b l e answer to the question. 
'What do they b e l i e v e ? ' i s 'A v a r i e t y of t h i n g s ' . I f we grasp t h i s d i s -
t i n c t i o n between d o c t r i n e and f a i t h , however, we need not be t r o u b l e d by 
the u s u a l subsequent q u e s t i o n 'Well i f they a l l b e l i e v e d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s , 
what makes them a l l C h r i s t i a n s ? 1 
T h i s , then, i s the sense i n which f a i t h s a r c transcendent. The 
argument f o r t h e i r e x i s t e n c e i s always that, they reako c e r t a i n k i n d s o f 
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i d e n t i t y p o s s i b l e . But they are not themselves p a l p a b l e . The t h e o l o -
gian, the p r i e s t and the communicant, the t h e o r i s t , the party l e a d e r 
and the agent, each of these has a d i f f e r e n t form of e x p r e s s i o n f o r 
h i s f a i t h and i n t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s and a t t i t u d e s what t h a t f a i t h i s i s 
made manifest. I t i s Conservatism which informs the w r i t i n g s of Hugh 
C e c i l , but C e c i l ' s w r i t i n g s do not c o n s t i t u t e Conservatism. I f they 
d i d , how could l a t e r w r i t e r s be j u s t l y c a l l e d C o n s e r v a t i v e and d i s s e n t . 
from h i s views. I t was Conservatism which informed the p o l i c y of T o r i e s 
who would not agree to the 1832 Reform, but i t was e q u a l l y Conservatism 
which informed P e e l ' s acceptance of the Reform as a f a c t i n 1835. And 
only i f we conceive of oppos i t i o n to reform i n terms of the acceptance 
of a b e l i e f or p r i n c i p l e do we f i n d a c o n t r a d i c t i o n here. 
3. I t w i l l be c l e a r t h a t , i f we attempted to give an account of 
what Conservatism iz>, the r e s u l t could only be a s e t of v e r b a l formula-
t i o n s . I t could not be the p u r s u i t o f p o l i c i e s for - t h a t would not be 
an account. Yet i t i s not by studying t h e i r d o c t r i n e s a l o n e t h a t we 
l e a r n who C o n s e r v a t i v e s are and what i t i r . t o be a C o n s e r v a t i v e , f o r , 
as we saw, th a t knowledge may be presupposed by qu e s t i o n s about t h e i r 
d o c t r i n e s . I t f o l l o w s f r o m t h i s t h a t any ay covin t o f Conservatism cannot 
be a d i s t i l l a t i o n o f the f a i t h which informed t h e great C o n s e r v a t i v e 
statesmen o f the p a s t , b u t a t b e s t a r e p e t i t i o n o f t h e d o c t r i n e s t o bo 
found i n t h e w r i t i n g s o f C o n s e r v a t i v e t h e o r i s t s . And o f course we can 
read t h e s e without b o t h e r i n g to r e p e a t fchern. To r e p e a t what t h e y have 
s a i d i s n o t t o add t o our knowledge and most i m p o r t a n t l y , i t i s .not t o 
arid t o ou.i.' knowledge by a v r i v i r . g a t a gen e r a l theory o f what CoYiscrvntisc 1 I K . 
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I f t h i s i s so, i t seems to me to have important i m p l i c a t i o n s 
f o r the study of ideology, f o r i t f o l l o w s t h a t no i n t e l l e c t u a l study of 
p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i e s i s p o s s i b l e . I t i s p o s s i b l e , as a C o n s e r v a t i v e , 
L i b e r a l or whatever, to g i v e i n t e l l e c t u a l e x p r e s s i o n to one's f a i t h . I 
s h a l l s h o r t l y say something about the nature of t h i s e n t e r p r i s e . I t i s 
p o s s i b l e to choose, as many have done, the t h e o r e t i c a l and d o c t r i n a l as 
a medium i n which p o l i t i c a l (or r e l i g i o u s ) l i f e i s to be conducted. 
M i l l , Marx, Hobhouse and Tawney are a l l c l e a r i n s t a n c e s of t h i s . I t i s 
f u r t h e r p o s s i b l e f o r the academic to recount the h i s t o r y of a p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t y or movement (or a Church). I t i s p o s s i b l e to w r i t e a biography of 
some remarkable p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e who was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h some i d e o l o g y , 
a l i f e of, f o r example, Gladstone or T r o t s k y . And a l l o f t h e s e would 
s e r v e to acquaint us w i t h the k i n d of t h i n g L i b e r a l i s m , or whatever, i s ; 
or, more pr o p e r l y , with what, ' l i b e r a l ' means. Eut none o f them, i n c l u d -
i n g the w r i t i n g s o f a man l i k e M i l l , can be s a i d to d e t e r m i n e , e i t h e r 
from an i d e o l o g i c a l or f r o m an academic point of v i e w , what L i b e r a l i s m 
I t i s , f u r t h e r , p o s s i b l e to give an account t o the k i n d o f 
b e l i e f and understanding i n v o l v e d i n a p o l i t i c a l i d e o l o g y or a r e l i g i o n , 
t o p r o v i d e , t h a t i s t o say, a p h i l o s o p h i c a l understanding o f i d e o l o g y . 
But here any i n d i v i c h i a l i d e o l o g y w i l l .verve as an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f 
g e n e r a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e s e s about thought and b e l i e f o f t h i s kind. T h i s 
k i n d o f un ders t and i n g w i l l o n l y be; an understanding o f a p a r t i c u l a r 
i d e o l o g y on i d e o l o g y . And t h i s if.; t h e k i n d o f e n t e r p r i s e i n i'/hieh I 
engaged i a vhis t h e s i s . 
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What i s not p o s s i b l e i s f o r the i n t e l l e c t u a l e i t h e r as an 
i d e o l o g i s t or as an academic to answer the qu e s t i o n 'What i s L i b e r a l i s m , 
S o c i a l i s m or whatever?' w i t h a fo r m u l a t i o n or summary of d o c t r i n e . For 
f a i t h informs a c t i v i t i e s of d i f f e r e n t k i n d s , whereas the f o r m u l a t i o n of 
d o c t r i n e i s only one kind of a c t i v i t y . I t i s the ca s e , of course, t h a t 
many d i s t i n g u i s h e d students of p o l i t i c s and what i s sometimes c a l l e d the 
h i s t o r y of i d e a s , have attempted to do something of t h i s s o r t , to d i s t i l l 
the e s s e n t i a l d o c t r i n e s of an ideology, The number of books e n t i t l e d 
' L i b e r a l i s m ' 'Nationalism' 'Marxism', or whatever, i s very g r e a t . But i n 
the l a s t a n a l y s i s t h e s e books can only c o n s i s t i n a r e p e t i t i o n of the 
d o c t r i n e s of famous exponents of the ideology i n q u e s t i o n , or i n exten-
s i v e i l l u s t r a t i o n s of a general p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e s i s . 1 Such books can 
and do s e r v e a purpose. They may s e r v e to acquaint us wi t h w r i t e r s 
and w r i t i n g s with whom we are u n f a m i l i a r and s e r v e thereby to keep 
such w r i t i n g s a l i v e . But, i f my argument i s c o r r e c t , they cannot be 
s a i d to form p a r t of any concrete and ongoing study of ideology i;uch as 
h i s t o r i c a l or p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t u d i e s may do. Nor can they be a c r i t i c a l 
or r a t i o n a l examination of t h e m e r i t s of v a r i o u s i d e o l o g i e s e i t h e r , f o r 
the tr a n s c e n d e n t nature of f a i t h p r o h i b i t s such endeavour. 
1 K l i e Kedourio's s t i m u l a t i n g book N a t i o n a l i s m c e nbines something 
o f t h e two. He user. the case o f N a t i o n a l i s m t o i l l u s t r a t e a 
gene r a l t h e s i s about i d e o l o g y no!: u n l i k e O a k e s h o t t ' s. N e v e r t h e -
l e s s , he does make t h e m i s t a k e w h i c h I c l a i m t o have exposed i n 
t h i s c h a p t e r . The v e r y f i r s t s e ntence o f hi» book reads 
' N a t i o n a l i s m i s a d o c t r i n e i n v e n t e d i n Kurops at the b e g i n n i n g 
o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y ' . ( K e d o u r i e : N a t i o n a l i s m ) 
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4. I f we keep t h i s major d i s t i n c t i o n between f a i t h and d o c t r i n e 
i n mind, we can see t h a t two d i f f e r e n t s e t s of questions can be r a i s e d , 
which the commonplace and s c e p t i c a l accounts of ideology tended to con-
f l a t e . F i r s t , we may ask 'What does i t mean to be a r e l i g i o u s b e l i e v e r ? ' 
'What does i t mean to accept or adhere to an i d e o l o g y ? 1 'What k i n d of 
d i f f e r e n c e does being a L i b e r a l , f o r example, make to being i n the world?' 
These are q u e s t i o n s whose c e n t r a l concern i s with understanding. What 
k i n d of understanding does f a i t h supply? T h i s i s the q u e s t i o n to which 
I t u r n my a t t e n t i o n i n Chapter 5. 
The second s e t of que s t i o n s which may occupy us i s about 
d o c t r i n e , theology and ideology i n the. second sense of the term. ' I s 
i t p o s s i b l e , and i f i t i s , how i s i t p o s s i b l e , to determine the t r u t h , 
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s , c o r r e c t n e s s of r e l i g i o u s and i d e o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e ? ' 
The c e n t r a l notion here, I t h i n k , i s r a t i o n a l i t y and the c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n 
i s 'What ki n d of r a t i o n a l i t y i s p o s s i b l e i n r e l i g i o u s and i d e o l o g i c a l 
r e f l e c t i o n and s p e c u l a t i o n ? I t i s to t h i s q u e s t i o n t h a t I t u r n my 
a t t e n t i o n i n Chapter 6. 
A l l t h i s I s h a l l do i n the context of a p a i ' a l l e l between 
r e l i g i o n and ideology. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r pursuing t h i s p a r a l l e l 
must u l t i m a t e l y l i e i n the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of doing so. I th i n k t h a t , 
prim;.! f a c i e , to pursue q u e s t i o n s of the nature of ideology i n company 
with some of the problems i n the philosophy of r e l i g i o n i s a p l a u s i b l e 
undertaking. N e v e r t h e l e s s , in- the long run the s u c c e s s of the under-
t a k i n g must he judged by the degree to which ova* t h i n k i n g nhout r e l i g i o n 
h elps us to get c'j ea.v about ideolog}'. and our t h i n k i n g about ideology 
helps to c l a r i f y our thoughts on r e l i g i o n . 
CHAPTER 5 
I d e o l o g i c a l and R e l i g i o u s Understanding 
"The q u e s t i o n of r e l i g i o n , l i k e t h a t cf m o r a l i t y 
i s not one of theory: i t i s a q u e s t i o n of the 
l i f e a man i s going to l e a d . " 
H J PATON 
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R e l i g i o u s f a i t h , indeed any f a i t h , must supply an under-
standing concerned with being and a c t i n g , r a t h e r than merely the obser-
v a t i o n or e x p l a n a t i o n of phenomena. F a i t h s are, and must be, i n 
T o l s t o y ' s phrase, 'What men l i v e by'. I f we are to d i s c o v e r , then, 
what k i n d of understanding f a i t h s u p p l i e s , we must i n q u i r e i n t o the 
c o n d i t i o n s to be s a t i s f i e d by any understanding which seeks to inform 
conduct. F a i t h , as Ki e r k e g a a r d remarked, i s concerned with problems of 
e x i s t e n c e r a t h e r than problems of i n t e l l e c t . I t was Kierkegaard's 
complaint a g a i n s t the Hegelian p h i l o s o p h i c system t h a t , though i t 
claimed to be the r a t i o n o . l i s a t i o n of C h r i s t i a n i t y , i t could provide 
n e i t h e r guidance nor a s s i s t a n c e i n the problems of men as human agents. 
T h i s f a i l u r e was, i n a sense, i n e v i t a b l e , f o r i t sprang from i t s h y b r i d 
c h a r a c t e r , i t s being an attempt to r a t i o n a l i s e a f a i t h , to p l a c e a 
r e l i g i o n on a f i r m p h i l o s o p h i c a l foundation. Rut philosophy, according 
to K i erkegaard, being an o b j e c t i v e i n q u i r y i n v o l v i n g proof and demon-
s t r a t i o n , i s never capable of anything but s y s t e m a t i c completion. A 
f a i t h , by c o n t r a s t , r e l i e s f o r i t s l i f e and i t s power upon i t s a b i l i t y 
to inform the l i v e s and deeds of men. 
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the o b j e c t i v e , what Kier k e g a a r d c a l l s 
the ' w o r l d - h i s t o r i c a l 1 , and the s u b j e c t i v e , i s c e n t r a l to my f i r s t t h e s i s 
about f a i t h . I s h a l l argue t h a t a f a i t h , whether r e l i g i o u s or p o l i t i c a l , 
i s , i n p. - sense which I hope to make c l e a r , e s s e n t i a l l y a s u b j e c t i v e 
understanding. But 1 s h a l l f u r t h e r argue. i n t h i s chapter and the next, 
that to acknowledge t h i s i s riot tantamount to r e l e g a t e v.g ju«1g«nenvs made 
i n the context of f a i t h to the realm of ' do;'.a1 or mere opinion, p. realm 
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i n which we cannot d i s c r i m i n a t e between r e a l and u n r e a l , the mistaken 
and the c o r r e c t . 
I 
1. We can begin to see the reasons f o r drawing a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the o b j e c t i v i t y provided by a s c i e n t i f i c ^ " understanding and the 
s u b j e c t i v i t y of the understanding of f a i t h by n o t i n g t h e i r attendant con-
c e p t s . A s c i e n c e must, i f i t i s to provide o b j e c t i v i t y , i n v o l v e 
evidence, f a l s i f i c a t i o n , demonstration, proof. I n c o n t r a s t , the notion 
of f a i t h i s l i n k e d to the concepts of doubt, commitment, devotion, 
d i s c i p l c s h i p . A f a i t h may be expressed i n b e l i e f s and d o c t r i n e s , but 
these do not d i f f e r from the p r o p o s i t i o n s and t h e o r i e s of c. s c i o n c e i n 
t h a t they are not q u i t e known, or not known f o r c e r t a i n , or yet to be 
proven. I f i t were p o s s i b l e to know, i n the sense of o b j e c t i v e l y prove, 
t h a t t h i s or t h a t b e l i e f was t r u e , we could i n nc sense commit o u r s e l v e s 
to i t . I f i t were t r u e our commitment would add nothing and i f i t v/ere 
not t r u e our commitment could not save i t from falsehood. T h i s would be 
l i k e supposing that a g.-imbler could gamble when he knew the r e s u l t i n 
advance. But thi.n l a s t image may bo mi s l e a d i n g . I do not mean to 
I li.e-e ' s c i e n t i f i c ' here i n the g e n e r a l sense- and not i n th'A 
r e s t r i c t e d sense of ' n a t u r a l ' s c i e n c e . 
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suggest t h a t b e l i e f i n matters of r e l i g i o n and of e t h i c s i s always 
something of a gamble, but r a t h e r that i f a demonstration of the t r u t h 
of some b e l i e f were p o s s i b l e and were given, f a i t h would not thereby 
be e s t a b l i s h e d or r a t i o n a l i s e d but a b o l i s h e d . I n o t h e r words, b e l i e f 
i n the e x i s t e n c e of God i s not a p r o p o s i t i o n (guardedly) assumed to 
be t r u e by those who pray. Rather, the r e a l i t y God has shows i t s e l f i n 
our p r a y e r s . Were we, t h e r e f o r e , to t r e a t the q u e s t i o n o f God's r e a l i t y 
as a matter f o r o b j e c t i v e i n q u i r y p r i o r to our p r a y i n g , we should nec-
e s s a r i l y remove the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r e l i g i o u s response."^ 
Again: one who b e l i e v e s i n the s o v e r e i g n i t y of the people 
does not s e t about h i s p o l i t i c a l campaigning t e n t a t i v e l y , l e s t what he 
has assumed to be t r u e should, i n the l i g h t o f new evidence or f r e s h 
t h i n k i n g , be shown to be f a l s e . H i s a f f i r m a t i o n of the s o v e r e i g n i t y o f 
the people, and the counter a f f i r m a t i o n s i t provokes, are p a r t and 
p a r c e l o f the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n which he i s engaged, and not the 
assumption on which i t i s based. 
No man w i l l conuD.it h i s l i f e t o the care and 
guidance of an h y p o t h e s i s recognised as such 
... f o r the s c i e n t i f i c man to convert h i s 
hypothesis i n t o a f a i t h were to betray the 
very s p i r i t of s c i e n c e . A hypothesis must 
not t u r n i n t o a dogma, and the s c i e n t i f i c man 
i s the s e r v i t o r of no creed. Hypotheses, con-
sequently, cannot transf o r m c h a r a c t e r . They 
have no p r a c t i c a l vim. ... 
The e f f e c t of t h i s :is w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d i n t'oe famous 
'prayer': '0 God, I f t h e r e i s one, Have my s o u l , i f 
I have one'. 
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The d i f f e r e n c e between a s c i e n t i f i c h y p o t h e s i s 
and r e l i g i o u s f a i t h seems to be fundamental. 
The s c i e n c e may c o n j e c t u r e , r e l i g i o n must "know"; 
t h a t i s to say, i t must be a matter experienced. 
The i d e a s of proof and demonstration, v e r i f i c a t i o n and f a l s i f i c a t i o n 
are a p p l i c a b l e to p r o p o s i t i o n s and hypotheses. But i t i s not i n pro-
p o s i t i o n s t h a t the man of f a i t h b e l i e v e s but i n such t h i n g s as the love 
of God, the power of s a l v a t i o n , the e q u a l i t y of men, the i n e v i t a b i l i t y 
of communism, man's moral goodness, or the h i s t o r i c d e s t i n y of a n a t i o n . 
I n other words, the ' w o r l d - h i s t o r i c a l ' r e q u i r e s an o b j e c t i v i t y , 
•which, when i t i s supplied,removes a l l power to inform conduct. Conduct, 
on the o t h e r hand, can only be s u b j e c t i v e l y informed. T h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y 
and i t s n e c e s s i t y can be made p l a i n e r i n the context of an examination 
of the notion of change. 
F a i t h , l i k e a l l p r a c t i c a l understanding, i s concerned with 
how t h i n g s ought to be. I t occupies t h a t p a r t of our l i f e i n which we 
t r y to change t h i n g s , r a t h e r than e x p l a i n them or contemplate them, to 
change both o u r s e l v e s and the world i n which we are. Now i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t a l l notions of changing must be absent from any o b j e c t i v e i n q u i r y . 
Our s t u d i e s , and the d i s c i p l i n e s of. which they are the e x e r c i s e , cannot 
be concerned to a l t e r the world, f o r the whole point i s to d i s c o v e r unci 
e x p l a i n the world as i t i s . S c i e n t i f i c hypotheses are advanced, as has 
o f t e n been noted, on the resumption t h a t nature in ur.ifono and inanimate. 
1 S i r Henry Jones: The_Fait.li that i n q u i r e s Loudon 'I.£-23, p. 83 
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But they must a l s o be advanced on the assumption t h a t the advancing 
of the hypothesis w i l l not i t s e l f a l t e r the phenomena which the hypo-
t h e s i s seeks to d e s c r i b e and e x p l a i n . I f i t d i d do t h a t i t would be 
s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . The p a s t must, f o r the h i s t o r i a n , be dead. I f i t 
were changeable then h i s mere a c t i v i t y could, r e g a r d l e s s of proof and 
evidence, render h i s h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e f a l l a c i o u s . I f p h i l o s o p h i s i n g 
changes the grounds upon what makes sense makes sense, then i t cannot 
be s a i d to have given the sense of a p r o p o s i t i o n . I f i t s d i s t i n c t i o n 
between, f o r example, what i s moral and what i s non-moral (as opposed to 
immoral) changes t h a t order of t h i n g s , i t cannot be s a i d t o have done 
any d i s t i n g u i s h i n g . 
The c o n c l u s i o n must be, then, t h a t o b j e c t i v e study cannot be 
concerned w i t h l i v i n g and changing.while f a i t h , r e l i g i o u s and i d e o l o g i c a l , 
must be. F a i t h i s concerned not to d e s c r i b e who we are but to determine 
i t and thereby to determine how we w i l l a c t . Someone may convince us 
t h a t we are s i n n e r s but i t i s the acceptance of t h i s f a c t which makes 
us s i n n e r s , f o r now we understand t h i n g s i n such a way t h a t we a c t i n 
r e l a t i o n to God as p e n i t e n t s . Someone may convince us t h a t we a r e , f o r 
example, f i r s t and foremost Irishmen, and i t i s the acceptance of this 
d e s c r i p t i o n which leads us to conduct o u r s e l v e s i n a c e r t a i n manner, to 
value c e r t a i n t h i n g s , to have c e r t a i n a s p i r a t i o n s , i n s h o r t those M a n n e r s , 
v a l u e s and a s p i r a t i o n s which make us I r i s h p a t r i o t s . And I do not inean-
t h a t a l l such t a l k i s c i r c u l a r , i f -that would be a c r i t i c i s m . An 
idee logy or a r e l i g i o n aust provide an understanding v h i c h encompasses 
the unci ft re; tf.vn.der and hi ?i r e l a t i o n s h i p to other persons, and t h i n ^ n . XX 
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t h i s were not so i t could not be the s o r t of t h i n g a man might l i v e 
by. And i f i t i s so, i t cannot hope to be o b j e c t i v e i n the manner of 
s c i e n c e , h i s t o r y or philosophy, where the person of the i n d i v i d u a l 
h i s t o r i a n , s c i e n t i s t or p h i l o s o p h e r cannot p l a y a p a r t without the 
d e s t r u c t i o n of the a c t i v i t y . T h i s i s how, then, ideology i n the f i r s t , 
sense i n which we d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h a t term, i s s u b j e c t i v e ; i t i s the 
k i n d of understanding i n which the understander must have a p l a c e . 
T h e r e f o r e f a i t h only s u p p l i e s an understanding of the world when we 
accept the p a r t t h a t f a i t h determines f o r us. I n t h i s sense, a f a i t h 
s u p p l i e s an understanding of the world and of our p l a c e i n the world 
only when i t i s accepted. 
2. I s h a l l t r y to e l a b o r a t e on the nature of t h i s acceptance 
and t h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y a l i t t l e l a t e r , but f i r s t I want to note t h a t , 
to grasp the e s s e n t i a l s u b j e c t i v i t y of f a i t h i s to see t h e e r r o r i n 
what many well-known authors have s a i d about r e l i g i o n and ideology. 
The, g e n e r a l l y M a r x i s t , suggestion t h a t ideology i s a f a l s e - c o n s c i o u s n e s s 
to be r e p l a c e d by some form of s c i e n c e f a i l s to see t h a t the one, i f 
i t were genuinely s c i e n t i f i c , could not r e p l a c e the other without 
d e s t r o y i n g i t s power to inform and guide our p r a c t i c a l l i f e . I f , 
when he s a i d 'The p h i l o s o p h e r s have only i n t e r p r e t e d the world i n 
various v.'ays; the p o i n t , however, i s to change i t ' , * Marx had i n mind 
ph i l o s o p h e r s whose t a s k was explanatory, he suggested what i t was 
im p o s s i b l e f o r them to do. For i f they had t r i e d to change the world 
K a r l Marx: Theses on Feuerbach XI 
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they must, l o g i c a l l y must, have ceased to do philosophy. I f on the 
other hand he s a i d i t of those whose t a s k was i d e o l o g i c a l , he presented 
a f a l s e dichotomy, f o r to engage i n r e l i g i o u s or i d e o l o g i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n 
i s to t r y to change the order of t h i n g s . The s o - c a l l e d union of theory 
and p r a c t i c e , then, was not an accomplishment, but a l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y . 
C o n v e r s e l y , Popper was equally mistaken i n condemning M a r x i s t 
theory because i t was not s c i e n t i f i c , " ^ f o r , g i v e n the concerns of i t s 
authors and s u p p o r t e r s , i t could not have been. F u r t h e r of course, i t 
was nonsense f o r him to c l a i m t h a t one and the same ki n d of b e l i e f or 
theory could be u n s c i e n t i f i c and dangerous, f o r any theory which 
q u a l i f i e s f o r the terms s c i e n t i f i c or - u n s c i e n t i f i c (as opposed to non--
s c i e n t i f i c ) i s n e c e s s a r i l y impotent and cannot, t h e r e f o r e , be dangerous 
or anything e l s e . And I t h i n k that the t h e o r i e s of Feuerbach and 
Mannheim concerning r e l i g i o n and ideology r e s p e c t i v e l y are s i m i l a r l y 
founded or i l l - f o u n d e d upon t h i s category mistake. 
3. I s a i d e a r l i e r t h a t one of the n e c e s s a r y p r e r e q u i s i t e s of 
f a i t h , as a form of understanding, was the acceptance of the f a i t h i n 
q u e s t i o n , and I hope now to make t h i s c l e a r e r w i t h the a i d of two 
sx&mples, the one r e l i g i o u s and the other i d e o l o g i c a l . 
Suppose someone t e l l s us that 'God s e s s the t r u t h , but w a i t s ' • 
I t may be t h a t our notion of the j u s t i c e of God cannot allow any 
1 I n , f o r example, 'Philosophy of S c i e n c e : a P e r s o n a l Report' i n 
B r i t i s h Philosophy i n '/iid-Ceniury ed C A Kaco, F i r s t . E d i t i o n 
London I S 57 
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o c c a s i o n f o r him to act u n j u s t l y and 'seeing the t r u t h , but w a i t i n g ' 
would c o n s t i t u t e j u s t such an o c c a s i o n . We may, i n s h o r t , r e j e c t the 
suggestion as unworthy of God. On the other hand, t h i s whole way of 
t a l k i n g may be q u i t e s e n s e l e s s to us. We may have no i d e a at a l l what 
has been claimed when i t i s claimed t h a t 'God sees the t r u t h , but w a i t s ' 
and our response w i l l be,then, not an attempt to agree or d i s a g r e e , but 
some acknowledgement of the f a c t t h a t we cannot, and perhaps have no 
d e s i r e t o , do so. We may, of course, go on to suggest t h a t the whole 
j a r g o n i s meaningless, t h a t i s , t h a t i t could not make sense f o r anyone, 
but t h i s would s t i l l be to t r e a t the p r o p o s i t i o n as meaningless r a t h e r 
than f a l s e . 
Again: suppose someone says 'The p r e s e n t economic c r i s i s i s 
y e t another i n s t a n c e of the r u l i n g c l a s s ' s attempt to c r u s h the p r o l e t -
a r i a t i n the advanced s t a g e s of the c o l l a p s e of c a p i t a l i s m ' . We 
might argue with someone who s a i d t h i s , t h i n k i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n f a l s e 
cn the grounds t h a t c a p i t a l i s m i s not i n an advanced stage of c o l l a p s e . 
Or we might agree w i t h what he s a i d , a f t e r having d i s c o v e r e d t h a t the 
extent and b i t t e r n e s s of i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e s has s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s e d 
over the l a s t twenty y e a r s . But i f we were to adopt e i t h e r of these 
responses our r e p l y would be couched w i t h i n the terms of the o r i g i n a l 
c l a i m and w i t h i n the whole framework of understanding i n which such a 
c l a i m i s made. 
Now a framework of understanding i s t h a t whole system of 
concepts and r u l e s of r e a s o n i n g which makes the a s s e r t i o n , c o r r e c t i o n 
and r e j e c t i o n of judgments about the world p o s s i b l e . I t i s only i f we 
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are f a m i l i a r with the r u l e s of s c i e n t i f i c r easoning, f o r example, and 
can employ the concepts of s c i e n c e t h a t we can make s c i e n t i f i c c l a i m s 
about and o f f e r s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s of the v a r i o u s phenomena i n 
the world. And i t i s t h e i r concord w i t h t h e s e r u l e s and t h e i r deploy-
ment of t h e s e concepts which make statements s c i e n t i f i c , independently 
or r e g a r d l e s s of whether they are t r u e or- f a l s e . Indeed the r u l e s and 
concepts of s c i e n c e make assessment of t r u t h and f a l s i t y p o s s i b l e . I n 
the examples j u s t given I have been t r y i n g to show t h a t i n a s i m i l a r 
f a s h i o n i d e o l o g i c a l and r e l i g i o u s d e s c r i p t i o n s of the world must deploy 
c e r t a i n concepts, and my point i s t h a t the acceptance, i n the sense of 
the use, of t h e s e concepts i s p r i o r to any t a l k of t r u t h and f a l s i t y , 
soundness and unsoundness. The i d e o l o g i c a l framework i n terms of which 
t h e s e judgments are made cannot i t s e l f be open to q u e s t i o n , any more 
than a s c i e n t i s t can q u e s t i o n the framework of s c i e n c e ; can i n other 
words wonder whether s c i e n c e i s a ' c o r r e c t ' understanding of the world. 
I did not get my p i c t u r e of the world by s a t i s -
f y i n g myself of i t s c o r r e c t n e s s ; nor do I have 
i t because 1 am s a t i s f i e d of i t s c o r r e c t n e s s . 
No, i t i s the i n h e r i t e d background a g a i n s t which 
I d i s t i n g u i s h between true and f a l s e . -• 
I n other words, we may s e n s i b l y wonder whether t h i s or that M a r x i s t 
c l a i m i s t r u e ; but i t does not make sense to wonder i f Marxism i s t r u e . 
' S t i l l ' , i t might be s a i d , 'new you are drawing a p a r a l l e l 
between s c i e n c e and ideology which you e a r l i e r s a i d co;?ld not be drawn. 
1 W i t t g e n s t e i n : O.n C e r t a i n t y Oxford 1973, para 04 
06 
But t h e r e are two important d i f f e r e n c e s between s c i e n c e and f a i t h 
which the e a r l i e r argument sought to emphasise and which the p a r a l l e l 
j u s t drawn did not deny. I n the f i r s t p l a c e , the s i g n i f i c a n c e of an 
i d e o l o g i c a l or a r e l i g i o u s understanding, an understanding of f a i t h , 
must l i e , at l e a s t f o r the major p a r t , i n the world of conduct. And 
t h i s world, u n l i k e the worlds of i d e a s c o n s t i t u t e d by a t h e o r e t i c a l 
understanding, i s one which we cannot avoid belonging to. The k i n d of 
r a t i o n a l i t y i n v o l v e d i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of an explanatory i n t e l l e c t u a l 
order, a s c i e n t i f i c theory or an h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e f o r example, w i l l 
n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d to the same c o n c l u s i o n , f o r anyone who chooses to 
f o l l o w the r e a s o n i n g . (Provided, of course, the r e a s o n i n g i s sound.) 
I f a man does not or w i l l not f o l l o w the c h a i n of reasoning or accept 
the evidence a p p r o p r i a t e l y presented, he simply ceases to be a s c i e n t i s t 
or an h i s t o r i a n . But i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e i t i s d i f f e r e n t . C l e a r l y a men 
cannot cease to be engaged i n the p r a c t i c a l world because he does not 
t h i n k i n one s e t of concepts and r u l e s of reasoning. The understandings 
which can inform p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y are t h e r e f o r e , to some degree, 
e x c l u s i v e . To t h i n k i n one way, as a Marxist f o r example, i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
not to t h i n k i n another, s:ay as a l i b e r a l . 
T h i s i s the same point as I made e a r l i e r . There i s no 
general sphere of understanding c a l l e d ideology or r e l i g i o n . There 
are only p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i c a l and r e l i g i o u s understandings. There 
i.s no such t i l i n g as t h a t which the commonplace model r e q u i r e d , a u n i t a r y 
background of Reason, a g a i n s t which a l l I d e o l o g i e s s.nd r e l i g i o n s can be 
t e s t e d . T h i s i s not to say t h a t such u n d c r s t a n c l i n g s are p a r t i a l ; they 
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are indeed u n i v e r s a l i n t h a t they enable us to d e s c r i b e and to l e n d 
s i g n i f i c a n c e to, p r e t t y w e l l , any phenomena of our experience. But 
they are incommensurable, at l e a s t to some degree, p r e c i s e l y because 
they make competing demands not simply upon what we must t h i n k , but 
upon what we must do. And to take one of two p o s s i b l e courses of 
a c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r i l y to f a i l to take the other. 
I n the second p l a c e , as i d e o l o g i e s and r e l i g i o n s a re p r a c t i c a l 
understandings they are made manifest not only i n what we say but i n 
how we behave, so t h a t to understand the world i n the terms of one 
i d e o l o g i c a l or r e l i g i o u s p i c t u r e i s a matter of a c t u a l l y conducting 
one's l i f e a f t e r a c e r t a i n f a s h i o n , i n a c e r t a i n p a t t e r n , of a c t i n g and 
r e a c t i n g i n one way r a t h e r than another. The Marxist approves and 
commends one s e t of a c t i o n s and events and the l i b e r a l another, and 
sometimes i t j u s t does not make sense to look f o r the grounds upon which 
such commendation i s based. For some r e a c t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s j u s t are 
those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of l i b e r a l s and M a r x i s t s . The question then of 
whether one understands a f t e r the manner of a l i b e r a l or a M a r x i s t i s 
a q u e s t i o n of how s i m i l a r one's a t t i t u d e s and reaction.'? are to each, a 
matter, i n s h o r t , of which a t t i t u d e s and r e a c t i o n s come n a t u r a l l y . The 
l i b e r a l ' s a t t i t u d e s are what they are and no q u e s t i o n of t r u t h can 
a r i s e here. What could such a q u e s t i o n mean? The p o s s e s s i o n of under-
standing, the k i n d of understanding which enables a man to i d e n t i f y , to 
cope with and to r e a c t to the v a r i o u s events and s i t u a t i o n s with which 
he i s confronted, i s a matter of belonging to t h i s r a t h e r than that. 
nmm:er of l i f e . And the iiicommenaurability benveeu one -.ideology and 
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another, betv/een one r e l i g i o n and another need not appear i n the 
form of a l t e r n a t i v e b e l i e f s so much as d i f f e r e n t ways of l i f e . ' * ' 
4. 'But you are s a y i n g t h a t i n ideology and r e l i g i o n t h e r e i s 
no scope f o r r a t i o n a l c r i t i c i s m , t h a t we must e i t h e r simply accept 
or r e j e c t * . The man who r a i s e s t h i s o b j e c t i o n f a i l s to see, I t h i n k , 
t h a t r a t i o n a l i t y or reasoned t h i n k i n g w i l l only take us so f a r . I do 
not say th a t t h e r e i s no scope f o r r a t i o n a l c r i t i c i s m here, but r a t h e r 
t h a t I do not know what c r i t i c i s m of Marxism, or C h r i s t i a n i t y , or 
L i b e r a l i s m or Buddhism as a whole would, be. Any e x e r c i s e of reason i n 
a c r i t i c a l or p o s i t i v e f a s h i o n pressupposes and can n e i t h e r e s t a b l i s h 
nor a b o l i s h such t r a d i t i o n s of b e l i e f and p r a c t i c e as the s e . I t i s , 
as the examples given above were intended to show, only when we t h i n k 
i n t h a t way and i n those terms t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of whether our 
thoughts are reasonable or unreasonable and our judgments sound or un-
sound can be r a i s e d . 
The o b j e c t i o n , however, may s p r i n g from a f e e l i n g that I have, 
so to speak, h e r m e t i c a l l y s e a l e d each ideology and each r e l i g i o n i n a 
world of i t s own, i n which c a s e the doubts of the o b j e c t o r w i l l not be 
so e a s i l y a l l a y e d . Nov/ t h i s might mean one of two t h i n g s . I t might 
mean f i r s t thai: my argument e n t a i l s t h a t the i d e o l o g i c a l adherent and the 
"There are, f o r i n s t a n c e , . these e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t ways of 
t h i n k i n g f i r s t of a l l - which needn't be expressed by one 
person s a y i n g one t h i n g , another another t h i n g . 
V/hat we c a l l b e l i e v i n g i n i: Judgment Day or not b e l i e v i n g 
i n Judg-.nont Day •• the e x p r e s s i o n of b e l i e ? may play an 
a b s o l u t e l y minor r o l e . " 
W i t t g o a s t e i n , L e c t u r e r and C o n v e r t z t i o n s Oxford 19C6 , p. 55 
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r e l i g i o u s b e l i e v e r can say whatever he l i k e s without any q u e s t i o n s 
being r a i s e d as to i t s r e a s o n a b l e n e s s ; t h a t i n r e l i g i o u s and i d e o l o g -
i c a l matters t h e r e i s a s o r t of g e n e r a l anarchy. I n which c a s e , i t 
w i l l be asked, can we t a l k of understanding at a l l here? But t h i s 
s u ggestion i s no p a r t of my argument, which i s r a t h e r that the c r i t e r i a 
of what i s reasonable and what unreasonable, what i t i s appropriate to 
say and to th i n k a r e i n t e r n a l r a t h e r than e x t e r n a l . T h i s i s not the 
same as c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e r e are no c r i t e r i a at a l l and i n the next 
chapter I s h a l l t r y to o u t l i n e what k i n d of c r i t e r i a may operate here. 
On the othe r hand the o b j e c t i o n may be t h a t the p i c t u r e I 
give i s one of each ideology and each r e l i g i o n being d i s c r e t e and d i s -
t i n c t from every other. But again t h i s i s not so. My argument is 
t h a t i d e o l o g i e s may best be understood as e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , by which 
I mean t r a d i t i o n s w i t h i n a general moral and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Roughly, 
then, we may c h a r a c t e r i s e the d i f f e r e n c e between one ideology and the 
next as a d i f f e r e n c e i n v o c a b u l a r i e s . ^ New the point i s th a t the degree 
to which these v o c a b u l a r i e s o v e r l a p i s a contingent matter. For example 
the way l i b e r a l s and c o n s e r v a t i v e s t a l k about t h i n g s and the vocabulary 
they employ are ofte n , and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h i s century, .-;uito s i m i l a r . 
}.!ut the c o n s e r v a t i v e and Marxist p i c t u r e s of the world have almost no 
eommos: f e a t u r e s , F u r t h e r , one p a r t i c u l a r person may combine a f a m i l i a r i t y 
1 )ly 'vocabulary 1 X do not simply mean the words used. The word 
' P r e j u d i c e ' ,for example, in Burke s i g n i f i e s qui to a d i f f e r e n t 
n otion to t h a t s i g n i f i e d by the sar?.e word i n M i l l . 
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w i t h the v o c a b u l a r i e s of two i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n s which are normally 
thought of as being d i f f e r e n t . He may thereby be able to see something 
i n , say, both l i b e r a l and n a t i o n a l i s t v e r s i o n s of some matter and have 
l o y a l t i e s to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n s (Mazzini f o r example). Or 
one man may be a l i b e r a l who can see the f o r c e of a c o n s e r v a t i v e view 
(Maine) or perhaps a l i b e r a l who f i n d s a good d e a l to sympathise with 
i n a s o c i a l i s t outlook (Hobhouse). I n s h o r t , the d i s c r e t e n e s s between 
f a i t h s i s not to be overemphasised f o r i t i s a contingent and not a 
l o g i c a l d i s c r e t e n e s s . Nor should i t be underemphasised. The d i s c r e t e -
ness t h a t i_s_ p o s s i b l e i s w e l l d e s c r i b e d by A l a s d a i r Maclntyre. 
A r i s t o t e l i a n i s r a , p r i m i t i v e C h r i s t i a n s i m p l i c i t y , 
the p u r i t a n e t h i c , the a r i s t o c r a t i c e t h i c of 
consumption, and the t r a d i t i o n of democracy have 
a l l l e f t t h e i r mark upon our moral vocabulary. 
Within each of these m o r a l i t i e s t h e r e i s a proposed 
end or s e t of ends, a l i s t of v i r t u e s , a s e t of 
r u l e s . But the ends, the r u l e s , the v i r t u e s 
d i f f e r . For A r i s t o t e l i a n i t s m to s e l l a l l t h a t you 
have and give to the poor would be absurd and mean 
s p i r i t e d ; f o r p r i m i t i v e C h r i s t i a n i t y the g r e a t -
s o u l e d man i s u n l i k e l y to pass through the eye of 
the needle which i s the gateway to heaven. A con-
s e r v a t i v e C a t h o l i c i s m would t r e a t obedience to the 
e s t a b l i s h e d a u t h o r i t y as a v i r t u e ; a democratic 
s o c i a l i s m such as Marx's would l a b e l the same 
a t t i t u d e s e r v i l i t y and see i t as the worst of v i c e s . 
For p u r i t a n i s m t h r i f t i s a major- v i r t u e , l a z d n e s s a 
v i c e ; f o r the t r a d i t i o n a l a r i s t o c r a t t h r i f t i s a l 
v i c e ; and so on. 
1 A l a s d a i r Maclntyre: A_3h'ort H i s t o r y of E t h i c s .London I9G7 , p. 2GG 
I do not intend by quoting t h i s to endorse the gau.&r->il p h i l o s o -
p h i c a l t h e s i s MacJntyre advances i n xh.\& book. Indeed, as I hope 
ray l a t e r j-.rguments; v / i l l show, some q u a l i f i c a t i o n i s needed oven 
i n h i s way of e x p r e s s i n g the i f i S i t t u r here, 
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5. The s u b j e c t i v i t y of both r e l i g i o u s and i d e o l o g i c a l under-
s t a n d i n g l i e s i n t h i s ; whether one s e t of concepts and one vocabulary 
can allow a man to d e s c r i b e the world i n t e l l i g i b l y and i n a manner 
which can s a t i s f a c t o r i l y supplement t h e conduct of h i s moral and 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e , i s a q u e s t i o n o f , depends upon,the i n h e r i t e d e t h i c a l 
and r e l i g i o u s background with which he begins. 'The t r u t h which 
e d i f i e s i s t r u t h f o r you'^, which i s not to say t h a t i n e t h i c s and 
r e l i g i o n anything goes, but t h a t some r e f l e c t i o n s and ways of t a l k i n g 
l o g i c a l l y cannot e d i f y and some b e l i e f s l o g i c a l l y cannot make much sense 
i f , c o n t i n g e n t l y , one has a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t mode of l i f e from t h a t i n 
which the r e f l e c t i o n s and the b e l i e f s a r c at home. T h i s i s not to say 
t h a t one cannot come to b e l i e v e and to t a l k i n th a t way, though I do 
not t h i n k t h a t the gaps thus t r a v e r s e d are ever very wide. Between 
the man who contents h i m s e l f w i t h t h i n k i n g t h a t 'The world i s the best 
of a l l p o s s i b l e worlds and. e v e r y t h i n g i n i t i s a n e c e s s a r y e v i l 1 and 
the man who h e r a l d s 'A now m a n i f e s t a t i o n of human powers and a new 
assessment of the human b e i n g ' 0 the e t h i c a l d i s t a n c e i s too great to 
allow mutual understanding. Only the most n a i v e ll-ii. ionnlir.m could 
suppose the d i f f e r e n c e between the two to be a n a t t e r of a l t e r n a t i v e 
1 Soren K i e r k e g a a r d : Conc 1 uding U n s c i e n t i f i c Poatscri.pt, t r a n s -
l a t e d by D 3? Sv/ennon £,-. \; Lowrie, P r i n c e t o n 1984, p.226 
2 Mich as .1 Gakeshott ' P o l i t i c a l Education* op _c.it p. 133 
3 Mar;;: ' P r i v a t e Property i\:\<\ Coiomunisift' M a J ^ a i ^ l : ^ W r i t i r - . g s _ 
ed. T n Kotto.more. London l'sG2 , p. 163 
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d o c t r i n e s or c o n t r a d i c t o r y p r o p o s i t i o n s . Perhaps an observer might, 
from some middle p o i n t , be able t c see something i n both t h e s e u t t e r -
ances but t h i s would not be enough to bridge the gap between the two. 
For he could not occupy and move i n the d i f f e r e n t worlds of moral 
and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the context of which t h i s k i n d of t a l k makes 
sense. The s u b j e c t i v i t y of f a i t h determines t h a t we cannot begin our 
moral, p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s l i f e from s c r a t c h . We must begin, i f 
t h a t makes sense at a l l , from where we a r e . 
o 
I I 
My second t h e s i s about f a i t h i s t h a t i t i s an understanding 
1 
of the world 'sub s p e c i e a e t e r n i t a t i s ' find the e l a b o r a t i o n of t h i s w i l l 
occupy me i n t h i s s e c t i o n and the next. 
1. To say of a c e r t a i n understanding t h a t i t views the world 
sub s p e c i e a e t e r n i t a t i s i s , roughly, to say t h a t i t i s concerned v;i th 
the essence or s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i n g s , r a t h e r than the f a c t or phenomenon 
of t h i n g s . 
Imagine t h a t we come i n t o a t h e a t r e a f t e r a play 
has s t a r t e d and a r c o b l i g e d to l e a v e before i t 
1 The phrase, as x,°, w e l l known, appears i n Spinoza' t : E t h i c s 
V:XX:;i. But I as! r.'Ot -using i t hero i n q u i t e tlio same 
sense, as the I: i n which Spinoza use,1; i t . 
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ends. We may then be p u z z l e d by t h e p a r t of 
the play v/e are able to see. We may ask 'What 
does i t mean?' I n t h i s case we want to know 
what went before and what came a f t e r . But some-
times even when we have seen or heard a play 
from beginning to end, we are s t i l l p u z z l e d as 
to what th e whole t h i n g means. I n t h i s c a s e 
we are not a s k i n g about what came before or 
what came a f t e r , we are not asking about any-
t h i n g o u t s i d e the play i t s e l f . We are, i f you 
l i k e , a s k i n g a very d i f f e r e n t s o r t of q u e s t i o n 
from t h a t we u s u a l l y put w i t h the words 'What 
does i t mean?' But we are s t i l l a s k i n g a r e a l 
q u e s t i o n which has sense and i s not absurd. For 
our words express a w i s h to grasp the c h a r a c t e r , 
the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the whole p l a y . They are a 
c o n f e s s i o n t h a t we have not y e t done t h i s and 
they are a request f o r help i n doing i t . I s the 
play a tragedy, a comedy or a t a l e t o l d by an 
i d i o t ? The p a t t e r n of i t i s so complex, so 
b e w i l d e r i n g , our grasp of i t s t i l l so inadequate, 
t h a t we don't know what to say, s t i l l l e s s whether 
to c a l l i t good or bad. But the q u e s t i o n i s not 
s e n s e l e s s . 
The q u e s t i o n i s not s e n s e l e s s , but ray i n t e r e s t l i e s i n what form a 
p o s s i b l e answer must take. F i r s t , i t must be noted t h a t wo have at 
our d i s p o s a l nothing other than the words and events of the p l a y . How-
ever we are to answer the q u e s t i o n our answer must be couched i n terms 
of the f a c t s of the p l a y , t h a t i s , what i s s a i d and dene i n the p l a y . 
I n other words, t h e r e are no s u p e r s e n s i b l e e n t i t i e s or e x t e r n a l 
f a c t s a v a i l a b l e to us nor, indeed, are any such t h i n g s c a l l e d f o r . 
The meaning of the play must be brought out, i n and. through the p l a y 
i t s e l f and carnot bo brought out by r e l a t i n g i t to something o u t s i d e 
1 John Wisdom: 'The meiining of the q u e s t i o n s of l i f e ' i n 
Paradox and Dis c o v e r y , Oxford 1934, p.41 
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i t s e l f . There i s no e x t e r n a l r e f e r e n c e here. 
T h i n means that to q u e s t i o n s of the form 'What i s the 
meaning of X?' we cannot g i v e an answer of the simple form 'Y' where 
'Y' i s a c l a i m about some matter of f a c t o u t s i d e or beyond 'X'. Nor, 
however, can our answer take the form of a simple re-statement ( f o r 
example another performance) of t h e f a c t s of the p l a y . These f a c t s 
w i l l not i n themselves answer the q u e s t i o n , f o r we have a l r e a d y w i t -
nessed the play and i t i s our p o s s e s s i o n of the knowledge of what if. i n 
the pipy t h a t has prompted our puzzlement. 
S i n c e , then, we cannot look f o r any f a c t s other than those 
of the p l a y , and s i n c e knowledge of those f a c t s w i l l not hy i t s e l f 
answer the q u e s t i o n , the answer must take the form of a s i g n i f i c a n t 
o r d e r i n g of the f a c t s we al r e a d y know. Our q u e s t i o n 'What does i t mean?' 
i s , t h e r e f o r e , an e x p r e s s i o n of l a c k of understanding and not c f 
ignorance. The f a c t s of t h e play, what happened, what was s a i d , can 
only be the s u b j e c t matter of knowledge. But we know the f a c t s of 
the play a l r e a d y , The meaning of the pla y i s a q u e s t i o n f o r the 
understanding, a quest i o n of hew we are to understand t h a t which we 
alr e a d y know. To be i n p o s s e s s i o n of an understanding, then, w i l l fos 
to have the a b i l i t y to o r r i s r the fact.3 which we a l l know i n a s a t i s -
f a c t o r y way. 
Wisdomj of course, wants, as I want, the i l l u s t r a t i o n of 
the p l a y to throw light; on tJ'.e nature of much more g e n e r a l and 
c r f c i t i o u s q u e s t i o n s , about the- racanir.g of l i f e a--.\ri of a l l t h i n g s . 
He continues the passage I quoted by s s y i n g ; 
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I n the same way when we ask 'What i s the 
meaning of a l l t h i n g s ? ' we are not asking 
a s e n s e l e s s q u e s t i o n . I n t h i s c ase, of 
course, we have not wi t n e s s e d the whole 
p l a y , we have only an i d e a of an o u t l i n e 
of what went before and what w i l l come a f t e r 
the s m a l l p a r t of h i s t o r y which we w i t n e s s . 
But w i t h the words 'What i s the meaning of 
i t a l l * ? ' v/e are t r y i n g to f i n d the order i n 
the Drama of Time. 1 
T h i s l a s t sentence, i f my argument i s c o r r e c t , i s not q u i t e r i g h t . 
We do not and could not f i n d the order i n the Drama of Time, i f by 
th a t we mean t h a t our puzzlement i s to be d i s p e l l e d by d i s c o v e r i n g 
f u r t h e r f a c t s , even f a c t s about some s u p e r s e n s i b l e realm, and thereby 
adding to our knowledge. For what we seek i s understanding and not 
knowledge. Our concern i s not so much wi t h the f a c t s , most of which 
we a l r e a d y know, as with the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the f a c t s . T h i s i s why 
I say t h a t f a i t h i s concerned w i t h the world sub s p e c i e a c t e r n i t a t i s . 
The sense of the world must l i e o u t s i d e the 
world. I n the world e v e r y t h i n g i s as i t i s , 
and e v e r y t h i n g happens as i t does happen: 
i n i t no v a l u e e x i s t s - and i f i t d i d e x i s t 
i t would have no va l u e . I f th e r e i s any 
value t h a t does have v a l u e , i t must l i e out-
s i d e the whole sphere of what happens and i s 
the case. 
For a l l t h a t happens and i s the case i s 
a c c i d e n t a l . What makes i t n o n - a c c i d e n t a l 
cannot l i e w i t h i n the world, s i j ; c e i f i t did 
i t would i t s e l f be a c c i d e n t a l . I t must l i e 
o u t s i d e the world. 
Wi sclom: op cit , . p. 41 
W i t t g e n s t e i n : T r a c t a t u s 6.41 
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Even t h i s way of p u t t i n g the matter might be m i s l e a d i n g . 'Outside 
the world' here cannot be understood to r e f e r to a realm beyond the 
world, a world beyond t h i s one. A f a i t h i s a transcendent understanding 
not i n the sense t h a t i t s u p p l i e s knowledge of a transcendent realm but 
i n that, i t b r i n g s to the f a c t s of t h i s world an order i n which they are 
i n t e l l i g i b l e . The mark of our p o s s e s s i n g an understanding of t h i s k i n d 
i s our a b i l i t y to order and thus to fathom the contingent f a c t s of 
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t happens and i s the c a s e . The understanding i s t r a n s -
cendent because i t can only be made manifest i n our o r d e r i n g of the 
f a c t s and f u r t h e r because i t i s not determined by those f a c t s . I f you 
l i k e , i t presupposes the f a c t of the f a c t s i n i t s o r d e r i n g of the f a c t s . 
'The l o v e of God' f o r example'is not based upon the f a c t s but i s i t s e l f 
the measure by which the C h r i s t i a n a s s e s s e s the facts'.''" 
2. I t might be s a i d , of c o u r s e , t h a t t h i s i s t r u e of a l l under-
st a n d i n g , the understanding s u p p l i e d by the t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c i p l i n e s of 
h i s t o r y and s c i e n c e no l e s s than t h a t s u p p l i e d by ' f a i t h . Put the 
d i f f e r e n c e between the two kinds of imclerstending i s t h i s . R e l i g i o n s 
and i d e o l o g i e s are c-valualory understandings whereas h i s t o r y and s c i e n c e 
are understandings of one k i n d of f a c t designed to e s t a b l i s h another 
k i n d of f a c t . I n other words, the understanding of f a i t h must enable 
us to r e l a t e the v/hoils sphere of f a c t to the sphere of conduct. w h i l e 
the understanding which the h i s t o r i a n or the s c i e n t i s t seeks never 
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moves beyond the sphere of f a c t , A c l o s e r examination of the cas e of 
h i s t o r y w i l l , I t h i n k , show t h i s to be s o / 
The d i f f e r e n c e I am p o i n t i n g to i s s i m i l a r to the d i s t i n c t i o n 
S t Augustine draws between s a c r e d and s e c u l a r h i s t o r y . According to 
Augustine, the t a s k of the w r i t e r of s a c r e d h i s t o r y i s to r e v e a l the 
hand of God i n the events of the p a s t . S e c u l a r , or pagan h i s t o r y , on 
the other hand, i s the rec o u n t i n g of what a c t u a l l y happened i n the p a s t , 
i n other words, h i s t o r y f i t f o r pagans to do. The d i s t i n c t i o n i s not 
q u i t e t h a t which I wish to draw. But I want to concur i n Augustine's 
opinion t h a t the disagreement between C h r i s t i a n and pagan i s not over 
the f a c t s of s e c u l a r h i s t o r y . 
The p o i n t can be made l i k e t h i s . I f an h i s t o r i a n c l a i m s f o r 
example, th a t R i c h a r d I I I was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the deaths of the P r i n c e s 
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i n the Tower , v/hat he says i s open to c o r r e c t i o n by another . h i s t o r i a n 
and i t s being open to c o r r e c t i o n i s v/hat maker: h i s t o r y an on-going 
study. Such c o r r e c t i o n , i f i t i s forthcoming, must be made not i n the 
l i g h t of what a c t u a l l y happened i n the p a s t ( f o r t h a t i s what i s under 
.1. H i s t o r y i s p a r t i c u l a r l y apposite here,not only because i n the 
study of h i s t o r y the f a c t u a l c h a r a c t e r of our judgments i s 
evid e n t , but because i t i s to ' h i s t o r y ' , i n the Honoe of 'the 
pftat',that many i d e o l o g i c a l and r e l i g i o u s w r i t e r s have turned 
t h e i r a t t e n t i o n . 
2 T h i s example s p r i n g s to mind because i t if. widely recognised 
as n contentious el;;iin. H i s t o r y can, so to speak, be seen al: 
work on t h i s s u b j e c t ,in Josephine Toy's sp.Inndirt pseuoo-
dctootivfe s t o r y , The Daughter of Time. 
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d i s p u t e ) but i n the l i g h t of the f a c t s of present evidence. And i f 
the evidence i s as the second h i s t o r i a n c l a i m s and i f h i s reasoning 
i s sound, the f i r s t h i s t o r i a n must acknowledge th a t h i s account of 
what happened i n the past i s mistaken. P a r t of what i s i n v o l v e d i n 
t h i s acknowledgement i s the acknowledgement of the f a c t s of the evidence. 
The h i s t o r i a n qua h i s t o r i a n cannot doubt t h i s , 1 s i n c e i f he d i d , the 
c r i t e r i a common to both and which enable not only the second h i s t o r i a n 
to c o r r e c t the f i r s t , but the f i r s t to r e j e c t , the proposed c o r r e c t i o n s 
of the second, would be removed and the. p o s s i b i l i t y of mutual i n q u i r y 
gone. On my argument, an understanding must take some f a c t s as given, 
t h a t i s , the f a c t s to be understood cannot be questioned i n terms of 
the understanding, which c o n s i s t s i n an o r d e r i n g of tho.-je f a c t s . A l t e r -
n a t i v e understandings (though not kin d s of underst a n d i n g ) , i f they are 
to be i n competition, then, must be i n agreement over some s e t of 
f a c t s . For the h i s t o r i a n these are- the f a c t s of present evidence. I n 
t h e s e he does and must agree with o t h e r h i s t o r i a n s , f o r t h i s agreement 
i s what enables him to agree and d i s a g r e e with t h e i r p r e f e r r e d n a r r a -
t i v e s of the p a s t . 
I n the case of i d e o l o g i c a l and r e l i g i o u s understanding t i l i n g s 
are very d i f f e r e n t . To begin with the i d e o l o g i c a l and r e l i g i o u s w r i t e r 
I do not say t h a t i t cannot be doubted, though i t sGSJ-JS t h a t 
the only p l a u s i b l e doubt could be 'chat of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
s c e p t i c , whose i n t e r e s t i s more i n matters of p o s s i b i l i t y 
and n e c e s s i t y than i n matters of f a c t and non-fact. 
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t r i e s to provide an understanding of the p a s t i t s e l f , or more p r o p e r l y , 
of the whole Drama of Time i n which p a s t and pr e s e n t and f u t u r e are 
conjoined. The past and the present are not d i s t i n c t c a t e g o r i e s i n 
r e l i g i o u s and i d e o l o g i c a l d i s c o u r s e and understanding i n the same way 
as they are f o r the h i s t o r i a n . The p a s t , i f i t i s the meaning of 
h i s t o r y which concerns us, i s our past and not, so to speak, the dead 
past of the h i s t o r i a n . T h i s means t h a t when the p a s t i s r e f e r r e d to 
i n i d e o l o g i c a l and r e l i g i o u s w r i t i n g , the f a c t s of what happened i n 
the past must be taken as given and are not themselves d u b i t a b l e . 
Augustine was r i g h t i n t h i n k i n g t h a t the t a s k of the s a c r e d • h i s t o r i a n 
i s to detect the hand of God i n the pa s t , whatever actual l y ' happened 
i n the p a s t . The f a c t s of the p a s t must be taken as given before 
s a c r e d h i s t o r y can be w r i t t e n . 
For example, Mazzini, the great e x p o s i t o r of I t a l i a n n a t i o n a l -
2 
ism, exhorts the I t a l i a n s to r e a l i z e t h e i r h i s t o r i c destxny ;.iy 
b u i l d i n g what he c a l l s the 'Rome of the People'. T h i s Rome i s the 
t h i r d Rome because i t has been preceded by the Rome of the Caesars 
and the Rome of the Popes. Mow c l e a r l y , t h i s p r e s e n t s un with some 
order of the drama of time. And i t i s the f a c t s of the past t h a t are 
so ordered, f o r there wore indeed such people as the Cae s a r s and such 
1 The Racred h i s t o r y of which Augustine speaks bus n. counterpart 
i n He g e l ' s philosophy of h i s t o r y , where Jl'egnl t r i e s to detect 
th?i movement- c f Absolute S p i r i t i n the f a c t s of the p a s t . 
2 I n ths essay 'To the I t a l i a n s ' See D u t i e s ^ o f Man 
and other essay:;, London 1907 
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people as the Popes and t h e i r deeds and q u a l i t i e s were much as Mazzini 
suggests. But i t i s not p a r t of Mazzini's t a s k or i n t e n t i o n , nor, 
u n l i k e many w r i t e r s , does he make any pretence of t r y i n g , to e s t a b l i s h 
these f a c t s as f a c t s . What he does i s to d e s c r i b e the f a c t s of the 
pa s t , which he i s prepared to take i n o u t l i n e and on t r u s t from 
h i s t o r i a n s , i n such a way as to r e l a t e those f a c t s to present concerns 
i n the world of conduct. He speaks to the I t a l i a n s of t h e i r f o r e f a t h e r s , 
and i n so doing he does not f l y i n the face of f a c t but makes, or at 
l e a s t t r i e s to make, the f a c t s of the past s i g n i f i c a n t to the people, 
of the present and i n terms of t h e i r p r e s e n t d i f f i c u l t i e s . S i m i l a r l y , 
the ages i n t o which Augustine's s a c r e d h i s t o r y was d i v i d e d were 
d i v i s i o n s which enabled him and other s to see a s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e 
i n the present age, T h i s i s what the e n t e r p r i s e of s a c r e d h i s t o r y i s 
about. 
The meaning of h i s t o r y l i e s always i n the pre s e n t 
... do not look around y o u r s e l f i n t o u n i v e r s a l 
h i s t o r y , you must look i n t o your own p e r s o n a l 
h i s t o r y . Always i n your present l i e s the meaning 
of h i s t o r y , and you cannot see i t as a s p e c t a t o r , 
but only i n your r e s p o n s i b l e a c t i o n s . * 
An i d e o l o g i c a l or a r e l i g i o u s understanding of the p a s t , then, 
i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from the understanding we may hope to ga i n i n the 
academic study of h i s t o r y . I t i s an e v a l u a t o r y o r d e r i n g . I t D e l e c t s 
out of the f a c t s of the past those which can be r e l a t e d to us as agents 
1 Kucopli BultKianii: H i s t o r y and Bachatology Edinburgh IS£58, p,l.'-:-'5 
I l l 
i n the p r e s e n t . I t i s about who we_ are, what our e x i s t e n c e adds up 
to, and very o f t e n where we are to go from here. I n t h i s way, i t 
provides us with the k i n d of understanding of f a c t s which may inform 
conduct. The understanding s u p p l i e d by the academic study of h i s t o r y , 
by c o n t r a s t , enables us only to a s s e r t more f a c t s of a d i f f e r e n t order. 
3. One o b j e c t i o n which s p r i n g s to mind i s t h i s : "The d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the f a c t of an event or a s t a t e of a f f a i r s and the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of an event or s t a t e of a f f a i r s cannot be s u s t a i n e d . The d i s t i n c t i o n 
seeks to r e l e a s e i d e o l o g i c a l and r e l i g i o u s accounts of the p a s t from 
the c r i t i c a l s c r u t i n y of h i s t o r i a n s , but t h i s cannot be done. 
Consider the f o l l o w i n g statements: 
The E s t a t e s General met on 5th May, 1789-
The French R e v o l u t i o n began i n 1789. 
The 5th May, 17S9 marked the end of f e u d a l monarchy 
i n France. 
Tlie French r e v o l u t i o n was a bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n 
which overthrew the o l d f e u d a l order i n France. 
The French r e v o l u t i o n marked tho beginning of 
R a t i o n a l i s t i c p o l i t i c s i n Europe. 
The o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t a l l of these statements about the p a s t 
are of the same form and t h a t t h e i r t r u t h or f a l s i t y w i l l depend upon 
h i s t o r i c a l evidence. To say, t h a t the French Revolution began in 1789 
and to say that i t was a bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n , i s j u s t the same as s a y i n g 
t h a t a bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n began i n 1789. And p.Jl of those a r c simple 
statements of f a c t . To say t h a t a bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n began i u 1788 
or t h a t r a t i o n a l i s t i c p o l i t i c s began w i t h the French R e v o l u t i o n i s not 
to give the s i g n i f i c a n c e of what happened, i t i s j u s t to r e l a t e what 
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happened." 
I f i n d t h i s o b j e c t i o n v e r y p l a u s i b l e but a s l i g h t l y more 
d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the examples given w i l l r e v e a l as c r u c i a l 
those d i f f e r e n c e s which t h i s o b j e c t i o n seeks to ignore. Consider the 
f i r s t statement again. 'The E s t a t e s General met on 5th May, 1789'. 
T h i s , I suggest, i s the only c l a i m among the examples given, that i s 
t r e a t a b l e as a Judgment made i n the context of the study of h i s t o r y . 
We could come a c r o s s d i a r i e s , documents, l e t t e r s , s t a t e papers, 
r e m i n i s c e n c e s which gave the date of the opening of the S t a t e s General 
and we could t h e r e f o r e be p r e t t y c e r t a i n as to what the a c t u a l date 
was. And i f we had formerly thought t h a t the opening had taken p l a c e 
on, l e t us say, 2nd May, such evidence would s e r v e to r e f u t e the 
r e c e i v e d account. My point i s t h a t h i s t o r i c a l r e a soning provides us 
w i t h a very c l e a r i d e a of v/hat would count as evidence here, and v/hat 
proof and di s p r o o f would be. And though the a c t u a l s t a t e of evidence 
may f o r c e us to r e s e r v e judgment, should the ap p r o p r i a t e evidence 
become a v a i l a b l e v/e cannot s e r i o u s l y doubt the h i s t o r i c a l judgment 
t h a t 'The E s t a t e s General met on 5th May, 1789'. 
Now c o n s i d e r the second example. 'The French I n v o l u t i o n 
begaai i n May 1789'. The term 'The French R e v o l u t i o n ' r e f e r s to a 
c l u s t e r of events and not to any p a r t i c u l a r event. Indeed the term-
' r e v o l u t i o n ' i s vague s i n c e r e v o l u t i o n s are not l i k e rugby matches, 
they do not begin and end with a w h i s t l e . To say t h a t the terms are 
vague i s not to say th a t they need to be made more p r e c i s e ; i t i s 
to say th a t they can never be determinate. T h e i r u s e f u l n e s s l i e s i n 
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t h e i r vagueness and we are not a w a i t i n g g r e a t e r p r e c i s i o n i n t h e i r 
use. I f they can never be determinate, any judgments which i n v o l v e 
t h e i r use can never be determinate. I t f o l l o w s t h a t the judgment 
'The French R e v o l u t i o n began i n May 1789' i s not a determinate f a c t 
the t r u t h of which could be a s s e s s e d by the examination of evidence 
alone. I t f o l l o w s then t h a t the canons of h i s t o r i c a l r e a s o n i n g alone 
cannot provide us w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y of a c c e p t i n g or r e j e c t i n g t h i s . 
judgment, f o r they enable us to a s s e r t and deny s p e c i f i c f a c t s about 
the p a s t , and t h i s statement i s not a s p e c i f i c f a c t . The date of the 
beginning of the French R e v o l u t i o n depends upon which events we i n c l u d e 
by t h a t term. Not t h a t we could decide which ought to be i n c l u d e d . 
The r e f e r e n c e of the term r e s u l t s simply from what we do i n c l u d e . A 
book on the French R e v o l u t i o n may w e l l begin with t h e opening of the 
S t a t e s General i n May 1789. But e q u a l l y w e l l i t could begin with the 
p e r i l o u s s t a t e of the French economy i n 1780 or with the D e c l a r a t i o n 
of the Rights of Man and C i t i z e n i n August 1789. And none of t h e s e 
would be wrong. Of course wo could not i n c l u d e any events we might 
fancy i n the term. The e x p r e s s i o n 'French R e v o l u t i o n ' g i v e s us a 
rough i n d i c a t i o n of the p e r i o d under d i s c u s s i o n . I t i s vague, but not 
h o p e l e s s l y vague. My p o i n t , however, i s t h a t the statement 'The French 
r e v o l u t i o n bogan i n May 1789' may w e l l be u s e f u l i n the w r i t i n g of a 
h i s t o r y book but, u n l i k e the statement 'The S t a t e s General met on 
5th May, 17S9', i t cannot be t r e a t e d as a p o s s i b l e judgrcent of h i s t o r -
i c a l f a c t which i t makes sense to t r y and prove or d i s p r o v e by the 
examination of evidence. I t i s , i n s h o r t , a specimen of the ' h i s t o r y 
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i n o u t l i n e ' r e f e r r e d to e a r l i e r and which, though i t i s o b v i o u s l y 
r e l a t e d to h i s t o r i c a l f a c t , can make a f u l l y i n t e l l i g i b l e appearance 
i n contexts other than h i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h . The p o i n t , however, i s 
t h a t here i s a statement about the past t h a t i s not the statement of 
a s p e c i f i c f a c t of the p a s t , and which the evidence a v a i l a b l e to h i s t o r -
i a n s w i l l not be s u f f i c i e n t to confirm or deny. I t cannot be the case, 
then, as the o b j e c t i o n we are c o n s i d e r i n g would suggest, t h a t a l l 
statements about the past are s u s c e p t i b l e to the i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of 
h i s t o r i a n s . 
L e t us now c o n s i d e r a t h i r d , and f i n a l , example from the 
l i s t w i t h which we began. 'The French R e v o l u t i o n was a bourgeois 
r e v o l u t i o n which overthrewthe o l d f e u d a l order i n France'. The term 
'bourgeois', l i k e any other term, must be a p p l i e d according to some 
c r i t e r i a , f o r example, the presence of f e a t u r e s X, Y, and Z. The 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n or d e s c r i p t i o n 'bourgeois' i s , t h e r e f o r e , an ordered 
understanding of the elements X, Y and Z. Of course, nothing much 
f o l l o w s from t h i s s i n c e t h i s i s t r u e of vast numbers of terms i n our 
language. However, i f we were to d i s p u t e t h a t the French R e v o l u t i o n 
was a bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n , we would have to c l a i m t h a t i n the c l u s t e r 
of events which can s e n s i b l y be c a l l e d the French R e v o l u t i o n some of 
the n e c e s s a r y elements X, Y or Z, are not to be found. 'Jut the 3laments 
X, Y, Z, must be f a c t s about the p a s t , f a c t s about what happened at 
t h a t time, l i k e the date of the opening of the S t a t e s General. TtOJc 
of 'bourgeois', then, i s a matter of o r d e r i n g the elements, the f a c t s , 
of the p a s t . But i f wo are to order the element.'! and i f i t i s p o s s i b l e 
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to o f f e r a l t e r n a t i v e o r d e r i n g s , the o r d e r i n g s must themselves be 
i n d i f f e r e n t to the f a c t of the elements. I f we are to understand the 
f a c t s we cannot be i n doubt as to what those f a c t s are. T h i s means 
t h a t the term 'bourgeois' occurs i n an understanding of the f a c t s of 
the p a s t , f o r the elements i t orders are f a c t s about the p a s t . But 
t h i s shows t h a t the concern here i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of the 
h i s t o r i a n whose primary t a s k i s to e s t a b l i s h what the f a c t s of the 
pas t are. H i s t o r y , i n t h i s sense, does not provide an understanding 
of the p a s t at a l l , but of the p r e s e n t ; H i s t o r y i s the p r e s e n t con-
c e i v e d as evidence f o r the p a s t . The p r o p o s i t i o n 'The Est a t e s General 
met on 5th May, 1789' e x p l a i n s the p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n of the evidence 
upon which t h a t c l a i m i s based. I t e x p l a i n s why c e r t a i n documents i n 
our p o s s e s s i o n are as they are. But i d e o l o g i c a l understandings, of 
which the statement I am now c o n s i d e r i n g i s a p a r t , are understandings 
of the p a s t . And we cannot understand the elements a, b, c, t h a t i s 
order them acco r d i n g to a manner of understanding, i f we are i n doubt 
as to what those elements are. I f the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t h i s t o r i a n s 
o f f e r us no understanding of the p a s t seems p a r a d o x i c a l , the pare.dox 
can perhaps be d i s p e l l e d by n o t i n g simply t h a t the product of h i s t o r i c a l 
r e s e a r c h i s a n a r r a t i v e of the events of the p a s t . But a n a r r a t i v e 
n a r r a t e s e v e n t s , i t does not e x p l a i n them. I t t e l l s us what happened, 
not why i t happened. 
I n c o n c l u s i o n , then, d e t a i l e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r 
c ases has shown, 1 t h i n k , t h a t although a l l the statements l i s t e d are 
statements about, the pact, and indeed statements about wi.'.?;t happened 
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i n the p a s t , they are not a l l e q u a l l y s u s c e p t i b l e to i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
by the methods of c r i t i c a l r easoning h i s t o r i a n s employ. The statements 
an h i s t o r i a n may make about the p a s t are d i f f e r e n t from those an 
i d e o l o g i s t may make about the past because they occur i n the context 
of d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s and d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of understanding. And 
the l a s t case i s c l e a r l y an i n s t a n c e of the s o r t of t h i n g about which 
I spoke e a r l i e r , namely, the p o r t r a y a l of the p a t t e r n of t h i n g s , the 
drama of Time, f o r the concept 'bourgeois' i s not to be understood 
o u t s i d e the g e n e r a l sequence of f e u d a l , bourgeois, s o c i a l i s t or communist. 
Here we have a b e l i e f i n h i s t o r i c f a c t s d i f f e r -
ent from a b e l i e f i n o r d i n a r y h i s t o r i c f a c t s . 
Even, they are not t r e a t e d as h i s t o r i c a l empir-
i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s . 1 
2 
4. The o b j e c t o r may here go on to say 'V/hat you are arguing 
here i n e f f e c t r e l e a s e s r e l i g i o n and ideology from c r i t i c i s m by r e f e r -
ence to hard f a c t . But though such a r e l e a s e may r e l i e v e the i d e o l o g i c a l 
or r e l i g i o u s a p o l o g i s t from the embarrassment of c e r t a i n c r i t i c i s m s , 
i t does so only at the cost of r e n d e r i n g h i s c l a i m s e m p i r i c a l l y 
vaccuous. For i f no evidence w i l l count f o r or a g a i n s t the claim s an 
i d e o l o g i s t may make, they cannot be s a i d to be c l a i m s at a l l ' . 
But t h e r e i s some confusion here. I d e o l o g i e s and r e l i g i o n s 
are understandings of the world and not s e t s of p r o p o s i t i o n s about the 
1 W i t t g e n s t e i n : ' L e c t u r e s and C o n v e r s a t i o n s p.57 
2 As A l a s d a i r Maclntyre does i n ' I s understanding r e l i g i o n 
compatible with b e l i e v i n g ? ' oee John Hick ed. F a i t h and the 
P h i l o s o p h e r s , London 1964 
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world. As understandings, they allow c l a i m s about the world to.be 
made and to be examined and r e j e c t e d . The c l a i m s t h a t are made by the 
i d e o l o g i s t , t h e r e f o r e , do not c o n s t i t u t e but r e v e a l the understanding 
i n terms of which they are made. And i f t h e judgments we make i n 
ideology or r e l i g i o n prove unsound, they do so a g a i n s t c r i t e r i a i n t e r n a l 
to the ideology and not a g a i n s t some g e n e r a l , e x t e r n a l c r i t e r i a of 'the 
f a c t s ' . 
My argument has been th a t i d e o l o g i e s and r e l i g i o n s are under-
s t a n d i n g s of the world 3ub s p e c i e a e t e r n i t a t i 3 and I have t r i e d t o 
e l a b o r a t e what I mean by the phrase. They cannot, t h e r e f o r e , be 
rendered e m p i r i c a l l y vaccuourj by anything I have s a i d s i n c e they were 
never, so to speak, e m p i r i c a l l y s u b s t a n t i a l . Nor could they be. To 
understand t h i n g s i n a r e l i g i o u s or an i d e o l o g i c a l manner does not, as 
i t does i n h i s t o r y or s c i e n c e , enable us to a s s e r t yet f u r t h e r f a c t s 
about the world, or even to e x p l a i n the f a c t s we al r e a d y know, but 
r a t h e r enables us to arrange the f a c t o of our experience i n an e v a l u a -
t o r y order, so th a t they become s i g n i f i c a n t i n terms of conduct, wiio 
we are, v/hat we must do and r e f r a i n from doing. 
I l l 
Are i d e o l o g i e s ami • r e l i g i o n s , then, as h«.s o f t e n been sugges-
t e d , much t h e same s o r t o f t h i n g ? Are i d e o l o g i e s a s e c u l a r i s e d f o r m 
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and the h i s t o r i c a l s u c c e s s o r s of r e l i g i o n s ? Even though we have so 
f a r encountered no reason to d i s t i n g u i s h between the two and even 
though what I have paid has r e f e r r e d to both under the ge n e r a l term 
' f a i t h ' , t h i s f a m i l i a r and, as I t h i n k , p l a u s i b l e suggestion cannot 
be s u s t a i n e d . For the s e c u l a r i s a t i o n of r e l i g i o n i s supposed to con-
s i s t i n a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n from an 'other-worldly' to a ' t h i s - w o r l d l y ' 
2 
understanding and such a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , i f i t were p o s s i b l e , would 
destroy what i s d i s t i n c t i v e i n a r e l i g i o u s understanding. Or so I 
s h a l l argue. 
I have not d i s t i n g u i s h e d between i d e o l o g i e s and r e l i g i o n s 
so f a r because I have been concerned to b r i n g out how very d i f f e r e n t 
these modes o f understanding, whose s i g n i f i c a n c e l i e s i n the realm of 
conduct, are from those which are t h e o r e t i c a l i n n a t u r e . And i n the 
p o r t r a y a l of such a c o n t r a s t ideology and r e l i g i o n must look a l i k e . 
T h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s , then, what d i s t i n g u i s h e s the one from the other, 
v / i l l be found not so much i n the form of r e f l e c t i o n s i n ideology and 
theology, as i n the kind") of a c t i v i t y which each seeks to inform. And 
i t i s indeed i n t h i s t h a t we may l o c a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n between ideology 
and r e l i g i o n . The concern of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f and p r a c t i c e i s p r i m a r i l y 
with e t e r n a l l i f e , w h i l e i d e o l o g i e s are e s s e n t i a l l y temporal i n con-
ce p t i o n . I t i s i n terms o f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the e t e r n a l and 
" C h r i . s t i r . n i t y wr-.s t h e graudmother o f B o l s h e v i s m " - S p o n g i e r 
r'emerbsch a t t e m p t s j u s t suck a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n .in 
Chrl»tii:tiiiv 
Essence o f 
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the temporal t h a t 1 should l i k e to show how r e l i g i o n i s a d i f f e r e n t 
k i n d of understanding from ideology. 
2. The way I have spoken, indeed have had to speak, about 
ideology and r e l i g i o n has alr e a d y given an i n d i c a t i o n of the d i f f e r -
ences I now want to b r i n g out, The i d e o l o g i e s of Marxism, L i b e r a l i s m 
and N a t i o n a l i s m , f o r example, I have d e s c r i b e d as e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , 
t h a t i s , manners of understanding w i t h i n the g e n e r a l realm of moral, 
p o l i t i c a l and e d u c a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y . But C h r i s t i a n i t y , Buddhism, i s l a m 
are r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s , t h a t i s , understandings which seek to inform 
a c t i v i t i e s and p r a c t i c e s p e c u l i a r l y t h e i r own.'- R e l i g i o n , we might 
say, i s s e l f - c o n t a i n e d i n s. way that, ideology i s not. I n other words, 
r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s and p r a c t i c e s inform r e l i g i o u s l i f e , which i s made 
up of a c t s of a c e r t a i n d i s t i n c t i v e k i n d . But t h e r e are no such t h i n g s 
as i d e o l o g i c a l p r a c t i c e s , u n l e s s perhaps v/e use the e x p r e s s i o n to r e f e r 
to the p a r t i c u l a r kind of t h i n k i n g and w r i t i n g which I s h a l l d i s c u s s 
i n the next chapter. I d e o l o g i e s inform a c t i v i t y i n the realm of 
p o l i t i c s or m o r a l i t y or education, a l l of which a r e , so to speak, con-
s t i t u t e d independently of them. 
T h i s can bo seen most e a s i l y i n the 'transforming' power of 
r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f and r i t u a l . Hove, 'ordinary' a c t s are, by d e s c r i p t i o n 
i n r e l i g i o u s terms and when performed i n the context of r e l i g i o u s 
1 I l e a v e a s i d e h e r e t h e complex quention o f the r e l a t i o n between 
e t h i c s and r e l i g i o n . . T h i s omission does n o t , i t seems t o mo, 
i m p a i r what 1" have t o say about r e l i g i o u s f a i t h . I t does, however, 
e n t a i l d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h thosH (some C h r i s t i a n s aud Buddhist.-.;, f o r 
example) who c l a i m t h a t t h e c h i e f i m p o r t o f r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f in; 
i n e t h i c s . 
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r i t u a l s , changed i n t o a c t s of a d i f f e r e n t order. For example, the 
everyday a c t i o n s of e a t i n g bread and d r i n k i n g wine, i n the context 
of C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f and r i t u a l , become the wholly d i f f e r e n t k i n d of 
act t h a t i s the c e l e b r a t i o n of the E u c h a r i s t . Again, k n e e l i n g and 
s i n g i n g become a c t s of p r a y i n g and worship. And so on. 
R e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t y , then, i s a c t i v i t y of a d i f f e r e n t k i n d 
from a l l other and I s h a l l t r y to say s h o r t l y wherein the d i f f e r e n c e 
l i e s . Here i t i s worth not i n g t h a t the tr a n s f o r m i n g c h a r a c t e r of 
r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f and r i t u a l lends to the r e l i g i o u s m a n an independence 
i n a c t i v i t y which i s not p o s s i b l e f o r the i d e o l o g i c a l adherent. 
To become a r e l i g i o u s b e l i e v e r must, i n p a r t , r e s u l t i n 
our engaging i n new kin d s of a c t i v i t y . We pray, we meditate, we 
worship where we d i d not before. To become convinced of a r e l i g i o u s 
f a i t h i s to adopt a d i f f e r e n t persona, t h a t of the r e l i g i o u s man. But 
to become, say, a L i b e r a l , i s to perform not d i f f e r e n t kinds of a c t 
but d i f f e r e n t a c t s from those which we would otherwise have performed. 
They a re a c t s i n the same realm, i n t h i s case the p o l i t i c s ] . , and are shared 
by the adherents of competing i d e o l o g i e s . ^ 
1 I n T r o l l o p s ' s Phinoas Redux, Mr Daubeny, t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e l e a d e r , 
throws b o t h h i s own p a r t y and the L i b e r a l o p p o s i t i o n i n t o g r e a t 
confusion by p r o p o s i n g l e g i s l a t i o n t o d i s e s t a b l i s h t h e Church. 
The c o n f u s i o n a r i s e s f r o m t h i s act-ion b e i n g h i t h e r t o r e c o g n i s e d 
as a t y p i c a l l y L i b e r a l p o l i c y and as snatlicnia t o C o n s e r v a t i v e s 
by i t s .-seeming q u i t e o u t of k e e p i n g w i t h Cons•ervativo p h i l o s o p h y . 
But t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f h i s a c t i n g i n this: way shews t h e p o l i t i c a l 
c h a r a c t e r o f t h e a c t t o be inde p e n d e n t o f part?/ and i d e o l o g y . 
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The dependence of i d e o l o g i c a l understandings upon a 
ge n e r a l realm of conduct which they do not and could not themselves 
c o n s t i t u t e i s perhaps even more evident i n the case of moral i d e o l -
o g i e s . The competition between one moral t r a d i t i o n and another, 
A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m and P u r i t a n i s m , say, cannot r e v o l v e around what i s to 
count as being moral a c t i v i t y , but r a t h e r what i s to count as morally 
good a c t i v i t y . The former debate i s about what i s moral and non-moral 
and t h i s i s a p p r o p r i a t e l y conducted i n moral philosophy. The l a t t e r 
i s a debate about what i s moral and what immoral, or more f r e q u e n t l y 
which v i r t u e s are of paramount importance and v.hich not."*" I n t h i s way 
moral i d e o l o g i e s presuppose a shared .form of moral l i f e and do not 
c o n s t i t u t e i t . The d i f f e r e n c e between,for example, the S t o i c and the 
E p i c u r e a n are d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the realm of moral conduct. 
'But i s n ' t t h i s al.se the cans i n r e l i g i o n ? Aren't the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between, say, C h r i s t i a n i t y and I s l a m w i t h i n one realm?' 
Perhaps they are, but t h e important point i s t h a t no shared c r i t e r i a 
of r e l i g i o u s a c t s are nec'i.T.sary to t h e l i f e o f a r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n . 
The r e l i g i o u s b e l i e v e r has always the n o n - r e l i g i o u s to compote wit h . 
But I cannot understand hew l i b e r a l i s m and c o n s e r v a t i s m could be com-
p e t i t o r s without a shared context o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . 
The e f f e c t , we nd.Q,ht say t h e s o c i a l n a n i f e s t a t i o n , of t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n between i d e o l o g i e s and r e l i g i o n s i s t h a t the one, r e l i g i o n , 
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takes the form of i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i l e the other takes the form of 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s . The l i f e of a r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n , the Church f o r 
example, r e v o l v e s around the maintenance of a c o n s t i t u t i v e framework 
o f a c t i v i t y , t h a t i s i n the maintenance and performance of r i t e s and 
p r a c t i c e s which cannot, l o g i c a l l y cannot, be performed o u t s i d e t h a t 
framework, f o r example, the o r d i n a t i o n of p r i e s t s , the c e l e b r a t i o n of 
t h e sacraments, the c o n s e c r a t i o n of p l a c e s of worship. By c o n t r a s t , 
t h e i d e o l o g i e s of l i b e r a l i s m , or s o c i a l i s m , or n a t i o n a l i s m , give r i s e 
to o r g a n i s a t i o n s , p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , whoso purposes are to win and 
r e t a i n the pcwer to e x e r c i s e the a u t h o r i t y of c e r t a i n o f f i c e s which 
l o g i c a l l y c o u l d be occupied by o t h e r s . F u r t h e r , the understanding 
s u p p l i e d by an ideology i s r e g u l a t i v e of our conduct i n a sphere i n 
w h i c h the adherents of i d e o l o g i e s other than ours may and do compete. 
I n s h o r t , then, to come to possess a r e l i g i o u s understanding 
i s , amongst other t h i n g s , to come to p a r t i c i p a t e not merely i n d i f f e r -
ent a c t i v i t i e s or even a d i f f e r e n t range of a c t i v i t i e s but i n a c t i v i -
t i e s of a d i f f e r e n t kind a l t o g e t h e r . To come to po s s e s s an i d e o l o -
g i c a l understanding i s to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the same k i n d of a c t i v i t y i n 
a d i f f e r e n t way. 
•3. But there i s more to be s a i d than t h i s . There i s something 
t o be s a i d about the 'essence' of the m a t t e r . And what more t h e r e i s 
may b e s t be b r o u g h t o u t , as I e a r l i e r m e n t i o n e d , i n the n o t i o n s of 
e t e r n i t y and t e m p o r a l i t y . 
R e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , and i n g e n e r a l t h e concerns of t h e r e l i -
g i o u s b e l i e v e r , are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y t h o u g h t of as b e i n g ' o t h e r -
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w o r l d l y ' . T h i s o t h e r - w o r l d l i n e s s l i e s , I t h i n k , i n the r e l i g i o u s 
b e l i e v e r ' s hope of and attempt to l i v e ' e t e r n a l l i f e ' . Now i t i s 
c l e a r t h a t to t a l k about e t e r n i t y i s not to t a l k about an i n f i n i t e 
d u r a t i o n of time. Any p e r i o d of time i n the p a s t , the pr e s e n t or the 
f u t u r e , however long, i s n e c e s s a r i l y temporal and the p o i n t about 
e t e r n i t y i s t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y t i m e l e s s . Nor w i l l i t do to t h i n k 
of e t e r n i t y a3 'the whole of time', f o r t h i s suggests l i m i t s and 
i t does not make sense to speak of time's having an end or a beginning. 
T h i s means t h a t e t e r n a l l i f e cannot be thought of, as very many t h i n k e r s 
have suggested, as a l i f e of i n f i n i t e d u r a t i o n which begins when our 
pr e s e n t , temporal l i f e ends. For a l i f e beyond the grave, being a 
l i f e i n time, v/ould not d i f f e r i n nature from t h a t which preceded i t . 
I f the n o t i o n of e t e r n a l l i f e i s intended to provide a r e l e a s e i r o n 
the t e m p o r a l i t y of e x i s t e n c e , a l i f e of i m m o r t a l i t y beyond the grave 
cannot do so. For such r> l i f e t f a r from being t i m e l e s s would be 
i n f i n i t e l y temporal. Even i f we suppose the world beyond the grave 
1 
to be occupied by some d i f f e r e n t k i n d of e n t i t y , the s o u l , a view 
which seems to me open to insurmountable l o g i c a l o b j e c t i o n s , we cannot 
j u s t i f i a b l y suppose t h a t the l i f e l i v e d by such e n t i t i e s would be any 
the l e s s a l i f e of chance and change than t h a t with which we are 
f. and. 1 i a r . 
1 There a r e , o f c o u r s e , o t h e r accounts o f .s o u l - t a l k than t h a t 
I have i n mind here. 
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When the Fourth E v a n g e l i s t r e p r e s e n t s J e s u s as 
s a y i n g 'This i s l i f e e t e r n a l , t h a t they might 
know thee, the only t r u e God, and J e s u s C h r i s t , 
whom Thou h a s t s e n t ' he p l a i n l y does not r e f e r 
to an i m m o r t a l i t y t h a t i s a t t a i n e d a f t e r death, 
but to a r e l a t i o n s h i p here and now which does 
not change or pass away. He i s , i n f a c t , 
u t t e r i n g what poets and m y s t i c s have always s a i d , 
t h a t i n and through the t r a n s i e n t i s r e a l i z e d 
the permanent. I f t h i s be t r u e - and t h e r e i s 
a mass of testimony to i t - then the a n t i t h e s i s 
between nature and supernature becomes absurd, 
and the t o t a l c o r r u p t i o n of the n a t u r a l must be 
abandoned: nature and grace become s a c r a m e n t a l l y 
r e l a t e d as outward to inward, and the i n c a r n a t i o n 
of the d i v i n e i s i n keeping w i t h the whole c h a r a c -
t e r of the p h y s i c a l world, s i n c e 'God so loved i t ' . 
My argument i n s e c t i o n two of t h i s chapter has been t h a t , 
j u s t as r e l i g i o u s e x p e r i e n c e i s not to be understood as something l i k e 
sense e x p e r i e n c e , only more mysterious and much r a r e r , s t i l l l e s s 
e x perience of a s u p e r s e n s i b l e realm of being, but r a t h e r as the pheno-
mena of our e x p e r i e n c e conceived and thereby understood i n a c e r t a i n 
2 1 manner , so the p o s s e s s i o n of an i d e o l o g i c a l understanding does not 
enable us to e x p l a i n the phenomena of our e x p e r i e n c e by r e l a t i n g them 
to something e x t e r n a l to them nor does i t r e v e a l the foundations of 
1 C E Raven, N a t u r a l R e l i g i o n and C h r i s t i a n T h e o l o g y , Cambridge 
1953, V o l I , p.38 
2 When we are t o l d t h a t someone has h e a r d 'The v o i c e o f God i n 
t h e w i n d 1 t h i s does n o t r e f e r t o s o m e t h i n g e x t r a t h a t he has 
h e a r d and we have n o t , b u t t o t h e impact upon and s i g n i f i c a n c e 
f o r him o f what we h a v e - a l l h e a r d . '"You c a n ' t hear God speak 
t o someone e l s e , you con h e a r him o n l y i f you are b e i n g addressed" 
That i s a g r a m a t i c n l remark' W i t t g e n s t e i n , Z e t t e l O x f o r d 1967, 
p a r a 717. 
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the v a l u e s we e x p r e s s , but i s i t s e l f a conception, an understanding, 
of those phenomena which bestows value upon them. But w h i l e the 
r e l i g i o u s understanding provides the p o s s i b i l i t y of our l i v i n g new 
l i f e , i d e o l o g i c a l understanding i n v o l v e s the f a s h i o n i n g , and on 
occasions r e f a s h i o n i n g , of the p a t t e r n of moral and p o l i t i c a l l i f e 
which v/e a l r e a d y l e a d . 
I 
The 'newness' of l i f e l i e s i n i t s being e t e r n a l l i f e , t h a t 
i s the r e a l i s a t i o n of the permanent i n and through the t r a n s i e n t . I n 
what does t h i s r e a l i s a t i o n c o n s i s t ? I t c o n s i s t s , I t h i n k , as the term 
ot h e r - w o r l d l y suggests, i n , so to speak, dying to t h i s world, t h a t i s 
c e a s i n g to f i n d the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the p r e s e n t i n what the f u t u r e 
b r i n g s . To conduct one's l i f e w i t h i n an e t e r n a l view of the p r e s e n t 
i s n e c e s s a r i l y to be i n d i f f e r e n t to how t h i n g s are i n the f u t u r e , or 
r a t h e r , s i n c e being i n d i f f e r e n t i s the achievement r a t h e r than the 
c o n d i t i o n of r e l i g i o u s l i f e , i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y to see the f u t u r e 
course of events as cause f o r i n d i f f e r e n c e . From the p o i n t of view 
of e t e r n i t y , the f u t u r e ~ i 3 not d i s t i n c t from the p r e s e n t or the p a s t ; 
i t i s merely more time. To conduct one's l i f e w i t h i n a temporal view 
of the p r e s e n t i s n e c e s s a r i l y to be concerned w i t h how t h i n g s go i n 
t h e f u t u r e s i n c e , i n a temporal v i e w , the f u t u r e i s the t e s t of the 
wisdom o f t h e p r e s e n t . 
Perhaps I can make t h i s s l i g h t l y obscure t a l k a l i t t l e more 
c l e a r by some c o n c r e t e examples. I f we are concerned t o a c t jLn t i m e , 
t h e n p l a i n l y t h e t i m e at w h i c h we act i s important, i f we are t o a c t 
s u c c e s s f u l l y . The r a t i o n a l economic i n v e s t o r , f o r example, w i l l c a r e -
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f u l l y a s s e s s the p r e s e n t s t a t e of the market i n order to maximise h i s 
f u t u r e g a i n s . The student w i l l prepare f o r these p r e s e n t examinations 
i n order t h a t h i 3 f u t u r e employment p r o s p e c t s may be improved. I n 
both t h e s e cases the hope of r e a l i s i n g a f u t u r e s t a t e of a f f a i r s informs 
our a c t i o n s , and what the f u t u r e turns out to be determines whether we 
have done w e l l or badly, acted w i s e l y or f o o l i s h l y . I n s h o r t , to act 
i n time i n the p r e s e n t i n v o l v e s the i d e a t h a t our p r e s e n t a c t i o n s are 
a s s e s s a b l e i n terms of the f u t u r e . Such a c t i o n i s f u t u r e orientated.. 
But temporal a c t i v i t y i s a l s o p a s t o r i e n t a t e d , f o r we l e a r n from our 
e x p e r i e n c e of how t h i n g s have turned out i n the p a s t how best we may 
manage the p r e s e n t so t h a t we may order the f u t u r e . I f having done X 
we f i n d t h a t Y does not m a t e r i a l i s e , we w i l l be i n c l i n e d to q u e s t i o n 
the e f f i c a c y of X as a means to Y and perhaps e l i m i n a t e i t from our 
stock of t a c t i c s . Thus, our present a c t i v i t y i s c o n s t a n t l y and c o n t i n -
uously modified i n t h e l i g h t of the p a s t i n order the b e t t e r to s e c u r e 
the f u t u r e . But some of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s and f e a t u r e s of our exper-
i e n c e n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e a r e j e c t i o n of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of t h i s s o r t . 
C h i e f among these are those i n v o l v i n g love. 
I f a mother lo v e s her son, she l o v e s him r e g a r d l e s s of what 
he may do i n the f u t u r e . He may leave her without a word, he may use 
her c r u e l l y , but i t would s t i l l be p e r f e c t l y i n t e l l i g i b l e f o r her to 
l o v e him i n s p i t e o f e v e r y t h i n g . Indeed t h e e x q u i s i t e p a i n o f such 
d i s a f f e c t i o n l i e s i n i t s b e i n g such love t h a t i s spurned. The mother 
l o v e s h e r son r e g a r d l e s s o f what may happen, even what he may do, and 
she l o v e s him, t h e r e f o r e , n o t because he i s l o v a b l e b u t because he i s 
h e r son. Of course, h i s d i s a f f e c t i o n may r e s u l t i n her c e a s i n g t o l o v e 
him, b u t t h i s i s n o t t h e k i n d o f m o d i f i c a t i o n i n b e h a v i o u r w h i c h i t ; 
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the r e s u l t of e x p e r i e n c e . I f she d i d cease to love him as a consequence 
of such treatment, f a r from d e c l a r i n g t h a t she had grown w i s e r by 
the experience, t h a t she had l e a r n t b e t t e r than to love him, she might 
w e l l t h i n k of her c e a s i n g to love him as the s i g n of her f a i l u r e as 
a mother. I n a sense the mother's love i s n e c e s s a r y not contingent. 
I t i s not a matter of c h o i c e f o r her whether to love him or not. C e r -
t a i n l y her love i s not the outcome of ex p e r i e n c e , i t i s not as though 
she found him l o v a b l e and so loved him; and, as I have t r i e d to i n d i c a t e , 
her love i s n e i t h e r modified by experi e n c e nor r e g u l a t e d by a n t i c i p a t i o n 
of the f u t u r e . 
Now i t seems to me t h a t t h i s account i s not only a l s o t r u e 
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of l o v i n g and worshipping God, but i s n e c e s s a r y to 
t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p . Love of God must, i n a sense, be abs o l u t e , t h a t i s , 
i t must o v e r r i d e a l l o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . I f our love of God i s 
intended to secure the f u t u r e , i f we worship Him because of what we 
hope He w i l l do f o r us, then our love i s dependent upon and i n propor-
t i o n to the contingenci<?£; of exp e r i e n c e . I n t h i s case i t cannot 
embody an e t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p because i t i s dependent upon what time [ 
w i l l b r i n g . When the worship of God i s designed to ensure or sec u r e 
f u t u r e b l i s s , even b l i s s beyond the grave, supposing t h a t i d e a to make 
sense, i t i s not a r e l a t i o n s h i p of love at a l l . Our love f o r God must, 
l o g i c a l l y must, be independent of f u t u r e c o n t i n g e n c i e s , e l s e i t cannot 
c o n s t i t u t e a r e l a t i o n s h i p of a d i f f e r e n t order. 
D Z P h i l l i p s , d i s c u s s i n g Kierkegaard, s a y s : 
He s e e s , r i g h t l y , that thanking God As a nec-
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e s s i t y and not an option f o r the b e l i e v e r . How 
i s i t p o s s i b l e ? I t i s p o s s i b l e p r e c i s e l y because the 
thanking i s not an appropriate c o n c l u s i o n i n f e r r e d 
from the way t h i n g s go, but i s i t s e l f a r e a c t i o n to, 
and an assessment of, the way t h i n g s go. The' C h r i s -
t i a n thanks God whatever happens i n the sense t h a t 
nothing can render l o v i n g God p o i n t l e s s . The way 
th i n g s go i s contingent, but the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
thanking God i n a l l t h i n g s , a p o s s i b i l i t y St. P a u l 
speaks of, i s , K i e r k e g a a r d s a y s , p a r t of the e t e r n i t y 
which God has put i n men's h e a r t s . 
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the e t e r n a l and the temporal i s 
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n a r e l i g i o u s understanding and thereby made manifest 
i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the r e l i g i o u s b e l i e v e r . I t allows and r e q u i r e s 
2 
a c t i v i t y of a d i f f e r e n t order because i t seeks to c h a l l e n g e the k i n d 
of l i f e which we o r d i n a r i l y l e a d . I t allows and r e q u i r e s the t r a n s -
formation of ord i n a r y a c t s of which I spoke e a r l i e r , a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n 
which takes our a c t i o n s out of time a l t o g e t h e r . 
5. I s such t r a n s f o r m a t i o n w i t h i t s notion of the t i m e l e s s a l s o 
i n v o l v e d i n the a c t i o n s taken and the l i v e s l e d which an i d e o l o g i c a l 
understanding informs? I have a l r e a d y given some reasons f o r t h i n k i n g 
t h a t t h i s i s not so. Tftere i s no comparable t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of human 
conduct i n the language and understanding which an ideology may supply. 
T h i s c l a i m i s borne out, I t h i n k , i n the examination of pax'ticular 
c a s e s . The concern of those who t h i n k and w r i t e i d e o l o g i c a l l y and those 
1 D Z P h i l l i p s , op c i t , p.208 
2 I do n o t say ' h i g h e r ' because I am n o t s u r e how t h e two c o u l d be 
assessed. I am i n c l i n e d t o say t h a t t h e r e l i g i o u s q u e s t s p r i n g s 
f r o m a c e r t a i n s o r t o f d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n r a t h e r thaw a more 
p r o f o m i r i d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . 
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who act i n the l i g h t of an i d e o l o g i c a l p i c t u r e of the world seems 
almost i n v a r i a b l y to be concerned w i t h the s e c u r i n g of a d e s i r a b l e 
f u t u r e . F o r example, Marxism, i n most of i t s v a r i e t i e s , seeks a 
' c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s ' of each p o l i t i c a l system and economic s i t u a t i o n i n 
order t h a t r e v o l u t i o n a r y change may be engineered most s u c c e s s f u l l y . 
The debate about whether a bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n i s a n e c e s s a r y p r e -
c o n d i t i o n of a s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s concern w i t h 
e f f i c a c y and i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y i n contingent c i r c u m s t a n c e s . C o n s e r v a t i v e 
t h e o r i s t s , to take another example, have o f t e n t r i e d to d e t e c t the 
p o i n t i n t h e past where t h i n g s went 'wrong' i n order t h a t we may put 
them ' r i g h t ' . Conceivably, N a t i o n a l i s t i d e o l o g i e s are l e a s t concerned 
with e f f i c a c y , f o r the k i n d of devotion a N a t i o n a l i s t w i l l give to 
h i s country o f t e n c o n s t i t u t e s the k i n d of r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s i n -
dependent of t i m e , of how t h i n g s go. But even here, notions of i n s t r u -
m e n t a l i t y and success have played an important p a r t , I t o z z i n i , f o r 
example, though he saw i t as the duty of every I t a l i a n to s t r u g g l e 
f o r t h e l i b e r a t i o n o f I t a l y , n e v e r t h e l e s s a l s o claimed t h a t t h i s was 
the o n l y way i n w h i c h the economic and s o c i a l i l l s of the country 
could be e l i m i n a t e d . F u r t h e r , much of the p o l i t i c a l p l a u s i b i l i t y of 
N a t i o n a l i s m , p a r t i c u l a r l y immediately a f t e r t h e F i r s t World War, lay-
i n i t s ; c l a i m t h a t the s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p e o p l e s was the b e s t way 
to s e c u r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace. A l i b e r a l ' s d e v o t i o n t o l i b e r t y m i g h t 
a l s o bo t h o u g h t o f as h a v i n g something of a t i m e l e s s d i m e n s i o n , but 
here a g a i n i t i s o f t e n an i m p o r t a n t and i n f l u e n t i a l argument i n i t s 
p r o p a g a t i o n t h a t r e as on nb lo r i e s s i n a l l t h i n g s its t h e o n l y way t o 
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avoid the dangers i n h e r e n t i n d o c t r i n a i r e extremism. 
T h i s t e m p o r a l i t y i n i d e o l o g i c a l understanding i s not, I 
t h i n k , s u r p r i s i n g . For as I e a r l i e r argued, i d e o l o g i e s inform k i n d s 
of a c t i v i t y which they do not themselves c o n s t i t u t e . We s h a l l expect, 
t h e r e f o r e , the understanding s u p p l i e d by an ideology to be as temporal 
as the a c t i v i t y i t seems to inform. I n the case of p o l i t i c s , * t h i s i s 
a complete t e m p o r a l i t y . P o l i t i c s j u s t i s t h e a c t i v i t y of c r e a t i n g , 
m a i n t a i n i n g and developing t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s and procedures of a s t a t e , 
i n and over time,to meet the requirements of the changing c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
time b r i n g s , The concern of the p o l i t i c i a n . qua p o l i t i c i a n , i s almost 
e x c l u s i v e l y with hew thin g s are and how t h e y w i l l go. 
F u r t h e r , most of t h e n o t e w o r t h y p o l i t i c a l i d e o l o g i s t s have 
thought and w r i t t e n almost e n t i r e l y i n terms of r e l a t i n g the p a s t to 
the p r e s e n t to the f u t u r e . They have p r e f e r r e d accounts of the p a s t 
which determine tho appropriateness o f a c t i o n s i n the p r e s e n t w i t h a 
view to a f u t u r e which they hope to s e c u r e . T h i s i s t r u e of Marx, 
M i l l , Maine, Mazzini, L e n i n and c o u n t l e s s o t h e r s . 
1 Someone might s u g g e s t t h a t an e t e r n a l d i m e n s i o n i s p o s s i b l e 
i n m o r a l i d e o l o g i e s , unde :ostandings w h i c h seek t o i n f o r m 
j j o r a l c o n d u c t . For, he m i g h t argue, m o r a l conduct a l s o 
concerns r e l a t i o n s h i p s o u t o f t i m e . T h i s q u e s t i o n i s t o o 
larg<s t o d i s c u s s f u l l y here w i t h o u t d e t r a c t i n g f r o m the-
main t h r e a d o f my crgument. S u f f i c e i t t o say t h a t s i n c e 
m o r a l r e l a t i o n s are between human b e i n g s , t h e y must bo tem-
p o r a l l y c o n f i n e d by t h e m o r t a l i t y o f human b e i n g s . I t is 
t h e o t h e r n e s s o f God. KimseJ f w h i c h a l l o w s l o v e o f Him to 
c o n s t i t u t e a p u r e l y o r c o m p l e t e l y e t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
131 
S t i l l , i t may be th a t the t e m p o r a l i t y of i d e o l o g i c a l under-
s t a n d i n g s i s a contingent matter. I mean t h a t i t i s perhaps conceiv-
able t h a t an ideology could provide the p o s s i b i l i t y of e t e r n a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s . As I i n d i c a t e d a moment ago, i n the e x p o s i t i o n s of 
n a t i o n a l i s t ideology the Nation sometimes tak e s on something of the 
c h a r a c t e r of a transcendent r e a l i t y , even perhaps a transcendent 
agency. 1 But by and l a r g e i n i d e o l o g i e s t h e r e i s no agency other than 
human agency, which means th a t the hopes of the i d e o l o g i s t must r e s t 
upon human endeavour and achievement. R e l i g i o n , on the other hand, 
and I know of no r e l i g i o n which does not e n s h r i n e t h i s d o c t r i n e 
e x p l i c i t l y , acknowledges the u l t i m a t e v a n i t y of human achievement. 
The hope of the r e l i g i o u s man i s f o r a 'Kingdom n o t of t h i s world'; i t 
i s e s c h a t o l o g i c a l ; i t r e s i d e s i n God. 
I t i s very easy to s l i p from e s c h a t o l o g i c a l hope 
d i r e c t e d to the coming Kingdom to r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
s t r a t e g y d i r e c t e d at the es t a b l i s h m e n t of a s o c -
i a l i s t s o c i e t y , without being conscious of the 
d i v i n e act which alone e s t a b l i s h e s the one, and 
the human work which b u i l d s the other. Augustine's 
r e p u d i a t i o n of the c l a s s i c a l ' p o l i t i c s of p e r f e c t i o n 1 
was, i n e f f e c t , a r e p u d i a t i o n of any hope of r e s o l -
v i n g the t e n s i o n s i n h e r e n t i n f a l l e n s o c i e t y through 
human means. I n c o n t r a s t to the r e v o l u t i o n a r y w i t h 
h i s programme and h i s s t r a t e g i e s f o r r e a l i z i n g i t . 
the man whose hope i s e s c h a t o l o g i c a l has no prog-
ramme, no ideology and no s t r a t e g y . His hope i s 
s e t upon a r e s o l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t s f a r beyond any 
ideology. I n so f a r as an ideology commits a man 
1 T h i s i s r e v e a l e d sometimes i n what i t means t o t h e n a t i o n -
a l i s t t o . l i v e and d i e f o r I r i s c o u n t r y , I n a sense, a l l t h a t 
i s i m p o r t a n t t o him i s q u i t e u n a f f e c t e d by h i s own d e a t h . 
to a v i s i o n of an u l t i m a t e l y d e s i r a b l e s o c i a l 
order, e s c h a t a l o g i c a l hope i s the negation of 
ideology. I t a s s e r t s t h a t the Gospel i s i n 
r a d i c a l c o n f l i c t with, the world, and must be so 
u n t i l the end, whatever shape 'the world' may 
assume - even i f the 'world' were one shaped by 
the Gospel i t s e l f , even i f t h e s o c i e t y were per-
meated by C h r i s t i a n i n s p i r a t i o n and formed under 
C h r i s t i a n impulse. The C h r i s t i a n hope i s 
r a d i c a l l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n t h a t i t must q u e s t i o n 
at i t s r o o t s a l l forms of s o c i a l order. But i t 
i s a l s o a n t i - i d e o l o g i c a l and a n t i - U t o p i a n i n , 
t h a t i t cannot h o l d out any p o s i t i v e i d e a l or 
Utopia as an a l t e r n a t i v e . 1 
1 K A LJarkus : S f ^ u l u m : H i s fcory and S o c i e t y i n t h e Theology 
o f 3 1 August±no c l r a b r i d g o ~ 1 9 6 9 ,~p.170-171. " 
CHAPTER 6 
Ideology, theology and theory 
" I t i s e v i d e n t l y e q u a l l y f o o l i s h zo accept 
probable reasoning from a mathematician 
and to demand from a r h e t o r i c i a n . s c i e n t i f -
i c p r o o f s . " 
ARISTOTLE 
1. I n the l a s t chapter I have t r i e d both to show that i d e o l o -
g i e s and r e l i g i o n s are understandings of the world and to chow what 
kinds of understanding they are. To say t h a t they are understandings 
i s to deny th a t they c o n s i s t i n s e t s of p r o p o s i t i o n s or p r i n c i p l e s and 
to a s s e r t t h a t they are themselves frameworks of understanding which 
allow c l a i m s to be made and to be r e f u t e d . And i t has been p a r t of 
my argument t h a t the c r i t e r i a , by which the soundness and unsoundness 
of these c l a i m s i s to be judged, are i n t e r n a l to the ideology i n 
q u e s t i o n . I n t h i s chapter I hope to show j u s t what the form of such 
c r i t e r i a might be and what kind of r e f l e c t i o n they allow. Thereby I 
hope to r e f u t e the s c e p t i c ' s suggestion t h a t i n matters of i d e o l o g i c a l 
b e l i e f t h e r e i s no scope f o r t a l k of a genuine e x e r c i s e of reasoning. 
To do t h i s i s to i n v e s t i g a t e the nature of ideology i n the 
second of the two senses I d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n Chapter 4, namely, 
i d e o l o g i c a l argument and r e f l e c t i o n , which I e a r l i e r c a l l e d the theo-
r e t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n of f a i t h . But i t might be suggested t h a t what I 
have s a i d so f a r p r o h i b i t s the p o s s i b i l i t y of any such e x p r e s s i o n , 
t h a t , f a r from r e f u t i n g the s c e p t i c , I am f o r c e d by my own argument 
to concur i n h i s opinion. Before t u r n i n g t c the main burden of t h i i i 
chapter, then, i t w i l l be n e c e s s a r y to c o n s i d e r t h i s o b j e c t i o n . 
2. I t could, I think.be put l i k e t h i s . 'In the course of the 
argument you have advanced two c l a i m s -which, taken together, p r o h i b i t 
the a s s e r t i o n of a t h i r d . The f i r s t two of these are as f o l l o w s , 
(A) I t i s i n the nature of t h e o r e t i c a l i n q u i r y thivt i t i s 
i n capable of p r o v i d i n g any o r i e n t a t i o n towards or knowledge of. the 
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f u t u r e . E v e r y t h i n g i n philosophy or h i s t o r y or s c i e n c e i s , from the 
point of view of the p r a c t i c a l man, v a l u e l e s s and u s e l e s s . Philosophy, 
fo r example, can o f f e r an account of m o r a l i t y but i t cannot make us 
moral. H i s t o r y can t e l l the s t o r y of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s but i t cannot 
t e l l us which to j o i n . S c i e n c e can r e v e a l the p r o p e r t i e s of the 
Uni v e r s e but i t cannot a d v i s e us on which to e x p l o i t . Academic or 
t h e o r e t i c a l i n q u i r y i s by i t s very nature concerned w i t h f a c t and non-
f a c t . But the f a c t u a l by i t s e l f i s dead. Theory, then, as you have 
argued throughout t h i s t h e s i s , cannot determine or guide the w i l l . 
I n s h o r t , academic i n q u i r y has no import f o r p r a c t i c a l l i f e . (B) On 
the other hand, those b e l i e f s and d o c t r i n e s and t r a d i t i o n s of thought 
and p r a c t i c e , which we o f t e n c a l l " p h i l o s o p h i e s " , which you have c a l l e d 
i d e o l o g i e s or more g e n e r a l l y f a i t h s , are concerned w i t h j u s t those 
questions of how we are to l i v e , both with r e l a t i o n to p a r t i c u l a r 
c ircumstances and i n g e n e r a l . But the s e , s i n c e they are the s o r t s of 
th i n g v/e l i v e by, must, i f the world i s to be understood i n t h e i r 
l i g h t , _be l i v e d by. I n t h i s way, where f a i t h s are concerned we cannot 
se p a r a t e understanding a view of the world e.nd understanding the world 
according to t h a t view. Thus, o b j e c t i v e examination i n t h i s context 
does not make sense. That i s . i t i s not p o s s i b l e to s u b j e c t a b e l i e f 
or sot of b e l i e f s of t h i s kind to r a t i o n a l s c r u t i n y and then accept 
or r e j e c t i t . I d e o l o g i c a l understanding i s , i n t h i s sense, a s u b j e c -
t i v e understanding. 
Given t h i s view of theory and t h i s view of f a i t h , i t f o l l o w s 
t h a t (C) i t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r a mail to t h e o r i s e about h i s f a i t h . Yet 
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you have claimed t h a t what i s d i s t i n c t i v e about the kinds of w r i t i n g 
and t h i n k i n g which we have been c o n s i d e r i n g i s t h a t they are the 
t h e o r e t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n of f a i t h . ' 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t e i t h e r t h e r e i s some e r r o r i n t h i s e l a b o r a -
t i o n of the argument or I am indeed f o r c e d to accept the s c e p t i c ' s 
c o n c l u s i o n . And, of course, i t i s my contention t h a t t h e r e i s some 
confusion i n the f i r s t argument, which I w i l l now t r y to show. The 
showing of t h i s i s r e a l l y the concern of the e n t i r e chapter. Here, 
t h e r e f o r e , I s h a l l merely make a few d i s c l a i m e r s . 
F i r s t , I am not arguing t h a t some form of t h e o r e t i c a l 
e l a b o r a t i o n of an ideology or a r e l i g i o n i s n e c e s s a r y to the l i f e of 
an i d e o l o g i c a l or r e l i g i o u s p e r s u a s i o n . Indeed, the contingency of 
such a r t i c u l a t i o n i s an important p a r t of my d i s t i n c t i o n between 
ideology i n the f i r s t and ideology i n the second sense, and between 
r e l i g i o n and theology. A l l C h r i s t i a n s , f o r example, as r e l i g i o u s 
men, are i n p o s s e s s i o n of a p e c u l i a r or p a r t i c u l a r understanding of 
the world and t h i s understanding i s manifested not p r i m a r i l y i n 
a s s e r t i o n s about how the world i s , but i n a whole way of behaving, a 
s e t of a t t i t u d e s and responses to thin g s i n the world. Again, most 
L i b e r a l s a r c p r i m a r i l y l i b e r a l i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e j j and i n the v a l u e s 
they s h a r e . What makes them i d e o l o g i c a l adherents i s the f a c t t h a t 
these a t t i t u d e s and v a l u e s make sense and can be a r t i c u l a t e d i n the 
context of, i n r e l a t i o n to,.a p i c t u r e of the world. But i t would 
simply be f a l s e to suggest that a l l l i b e r a l s could g i v e an e x p o s i t i o n 
of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and iaoral b e l i e f , .iust as i t would be f a l s e to 
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c l a i m t h a t a l l C h r i s t i a n s have a t h e o l o g i c a l account of t h e i r b e l i e f 
at t h e i r f i n g e r t i p s . I t f o l l o w s t h a t the a r t i c u l a t e e x p o s i t i o n of 
the understanding f a i t h s u p p l i e s i s only one p o s s i b l e form of e x p r e s s i o n , 
t h a t t h e r e are many othe r ways i n which i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f and under-
s t a n d i n g manifest themselves. Of course, t h i s a r t i c u l a t e , t h e o r e t i c a l 
e l a b o r a t i o n i s u s u a l l y more communicable and approachable than the more 
concrete, p r a c t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s . But t h i s i s because i t takes the 
form of p r o p o s i t i o n s and arguments, not because i t i s i n some sense 
the 'core' of the f a i t h . Indeed, theology and ideology are p a r a s i t i c 
to some extent upon the other k i n d s of e x p r e s s i o n which the f a i t h s 
they seek to express enjoy and I can r e a d i l y conceive ox a f a i t h 
which does not give r i s e to any t h e o r e t i c a l account of i t s e l f . " 1 " To 
argue, then, as I w i s h to do, t h a t r e f l e c t i o n i n matters of f a i t h can 
have H genuine p l a c e i n the conduct of l i f e i s not to argue t h a t such 
r e a s o n i n g i s c e n t r a l to or even a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of a f a i t h ' s 
1 Compare W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s remark to F r i e d r i c h Waisiuann: 
" I s speech e s s e n t i a l f o r r e l i g i o n ? I can q u i t e w e l l 
imagine a r e l i g i o n , i n which there are no d o c t r i n e s 
and hence nothing i s s a i d . Obviously, the essence 
of r e l i g i o n can have nothing to do w i t h the f a c t that 
speech o c c u r s , or r a t h e r : i f speech does occur th±r, 
i t s e l f i s a component of r e l i g i o u s behaviour and not 
a theory. T h e r e f o r e nothing turnr; on whether the 
words are t r u e . f a l s e or n o n s e n s i c a l . " 
P h i l . Review, Vol 75, 196 5, p.16 
T h i s £.eems to *ie not q u i t e r i g h t . At l e a s t , a l l I want to 
c l a i m i s t h a t a r e l i g i o n without d o c t r i n e i a pofir=:Lble. But not 
a l l r e l i g i o u s language i s or even a r i s e s out of d o c t r i n e . 
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e x i s t e n c e . 
S t i l l l e s s i s i t to argue t h a t the b e l i e f s by which men 
l i v e can be founded on an o b j e c t i v e b a s i s , t h a t they can be shown or 
demonstrated, independently of the context of the f a i t h i t s e l f , to be 
sound or unsound, r a t i o n a l or i r r a t i o n a l . Tor I have argued a l l along 
t h a t t h i s i s the d i f f e r e n c e between s c i e n t i f i c or ' w o r l d - h i s t o r i c a l ' 
p r o p o s i t i o n s and the b e l i e f s of a f a i t h , t h a t the l a t t e r cannot be 
given any o b j e c t i v e foundation, w h i l e t h a t i s j u s t what the former 
must have. 
3. Here i t might be s a i d t h a t such d i s c l a i m e r s as t h e s e show 
th a t the term 'theory' used i n the context of ideology or r e l i g i o n , 
i s , at the very l e a s t , g r o s s l y m i s l e a d i n g . For the argument i n 
Chapter 5 so centred around the c o n t r a s t between t h e o r e t i c a l and 
p r a c t i c a l understanding t h a t t h e use of 'theory' here can only serve 
to obfuscate. 
T h i s may be so, and i n the l i g h t of t h i s o b j e c t i o n I s h a l l 
use the terms ' r e f l e c t i o n ' and ' r e f l e c t i v e ' i n p r e f e r e n c e to 'theory' 
and ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' . But s i n c e the terms 'theory' and ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' 
a r c commonly used to r e f e r to j u s t those works of l i t e r a t u r e whose 
c h a r a c t e r I wish to i n v e s t i g a t e , 1 can, I t h i n k , s a f e l y c l a i m , without 
denying the e a r l i e r d i s t i n c t i o n , between the t h e o r e t i c a l and the 
p r a c t i c a l , t h a t what I have to say about i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i s a 
matter of r e v e a l i n g what 'theory' i s l i k e , or more p r o p e r l y , what i t 
must be l i k e , i n ideology. I t i s to t h i s t h a t I s h a l l now t u r n . 
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I 
1. We sometimes c o n t r a c t theory with p r a c t i c e when we are not, 
and could not be, i n any doubt t h a t both are c e n t r a l l y w i t h i n the 
world of p r a c t i c e . These are c a s e s where, f o r example, we c o n t r a s t 
t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p e r f e c t i o n of a design with the l i k e l y p r a c t i c a l d i f f i -
c u l t y of i t s e x e c u t i o n . But I do not t h i n k t h a t our speaking i n t h i s 
way a r i s e s out of t o t a l c o n fusion. C l e a r l y , however, the use of 
'theory' here i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h a t i n which we d e s c r i b e 
s c i e n c e or philosophy as theory. I n the case I have j u s t c i t e d 
p r a c t i c e i s the a c i d t e s t of theory, but a s c i e n t i f i c theory could 
not be t e s t e d i n p r a c t i c e s i n c e i t i s i n c a p a b l e of advocating anything 
which might or might not work i n p r a c t i c e . For example, the h y p o t h e s i s 
t h a t ' A l l gases expand when heated' can be t e s t e d by h e a t i n g gases. 
But i t i s not the a c t of h e a t i n g which r e f u t e s or confirms i t , but 
the f a c t which the act i s designed to r e v e a l . On the other hand, 
the 'theory' t h a t 'The l o p of the b o t t l e w i l l come o f f i t you heat i t 
under the tap' i s ' f a l s i f i e d ' i f i t f a i l s to get t h e top off. 
I n other words, the a c t of h e a t i n g gases has a s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the 
context of developing and t e s t i n g a s c i e n t i f i c theory. The theory 
about the b o t t l e top has s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the context of a p r a c t i c a l 
a c t . 
T h i s d i f f e r e n t use of the term 'theory' i s not q u i t e t h a t 
upon which I wish to focus a t t e n t i o n . I c i t e i t only to 3how t h a t 
i n o r d i n a r y language the word can be used to draw a c o n t r a s t between 
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p r a c t i c a l reasoning and p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . T h i s i s p a r t l y the 
c o n t r a s t w h i c h I wish to make,but I want to p o i n t to a d i f f e r e n c e 
between two p o s s i b l e responses to p r a c t i c a l l i f e which both i n v o l v e 
reasoning. I s h a l l c a l l t h e s e the r e f l e c t i v e and the a c t i v e responses 
to the conduct of l i f e . The r e f l e c t i v e response, as I s h a l l e l a b o r a t e 
i t , i s the response which i s not content merely to l i v e out a l i f e , but 
which seeks to ' p h i l o s o p h i s e ' , i n the layman's sense, t h a t i s to 
a r t i c u l a t e t h a t l i f e and the s i g n i f i c a n c e i t a t t r i b u t e s 'to events 
and phenomena. 
2. The c o n t r a s t between the a c t i v e and the r e f l e c t i v e can be 
brought o u t , I t h i n k , by c o n s i d e r i n g again the example of the b o t t l e 
top. The p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y , i n t h i s c ase, i s t h a t of removing 
the top of the b o t t l e . I t i s suggested t h a t one way of doing t h i s 
i s to loosen the top by warming i t under the hot tap. T h i s i s 
suggested, l e t us suppose, on the very good grounds t h a t metal 
expands more than g l a s s . T h i s i s , as I say, a very good reason f o r 
t r y i n g t h i s method of s o l v i n g the problem, but from the point of view 
of the p r a c t i c a l t a s k i n hand, though th e s e grounds may be good and 
may be p e r s u a s i v e , they do not stand or f a l l w i t h the s u c c e s s or 
. f a i l u r e of t h e recommended method. I t i s the method t h a t i s important 
and not t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f why i t i s s u c c e s s f u l . I n other words, i f 
we do warm t h e top of t h e b o t t l e and i t does n o t come o f f , i t does 
n o t f o l l o w t h a t metal does not expand more t h a n g l a s s . But e q u a l l y , 
i t i s i r r e l e v a n t , i f t h e method has. f a i l e d , t o s e t about proving t h a t 
m e t a l docs expand more than g l a s s , f o r however t h a t may be, t h e 
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method of removing the b o t t l e top has s t i l l been a f a i l u r e . I n 
b r i e f , from a p r a c t i c a l point of view what works i s r i g h t and what 
f a i l s to work i s u s e l e s s and of no f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t , r e g a r d l e s s of 
the soundness of the grounds upon which such a method i s advanced. 
I t i s easy to be m i s l e d by t h e s i m p l i c i t y of t h i s example. 
I n f a c t , I t h i n k t h a t a s i m i l a r a n a l y s i s of, f o r example, the 
r e l a t i o n s between economic theory and a d v i c e to p o l i t i c i a n s on 
s t e e r i n g the economy, w i l l hold good. Be t h a t as i t may, the con-
t r a s t I want to draw i s between t h i s v a r i e t y of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g , 
which i s , we might say, geared to r e s u l t s , where what i s s e n s i b l e 
i s what works and what has been found to work, and t h a t s p e c i e s of 
p r a c t i c a l reason where, r e g a r d l e s s of what works, what matters i s 
what i s r i g h t . Consider the f o l l o w i n g exanple, 
Suppose that a p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r , faced w i t h the p o s s i b l e 
e x p u l s i o n of h i s party from power, together, l e t us suppose, w i t h 
a l l t h a t he and h i s party have fought f o r , i s advised to imprison 
some of h i s p o l i t i c a l opponents even though they have committed no 
impeachable o f f e n c e s . The arguments f o r and a g a i n s t t h i s p o l i c y 
might be c o n s i d e r a b l e . For example, i t could be argued t h a t , such 
was the p r e s e n t o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t a t e of the p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n 
t h a t , i f a few key men were imprisoned and thereby removed from 
t h e i r e x e c u t i v e p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n , the o p p o s i t i o n , 
d e s p i t e c o n s i d e r a b l e r e s o u r c e s , would c o l l a p s e . The e x p e r t i s e and 
experience n e c e s s a r y .for the s u c c e s s f u l deployment of those r e s o u r c e s 
would have been destroyed. Against the i d e a of imprisonment without 
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t r i a l i t might be argued t h a t such a p o l i c y had always proved the 
s u r e s t method of s t i f f e n i n g the r e s o l v e of those committed to the 
o p p o s i t i o n by making martyrs of t h e i r l e a d e r s ; t h a t i t would provide 
an a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r which would push many uncommitted people i n t o 
s upporting the o p p o s i t i o n ; t h a t i t would c r e a t e the c o n s i d e r a b l e 
problem of p r o v i d i n g top s e c u r i t y p r i s o n s f o r those i n t e r n e d . Or 
more g e n e r a l l y i t might be argued t h a t the r e p u t a t i o n of the govern-
ment would be i r r e p a r a b l y damaged both at home and abroad. 
A l l of these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are designed to show t h a t t h i s 
measure w i l l or w i l l not accomplish a c e r t a i n e f f e c t . I n o t h e r words, 
they are concerned w i t h what w i l l and what w i l l not work. Such 
arguments, of course, cannot demonstrate t h a t such and such w i l l 
be the outcome. The a c t u a l e f f e c t of any measure i s a contingent 
matter. Rather t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s have a bearing upon the 
a d v i s a b i l i t y of a c e r t a i n a c t i o n . But t h e r e i s another s e t of con-
s i d e r a t i o n s which might be brought to bear i n an a r g u t i e n t of t h i s 
k i n d and t h e s e are c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of T i g h t n e s s . 
Suppose t h a t the p o l i t i c i a n i n q u e s t i o n r e f u s e d to adopt 
the measure of imprisonment without t r i a l f o r t h e reason t h a t , when 
the law has not been broken, freedom from c o e r c i o n i s a fundamental 
human r i g h t . He might c l a i m t h a t , whatever the l i k e l y consequences 
and however d e s i r a b l e these m i g h t be, imprisonment without t r i a l 
i s fundamentally wrong. O r . a g a i n , from a d i f f e r e n t viewpoint, some-
one m i g h t a r g u e t h a t i n a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e , i m p r i s o n m e n t w i t h o u t 
t r i a l was so a l i e n to the c o u n t r y ' s p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s t h a t nothing 
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could j u s t i f y i t . The point about both th e s e arguments and i n 
general the hi n d of c o n s i d e r a t i o n of which they are i n s t a n c e s , i s 
th a t i t i s u s e l e s s now to estimate the outcome or e f f i c a c y of the 
measure, f o r the judgments are about r i g h t and wrong, about what can 
and cannot be done r e g a r d l e s s of these p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I 
do not mean t h a t judgments such as t h e s e and the f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n 
a r r i v i n g at them have nothing to do w i t h the s u c c e s s and f a i l u r e of 
a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y . They may. I f a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i s s u f f i c i e n t l y 
a l i e n to a giv e n p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e t h e degree of o p p o s i t i o n i t 
provokes may be q u i t e u n l i k e normal p o l i t i c a l unease. What I do 
want to argue i 3 t h a t considerations, of immediate success and f a i l u r e 
can r i g h t l y be regarded as i r r e l e v o n t to judgments of t h i s s o r t , 
f o r they are judgments of a d i f f e r e n t order. A man cannot advocate 
a measure on pragmatic grounds, i f he has good reason to think t h a t 
t h i s w i l l l e a d to u n d e s i r a b l e consequences. But i f he i s concerned 
to do what i s r i g h t i t need not matter to him whether the r i g h t 
a c t i o n w i l l a l s o be s u c c e s s f u l . 
3. To say t h i s i s not to revoke my e a r l i e r d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the e t e r n a l and the temporal. An e t e r n a l view of the present under-
stands human e f f o r t i n the world of change to be u l t i m a t e l y v a i n . I t 
i s , i f you l i k e , a r e f u s a l to acknowledge any value i n the world of 
pragmatic endeavour. But such a r e f u s a l i s n o t i n v o l v e d h e r e . The 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of r i g h t n e s s such as i n t h e example I have j u s t givo:-i, 
do n o t i n v o l v e a d e n i a l of the importance o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y b u t 
are r a t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of t h e l i m i t s t o such a c t i v i t y . They t r a n s -
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cend the p a r t i c u l a r c ircumstances i n the sense t h a t t h e i r concern 
i s , so to speak, w i t h an o v e r a l l view of the p o l i t i c a l l i f e a man 
i s going to l e a d , r a t h e r than w i t h the p o l i t i c a l wisdom of t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r act i n t h e s e p r e s e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
T h i s , however, i s not a r e j e c t i o n of the whole i d e a of a 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e . I t s concern i s w i t h p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y . 1 I mean to 
say t h a t what I have c a l l e d p u r e l y pragmatic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are per-
t i n e n t to the p o l i t i c i a n qua p o l i t i c a n , w h i l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of 
T i g h t n e s s a r i s e when the q u e s t i o n i s asked 'What must I do and what 
must I r e f r a i n from doing i f my i n t e g r i t y and i d e n t i t y as a l i b e r a l 
( o r whatever) i s to be p r e s e r v e d ? 1 
4. The d i s t i n c t i o n I am drawing i s h a r d l y new. I t h i n k t h a t 
t h i s k i n d of d i s t i n c t i o n between the morally r i g h t and the p r a c t i c a l l y 
e f f i c a c i o u s i s t h a t which S o c r a t e s defends i n both The 
R e p u b l i c and Gorgias. I t h i n k , too, t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s d i s -
t i n c t i o n i s what l e d Kant to l o c a t e moral goodness, not i n the con-
sequences of an a c t i o n , but i n a good w i l l . What I am t r y i n g to do 
here i s employ t h i s age-old d i s t i n c t i o n i n the context of a c e r t a i n 
problem, the problem of the p l a c e of e t h i c a l and r e l i g i o u s r e f l e c t i o n 
i n the conduct of p r a c t i c a l l i f e . And I t h i n k I can do t h i s i n the 
f o l l o w i n g manner. 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t , i n the example I have been u s i n g , the 
f i r s t , the pragmatic, s e t of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s about what w i l l work and 
1 
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what w i l l not work are the outcome of e x p e r i e n c e , experience t h a t 
i s to say of what has cud has not worked i n the p a s t . The best 
a d v i s o r s , then, w i l l be men of p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e . But of course 
i t i s not enough t h a t we have experience of t h e p a s t . S k i l l i n the 
b u s i n e s s of a d v i s i n g and d e c i d i n g l i e s i n our a b i l i t y to r e l a t e the 
l e s s o n s of the pa3t to the c o n c r e t e , a l t e r e d circumstances of the 
p r e s e n t . ^ T h i s i s the s e n s e i n which the p r a c t i c a l past i s q u i t e 
d i f f e r e n t from the h i s t o r i c p a s t . For, w h i l e the h i s t o r i a n ' s p a s t 
i s s t u d i e d f o r i t s own sake, the p r a c t i c a l man can r e a d i l y d i s c a r d 
those events i n the p a s t which throw no l i g h t upon the p r e s e n t . The 
c r i t e r i a of what i s important i n the p a s t are q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f o r 
the h i s t o r i a n and the p r a c t i c a l man. 
I n p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l , pragmatic r e a s o n i n g , then, the p r e s e n t 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s are c r u c i a l i n determining the wisdom or f o l l y of any 
p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n . But i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of the second kind, the 
attempt i s to t r a n s c e n d those very c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t o d e t e c t the enduring 
f e a t u r e of the a c t , i t s good and i t s e v i l . P r e s e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
when they do play a p a r t i n such judgments are always m i t i g a t i n g 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . C o n s i d e r a t i o n s of the second k i n d are not d i r e c t l y 
concerned with what i s to be done but r a t h e r what can and cannot be 
done i n the l i g h t of who v/c are and what we v a l u e , independently of 
1 I t h i n k t h a t M a c h i a v e l l i 's J i ' e _ P r i n c e e x e m p l i f i e s tins e r r o r 
o f t h i n k i n g t h a t knowledge o f t h e p a s t i s s u f f i c i e n t i n 
i t s e l f . 
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t h i s p a r t i c u l a r t i n e and circumstance. Of course, circumstances 
may f o r c e us to abandon one v a l u e i n favour of another f o r , notor-
i o u s l y , e t h i c a l c h o ices most u s u a l l y p r e s e n t themselves not i n b l a c k s 
and whites but i n v a r y i n g shades of grey. 
I n pragmatic or p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l r easoning, the wisdom or 
soundness of any judgment as to what i s to be done i s a s s e s s e d i n 
the l i g h t of past e x p e r i e n c e , p r e s e n t circumstance and reasonable 
p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n as to the f u t u r e . By what c r i t e r i a , i f any, i s the 
soundness, wisdom or f o l l y of any e t h i c a l judgment to be a s s e s s e d ? 
The essence of the s c e p t i c ' s case i s t h a t i t makes no sense to t a l k 
of wisdom here, f o r no r e f l e c t i o n can show one e t h i c a l judgment to be 
b e t t e r than another. 
5. Now i n Chapter 5, I argued t h a t only i n the context of a 
t r a d i t i o n of moral l i f e can a judgment be an e t h i c a l judgment and 
have sense, be i n t e l l i g i b l e . T h i s i s to say t h a t b e f o r e any 
i d e o l o g i c a l , r e l i g i o u s or e t h i c a l p r e p o s i t i o n can be assented t o , 
i t must be understood ( t h i s , of course^ i s t r u e of e.1.1 p r o p o s i t i o n s ) 
and what i s i n v o l v e d i n understanding a moral judgment, the l o g i c a l l y 
n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s being understood, 
i s a form of moral l i f e shared between the maker and the underutander 
of the judgment, however l i m i t e d the extent of the shared elements 
of t h a t l i f e may be. I should l i k e now to argue, t h a t , given the 
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f e t h i c a l Judgment, the e x i s t e n c e of a shared, 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e t r a d i t i o n of i d e o l o g i c a l or t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t : i o n 
allows t h e possil b i i i t y of a mutual and genuine r e f l e c t i v e examination 
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of such judgments. 
L e t us r e t u r n f o r a moment to t h e example we have been 
c o n s i d e r i n g . I n the second s e t of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , i t was s a i d t h a t 
to introduce imprisonment without t r i a l would be to v i o l a t e a funda-
mental human r i g h t . The burden of Chapter 5 i s t h a t i t makes no sense 
to wonder whether i t i s wrong to v i o l a t e a fundamental human r i g h t . I t 
j u s t i s the case, f o r anyone to whom t a l k of fundamental r i g h t s makes 
sense, t h a t they are the s o r t s of thin g s which must not be v i o l a t e d 
and which s e t l i m i t s to what can and cannot be done. I f , then, any 
di s p u t e i s to a r i s e at t h i s p o i n t , i t cannot be an argument about 
whether the v i o l a t i o n of human r i g h t s io r i g h t or wrong. Such a d i s -
pute would not be p e c u l i a r l y e t h i c a l , as some ph i l o s o p h e r s have 
suggested; i t would be vacuous. The e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n , i f t h e r e i s 
one, then, must r a t h e r be over whether t h i s i s or i s not a ca s e of 
the v i o l a t i o n of a human r i g h t . What marks i t o f f as a q u e s t i o n of 
a d i f f e r e n t k i n d i s t h a t i t i s couched i n t h e language of a recog-
n i s a b l e e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n . I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, however,, t h e r e 
i s not much scope f o r debate, s i n c e f o r most l i b e r a l w r i t e r s and 
l i b e r a l people, imprisonment without t r i a l i s the paradigm case of 
the v i o l a t i o n of a fundamental r i g h t . But s i n c e the l i f e of i d e o l o g i c a l 
and r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s must be c a r r i e d on i n a world of chance and 
change, questions of t h i s order do a r i s e and are introduced. 
Few people who f i n d t a l k of human r i g h t s i n t e l l i g i b l e would 
doubt th a t imprisonment without t r i a l i s indeed the v i o l a t i o n of such 
a r i g h t . I t is? not over cases l i k e t h i s t h a t d i s p u t e s a r i s e . But 
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suppose t h a t a p o l i t i c i a n i s urged to i n t e r v e n e i n the c l o s u r e of 
a f a c t o r y on the grounds t h a t those who are about to l o s e t h e i r jobs 
have a fundamental r i g h t to work. Here we might w e l l wonder whether 
work can be c o n s i d e r e d a fundamental r i g h t , l i k e the r i g h t s to l i f e 
and l i b e r t y , and a d i s p u t e may a r i s e between those who take d i f f e r i n g 
views of the matter. My q u e s t i o n i s whether there i s any p o s s i b i l i t y 
of r e a c h i n g a c o n c l u s i o n on an i s s u e such as t h i s , i n a process of 
r e f l e c t i o n , as opposed to the mere a s s e r t i o n c f an opinion one way 
or the other. 
I should l i k e t h i s p oint to be q u i t e c l e a r , however. I am 
not t r y i n g to r e - i n t r o d u c e a notion 'Truth' l i k e t h a t i n the common-
p l a c e model which I e a r l i e r r e j e c t e d . Rather, I am t r y i n g to r e v e a l 
the k i n d of r a t i o n a l i t y , i f any, t h a t i s p o s s i b l e i n i d e o l o g i c a l and 
t h e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n . And I t h i n k t h a t we may s e n s i b l y speak of a 
judgment's being r a t i o n a l without thereby implying any i d e a c f 
demonstrable c e r t a i n t y or without wishing, even, to engage i n any 
t a l k of t r u t h or f a l s i t y . 
I I 
1. To a r r i v e at an answer to the q u e s t i o n of whether tho 
e t h i c a l w r i t i n g which we c a l l works of ideology can i n v o l v e any 
n o t i o n of r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n , I s h a l l explore the p a r a l l e l suggested 
by tho t i t l e •:>£ t h i s chapter, that between i d s o l o y y and theology. For 
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I t h i n k t h a t the ki n d of r e a s o n i n g i n v o l v e d i s s i m i l a r i n both. 
The p a r t i c u l a r example I should l i k e to c o n s i d e r , i n some 
d e t a i l , i s the c o n t r o v e r s y between P e l a g i u s and the doctors of the 
Church, Jerome and Augustine. T h i s d i s p u t e was about the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between nature and grace, o r i g i n a l s i n and g u i l t , a q u e s t i o n which has 
of t e n occupied t h e o l o g i a n s . P e l a g i u s claimed t h a t i t was p o s s i b l e f o r 
a man to be p e r f e c t without knowledge of C h r i s t . Augustine claimed 
t h a t a l l men were cor r u p t by nature so t h a t p e r f e c t i o n was only 
p o s s i b l e by the s a v i n g power of the c r o s s . What i n t e r e s t s me i n t h i s 
d i c p u t e i s the form of t h e argument;? t h a t were advanced on e i t h e r s i d e 
and with a view to commenting on them, I should l i k e to summarise them 
b r i e f l y . 1 
P e l a g i u s argued t h a t , i f men were i m p e r f e c t by nature, i f 
t h a t i s to say, 'a man were of such a c h a r a c t e r t h a t he could not 
2 
p o s s i b l y be without s i n , he would be f r e e of blame'. I n other words, 
i f s i n i s i n our nature, i t cannot be a f f e c t e d by and cannot, t h e r e -
f o r e , i n v o l v e a r e s p o n s i b l e or an i r r e s p o n s i b l e e x e r c i s e of the w i l l . 
'Kow can one be s u b j e c t e d to God f o r the g u i l t of t h a t s i n , which he 
knows i s not h i s own. Or, i f i t i s h i s own i t i s v o l u n t a r y , i t can 
1 What f o l l o w s i s a g r e a t l y attenuated and s i m p l i f i e d account 
of t h i s f a s c i n a t i n g debate. 
2 Augustine: On Nature and Grace Trans, P Holmes i n \Y J Oates (ed) 
Ba s i c- W r i t i n g s of S t Augustine, Now York, 1948, Vol I . Apart 
from a few fraginonvs .the only vocord c£ P e l a g i u s ' o r i g i n a l work i s 
i n Augustine's c r i t i c A s i a of i t . A l l my q u o t a t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , 
coico •;::coc: this work. 
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be avoided'. I f , then, i t can be avoided, i t i s p o s s i b l e that i n 
some men s i n i s not committed at a l l and t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , there i s 
no i m p e r f e c t i o n i n t h e i r s o u l s . 
Now i n order to avoid the charge t h a t he has l e f t no p l a c e 
f o r God's supremacy and man's i n f e r i o r i t y , P e l a g i u s adds t h a t , of 
course he i s d i s c u s s i n g a matter of p o s s i b i l i t y and not a c t u a l i t y 
and t h a t a l l men a r e , as i t happens, s i n f u l . F u r t h e r , he agrees t h a t 
i f the p o s s i b i l i t y ever i s an a c t u a l i t y i t i s so only by the grace of 
God. 
There are two q u i t e d i f f e r e n t kinds of argument at work 
here. The f i r s t of th e s e i s what we could c a l l l o g i c a l argument. 
P e l a g i u s t h i n k s t h a t he has d e t e c t e d an incoherence i n the d o c t r i n e 
of o r i g i n a l s i n and he t h i n k s t h a t i f t h i s incoherence i s remedied the 
r e s u l t i n g p o s i t i o n acuaits the p o s s i b i l i t y of s i n f u l n e s s without 
s a l v a t i o n . The second k i n d of argument, h i s defense of t h i s view as 
orthodox, i n v o l v e s an appeal to general notions of orthodoxy and to 
the s p e c i f i c orthodoxy ~i.aid down i n the w r i t i n g s of the t h e o l o g i a n s , 
( P e l a g i u s r e f e r s to Origen, f o r example.) I t f u r t h e r i n v o l v e s an 
appeal to and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S c r i p t u r e . 
Augustine's o b j e c t i o n s to P e l a g i u s are of th e s e same two 
k i n d s . He takes up the l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n of nature and vo l u n t a r y a c t i o n 
and argues t h a t n e c e s s i t y and f r e e w i l l are not incompatible. ( I do 
1 i b i d . XXXIV 
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not say t h a t t h i s i s a sound argument, only t h a t i t i s r e c o g n i s a b l y 
an argument.) Secondly, he argues t h a t , even though P e l a g i u s admits 
the n e c e s s i t y of the grace of God to the p e r f e c t i o n of any man, h i s 
cl a i m t h a t human p e r f e c t i o n i s p o s s i b l e without redemption e n t a i l s 
the h e r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n that C h r i s t ' s death and r e s u r r e c t i o n were 
i n v a i n . 
I take the i n s t a n c e of a young man, or an o l d man, 
who has di e d i n a reg i o n where he could not hear 
the name of C h r i s t . Well, could such a man have 
become ri g h t e o u s by nature and f r e e w i l l ; or could 
he not? I f they contend t h a t he could, then see 
what i t i s to render the Cross of C h r i s t of none 
e f f e c t , to contend t h a t anyman, without i t , can bo 
j u s t i f i e d by the law of nature ajid the power of 
h i s w i l l . 1 
I n s h o r t , P e l a g i u s ' d o c t r i n e i n v o l v e s a d e n i a l of the p l a c e 
of C h r i s t i n the s a l v a t i o n of man and can s c a r c e l y , then, stand as a 
C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e . 
F u r t h e r , Augustine c l a i m s t h a t P e l a g i u s 1 t e a c h i n g j s d i r e c t l y 
c o n t r a r y to the S c r i p t u r e s and he quotes.Paul's l e t t e r to the G a l a t i a n s 
' I f r i g h t e o u s n e s s come by the Lav/ then C h r i s t i s dead i n v a i n ' . 
2. Now my i n t e r e s t i s not i n the content or the substance of 
thes e arguments but r a t h e r i n what kind of arguments they are. We have 
seen t h a t two d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of o b j e c t i o n and defence are i n v o l v e d 
here. P e l a g i u s appeals f i r s t to l o g i c and then to orthodoxy. Ke 
claims t h a t the d o c t r i n e of o r i g i n a l s i n cannot he l i g h t because i t i s 
1 i b i d XXXIV 
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i n c o h e r e n t , and t h a t the r e j e c t i o n of t h a t d o c t r i n e i s not i n con-
f l i c t w ith orthodox t e a c h i n g as enshrined i n S c r i p t u r e and the w r i t i n g s 
of the F a t h e r s . Augustine c l a i m s t h a t the d o c t r i n e of o r i g i n a l s i n 
i s not incoherent and t h a t i t s r e j e c t i o n i s i n c o n f l i c t w i t h orthodox 
b e l i e f as e n s h r i n e d i n S c r i p t u r e and i n the t e a c h i n g s of the F a t h e r s . 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t arguments of the f i r s t s o r t are indeed 
p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i o n s , as indeed they are i n almost a l l k i n d s of d i s -
course. For s i n c e , though what i s l o g i c a l l y i ncoherent can be s a i d , 
i t cannot be a s s e r t e d , (eg. 1 have squared the c i r c l e ) and what i s 
l o g i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y cannot be denied and'further, s i n c e a l l argument 
c o n s i s t s i n p a r t of a s s e r t i o n and rieraal, i t f o l l o w s t h a t the q u e s t i o n 
of the l o g i c a l coherence or incoherence of our a s s e r t i o n s and d e n i a l s 
i n argument w i l l always be p e r t i n e n t . However ; the degree to which 
t h i s k i n d of argument i s capable of generating c l e a r c u t o b j e c t i o n s 
o u t s i d e of those contexts where i t i s the only form of argument 
(philosophy proper, f o r example) should not be overestimated. Often 
i t i s not at a l l c l e a r whether two notions are incompatible or not 
( f o r example transcendence and immanence) and f u r t h e r , as I s h a l l t r y 
to b r i n g out i n the next chapter, t h e r e may y e t be point i n a f f i r m i n g 
the seemingly n o n s e n s i c a l or t a u t o l o g i c a l . Arguments of the second 
k i n d are of more i n t e r e s t i n the context o;° the p r e s e n t t h e s i s . They 
i n v o l v e a notion of r e l i g i o u s s c r u p l e . Augustine's c l a i m i s t h a t to 
argue i n the manner of P e l a g i u s i s to give way to h e r e t i c a l opinion. 
I t s h e r e t i c a l nature can be brought out by showing t h a t i t c o n f l i c t s 
with the teachings o:C e a r l i e r and re.".pected C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r s , or 
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t h a t I t i s c o n t r a r y to S c r i p t u r e , or both. 
Now what I want to c l a i m i s t h a t , where t h e r e i s an acknow-
ledged t r a d i t i o n a l corpus of l i t e r a t u r e i d e n t i f i e d p e c u l i a r l y w i t h 
the l i f e of a p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n i s a t i o n or i n s t i t u t i o n and where t h e r e 
i s an a u t h o r i t a t i v e t e x t , t h e r e i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of agreement and 
disagreement as to the s i g n i f i c a n c e and nature of conduct and events 
i n the world and t h a t s i n c e , w i t h i n l i m i t s , t h e s e disagreements are 
s e t t l e a b l e , i t makes sense to speak of a r e f l e c t i v e employment of 
reason i n matters of f a i t h . But t h i s k i n d of reason does not and 
could not supply the demonstrable c e r t a i n t y or c o n c l u s i v e n e s s of the 
e x e r c i s e of reason i n v o l v e d i n a t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c i p l i n e l i k e mathe-
matics or h i s t o r y . The s c e p t i c concludes t h a t because t h e r e i s no 
c e r t a i n t y , no c o n c l u s i v e n e s s , t h e r e i s no reason. I should new l i k e 
to show t h a t t h i s i s not so. 
3. I spoke of t h i s argument between Augustine and P e l a g i u s as 
i n v o l v i n g a q u e s t i o n of what could and could not be a f f i r m e d by the 
b e l i e v e r . I n a t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c i p l i n e , the q u e s t i o n i s what can and 
cannot be a s s e r t e d . I f a man i n s i s t s t h a t Napoleon did not die i n 
1S21 d e s p i t e evidence to the c o n t r a r y , then he v i o l a t e s the canons 
of h i s t o r i c a l r e a s o n i n g and thus ceases to be an h i s t o r i a n , to be 
doing h i s t o r y , at a l l . S i m i l a r l y , i f a man a f f i r m s t h a t observance 
of the Law can be s u f f i c i e n t f o r human p e r f e c t i o n , then, at l e a s t on 
Augustine's account, he denies the u n i v e r s a l and n e c e s s a r y s a v i n g 
power of C h r i s t and thus v i o l a t e s orthodox C h r i s t i n a d o c t r i n e . I n s h o r t , 
to b e l i e v e what P c l a p l u s a s s e r t s i s to cease to be a C h r i s t i a n . 
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Of course, the s c e p t i c w i l l r e p l y , 'This i s a matter of 
opinion; i t cannot be shown'. But i t can be shown, and, as i t 
happens, I t h i n k Augustine does show P e l a g i u s to be mistaken here. 
I t can be shown because there e x i s t a u t h o r i t i e s to which appeals 
may be made, namely the B i b l e and the t e a c h i n g of the Church F a t h e r s , 
and because the a p p l i c a t i o n of the terms grace, nature and o r i g i n a l 
s i n are not t o t a l l y a r b i t r a r y . 
Someone w i l l say here: ' A l l t J i i s depends on whether or not 
you accept the S c r i p t u r e s as a u t h o r i t a t i v e . What i f a man says " I 
don't c a r e what i t says i n t h e S c r i p t u r e s ? " then no c o n c l u s i o n i s 
b i n d i n g upon him.' But could t h i s be s a i d ? I f P e l a g i u s r e f u s e d to 
be c o r r e c t e d by what was s a i d i n the S c r i p t u r e s then I cannot see 
the sense i n which he could have been engaged i n t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y at 
a l l . I f he denied t h a t what he s a i d had i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the con-
t e x t of being a r e f l e c t i o n upon the S c r i p t u r e s , 1 I cannot see t h a t ho 
could have claimed any s i g n i f i c a n c e for i t at a l l . B e s i d e s , 
P e l a g i u s t r i e s to a v o i d " c o n f l i c t with orthodoxy, not because he i s 
a f r a i d of what w i l l happen to him, but because he r e c o g n i s e s such 
c o n f l i c t as e r r o r as much as Augustine does. 
Of course, i f appeal to the S c r i p t u r e s means nothing to a 
man, then he cannot engage i n any controversy i n v o l v i n g such an appeal. 
But then he cannot express opinions w i t h i n t h a t c o n t r o v e r s y e i t h e r . 
I n f a c t the arguments of On Nature appeared f i r s t i n a 
Continent a ry on the E p i s t l e s of Paul, 
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I want to say here t h a t something e i t h e r i s or i s not, has or has 
not a u t h o r i t y . I t cannot i n t e n t i o n a l l y be made an a u t h o r i t y nor can 
i t i n t e n t i o n a l l y be r e j e c t e d . I f t h i s i s r i g h t , i t f o l l o w s t h a t i t 
does not make sense to suppose t h a t I am not bound by a c o n c l u s i o n 
i n theology i f I do not accept the B i b l e as an a u t h o r i t y . I f the 
B i b l e has no a u t h o r i t y f o r me, then q u e s t i o n s which depend f o r t h e i r 
r e s o l u t i o n on i t s deployment as an a u t h o r i t y cannot a r i s e . 
4. I am not s a y i n g , however, t h a t the c o n c l u s i o n s of t h e o l o g i -
c a l r e f l e c t i o n are demonstrably c e r t a i n , though some may be. Rather 
I am s u g g e s t i n g t h a t i f we are perplexed i n matters of r e l i g i o n i t 
i s p o s s i b l e to reach c o n c l u s i o n s a f t e r a process of reasoning; i n 
s h o r t , t h a t genuine reason i s p o s s i b l e i n matters of f a i t h . The 
degree to which such reason w i l l r e s u l t i n c o n c l u s i o n s agreed upon 
by a l l i s a contingent matter. I t depends upon the extent to which 
the S c r i p t u r e s and the w r i t i n g s of t h e o l o g i a n s are open to i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n and whether t h e r e are any supplementary a u t h o r i t i e s l i k e , 
f o r example, Papal b u l l s . What can be s a i d a p r i o r i i s t h a t where 
t h e r e i s a t r a d i t i o n of r e f l e c t i o n upon an a u t h o r i t a t i v e t e x t t h e r e 
are the ne c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r reasoned, reasonable and unreasonable 
concluding and a f f i r m i n g . 
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I I I 
1. The question now a r i s e s as to whether what I have been 
arguing i n the c a s e of theology a l s o holds good f o r i d e o l o g i c a l 
r e f l e c t i o n . What I have sketched are the c o n d i t i o n s which, when 
r e a l i s e d , allow the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n s i d e r i n g r a t i o n a l l y what i t 
i s a p p r o p r i a t e and what i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e to do and to b e l i e v e 
i n the context of a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n . Now i t i s 
probably f a i r l y c l e a r t h a t t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s are not o f t e n r e a l i s e d 
i n the e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n s which we c a l l i d e o l o g i e s . 
To begin w i t h , almost none, w i t h the p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n 
of Marxism, has anything which could even be thought of as an 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e t e x t , s t i l l l e s s an a u t h o r i t a t i v e t r a d i t i o n of 
commentary and r e f l e c t i o n upon t h a t text."*" Even i f we were to con-
s i d e r Marx's own w r i t i n g s as a u t h o r i t a t i v e f o r M a r x i s t s , they could 
not be so i n the same way t h a t , f o r example, the B i b l e i s f o r C h r i s t i a n s , 
f o r i t s a u t h o r i t y d e r i v e s from i t s being d i v i n e l y i n s p i r e d . 
Secondly, most i d e o l o g i s t s of modern times have been so 
imbued w i t h the s p i r i t of R a t i o n a l i s m t h a t they have been unable 
to t r e a t the w r i t i n g s of the f o r e b e a r s of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n as author-
i t a t i v e . For P e l a g i u s , the f a c t of being i n c o n f l i c t w i t h e a r l i e r 
1 Consider here the k i n d of a u t h o r i t y eujoyed by P e t e r Lombard's 
Sentences. , 
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t h e o l o g i a n s i s i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t i o n of e r r o r . For most 
modern w r i t e r s some ground o u t s i d e the t r a d i t i o n i t s e l f , which w i l l 
provide a r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i o n by which the f o r e b e a r s may themselves 
be c r i t i c i s e d i s sought a f t e r , and, of course, sought a f t e r i n v a i n . * 
2 
T h i r d l y , some i n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y o f t e n h e l p s to r e -
i n f o r c e the authoritative l i t e r a t u r e . I n the h i s t o r y of C a t h o l i c i s m 
the stamp of Papal approval has o f t e n provided c r u c i a l c l a r i t y on the 
demarcation between the orthodoxy and the h e r e t i c a l . But I know of 
no i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n where a p a r a l l e l i n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y 
has had a recognised and continued e x i s t e n c e i n the l i f e of t h a t 
3 
t r a d i t i o n . 
I t seems, then, t h a t an a c t u a l p e r u s a l of i d e o l o g i e s r e v e a l s 
nothing of q u i t e the same c h a r a c t e r as a t e x t with the a u t h o r i t y of 
Holy Writ. Perhaps i t i s indeed i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t such a t e x t could 
be found, f o r Holy Writ e terns from and i s concerned w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r 
k i n d of r e a l i t y , the r e a l i t y of God, which, as I have noted a l r e a d y , 
1 T h i s of course a l s o a p p l i e s to r e l i g i o u s w r i t e r s . P a l e y ' s 
Evidences of C h r i s t i a n i t y i s one example. 
2 I t need not always, I suppose, be i n s t i t u t e d . I t was Augustine's 
p e r s o n a l a u t h o r i t y which,, i n many ways, swung the opinion of 
orthodoxy a g a i n s t the D o n a t i s t s . As Bishop of Hippo he had no 
p a r t i c u l a r a u t h o r i t y i n the matter. 
3 I n Marxism, the Second I n t e r n a t i o n a l was a p o s s i b l e contender 
for the r o l e of j u s t such an a u t h o r i t y . But i t s f a i l u r e l a y 
p r e c i s e l y i n t h a t i t d i d not become the accepted body which 
would decide upon orthodoxy. 
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has no p a r a l l e l i n ideology. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , i d e o l o g i e s o f t e n do have a corpus of 
' c l a s s i c s ' and i t i s such a corpus, or so I s h a l l argue, which, i f 
i t does not allow r e a s o n i n g of q u i t e the k i n d to be found i n theology, 
does allow t h a t e t h i c a l judgments need not wholly be at the mercy of 
whim and the arguments summoned i n t h e i r defence need not be 
wholly random. 
The reasoning i n which t h e o l o g i a n s engage i n v o l v e s a 
notion of orthodoxy i n d o c t r i n e , the d o c t r i n e of God and of H i s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p to men. The orthodoxy which a corpus of l i t e r a t u r e 
t h a t has no such transcendent r e a l i t y may e n s h r i n e i s not so much 
an orthodoxy of d o c t r i n e as of language. And, as I hope to show, 
orthodox agreement i n language can, at l e a s t on o c c a s i o n s , a l l o w 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of r a t i o n a l agreement i n opinion. 
2. I have noted a l r e a d y more than once i n the course of t h i s 
t h e s i s t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s between one ideology and another r e v e a l 
themselves not i n a sinfple o p p o s i t i o n of p r i n c i p l e or p r o p o s i t i o n but 
i n the vocabulary, the concepts, each employs. Of course the concepts 
p e c u l i a r l y i d e n t i f i e d with one t r a d i t i o n may be mixed, o f t e n q u i t e 
h a p p i l y , with those of another. I n M a z z i n i ' s w r i t i n g , f o r example, 
l i b e r a l i s m and n a t i o n a l i s m are almost i n e x t r i c a b l y combined. I n 
Beveridge s o c i a l i s m and l i b e r a l i s m a re i n s e p a r a b l e . S t i l l , we can 
s e n s i b l y make d i s t i n c t i o n s ; between l i b e r a l and n a t i o n a l i s t , s o c i a l i s t 
and c o n s e r v a t i v e and to show th a t there are b o r d e r l i n e c a s e s i s not 
to deny but to a f f i r m that some such d i s t i n c t i o n s are 
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p o s s i b l e . But i f such d i f f e r e n c e s are to be brought out t h i s 
must be done by r e f e r e n c e to the c o n t r a s t i n g ways i n which each 
understands and d e s c r i b e s the world. The d i f f e r e n c e s do not con-
s i s t i n opposing a s s e r t i o n s about the world. 
For example, a p e r u s a l of l i b e r a l l i t e r a t u r e , however 
comprehensive, w i l l not d i s c o v e r a 'core' of d o c t r i n e which l i b e r a l s 
have, by and l a r g e , accepted. What i t w i l l d i s c o v e r i s a continuous 
r e v i s i o n and m o d i f i c a t i o n of, and disagreement over d o c t r i n e , i n which 
a l l p a r t i e s express t h e i r disagreements i n s i m i l a r terms. I n b r i e f , 
they a l l use the concepts of l i b e r a l i s m . And prominent among the s e 
concepts are the notions of l i b e r t y , c i v i l i t y , law, r i g h t s , t o l e r a t i o n . 
I t i s the presence of t h i s shared language and not agreement over 
d o c t r i n e which u n i t e s them i n the same t r a d i t i o n . 
I do not mean to say t h a t by drawing up a l i s t of such 
concepts f o r each ideology we w i l l have a c r i t e r i o n by which to 
determine who i s t r u l y l i b e r a l ( o r whatever). A language must be 
shared but i t i s not thereby bounded and, as I have suggested 
a l r e a d y , the b o r d e r l i n e cases must remain b o r d e r l i n e . What can be 
s a i d , at l e a s t what I now hope to show, i s t h a t though, i n g e n e r a l , 
a language cannot determine what w i l l be s a i d i n i t , at l e a s t on 
1 'Many words i n t h i s sense t h e n d o n ' t have a s t r i c t meaning. 
But t h i s i s n o t a d e f e c t . To t h i n k i t i s would be l i k e s a y i n g 
t h a t t h e l i g h t o f my r e a d i n g lamp i s no r e a l l i g h t at a l l 
because i t has no sharp boundary' 
W i t t g e n s t e i n : The Blue Book 
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some o c c a s i o n s the meaning of words does determine what can and 
cannot be aff i r m e d , and f u r t h e r , t h a t terms may d e r i v e t h e i r meaning 
c h i e f l y from t h e i r s y s t e m a t i c use i n works of i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n . 
L e t us r e t u r n to the ca s e concerning human r i g h t s . I s a i d 
t h e r e t h a t any e t h i c a l d i s p u t e could not p o s s i b l y be about whether 
i t was r i g h t or wrong to v i o l a t e a human r i g h t but whether th.1.3 or 
that s e t of a c t i o n s d i d or did not amount to the v i o l a t i o n of a 
human r i g h t . I t i s c l e a r , then, t h a t the d i s p u t e i s over the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the term 'human r i g h t ' , about whether i t i s or i s not 
a p p l i c a b l e i n a given s e t of c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Now the proper a p p l i c a t i o n 
of a term i s to be decided i n the l i g h t of i t s meaning, and the 
meaning of a term i s to be d i s c o v e r e d i n and d e r i v e s from i t s use. 
The use of a term, of course, must be reasonably s y s t e m a t i c and 
e x t e n s i v e i f i t i s to g i v e a f a i r l y c l e a r meaning. T h e r e f o r e , i f 
a p a r t i c u l a r work employs a term f a i r l y s y s t e m a t i c a l l y , r e f e r e n c e 
to t h a t work ( o r works) may, on o c c a s i o n , s a t i s f a c t o r i l y r e s o l v e 
q u e s t i o n s about the appropriateness of f u r t h e r a p p l i c a t i o n of the 
term. 
T l i i s i s the way i n which a corpus of l i t e r a t u r e may s u s -
t a i n an e t h i c a l language and may provide t h a t orthodoxy i n language 
which enables a r e f l e c t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i on of the reasonableness or 
soundness of e t h i c a l judgments. T h i s point can, I th i n k , be best 
e l a b o r a t e d and defended i n the context of another p a r a l l e l , t h a t 
between i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n and l e g a l reasoning. 
3. I t has been noted t h a t l e g a l q u e s t i o n s are o f t e n q u e s t i o n s 
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about words, or, more p r o p e r l y , about the a p p l i c a t i o n of wards. 
But we should not conclude from t h i s t h a t t h e s e matters are merely 
matters of words, whatever might be meant by t h a t . For upon the 
d e c i s i o n whether to c a l l t h i s an act of manslaughter or of murder 
a very great d e a l may depend. I. t h i n k t h a t the way i n which words 
are important, become important,and i s s u e s over words may c a l l f o r 
r e s o l u t i o n i n q u e s t i o n s of i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n f i n d s an 
i n s t r u c t i v e p a r a l l e l i n the l e g a l concern over words. More impor-
t a n t l y f o r our purposes here, the p a r a l l e l a l s o extends to the way 
i n which these i s s u e s may reasonably be r e s o l v e d . 
The p a r t i c u l a r example of l e g a l r e asoning I should l i k e 
to e x p l o r e i s the i s s u e i n Anthony T r o l l o p e ' s novol The E u s t a c e 
Diamonds. 
I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t the t i t l e of t h i s s t o r y r e f e r s 
to a diamond n e c k l a c e , the ownership of v.hich i s i n d i s p u t e . I t 
i s claimed by the executors of the e s t a t e t h a t the n e c k l a c e could 
not have been bestowed upon h i s w i f e by the l a t e S i r F l o r i a n E u s t a c e , 
s i n c e t h i s p a r t i c u l a r n e c k l a c e i s a f a m i l y heirloom. I t i s not i n 
doubt t h a t an heirloom cannot be g i v e n away. V/hat i s i n doubt i s 
whether the n e c k l a c e i s i n f a c t an heirloom. The learned Mr Dove, 
reputed f o r the e x c e l l e n c e of h i s o p i n i o n s , i s i n v i t e d to o f f e r one 
i n t h i s case. He determines t h a t the n e c k l a c e cannot be an heirloom 
1 See G l a n v i l l e W i l l i a m s : 'Language and t h e Law' i n 
Law Q u a r t e r l y Review January and A p r i l 1945 
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and t h a t , s i n c e i t s s p e c i f i c i n c l u s i o n i n the w i l l i s i n doubt, i t 
could be claimed by the widow to be ' p a r a p h e r n a l i a ' . Now the manner 
i n which Mr Dove a r r i v e s at t h i s opinion i s the same as t h a t by 
which most l e g a l q u e s t i o n s are r e s o l v e d , namely by an i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
of p r e v i o u s c a s e s . Mr Dove determines t h a t , given the way the 
terms 'heirloom' and ' p a r a p h e r n a l i a ' have been used i n the p a s t , the 
n e c k l a c e cannot p r o p e r l y be c a l l e d an heirloom, and, d e s p i t e i t s great 
v a l u e , could p l a u s i b l y bs c a l l e d ' p a r a p h e r n a l i a 1 . Of course, should 
the d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s be d i s s a t i s f i e d with t h i s r e a s o n i n g , the r e a s o n i n g 
cannot i t s e l f s e t t l e the matter. T h i s r e q u i r e s a judgment i n court. 
But the judge's d e c i s i o n w i l l be taken''" i n the l i g h t of reasoning 
s i m i l a r to Mr Dove's. Mr Dove's reasoning i s , i f you l i k e , p r e l i m -
i n a r y reasoning,but only i n the sense t h a t i t i n d i c a t e s i n advance 
of an a c t u a l court r u l i n g how t h a t r u l i n g w i l l go. 
Mr Dove a r r i v e s at h i s opinion hy c o n s i d e r i n g how the 
terms 'heirloom' and ' p a r a p h e r n a l i a ' have been used i n p r e v i o u s judg-
ments. By doing t h i s , he t r i e s t o determine the proper meaning of 
the terms and h i s c o n c l u s i o n it; c o r r e c t i n so f a r as i t coheres 
with the meaning a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d i n law. T h i s i s the sense i n 
which l e g a l opinions are coherent or i n c o h e r e n t . Nov/, depending on 
how s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and e x t e n s i v e l y the terms have p r e v i o u s l y been 
used, Mr Dove's t a s k w i l l be more or l e s s d i f f i c u l t and the t r u t h 
1 And w i l l be c r i t :i.ci;;able. t h a t i s open t o appeal 
162 
of h i s c o n c l u s i o n more or l e s s a s c e r t a i n a b l e . I t i s u n l i k e l y 
and perhaps i n c o n c e i v a b l e * t h a t the past employment should be so 
s y s t e m a t i c as to allow complete c e r t a i n t y over the c o r r e c t n e s s of 
the present opinion. But the po i n t i s t h a t such l e g a l o p i n i o n s may 
be a r r i v e d at by r e f l e c t i o n and t h a t the reasonableness or unreason-
ableness of the opinion can be shown w h i l e , at the same time, no 
suggestion of i n d u b i t a b l y demonstrable proo;' or c e r t a i n t y a r i s e s . 
We may, i n s h o r t , s e n s i b l y speak of the coherence or incoherence of 
a l e g a l o p i n i o n without pre-supposing the ki n d of complete coherence 
f o r which a t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c i p l i n e s t r i v e s . 
4. I f we now tur n our a t t e n t i o n to i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n we 
s h a l l f i n d , I t h i n k , t h a t i n many i n s t a n c e s t h i s i s not d i s s i m i l a r . 
One s t r i k i n g d i s s i m i l a r i t y , of course, i s the absence of what would 
i n t h i s case appear to be v i t a l , namely a corpus of past l e g a l 
d e c i s i o n s . But. t h i s absence i s , at l e a s t on o c c a s i o n s , remedied by 
a corpus of l i t e r a t u r e . And I should l i k e to show, i f I can, t h a t 
t h i s i s indeed the case by examining the i n s t a n c e of Marxism. 
When we read Marx's w r i t i n g s , e s p e c i a l l y C a p i t a l , we cone 
away, i f we are persuaded by what we read t h e r e , w i t h seme s o r t of 
understanding of the world i n which we move and have our being, 
In what i s t h i s understanding r e v e a l e d ? I t i s not r e v e a l e d , and 
1 T h i s i s n o t p e c u l i a r to l e g a l t a l k . I t i s v/hat has been 
c a l l e d t h e 'open t e x t u r e ' of language. 
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could not be i f my argument so f a r i s c o r r e c t , i n our now being 
able to a s s e r t a number of p r o p o s i t i o n s about the world to be t r u e . 
For, the understanding we are now i n p o s s e s s i o n of could not c o n s i s t 
i n some a d d i t i o n a l f a c t s about the world which we d i d not formerly 
know to be t r u e . T h i s would be knowledge r a t h e r than understanding 
t h a t we had won. I t c o n s i s t s r a t h e r i n the a b i l i t y to make a new 
range of judgments about the world. V.'e may, of course, now a f f i r m 
c e r t a i n b e l i e f s which we d i d not formerly a f f i r m , but these ai*e not 
simple p r o p o s i t i o n s 1 about the world which we did not formerly know 
to be t l i e c a s e . Such a f f i r m a t i o n s cannot be given any meaning, any 
sense, o u t s i d e the understanding we. have newly acquired. Nor does 
the understanding c o n s i s t i n a stock of p r i n c i p l e s f o r a c t i o n ; 
i d e o l o g i e s cannot be understood to be a stock of p r i n c i p l e s 
2 
( a b s t r a c t or otherwise) . The unaerstanding we now possess r e v e a l s 
i t s e l f i n an a b i l i t y to d e s c r i b e and e x p l a i n the v a r i o u s phenomena 
of w i l l and s e n s a t i o n i n which the world c o n s i s t s , i n terms of a 
p a r t i c u l a r and d i s t i n c t i v e s e t of concepts, concepts l i k e , f o r example, 
a l i e n a t i o n , s c i e n c e , ideology, labour, c a p i t a ] , s u r p l u s - v a l u e , 
e x p l o i t a t i o n , r e v o l u t i o n , feudalism, s o c i a l i s m and so on. Toe 
1 ' I b e l i e v e i n God 1 i s not l i k e , doss not do the same s o r t of 
job as ' I b e l i e v e t h e r e i s a t i g e r o u t s i d e the door', Sim-
i l a r l y , a f f i r m i n g ' C a p i t a l i s t i c r e l a t i o n s are e x p l o i t a t i v e ' 
i s not l i k e a s s e r t i n g 'Granny Smith apples are green'. Tin? 
p e c u l i a r i t y of b e l i e f s such as t h e s e i s examined at length 
i n the next chapter. 
2 As J. argued i n Chap torn 3 ;>.nd 4 
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extent to which t h e s e concepts combine together to make, so to 
speak, a workable understanding, i s determined by the extent to 
which the r u l e s f o r t h e i r employment, t h a t i s t h e i r meanings, are 
determinate enough to prevent t h e i r w h i m s i c a l use. And the r u l e s , 
v ery o f t e n , are j u s t as determinate as the works from which they 
s p r i n g are s y s t e m a t i c . 
Marxism i s a good i l l u s t r a t i o n here because the language 
of M a r x i s t s i s so very n e a r l y the language of Marx, even where the 
M a r x i s t s i n q u e s t i o n have not read Marx. And p r e c i s e l y as the terms 
of Marx's w r i t i n g s are used e x t e n s i v e l y and s y s t e m a t i c a l l y to t h a t 
degree d i s p u t e s over t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n are s e t t l e a b l e . For example, 
the term ' s u r p l u s - v a l u e ' can be used to d e s c r i b e and r e l a t e pheno-
mena with a r e a s o n a b l e l a c k of ambiguity. The term 'ideology', on 
the other hand, i s one which Marx s c a r c e l y employs so t h a t the 
numerous Ma r x i s t accounts of ideology, though they bear something 
of a family resemblance, are at c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i a n c e . Marx's use 
of the term i s so l i m i t e d i n extent, t h a t r e c o u r s e to t h a t w i l l not 
s u f f i c e to s e t t l e any disagreements.''" 
I t i s my suggestion, then, t h a t more or l e s s s i m i l a r 
n o tions of T i g h t n e s s and wrongness can apply here as did i n the 
1 Perhaps t h i s i s true ofmany Marxist concepts. C e r t a i n l y a 
p e r u s a l of M a r x i s t l i t e r a t u r e does not, as a matter of f a c t , 
r e v e a l much agreement and suggests t h a t often the use of 
terms i s w h i m s i c a l . I am. however, only concerned with 
l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
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case of Augustine and P e l a g i u s and of Mr Dove and the heirloom. 
I am c l a i m i n g t h a t , i n some d i s p u t e s between M a r x i s t s t h e r e i s , 
i n p r i n c i p l e , some scope f o r a r e f l e c t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the 
c o r r e c t n e s s or i n c o r r e c t n e s s of a judgment. The r e f l e c t i o n con-
s i s t s i n a comparison of any p a r t i c u l a r judgment with the c o r r e c t 
usage of the terms i t employs, as r e v e a l e d by the w r i t i n g s of 
Marx. The degree t o which reasoned r e f l e c t i o n i s p o s s i b l e i s a 
f u n c t i o n of the degree to which those same terms are used exten-
s i v e l y and s y s t e m a t i c a l l y by Marx. 
Someone w i l l say here: ' A l l t h i s depends upon our acceptance 
of Marx's w r i t i n g s as a u t h o r i t a t i v e ' . I cannot ree t h a t anything 
could depend on t h a t . We cannot 'accept' something as a u t h o r i t a t i v e . 
What would such acceptance be l i k e ? To be a M a r x i s t i s not to have 
accepted Marx's w r i t i n g s as a u t h o r i t a t i v e . I t i s to be someone f o r 
whom those w r i t i n g s have a u t h o r i t y and t h i s i s r e v e a l e d , not i n 
something we believe- about them, but by the p a r t they play i n . our 
l i v e s . For many M a r x i s t s , of course, E n g e l s i s a l s o i n v o l v e d . 
F u r t h e r , many d i s a g r e e over which of Marx's w r i t i n g s (The Young or 
The Mature) a r e the embodiment of the 'true' theory. The matter 
i s even f u r t h e r complicated by the l a t e r t h e o r i s t s L e n i n , T r o t s k y , 
l e s s often S t a i i n , and r e c e n t l y Mao. I t i s i n p a r t an i l l u s t r a t i o n 
of my t h e s i s t h a t the most profound disagreements tend to r e v o l v e 
around these c a n o n i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s . 
The o b j e c t i o n may be r a i s e d : 'What about Mavx? Ho must 
have used Marxist vocabulary and y e t he cannot have belonged to the 
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t r a d i t i o n which he founded. How'did h i s words have sense? I f he 
t a l k e d nonsense, being without a canon of l i t e r a t u r e , e v e r y t h i n g 
based upon what he s a i d must a l s o be nonsense. But i f he t a l k e d 
sense, the sense of what he s a i d must have d e r i v e d from something 
other than the Marxist t r a d i t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , i f Marxist t a l k 
makes any sense, i t must do so on some b a s i s or c r i t e r i o n e x t e r n a l 
to i t s e l f . ' 
But such an o b j e c t o r has f a i l e d to understand the i d e a of 
a t r a d i t i o n . Marx d i d not found a t r a d i t i o n ; t h i s could not be 
done. A t r a d i t i o n has grown up around what Marx wrote and the 
growth of t h a t t r a d i t i o n has l e n t to those w r i t i n g s a c e r t a i n 
a u t h o r i t y . They d i d not come with t h a t a u t h o r i t y b u i l t i n . Kor 
could any b a s i s i n s c i e n c e c r h i s t o r y lend them a u t h o r i t y of t h a t 
ki n d . What Marx s a i d was, as i s w e l l known, couched i n the language 
of German philosophy, French s o c i a l i s m and E n g l i s h economic theory. 
No doubt the s y n t h e s i s achieved between t h e s e t h r e e d i s p a r a t e 
elements was, i n i t s way, a c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e l l e c t u a l f e a t . No 
doubt, too, i t i s t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l s t r e n g t h which i n p a r t caused 
a t r a d i t i o n to grow up around t h e s e r a t h e r than some other w r i t i n g s . 
But the intelD.ectual e f f o r t n e i t h e r founded nor d i d i t provide a 
foundation f o r tho i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n which grew up arouad i t s 
product. 
5. What I have been s k e t c h i n g are the l o g i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y 
c o n d i t i o n s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of some degree of r e f l e c t i o n , agree-
ment and disagreement i n the making and c o n s i d e r i n g of e t h i c a l 
judgments, given t h a t t h e s e can only have sen3e i n the context of 
an i d e o l o g i c a l or r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n . I n s h o r t , I have claimed, 
a g a i n s t the s c e p t i c a l account of ideology, t h a t reason and unreason 
are p o s s i b l e here, given c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . 
Of course, t a l k of p o s s i b i l i t i e s may suggest a s i m p l i c i t y 
which the r e a l i t y , the a c t u a l i s e d p o s s i b i l i t y , i s u n l i k e l y to have. 
To begin w i t h , even when reason i s p o s s i b l e , men are not always 
reasonable. Secondly, d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of the l i t e r a t u r e of a 
t r a d i t i o n may c o n f l i c t , or worse, i t may be u n c e r t a i n whether they 
do c o n f l i c t or not. T h i r d l y , the a u t h o r i t y of the l i t e r a t u r e may 
not be r e c o g n i s e d by a l l the p a r t i e s . F o u r t h l y , p a s s i o n s i n t h e s e 
matters tend to run high. And so on. Very few, i f any, i d e o l o g i c a l 
debates are as c l e a r - c u t as t h e matter of 'heirloom' vs. 'para-
p h e r n a l i a ' , or even as c l e a r - c u t as the P e l a g i a n c o n t r o v e r s y . I n 
consequence, the l i f e of an i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n i s always t u r b u l e n t 
1 I do not understand those who speak of Marxism's 'standing or 
f a l l i n g ' with, say, Marx's theory of h i s t o r y . I suppose t h i s 
means something l i k e ' I f Marx's theory of h i s t o r y i s t r u e , 
then Marxism can be b e l i e v e d , w i l l be b e l i e v e d ' . But we know 
th a t i l can be b e l i e v e d , without going i n t o Marx's theory of 
h i s t o r y . An ideology cannot depend f o r i t s l i f e upon the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l coherence of one of i t s d o c t r i n e s . 
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and r a r e l y approaches anything l i k e the s u s t a i n e d s t a b i l i t y of a 
l e g a l system or even a church. But i n form, the three are not so 
very different."'' I n any event, they are more l i k e than i s the form 
of i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n to the l o g i c of an i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s c i p -
l i n e , and t h i s i s the e r r o r I have sought to c o r r e c t . 
IV 
1. The quest i o n with which we have been concerned i s how, i f 
at a l l , those e t h i c a l judgments which we make i n the course of our 
conduct of l i f e and which s e t l i m i t s to what i s a p p r o p r i a t e and 
p e r m i s s i b l e , to what can and cannot be done and thought i n the 
context of a moral or p o l i t i c a l , t r a d i t i o n , can be r e f l e c t i v e , con-
s i d e r e d judgments, net capable of proof or demonstration, but 
n e v e r t h e l e s s f r e e from tiie a r b i t r a r y d i c t a t i o n of whim and fancy. 
I have argued t h a t a corpus of l i t e r a t u r e s u f f i c i e n t l y s y s t e m a t i c 
and w i t h s u f f i c i e n t a u t h o r i t y can supply the c r i t e r i o n by which the 
reason and unreason c f our v a r i o u s judgments can be determined, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n those e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s , and perhaps a l l e t h i c a l 
1 There are d i f f e v e n c e s , of course. One i s t h a t to which J have 
a l l u d e d a l r e a d y , the presence, o f t e n c r u c i a l , of an i n s t i t u t i o n -
a l a u t h o r i t y i n law, and soir.etiraes i n t h e church. T h i s i s 
connected, I t h i n k , w i t h the poi:vfc I made e a r l i e r (Chapter 5: 
I I I : 3 > that thi- s o c i a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a r e l i g i o n , and the law. 
i s an i n s t i t u t i o n , that. o:C an ideology ai\ o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
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questions are of t h i s s o r t , where i t s e r v e s no u s e f u l purpose to 
d i s t i n g u i s h betwecii matters of f a c t or substance and matters of 
language or words. 
A l l t h i s , i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , has been advanced a g a i n s t 
the s c e p t i c who c l a i m s that i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i s a s p u r i o u s 
form of reasoning, i n s h o r t , no e x e r c i s e of reason at a l l , a n d f u r t h e r , 
t h a t my account of i d e o l o g i c a l understanding e n t a i l s my concurrence 
i n j u s t such a view. I hope th a t the argument has shown that n e i t h e r 
of t h e s e suggestions can be s u b s t a n t i a t e d . Before concluding t h i s 
s e c t i o n , however, I should l i k e to c o n s i d e r one f i n a l argument a g a i n s t 
my r e b u t t a l of the s c e p t i c , an argument which ha3 much i n sympathy 
with and could be s a i d to be d e r i v e d from A r i s t o t l e ' s account of 
e t h i c a l l i f e i n the Nichomache.an E t h i c s . 
2. 'The scope you allow', i t w i l l be s a i d by t h i s o b j e c t o r , 
'to i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n depends upon a fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n 
drawn between two k i n d s of q u e s t i o n and c o n s i d e r a t i o n which may 
a r i s e i n the course of our l i v e s , roughly,purely p r a c t i c a l or t e c h -
n i c a l q u e s t i o n s and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and questions of r i g h t n e s s . But 
such a d i s t i n c t i o n cannot be drawn. A man cannot be wise and be 
e v i l . The wise man knows what i s good f o r the l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l 
and of the s t a t e and such goodness cannot be separated i n t o m a t e r i a l 
and e t h i c a l goodness. The 'pbronemos', the p r a c t i c a l l y s k i l f u l and 
wise p o l i t i c i a n , w i l l not do t h a t which offends the ethos of the s t a t e 
both because i t of jfconcls and because i t i s i n j u r i o u s . P o l i t i c a l 
education,the education n e c e s s a r y to the s u c c e s s f u l government of 
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s o c i e t y cannot c o n s i s t , then, merely i n the a c q u i s i t i o n of s k i l l i n 
the b u s i n e s s of manipulating and m a i n t a i n i n g p o l i t i c a l procedures. 
I t i n v o l v e s l e a r n i n g the appropriate use of those procedures as w e l l 
as a t r a i n i n g i n t h e i r mechanics. We do not know how to a c t p o l i t i -
c a l l y i f we know only how to i n i t i a t e procedures. Complete p o l i t i c a l 
knowledge, the knowledge which w i l l a l low a co n c r e t e , self-moved 
a c t i v i t y of p o l i t i c s , i s knowledge of the how and the when and the 
what of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . 1 ^ 
I do not d i s a g r e e with any of t h i s . I t i s not, however, 
an o b j e c t i o n to what I have been sa y i n g . The argument i s t h a t , i n 
concrete p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y pragmatic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and c c i : s i d e r a - | 
t i o n s of T i g h t n e s s are i n s e p a r a b l e . But it; does not fo l l o w from 
t h i s t h a t they a r e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . We cannot s e p a r a t e out the 
mind and the body of a man but we can, do and must d i s t i n g u i s h 
between the two. To e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t i o n we do not 
have to i s o l a t e minds from bodies ( t h i s was p a r t of D e s c a r t e s ' 
mistake, I t h i n k ) . We have to show th a t judgments about a man's mind 
cannot be reduced to judgments about h i s body. S i m i l a r l y , i n order 
to show t h a t pragmatic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are d i s t i n c t from c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
of r i g h t n e s s we do not have to show t h a t the one, i n r e a l i t y , can 
stand on i t s own, without the other, but t h a t the one i s not 
r e d u c i b l e to the other. And t h i s I t h i n k I have shown. For I 
1 I hope i t i s c l e a r how t h i s o b j e c t i o n may be s a i d to be 
A r i s t o t e l i a n . 
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argued t h a t w h i l e circumstance i s c e n t r a l to judgments made i n the 
l i g h t of pragmatic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , c i r c u m s t a n c e s are a matter of 
i n d i f f e r e n c e to judgments of T i g h t n e s s . The man who does what duty 
r e q u i r e s of him f o r f e a r of the consequences of not doing so has not 
acted out of duty.* 
3. The A r i s t o t e l i a n view, then, i s e i t h e r mistaken, or i t i s 
the view t h a t both e t h i c a l and p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and judgments 
are n e c e s s a r y to and i n s e p a r a b l e i n any c o n c r e t e moral or p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e . T h i s , of course, I do not q u e s t i o n , and nothing I have s a i d 
i m p l i e s anything to the c o n t r a r y . No doubt t h i s s o r t of o b j e c t i o n 
goes p a r t of the way to c o r r e c t the R a t i o n a l i s t e r r o r i n t h i n k i n g 
t h a t the c oncrete a c t i v i t y of s u s t a i n i n g a l i f e together can f i n d 
i t s source and r e s o u r c e i n thought alone. T h i s e r r o r i s one I a l s o 
sought to c o r r e c t e a r l i e r i n the t h e s i s . I t i s perhaps worth under-
l i n i n g t h e f a c t that the i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n , the. p o s s i b i l i t y of 
which I have t r i e d to allow, i s and can only be s e n s i b l e or meaning-
f u l r e f l e c t i o n v/ithin come i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n . 
1 T h i s r e v e a l s , i n p a r t , the s i n g u l a r i t y of the q u e s t i o n p h i l o -
sophers have o f t e n asked themselves 'Why should I be moral?' 
I f i t ~ could be shown t h a t , i n some way, m o r a l i t y pays, t h i s 
would e i t h e r be i r r e l e v a n t to the man who does what he t h i n k s 
i s r i g h t because i t is r i g h t ; or i t would suggest that moral 
judgments are ' v e i l e d ' judgments as to which course of a c t i o n 
i s most l i k e l y to a f f o r d b e n e f i t . But s u r e l y the most d i f f i -
c u l t human problems i n v o l v e c o n f l i c t between the n a t u r a l 
d e s i r e to b e n e f i t and the o b l i g a t i o n to do r i g h t ? 
P A R T T H R E E 
THOUGHT AND CONDUCT 
" d e l i b e r a t i n g i s not to be understood as 
a r e g r e t t a b l e f r u s t r a t i o n of a demonstra-
t i v e manner of t h i n k i n g . I t i s the only 
kind of argument i n which an agent can 
recommend an a c t i o n to h i m s e l f and i t s 
reasons are the only k i n d s of reasons 
which may l e g i t i m a t e l y be adduced f o r 
having made t h i s r a t h e r than that c h o i c e . " 
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT 
CHAPTER 7 
E t h i c s and G e n e r a l i t y 
"Not e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s expressed i n the 
language of information belongs to the 
language-game of g i v i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . " 
WITTGENSTEIN 
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1. Someone w i l l say: 'What you have now shown i s t h a t when 
we make p a r t i c u l a r statements i n e t h i c s what we say i s indeed sub-
j e c t to reason and unreason. And no doubt i t i s the c a s e t h a t 
the r easonableness or o t h e r w i s e of p a r t i c u l a r statements can only 
be determined i n the context of a corpus of a u t h o r i t a t i v e l i t e r -
a t u r e . But to show t h i s i s not to show, as was e a r l i e r claimed, 
t h a t a t h e o r e t i c a l or r e f l e c t i v e e x p r e s s i o n of one's e t h i c a l per-
s u a s i o n i s p o s s i b l e . To be able to make reasonable and unreasonable 
p a r t i c u l a r judgments about the world may show t h a t we are i n p o s s e s s i o n 
of an understanding of the world, as opposed to a mere account of i t . 
But a t h e o r e t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n of one's understanding of the world 
would be couched i n g e n e r a l or u n i v e r s a l , not p a r t i c u l a r , statements. 
I t would r e v e a l the ground of the p a r t i c u l a r judgments. The reason 
which the t h e o r i s t must c l a i m to e x e r c i s e cannot be one which, i n 
the l i g h t of p r e v i o u s r e f l e c t i o n s , g i v e s r i s e to p a r t i c u l a r d e s c r i p -
t i o n s of the world; t h a t i s what any adherent of the ideology i n 
que s t i o n may do. Rath«r, the t h e o r i s t seeks to add to that corpus 
of l i t e r a t u r e i t s e l f , by r e v e a l i n g , i n g e n e r a l , how such p a r t i c u l a r 
judgments are to be made. What has y e t to be shown', i t w i l l be 
s a i d , ' i s not how i t i s p o s s i b l e to employ such l i t e r a t u r e as a 
standard of r a t i o n a l i t y i n the making and c o n s i d e r i n g of p a r t i c u l a r 
judgments, but how such l i t e r a t u r e i s p o s s i b l e . ' 
I t h i n k t h a t the roar, who o b j e c t s i n t h i s way i s mistaken 
about the c h a r a c t e r of e t h i c a l judgments, f o r , i n a sense, such 
judgments do not admit of g e n e r a l i t y . F u r t h e r , when we do t r y to 
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speak g e n e r a l l y i n the language of an e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n what we 
have to say, i f understood as being i n an explanatory mode or 
r e v e a l i n g the founding p r i n c i p l e s of our t a l k , must turn out, upon 
a n a l y s i s , to be e i t h e r t a u t o l o g i c a l or n o n s e n s i c a l . 
I f then,we are to i d e n t i f y s a t i s f a c t o r i l y the p l a c e and 
importance of i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i n the conduct of l i f e , we s h a l l 
have to l o c a t e i t i n a p e c u l i a r or d i s t i n c t i v e response to t h e . p a r t i c -
u l a r and not i n a general explanatory account of the p a r t i c u l a r . I n 
t h i s chapter, I s h a l l t r y to show t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n does 
not p l a y a p a r t i n our l i v e s by adding to the st o c k of our knowledge 
or by p r o v i d i n g t h e o r e t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s of th a t which we a l r e a d y 
know. The r e f l e c t i o n s which may enable us to understand the world 
e t h i c a l l y do not take the form of h e l p f u l i n f o r m a t i o n or ge n e r a l 
t h e o r i e s . 
2. According to the argument of Chapter 5, an e t h i c a l judgment 
i s a judgment of f a c t conceived w i t h i n n world of va l u e , which i s to 
say, a d e s c r i p t i o n of vhe world i n the language of an e t h i c a l vocab-
u l a r y . The p o s s i b i l i t y of a f a c t ' s being e t h i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t depends 
upon our being able to impose some order c f v a l u e upon the world of 
contingent f a c t . T h i s i s to be done by d e s c r i b i n g , and hence under-
st a n d i n g , contingent f a c t s i n the vocabulary of an e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n 
and thereby encompassing the contingent f a c t s of exp e r i e n c e , which 
i n themselves are without v a l u e , in t h s e t h i c a l world i n which we 
move. 
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I t f o l l o w s from t h i s t h a t any p r o p o s i t i o n conceived 
w i t h i n a world of va l u e w i l l , t o those who move i n that world, be 
understood as a simple f a c t u a l p r o p o s i t i o n , and to those who do not, 
i t w i l l be u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . To say 'That i s blasphemy' i s , i f one 
i s a r e l i g i o u s b e l i e v e r , however devout, a simple a s s e r t i o n about 
the f a c t . I f one i s t o t a l l y out of sympathy with r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , 
2 
i t i s to u t t e r a meaningless sentence. 
The d i f f e r e n c e between a p r o p o s i t i o n which has import i n 
e t h i c s and one which does not,does not l i e i n t h e i r being d i f f e r e n t 
3 
s o r t s of p r o p o s i t i o n (eg. d e s c r i p t i v e / e v a l u a t i v e ) . The d i f f e r e n c e 
l i e s , r a t h e r , i n the c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r understanding and 
1 I speak only of p r o p o s i t i o n s here, because I am i n t e r e s t e d 
i n the nature of an e t h i c a l understanding of the f a c t s and 
events of experi e n c e (what happens and i s the c a s e ) . Moral 
and p o l i t i c a l v o c a b u l a r i e s , however, may be, and perhaps 
most f r e q u e n t l y a r e , used i n u t t e r a n c e s which are not pro-
p o s i t i o n s about the world. Commands and e n t r e a t i e s , f o r 
example, may be couched i n an e t h i c a l vocabulary. Such u t t e r -
ances are themselves e t h i c a l a c t i o n s and form part of on a c t i v e 
r a t h e r than a r e f l e c t i v e response to e t h i c a l l i f e . At a l a t e r 
s t a g e , I s h a l l d i s c u s s the r e l a t i o n s between e t h i c a l p r o p o s i -
t i o n s about the world and those e t h i c a l statements i n v o l v i n g 
'ought'. 
2 Sentences can, of course, be understood i n degrees. I may 
p e r f e c t l y w e l l understand t h a t the word 'blasphemy' i s being 
used to condemn. 
3 J u l i u s K o v e s i ' s s t i m u l a t i n g d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s problem reaches 
a c o n c l u s i o n of the same form as th a t which he wishes to 
r e j e c t . For on h i s account judgments i n e t h i c s t u r n out to 
be d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of p r o p o s i t i o n . See K o v e s i : Moral Motions 
London 19G7 
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agreeing t h a t the p r o p o s i t i o n s are indeed f a c t . For example, to 
agree t h a t 'This man i s g u i l t y ' i t i s n e c e s s a r y to f o l l o w a l l those 
c o n v e n t i o n a l procedures by which the f a c t t h a t i t was t h i s man and 
not another who committed the felony i n q u e s t i o n i s to be e s t a b l i s h e d . 
But i n order to do t h i s i t i s n e c e s s a r y f i r s t to understand the 
u t t e r a n c e and t h i s i n v o l v e s or r a t h e r r e q u i r e s t h a t we share t h a t 
form of l i f e where l e g a l i t y and i l l e g a l i t y make sense, where t a l k 
of g u i l t and fel o n y can begin. And t h i s i s a matter of belonging 
and p a r t i c i p a t i n g . I f we do not, to some degree, move i n t h a t world 
of v a l u e , we w i l l not understand what i t i s to be g u i l t y , so t h a t 
t h e judgment 'He i s g u i l t y ' w i l l not convey anything to us. I f , or. 
the other hand, we do understand what i t meens to be g u i l t y , the 
q u e s t i o n of whether t h i s man i s g u i l t y or not i s simply'' a n a t t e r 
of f a c t . The po i n t i s t h a t there are no such t h i n g s as 'value-judg-
ments ' , i f we mean by th a t term a judgment of value as opposed to 
a judgment of f a c t . 
To take another example. Given the Marxist scheme of 
t h i n g s , the d i s p u t e about whether the R u s s i a n r e v o l u t i o n of 1905 was 
a bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n i s simply a d i s p u t e about a matter of f a c t , 
namely, whether the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s n e c e s s a r y f o r something's being 
a bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n wore or were not pr e s e n t i n R u s s i a at t h a t 
time. But to be able to make and d i s p u t e t h i s judgment i t i s not 
1 When I say 'simply' I do not mean to deny t h a t these are o f t e n 
complex q u e s t i o n s . 
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only n e c e s s a r y to know some f a c t s about R u s s i a i n 1905, i t i s nec-
e s s a r y to understand, t h a t i s to share i n , the Marxist scheme of 
t h i n g s . Y/ithout t h i s l a t t e r understanding, the judgment ' I t was 
a bourgeois r e v o l u t i o n ' i s not a value judgment, s t i l l l e s s a f a c -
t u a l l y erroneous judgment; i t simply makes no sense, The man who 
does not t h i n k and move w i t h i n the world of Marxism does; not him-
s e l f understand the f a c t s of h i s t o r y i n these terms and cannot-, 
t h e r e f o r e , a s s e s s whether judgments couched i n these terms are 
c o r r e c t or i n c o r r e c t . 
I n c o n t r a s t to both these c a s e s stand p r o p o s i t i o n s l i k e 
'This pen i s red'. Here, the n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n : f o r understanding 
( a s opposed to v e r i f y i n g or f a l s i f y i n g ) the p r o p o s i t i o n do not 
i n c l u d e a shared world of value, f o r , by themselves, the terms 
'pen' and 'red' do not convey any p o s i t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e in. the world 
of p r a c t i c e . And the d i f f e r e n c e between the f i r s t two and. the t h i r d 
does not l i e i n t h e i r being p r o p o s i t i o n s of a d i f f e r e n t k i n d or 
form, but i n the n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i r being understood. 
I take t h i s to be the point of the remark t h a t : ' I t i s 
i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h e r e to be p r o p o s i t i o n s of e t h i c s ' , x f o r what we 
have c a l l e d f a c t u a l judgments conceived w i t h i n a world of value, 
however d i s c r e e t t h a t world may be from any other, are always 
p a r t i c u l a r or r e l a t i v e judgments and never genera], or absolute 
1 
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judgments. A general p r o p o s i t i o n of e t h i c s i s , i f my argument i s 
c o r r e c t , i m p o s s i b l e , s i n c e t h i s would have to be, not a f a c t u a l 
judgment conceived w i t h i n a world of v a l u e , but a statement, a 
p r o p o s i t i o n about those concepts i n themselves. I n other words, 
while the t a s k of e t h i c a l t h i n k i n g and b e l i e f i s to confer s i g n i f i -
cance upon an i n d i f f e r e n t world, to look f o r general or abs o l u t e 
p r o p o s i t i o n s of e t h i c s would be to r e q u i r e statements about the 
valu e of va l u e i t s e l f . The attempt to do t h i s must always, I t h i n k , 
r e s u l t i n incoherence (eg. J u s t i c e i s e v i l ) or v a c u i t y (eg. L y i n g 
i s wrong). 
I n s h o r t , i f , as has been argued, the d i f f e r e n c e between 
one ideology and another l i e s i n d i f f e r e n c e s over the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of the f a c t s and not the f a c t s themselves, then, though t h e s e 
d i f f e r e n c e s can be made manifest i n d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e s , ways of 
behaving and d e s c r i p t i o n s of the world, they cannot be captured 
i n anything s a i d . No p r o p o s i t i o n can c o n t a i n , so to speak, a judg-
ment of pure v a l u e . 
I f t h i s sounds odd, i t can be made more p l a u s i b l e by a 
couple of examples. 'This i s murder'. 'He has committed murder'. 
'She was murdered'. 'Ycu have been found g u i l t y of murder'. These 
1 I an aware th a t the terms 'absolute' and ' r e l a t i v e ' are used 
by V / i t t g e n s t e i n i n h i s 'Lecture on E t h i c s ' . However, I do 
not think the d i s t i n c t i o n advanced here p r e c i s e l y c o i n c i d e s 
with h i s . 
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a r e a l l p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e m e n t s r e f e r r i n g t o p e o p l e and e v e n t s i n 
t h e w o r l d and a l l e m p l o y i n g t h e t e r m 'murder'. D e p e n d i n g on how 
t h i n g s a c t u a l l y a r e i n t h e w o r l d , e a c h w i l l be t r u e o r f a l s e . 
They a r e a l l s t a t e m e n t s o f p a r t i c u l a r f a c t , and s ometimes i t i s 
s u p p o s e d t h a t t h e e t h i c a l e l e m e n t i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n 'He i s a 
m u r d e r e r ' c a n be b r o u g h t out by s h o w i n g t h a t t h e making o f s u c h 
j u d g m e n t s p r e s u p p o s e s o r assumes a g e n e r a l e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e a b o u t 
murder. B u t what w o u l d s u c h a g e n e r a l e t h i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n l o o k 
l i k e ? Of c o u r s e , we c a n t h i n k o f a p l a u s i b l e c a n d i d a t e h e r e , n amely 
'Murder i s wrong'. Now i t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e a c c e p t a n c e and 
a s s e r t i o n o f t h i s f u n d a m e n t a l p r o p o s i t i o n o f e t h i c s i s what t u r n s 
t h e f a c t u a l j udgment 'He h a s c o m m i t t e d murder' i n t o an e t h i c a l j u d g -
ment, a judgment o f v a l u e , and t h a t s u c h a g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n o r 
p r i n c i p l e i s a n e c e s s a r y p a r t o f any l e g i t i m a t e argument w h i c h s e e k s 
t o move from f a c t t o v a l u e . 
B u t upon c l o s e r e x a m i n a t i o n , we must c o n c l u d e t h a t s u c h 
an u t t e r a n c e c o u l d n o t be t h e a s s e r t i o n o f a s u b s t a n t i v e g e n e r a l 
p r o p o s i t i o n o f e t h i c s , ' 1 " o r i n d e e d a s u b s t a n t i v e a s s e r t i o n o f a n y t h i n g 
e l s e . I t i s v a c u o u s . F o r one f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e n o t i o n 'murder' 
i t j u s t i s t h e c a s e t h a t one c a n n o t murder w i t h i m p u n i t y . T h e r e i s 
1 I am n o t , o f c o u r s e , d e n y i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f g e n e r a l e m p i r i -
c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s a b o u t murder, F o r e x a m p l e , t h e p r o p o s i t i o n 
t h a t ' A l l m u r d e r s a r e c o m m i t t e d i n t h e m o r n i n g ' i s n e i t h e r 
t a u t o l o g i c a l n o r s e n s e l e s s . I t i s s i m p l y f a l s e . 
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no l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f e t h i c a l d i s a g r e e m e n t o r e t h i c a l d i f f e r -
e n c e ( a n d h e n c e a g r e e m e n t and u n i t y ) i n t e r m s o f g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s 
o r p r o p o s i t i o n s l i k e t h i s . E t h i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s a r e n o t bet w e e n 
t h o s e who t h i n k t h a t murder i s r i g h t and t h o s e who t h i n k i t i s 
wrong, b u t bet w e e n t h o s e who t h i n k , s a y , t h a t k i l l i n g by d r u n k e n 
d r i v i n g i s murder, and t h o s e who t h i n k i t i s n o t . I t s i m p l y does 
n o t make s e n s e t o c l a i m t h a t murder i s r i g h t , t h o u g h i t makes p e r -
f e c t l y good s e n s e t o c l a i m t h a t some p a r t i c u l a r m urder, ( t h e a s s a s -
s i n a t i o n o f H i t l e r , f o r e x a m p l e ) i s j u s t i f i a b l e . B u t e v e n h e r e , 
though we may d i s a g r e e a b o u t what t o t h i n k , t h i s d i s a g r e e m e n t i s n o t 
about t h e t i g h t n e s s o r w r o n g n e s s o f murder i n g e n e r a l , b u t , g i v e n 
t h e w r o n g n c s s o f any murder, w h e t h e r t h i s one c a n be j u s t i f i e d . 
A g a i n , i t i s c l e a r l y m e a n i n g f u l t o s a y 'That was v e r y 
g e n e r o u s o f y o u ' 'lie i s a g e n e r o u s man'. T h e s e a r e p a r t i c u l a r j u d g -
ments. They c o n v e y i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e w o r l d . B u t i f I s a y 
' G e n e r o s i t y i n good', t h i s i s v a c u o u s , i t t e l l s u s n o t h i n g . We 
c a n n o t s e n s i b l y a r g u e a b o u t t h e m a t t e r f o r i t would be n o n s e n s e t o 
s u g g e s t t h a t g e n e r o s i t y i s a bad t h i n g . T h o s e f o r whom g e n e r o s i t y 
i s a p r i n c i p l e v i r t u e do n o t d i f f e r f r om t h o s e f o r whom i t i a n o t 
i n t h a t t h e f o r m e r t h i n k i t good w h i l e t h e l a t t e r t h i n k i t bad. 
The f o r m e r may, i n some p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e , c a l l a man g e n e r o u s 
w h e re t h e l a t t e r would bo i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k him a s p e n d t h r i f t . I t i s 
i n t h i s s o r t o f d i f f e r e n c e t h a t e t h i c a l b o u n d a r i e s a r e 
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r e v e a l e d . 
T h e s e two c a s e s a r e i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f t h e t h e s i s t h a t 
t h e r e c a n be no g e n e r a l e t h i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s . T h e man, t h e n , who 
r e q u i r e d o f i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n t h a t i t a l l o w g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s 
was a s k i n g t h e i m p o s s i b l e . No g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s c a n be f o r t h -
coming. I f , t h e n , i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i s a n y t h i n g a t a l l , i t i s 
r e f l e c t i o n c o n c e r n e d i n t h e making and c o n s i d e r i n g o f p a r t i c u l a r 
j u d g m e n t s . 
2. Once t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s i n e t h i c s 
i s a d m i t t e d , t h o s e s y m p a t h e t i c t o t h e o b j e c t i o n w i t h w h i c h t h i s 
c h a p t e r began may c o n c l u d e t h a t a l l t a l k o f t h e o r y i n i d e o l o g y i s 
m i s c o n c e i v e d . B u t t o c o n c l u d e i n t h i s way w o u l d be a m i s t a k e , i f 
we mean by d e n y i n g t h e p e r t i n e n c e o f t h e word ' t h e o r y ' t h a t t h e r e 
i s no d i f f e r e n c e between t h e a c t i v e and t h e r e f l e c t i v e r e s p o n s e 
w i t h i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e . And i f t h i s d e n i a l i s on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t 
t a l k w h i c h g e n u i n e l y h a s i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e , i n t h e 
p r a c t i c a l o r d e r i n g o f t h e w o r l d , i s n o t h i n g l i k e t h e t a l k i n v o l v e d 
i n an i n t e l l e c t u a l manner o f o r d e r i n g t h e v / o r l d , l i k e s c i e n c e o r 
h i s t o r y , t h e c o n c l u s i o n i s d o u b l y m i s t a k e n . F o r i t l i a s b een t h e 
c o n s t a n t theme o f t h i s t h e s i s t h a t t h e s e two k i n d s o f o r d e r i n g a r e 
l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t . We s h o u l d n o t t h e i i e x p e c t i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n 
1 T h i s , I hope, makes p l a i n t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s I s p o k e o f 
e a r l i e r , when I q u o t e d from A l a s d a i r M a c l n t y r e ' s S h o r t 
H i s t o r y o f E t h i c s . S e e page 100, 
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t o l o o k a n y t h i n g l i k e t h a c o n s t r u c t i o n o f an i n t e l l e c t u a l u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g . And I t h i n k t h a t f a i l u r e t o g r a s p t h i s l i e s a t t h e h e a r t 
o f b o t h t h e commonplace and t h e s c e p t i c a l a c c o u n t s o f i d e o l o g y . B o t h 
t h i n k t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n a t s t a k e i s w h e t h e r t h e r e f l e c t i o n t h a t i s 
p o s s i b l e i n t h e r e a l m o f p r a c t i c e c a n be a s c i e n c e . The one a s s u m e s 
t h a t t h i s i s s o and e x p l a i n s t h e p l a c e o f i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n 
a c c o r d i n g l y . The o t h e r s e e s t h a t no s c i e n c e i s p o s s i b l e h e r e and 
c o n c l u d e s t h e r e f o r e t h a t no r e f l e c t i o n i s p o s s i b l e . B u t t h i s i s an i n -
a p p r o p r i a t e d i c h o t o m y w i t h w h i c h t o a p p r o a c h t h e m a t t e r and I s h o u l d 
l i k e now, i f I c a n , t o d e s t r o y t h o s e l a s t v e s t i g e s o f t h e way o f 
t h i n k i n g w h i c h i n c l i n e s u s t o s u p p o s e i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n t o be 
s o m e t h i n g a k i n t o t h e e x e r c i s e o f an i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s c i p l i n e . 
3. I s p o k e o f a c t i v e and r e f l e c t i v e r e s p o n s e s t o p r a c t i c a l 
l i f e . T h e d i f f e r e n c e c a n be b r o u g h t o u t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way. A 
p r a c t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d must c o n s i s t i n an. a b i l i t y t o 
b e s t o w upon t h e e v e n t s t h a t c o n t i n g e n t l y o c c u r i n t i r a e . a s i g n i f i c a n c e 
f o r u s a s a g e n t s . The movement o f a hand i n s p a c e i s , i n a p r a c t i -
c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , n e i t h e r c o n t e m p l a t e d i n i t s a e s t h e t i c q u a l i t y 
( a s i n t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n o f a b a l l e t ) n o r does i t s t i m u l a t e e x p l a n a -
t i o n i n t e r m s o f i t s p h y s i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y a n t e c e d e n t s ( a s i n t h e 
s c i e n c e o f p h y t i i o l o g y ) b u t i s r e c o g n i s e d , s a y , a s a b i d a t an 
a u c t i o n . U n d e r s t o o d a s s u c h , i t p r o v o k e s a response,, a r e a c t i o n on 
t h e p a r t o f t h e o t h e r a g e n t s i n v o l v e d i n t h e s i t u a t i o n . The mark 
o f o u r b e i n g i n p o s s e s s i o n o f t h i s s o r t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g l i e s i n 
o u r a b i l i t y t o r e s p o n d a p p r o p r i a t e l y ( i n t h i s c a s e by a c c e p t i n g o r 
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r a i s i n g t h e b i d ) and a l a c k o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s s i g n a l l e d i n an 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e r e s p o n s e ( b y , f o r example, t r e a t i n g i t a s a t h r e a t e n i n g 
g e s t u r e ) . 
T he c h i l d who l e a r n s t o l i v e and t o a c c o m p l i s h h i s p u r p o s e s , 
l e a r n s , e v e n , w h i c h p u r p o s e s i t i s s e n s i b l e t o e n t e r t a i n , l e a r n s how 
t o b e h a v e , w h i c h a c t i o n s and r e s p o n s e s a r e a p p r o p r i a t e and when. The 
p o i n t about t h i s s o r t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s t h a t , u n l i k e t h e i n t e l l e c -
t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t h a t h i s t o r y and s c i e n c e s u p p l y , i t s p r a c t i c a l 
c h a r a c t e r a l l o w s i t , o f t e n , n o t t o t a k e an a r t i c u l a t e form, b u t r a t h e r t o 
f i n d i t s i m m e d i a t e e x p r e s s i o n i n a c t u a l c o n d u c t . A p r a c t i c a l u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d a l l o w s u s t o f e e l and t o be a t home i n t h e m i d s t 
o f a w o r l d o f c h a n c e and c h a n g e . And b e i n g a t home r e v e a l s i t s e l f 
i n t h e e a s e and c o n f i d e n c e w i t h w h i c h we a c t . 
Th e p r i m a r y e x p r e s s i o n o f p r a c t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e n , 
w i l l t a k e t h e form o f b e i n g a b l e t o a c t , r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g a b l e t o 
as s e r t . ' ' ' The knowledge i t s u p p l i e s w i l l be i n t h e n a t u r e o f a s k i l l , 
an a b i l i t y t o do. Of c o u r s e , I s p e a k h e r e o f t h e l o g i c o f t h e m a t t e r , 
f o r o n l y i n l o g i c c a n t h e d o i n g be s e p a r a t e d from o u r a r t i c u l a t i o n o f 
what we do. Once t h e power t o a r t i c u l a t e and a s s e s s c u r a c t i v i t y i n 
words becomes an a c t u a l i t y we c a n n o t i n f a c t _ s e p a r a t e o u r t h o u g h t 
and o u r s p e e c h from o u r b e h a v i o u r . 
1 Some u t t e r a n c e s , a s I n o t e d e a r l i e r , a r e t h e m s e l v e s a c t i o n s . 
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N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h o u g h i t i s e a s y t o t h i n k o f o u r b e h a v i o u r 
a s , i n some s e n s e , r e s u l t i n g f rom a t l e a s t o u r v e r b a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
o f phenomena i n t h e w o r l d , t h i s i s n o t s o . T h e c h i l d d oes no t l e a r n -
t o i d e n t i f y c e r t a i n p e o p l e a s 'mother' o r ' f a t h e r ' f i r s t and t h e n 
a c t a c c o r d i n g l y . P a r t o f l e a r n i n g how t o a c t a p p r o p r i a t e l y t o 
' t h i s ' ( a n d t h e ' t h i s ' must r e m a i n u n s p e c i f i a b l e ) i s t o c a l l t h i s 
'mother' o r ' f a t h e r ' . Our l e a r n i n g o f l a j i g u a g e does n o t p r e c e d e 
b u t comes a m i d s t , i s c o e v a l w i t h , o u r l e a r n i n g how t o a c t i n t h e 
w o r l d . 
Now, i t f o l l o w s f rom t h i a t h a t a p r a c t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
c o u l d , a t l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e , be r e v e a l e d a l m o s t w h o l l y i n i n a r t i -
c u l a t e a c t i v i t y ; t h a t t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e b e s t o w e d upon t h e phenomena 
o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e c o u l d make i t s e l f m a n i f e s t o n l y i n o u r r e a c t i o n s 
t o them. I f , t h e n , we s o m e t i m e s a r t i c u l a t e t h a t s i g n i f i c a n c e , t h e 
words we u t t e r s h o u l d n o t be u n d e r s t o o d a s d e s c r i b i n g o r f o r m u l a t i n g 
t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f o u r u n a r t i c u l a t e d a c t i v i t y , b u t r a t h e r a s r e p l a c i n g 
t h a t a c t i v i t y , r e p l a c i n g t h e r e a c t i o n i n p h y s i c a l b e h a v i o u r by a 
r e a c t i o n i n l i n g u i s t i c behaviour.''" P r a c t i c a l and e t h i c a l t a l k d oes 
n o t r e v e a l an e t h i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d i n t h e same way 
t h a t a n e w s p a p e r r e p o r t r e v e a l s what went on a t Wembley l a s t n i g h t . 
I t s r o l e i s n o t t h a t o f s u p p l y i n g , e i t h e r t o o n l o o k e r s o r t h e a g e n t 
h i m s e l f , i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t a c e r t a i n e t h i c a l o r d e r i n t e r m s o f w h i c h 
1 S o m e t h i n g s i m i l a r c a n be a r g u e d about ' p a i n ' l a n g u a g e and 
' t h e l a n g u a g e o:C l o v e ' , J. t h i n k . 
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t h e w o r l d i s a r r a n g e d . S t i l l l e s s d oes t h e p a r t i c u l a r i t y o f e t h i c a l 
t a l k l i e i n i t s g i v i n g p e c u l i a r i n f o r m a t i o n o r r e p o r t s o f a p e c u l i a r 
s o r t . 1 . The s e n t e n c e s 'He was mu r d e r e d a t 3.00am' and 'The k n i f e 
e n t e r e d t h e h e a r t and li£e was t e r m i n a t e d a t 3.00am' do n o t d i f f e r 
i n t h a t t h e f o r m e r c o n v e y s an e t h i c a l meaning on t o p o f , o r a s w e l l 
a s , d e s c r i b i n g t h e f a c t s , w h i l e t h e l a t t e r m e r e l y d e s c r i b e s t h e 
f a c t s . R a t h e r t h e f o r m e r d e s c r i b e s t h e f a c t s i n s u c h a v/ay, i n a 
l a n g u a g e w h i c h e n a b l e s t h e f a c t s t o h a v e i m p o r t i n e t h i c a l l i f e . 
What makes e t h i c a l t a l k d i s t i n c t i v e i s n o t t h a t i t i s a d d i t i o n a l l j ' 
i n f o r m a t i v e , w h e t h e r a b o u t some s u p e r - s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s w h i c h t h e 
w o r l d i s t h o u g h t t o p o s s e s s o r about o u r f e e l i n g s , b u t e n a b l i n g . 
I t e n a b l e s u s t o go on i n t h e w o r l d . 
We c a n s e e from t h i s , I hope, t h a t what I h a v e c a l l e d 
t h e r e f l e c t i v e r e s p o n s e t o e t h i c a l l i f e shows i t s e l f a s an i n c l i n a -
t i o n t o a r t i c u l a t e t h e e t h i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f p a r t i c u l a r phenomena 
i n t h e w o r l d . I t a t t e m p t s t o f o r m u l a t e i n words t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f t h i n g s . S u c h f o r m u l a t i o n , however, must r e p l a c e o r accompany 
s i m p l e b e h a v i o u r , and does n o t d e s c r i b e i t o r r e v e a l i t s f o u n d a t i o n s . 
T h e words we u t t e r must do, i n some way, what t h e a c t i o n d o e s . T h e 
wort's must be o f s e r v i c e , and t h e i r power i s t o e n a b l e , n o t t o 
a s s e r t . To u n d e r s t a n d s u c h words i s t o be a b l e t o a c c e p t t h e 
judgment w h i c h s u c h words e x p r e s s . I t i s t o be e n a b l e d t o come t o 
1 As t h e s c h o o l o f m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y known a s ' i n t u i t i o n i s m ' 
s u p p o s e d t h a t i t d i d . 
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t e r m s w i t h t h e phenomena t o w h i c h t h e y r e f e r . Any f u r t h e r r e f l e c t i o n 
r e f l e c t i o n upon t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f s u c h j u d g m e n t s i s , i f i t i s p r o d u c 
t i v e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a l s o e n a b l i n g and n o t d e s c r i p t i v e o r e x p l a n a -
t o r y . The t e s t o f w h e t h e r , h a v i n g r e f l e c t e d i n t h i s way, o u r e t h i c a l 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d i s e n h a n c e d i s n o t m e r e l y w h e t h e r we c a n 
go on, but w h e t h e r we c a n go on w i t h g r e a t e r c o n f i d e n c e and e a s e i n 
o u r c o n d u c t o f l i f e . 
an i n c l i n a t i o n t o r e a c t t o t h e w o r l d by t h i n k i n g and t a l k i n g r a t h e r 
t h a n i n a c t i o n , t o a f f i r m i n words o n e ' s e t h i c a l r e l a t i o n t o t h e 
phenomena o f t h e w o r l d . F o r e x a m p l e , when t h e e v e n t s we c a l l t h e 
F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n t o o k p l a c e , t h e r e a c t i o n s o f E n g l i s h m e n were many 
and v a r i e d . Most, I i m a g i n e , knew l i t t l e and c a r e d l e s s a b o u t what 
had happened and was h a p p e n i n g i n F r a n c e . Some went t o F r a n c e t o 
j o i n r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements t h e r e and g e n e r a l l y t o t a k e p a r t i n t h e 
t u r b u l e n t e v e n t s . O t h e r s s t a y e d i n E n g l a n d and, s h a r i n g t h e same 
s e n t i m e n t a s t h o s e who went, r a i s e d v/hat s u p p o r t t h e y c o u l d f o r t h e 
r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s and t r i e d t o e m u l a t e t h e i r a c t i o n s i n E n g l a n d . •, S t i l l 
o t h e r s sought, t o p r e v e n t any s u c h s u p p o r t b e i n g g i v e n , t o f o s t e r t h e 
e m i g r e F r e n c h n o b i l i t y and t o s u p p r e s s any s i m i l a r r e v o l t i n E n g l a n d . 
A l l t h e s e a r e p r a c t i c a l r e a c t i o n s and t h e y s p r i n g from, t h e y i n d i c a t e 
and t h e y make s e n s e i n t h e c o n t e x t o f , an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d 
i n w h i c h t h e e v e n t s i n F r a n c e a r e e n c o m p a s s a b l e . They a r e a l l a c t i v e 
r e s p o n s e s . They c o n s i s t i n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of a c t u a l a c t i o n s , o f a 
more o r les.y u n u s u a l n a t u r e . And a l l o f them may be c o n t r a s t e d 
The r e f l e c t i v e r e s p o n s e t o e t h i c a l l i f e , t h e n , c o n s i s t s i n 
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w i t h , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e s e r m o n s o f Dr P r i c e , and, above a l l , B u r k e ' s 
R e f l e c t i o n s on t h e R e v o l u t i o n i n F r a n c e and P a i n e ' s R i g h t s o f Man. 
T h e s e l a s t two a r e i d e o l o g i c a l w o rks p a r e x c e l l e n c e , f o r t h e y a r e 
r e s p o n s e s t o p a r t i c u l a r e v e n t s i n t h e w o r l d w h i c h t a k e t h e form o f a 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h o s e e v e n t s i n t h e t e r r a s o f an e t h i c a l v o c a b u l a r y , a 
v o c a b u l a r y , t h a t i s t o s a y , w h i c h e n a b l e s us t o g r a s p t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f t h e e v e n t s , t o s e e t h e i r good and t h e i r e v i l . 
' S e e i n g ' t h e good and e v i l , h owever, i s a m e t a p h o r i c a l way 
o f s p e a k i n g , f o r i t i s n o t l i k e s e e i n g t h e c o l o u r o r t h e s h a p e o f an 
o b j e c t . To be aware o f t h e e v i l o f s o m e t h i n g i s t o be a b l e t o encom-
p a s s t h a t phenomena i n t o o n e ' s p r a c t i c a l l i f e i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e 
i n t e g r i t y o f t h a t l i f e w i l l n o t be d e s t r o y e d by i t . And t o u n d e r s t a n d 
t h e good i s t o encompass phenomena i n s u c h a way t h a t p r a c t i c a l l i f e 
i s e n h a n c e d , t h a t one i s e d i f i e d . 
When we s p e a k o f r e f l e c t i o n i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e , t h e r e f o r e , 
and wonder about t h e p l a c e i t h a s , we must n o t s u p p o s e o u r s e l v e s t o 
be t h i n k i n g o f a r e f l e c t i o n upon o r about t h a t a c t i v i t y b u t w i t h i n 
t h a t a c t i v i t y ; n o r s h o u l d we t h i n k t h a t t h e i l l u m i n a t i n g c h a r a c t e r 
o f s u c h r e f l e c t i o n , i f i l l u m i n a t i n g i t be, l i e s i n i t s p r o v i d i n g 
f u r t h e r o r n e c e s s a r y i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e o p e r a t i o n s o f t h o u g h t w h i c h 
t h e e x e r c i s e o f an i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s c i p l i n e must i n v o l v e , t h e a c t i v i t i e 
o f m a k i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s , e x p l a i n i n g , r e p o r t i n g , v e r i f y i n g , f a l s i f y i n g , 
a r e , by and l a r g e , a l i e n t o any r e f l e c t i o n whose s i g n i f i c a n c e l i e s 
i n p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . S u c h t a l k i s n o t o f t h e a c c o u n t i n g , v e r i f y i n g , 
e x p l a i n i n g v a r i e t y , b u t r a t h e r e n a b l i n g , e d i f y i n g , i n s t r u c t i v e . 
Works o f i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n a r e p r o f o u n d l y m i s u n d e r s t o o d 
as r e f l e c t i v e i f we, o r i n d e e d t h e a u t h o r s t h e m s e l v e s , i m a g i n e them 
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t o be s c i e n t i f i c , i n f o r m a t i v e , e x p l a n a t o r y . They c a n , i f t h e y a r e t o 
b e a r any s o r t o f r e l a t i o n t o human c o n d u c t , be n o t h i n g o f t h e s o r t . 
T h e i r r e f l e c t i v e n e s s l i e s i n t h e i r b e i n g d e s c r i p t i o n s o f , j u d g m e n t s 
about t h e w o r l d , r a t h e r t h a n a c t i o n s i n i t . What i n c l i n e s u s t o c a l l 
them t h e o r e t i c a l , I t h i n k , i s t h e i r s y s t e m a t i c c h a r a c t e r . B u t , s i n c e 
s u c h r e f l e c t i o n s c a n n o t , l o g i c a l l y c a n n o t , r e s u l t i n g e n e r a l e t h i c a l 
p r o p o s i t i o n s o f p u r e v a l u e , a n y t h i n g s y s t e m a t i c must r e v e a l i t s e l f 
i n p a r t i c u l a r j u d g m e n t s a b o u t t h e w o r l d . I d e o l o g i c a l t r e a t i s e s a r e 
n o t s y s t e m a t i c i n t h e same way t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e a t i s e s a r e . 
I h a v e a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d B u r k e and t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n . 
Men o f B u r k e ' s p e r s u a s i o n , no do u b t , d i d e x p r e s s t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o 
t h e R e v o l u t i o n i n words and s p e e c h e s . What marks B u r k e o f f i s n o t 
t h a t h e had some a d d i t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e e v e n t s i n F r a n c e , 
w h e r e a s t h e a v e r a g e Whig had o n l y an a c c o u n t o f them. R a t h e r , B u r k e 
t r i e s t o g i v e a c o m p l e t e a c c o u n t o f t h e R e v o l u t i o n i n t h e v o c a b u l a r y 
o f a c e r t a i n e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n . T h i s v o c a b u l a r y i s a l s o t h a t i n 
w h i c h t h e i s o l a t e d j u d g m e n t s o f t h e Whigs a r e made. F u r t h e r , i t s 
e t h i c a l c h a r a c t e r l i e s i n i t s s e r v i n g t o mark d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n 
p e o p l e and e v e n t s w h i c h a r e a l s o made m a n i f e s t i n a c t u a l c o n d u c t 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f Whigs. B u r k e and t h e a v e r a g e Whig,'*' i f t h e y h a v e 
1 'Average Whig' i s p e r h a p s an u n f o r t u n a t e t e r m s i n c e i t i s 
a r g u a b l e t h a t t h e r e was, a t t h e t i m e , no one s e t o f p e o p l e 
t o whom s u c h a t e r m c o u l d r e f e r . B u t I u s e i t t o i n d i c a t e 
what m i g h t be c a l l e d a l o g i c a l f i c t i o n . I am c o n c e r n e d 
w i t h a l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e r a t h e r t h a n an h i s t o r i c a l l y 
a c t u a ! r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
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an e t h i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w i l l be a b l e t o encompass t h e c a t a c l y s m i c 
e v e n t s o f t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n w i t h some d e g r e e o f e q u a n i m i t y . T h e y 
w i l l n o t be n o n p l u s s e d , c o m p l e t e l y c o n f u s e d , and t h r o w n o f f b a l a n c e 
by t h o s e e v e n t s . I n s h o r t , t h e y w i l l know, i n a s e n s e , what i s 
g o i n g on and what i t a l l adds up t o . B u t s u c h k n o w l e d g e and s u c l i 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g does n o t s u p p l y an e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f 
t h o s e e v e n t s , b u t r e v e a l s i t s e l f i n an a b i l i t y t o r e a c t . i n t e l l i g i b l y 
t o them. The d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e one and t h e o t h e r l i e s i n t h e 
f a c t t h a t t h e one c o n s i s t s i n deeds ( h a r b o u r i n g e m i g r e s , f i g h t i n g a 
w a r ) w h i l e t h e o t h e r c o n s i s t s i n r e f l e c t i o n s ( a t r e a t i s e ) . 
T h e t r e a t i s e , h owever, i s n o t e x p l a n a t o r y o f t h e e v e n t s 
o f t h e R e v o l u t i o n , n o r i s i t , f o r r e a s o n s a d v a n c e d i n C h a p t e r 2, t o 
be u n d e r s t o o d a s t h e b a s i s o r t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e 
members o f t h e e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n t o w h i c h i t i t s e l f b e l o n g s . I t 
d o e s n e i t h e r o f t h e s e s i n c e b o t h o f them would be ' s c i e n t i f i c ' i n 
c h a r a c t e r ( t h e f i r s t h i s t o r i c a l , t h e s e c o n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l ) and c o u l d 
n o t , t h e r e f o r e , h a v e any i m p o r t i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e . B u r k e ' s 
' R e f l e c t i o n s ' i s i t s e l f one k i n d o f r e s p o n s e w i t h i n an e t h i c a l 
t r a d i t i o n . I t i s t h e p a s s i n g and making p u b l i c o f j u d g m e n t s c o u c h e d 
i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h a t t r a d i t i o n . 
T h e s e j u d g m e n t s a r e abo u t t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e e v e n t s 
o f t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n . J udgments about t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i n g s 
w i l l c o n s i s t i n d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h o s e t h i n g s , b u t t h e i r a b i l i t y t o 
conv e y and b e s t o w s i g n i f i c a n c e d oes n o t l i e i n t h e i r b e i n g d e s c r i p -
t i o n s o f some p e c u l i a r a s p e c t o f t h e phenomena i n q u e s t i o n . The 
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d e s c r i p t i o n i n e t h i c a l t e r m s i s one way o f b e s t o w i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e 
on t h o s e phenomena, o f b r i n g i n g them w i t h i n t h e compass o f o u r 
p r a c t i c a l and e t h i c a l l i f e . 
T h e b u s i n e s s o f w r i t i n g and r e f l e c t i n g i d e o l o g i c a l l y , 
t h e n , i s t h e b u s i n e s s o f malting t h e w o r l d e t h i c a l l y i n t e l l i g i b l e by 
d e s c r i b i n g t h e c o n t i n g e n t phenomena o f t h e w o r l d i n t h e v o c a b u l a r y 
o f an e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n . And t h e p o i n t o f s u c h s i g n i f i c a n c e i s n o t 
l i k e t h a t i n , s a y , e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e . I t s o b j e c t i s n o t t o i n f o r m 
o r t o e x p l a i n , t o s u p p l y us w i t h f r e s h k nowledge o f t h e w o r l d , b u t 
t o e n a b l e us t o c o n d u c t o u r l i v e s i n t h e w o r l d v / i t h c o n f i d e n c e and 
e a s e . F u r t h e r , a s I a r g u e d i n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r , s u c h d e s c r i p t i o n s 
c a n be f r e e f r o m whim, and t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o r i n c o r r e c t n e s s o f s u c h 
d e s c r i p t i o n s i s a s c e r t a i n a b l e w h e r e t h e r e i s some a u t h o r i t a t i v e 
a p p e a l , a s , f o r e x a m p l e , a c o r p u s o f l i t e r a t u r e i d e n t i f i e d p e c u l i a r l y 
w i t h t h a t t r a d i t i o n . 
I t f o l l o w s from what I h a v e b e e n s a y i n g t h a t most i d e o l o g -
i c a l w r i t i n g w i l l be c o n c e r n e d w i t h making p a r t i c u l a r j u d g m e n t s a b o u t 
some s p e c i f i c s e t o f phenomena i n t h e w o r l d , however l a r g e o r s m a l l 
t h a t s e t may be. And I t h i n k t h a t t h i s i s b o r n e o u t by a p e r u s a l 
o f t h o s e w o r k s u s u a l l y d e s c r i b e d as i d e o l o g i c a l o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n 
t h e l a y m a n ' s s e n s e o f t h a t t e r m . J u s t a s B u r k e c o n v e y s and p r o p a g a t e s 
h i s e t h i c a l w o r l d v i a an a c c o u n t o f t h e e v e n t s o f t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , 
s o P a i n e o f f e r s an a l t e r n a t i v e e t h i c a l w o r l d t h r o u g h a c o m p e t i n g 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e same e v e n t s . A g a i n , Marx r e v e a l s t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f t h i n g s t h r o u g h d e s c r i p t i o n s o f , v a r i o u s l y , t h e 1.848 R e v o l u t i o n s , 
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w o r k i n g c l a s s l i f e i n 1 9 t h c e n t u r y E n g l a n d , t h e c i v i l war i n F r a n c e . 
M a z z i n i ' s l i b e r a l n a t i o n a l i s m i s c o n v e y e d by a s y s t e m a t i c d e s c r i p t i o n 
o f t h e a c t i o n s o f A u s t r i a n ? i n I t a l y . Maine and M i l l b o t h c o n c e r n 
t h e m s e l v e s w i t h p o p u l a r movements i n E n g l a n d . And so on. The 
e x a m p l e s a r e e n d l e s s , f o r t h e r e i s no o t h e r way t h a n by t h e d e s c r i p 7 
t i o n o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r t h a t an e t h i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n be c o n v e y e d 
i n w o r d s . T h e r e c a n be no p r o p o s i t i o n s o f e t h i c s . 
S u c h works a s t h o s e I h a v e c i t e d a r e o f t e n h e l d t o be 
e x p l a n a t o r y , and, i n a s e n s e , t h e y a r e , t h o u g h I h a v e r e j e c t e d t h a t 
t e r m . B u t s i n c e t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e l i e s i n t h e p r a c t i c a l w o r l d , 
t h e w o r l d o f a c t i v i t y and e v a l u a t i o n , t h e y a r e ' e x p l a n a t o r y ' n o t i n 
t h e i r a b i l i t y t o a b a t e m y s t e r y , t h e m y s t e r y o f i g n o r a n c e , b u t t o 
a b a t e u n e a s e , t h e u n e a s e t h a t a r i s e s when we h a v e no c o n f i d e n c e i n o u r 
a b i l i t y t o go on. What we s t a n d t o g a i n i n f a i t h , o r t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g 
°f f a i t h , i s n e i t h e r k nowledge n o r i n f o r m a t i o n , b u t c o n f i d e n c e and 
e d i f i c a t i o n . I d e o l o g i c a l t r e a t i s e s do n o t ' e x p l a i n ' phenomena i n t h e 
way t h a t s c i e n t i f i c h y p o t h e s e s e x p l a i n . They a r e n o t g e n e r a l , n o r 
do t h e y s t a n d o u t s i d e t h e phenomena t o w h i c h t h e y r e l a t e . L i b e r a l 
t r e a t i s e s , f o r e x a m p l e , do n o t show t h a t l i b e r a l i s m i s t r u e ( w h a t e v e r 
t h a t might mean) b u t show t h e T r u t h o f L i b e r a l i s m . ' " F a i t h cometh by 
h e a r i n g " . B u t t h i s f a i t h i s i n o u r h e a r t s and makes us s a y , n o t " I 
know" b u t " I b e l i e v e " . ' 1 
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4; Someone w i l l s a y : "But t h e s e w o r k s do i n v o l v e p r o o f , 
d e m o n s t r a t i o n and e x p l a n a t i o n . Marx i s n o t m e r e l y c o n t e n t t o 
e l a b o r a t e an a c c o u n t o f 1 9 t h c e n t u r y i n d u s t r y . He d e f e n d s h i s 
a c c o u n t and a r g u e s i n f a v o u r o f i t a s t h e t r u e a c c o u n t . Maine 
t i ' i e s t o show, w i t h h i s t o r i c a l e v i d e n c e , t h a t p o p u l a r government 
i s d e s t r u c t i v e . L o c k e t r i e s t o p r o v e l o g i c a l l y t h a t p r o p e r t y i s 
n e c e s s a r y t o s o c i e t y . And i n a l l t h e s e a r g u m e n t s t h e r e i s r e c o u r s e 
t o g e n e r a l t h e o r i e s and a s s e r t i o n s . P a i n e , f o r e x a m p l e , d o e s n o t 
m e r e l y s a y 'That i s a r i g h t ' and 'That i s a r i g h t ' . He s a y s t h i n g s 
l i k e ' E v e r y c i v i l r i g h t grows o u t o f a n a t u r a l right'"''. Now t h i s i s 
g e n e r a l and i t i s a r g u e d f o r . " 
T h e f i r s t t h i n g t o be s a i d ' a b o u t t h i s o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t 
i d e o l o g i c a l w r i t e r s , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e i n t h e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y , h a v e o f t e n 
t h o u g h t t h e m s e l v e s t o be engaged i n a c a d e m i c i n q u i r y , t o be p r o v i n g 
f rom t h e f a c t s o f h i s t o r y , d e m o n s t r a t i n g by s c i e n t i f i c r e a s o n i n g , 
d r a w i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s . B u t i t does n o t f o l l o w from t h e 
f a c t t h a t t h e y t h o u g h t t h a t t h i s i s what t h e y were d o i n g , t h a t t h i s 
i s what t h e y w e r e d o i n g . I may c l a i m , and p e r h a p s e v e n i n t e n d , t o . 
show t h a t 2 p l u s 2 e q u a l s 5, but i f 2 p l u s 2 does n o t e q u a l '6, w h a t -
e v e r my i n t e n t i o n and w h a t e v e r my o p i n i o n o f t h e a c h i e v e m e n t c f my 
work, my c l a i m i s m i s t a k e n . S i m i l a r l y , Marx t h o u g h t he had, i n h i s 
w r i t i n g s , u n i f i e d t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e . B u t i f t h i r . i s l o g i c a l l y 
1 Thomas P a i n e : R i g h t s o f Man P e l i c a n C l a s s i c s e d i t i o n 
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i m p o s s i b l e , t h e n h i s c l a i m i s m i s t a k e n . And, o f c o u r s e , h i s m i s t alee 
c a n n o t l i e i n h i s h a v i n g done t h e l o g i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e . H i s work 
c a n n o t i t s e l f be a l o g i c a l c o n f u s i o n . When i t i s s a i d , t h e r e f o r e , 
t h a t Marx was n o t c o n t e n t t o e l a b o r a t e an e t h i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f 
1 9 t h c e n t u r y i n d u s t r y , b u t s o u g h t t o d e v e l o p a r e v o l u t i o n a r y t h e o r y 
o f t h a t s o c i e t y , we must u n d e r s t a n d t h i s t o mean t h a t Marx would n o t 
h a v e t a k e n f a v o u r a b l y t o t h e s u g g e s t i o n s t h a t h i s work jLs t h e 
e l a b o r a t i o n o f s u c h a d e s c r i p t i o n ; t h a t he does n o t and c o u l d n o t 
p r o v e what he s a y s s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ; t h a t no u n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e o r y and 
p r a c t i c e d o e s o r c o u l d r e s u l t . B u t Marx's f e e l i n g s on t h i s m a t t e r a r e 
c l e a r l y i r r e l e v a n t . The s u b s t a n t i a l q u e s t i o n h e r e i s 'What a c t u a l l y 
i s t h e n a t u r e o f h i s w r i t i n g and r e f l e c t i o n ? ' and t h o u g h Marx, l i k e 
anyone e l s e , i s e n t i t l e d t o a d v a n c e an o p i n i o n on t h e n a t u r e o f h i s 
work, i t i s not a p r i v i l e g e d o p i n i o n b e c a u s e t h a t work i s h i s . We 
n e e d n o t t r o u b l e , t h e n , i f an a c c o u n t o f what k i n d o f r e f l e c t i o n i s 
p o s s i b l e i n i d e o l o g y i s g r e a t l y a t v a r i a n c e w i t h t h e v i e w s o f t h o s e 
who a r e famous f o r t h a t ~ r e f l e c t i o n . I t i s n o t o r i o u s t h a t e v e n t h e 
most b r i l l i a n t s c i e n t i s t may make a poor s h o w i n g a t g i v i n g an a c c o u n t 
o f t h e l o g i c o f b i s d i s c i p l i n e . 
T h e s e c o n d p o i n t t o be made a g a i n s t t h e o b j e c t i o n we a r e 
c o n s i d e r i n g i s t h a t I h a v e n o t d e n i e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e f l e c t i v e 
argument i n i d e o l o g y and, s i n c e t h e w h o l e o f t h e l a s t c h a p t e r was 
c o n c e r n e d t o r e v e a l what k i n d o f r e a s o n and argument i s p o s s i b l e , I 
hope I c a n t a k e t h i s t o h a v e been shown. B u t t h e form o f s u c h a r g u -
ment i s n o t t h e d e f e n s e o r r e j e c t i o n of g e n e r a l j u d g m e n t s by r e f e r -
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e n c e t o e v i d e n c e o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r ( a s i n t h e c a s e o f s c i e n c e ) b u t 
t h e d e f e n s e o f p a r t i c u l a r d e s c r i p t i o n s by an a p p e a l t o o r t h o d o x y i n 
l a n g u a g e and d o c t r i n e e n s h r i n e d i n a c o r p u s o f a u t h o r i t a t i v e l i t e r -
a t u r e . 
The t h i r d p o i n t w i l l r e q u i r e r a t h e r more e x t e n s i v e e l a b o r -
a t i o n t h a n t h e s e f i r s t two. I t h a s b e e n s a i d t h a t i d e o l o g i s t s do 
make g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t s and t h e e x a m p l e q u o t e d i s P a i n e ' s r e m a r k 
t h a t ' E v e r y c i v i l r i g h t grows o u t o f a n a t u r a l r i g h t " . H e r e , i t w i l l 
be s a i d , i s c l e a r l y a g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f r i g h t . Genera.l p r o p o s i t i o n s 
o f e t h i c s , t h e n , c a n n o t be i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h i s i s one. My r e p l y t o 
t h i s i s r e a l l y a f u r t h e r e l u c i d a t i o n o f t h e v i e w t h a t when e t h i c a l 
lr.nguage t a k e s on t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f a g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t a b o u t t h e 
w o r l d , i t must be u n d e r s t o o d t o be e n a b l i n g r a t h e r t h a n e x p l a n a t o r y 
o r i n f o r m a t i v e . I s h a l l t r y to show t h a t i f P a i n e ' s r e m a r k i s t a k e n 
t o be e x p l a n a t o r y i t must, upon a n a l y s i s , t u r n o u t t o be n o n s e n s e . 
But I s h a l l t h e n go on t o show, i f I c a n , t h a t when we u n d e r s t a n d 
u t t e r a n c e s o f t h i s s o r t t o be e n a b l i n g , we may s e e t h a t w h e r e i n f o r m a -
t i o n i s n o t and c o u l d n o t be c o n v e y e d by t h e s t a t e m e n t t h e r e may y e t 
be p o i n t i n making i t . 
5. L e t us b e g i n w i t h P a i n e ' s s t a t e m e n t . ' E v e r y c i v i l r i g h t 
grows o u t o f a n a t u r a l r i g h t ' . T h e q u e s t i o n i s , b r i e f l y , w h e t h e r 
g e n e r a l t a l k o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s c a n do t h e same s o r t o f j o b a s t a l k 
o f c i v i l r i g h t s . I f we a r e a r g u i n g a b o u t w h e t h e r a man h a s a r i g h t 
t o a c e r t a i n p i e c e o f l a n d c u r argument can f a i r l y r e a d i l y be 
s e t t l e d by r e c o u r s e t o t h e l a w r e l a t i n g t e 1 and o w n e r s h i p and t h e 
f a c t s of the case. I f t h e r e s t i l l remains something of a d i s p u t e , 
we may t r y to determine what h i s r i g h t s i n g e n e r a l a r e , as the law 
now s t a n d s . But the whole of our argument i s dependent f o r i t s sense 
and f o r i t s concrete c h a r a c t e r upon a l e g a l framework, the l e g a l 
system w i t h i n which such questions can s e n s i b l y be r a i s e d and 
answered. I t i s not as though, were there no l e g a l system he would 
have d i f f e r e n t r i g h t s or t h a t h i 3 r i g h t s would be a b o l i s h e d , s t i l l 
l e s s t h a t he would have those r i g h t s , only they would now be un-
e n f o r c e a b l e . I t i s r a t h e r t h a t , without a l e g a l system,no t a l k of 
r i g h t s and no arguments concerning them can begin. The b u s i n e s s of 
c l a i m i n g or denying a r i g h t presupposes a system of law. The e x i s t -
ence of law allows the p o s s i b i l i t y of r i g h t s , and the content of law 
determines what those r i g h t s are. The non-existence of law, t h e r e -
f o r e , does not a l t e r the substance of r i g h t s but p r o h i b i t s t h e i r 
p o s s i b i l i t y . T h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t a l k of r i g h t s depends upon the 
e x i s t e n c e of a s p e c i f i a b l e l e g a l system. T h i s i s p a r t of the grammar 
of ' r i g h t ' . 
T h i s being the case, what are we to make of t a l k of n a t u r a l , 
or f o r t h a t matter, human, r i g h t s . * The s u p e r f i c i a l appearance of 
P a i n e ' s remark suggests t h a t he can supply the ground or foundation 
of the r i g l i t n e s s of a r i g h t o u t s i d e any_ l e g a l framework. But t h i s i s 
absurd. I t i s absurd because, as we have seen, r i g h t s presuppose 
1 Or, c o n v e r s e l y , the 'Duties of Man' (Mat'-zini) 
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some system of law or c i v i l i t y , w h i l e n a t u r a l r i g h t s t r a n s c e n d 
any s o c i a l system. I say 'transcend' here because, as P a i n e ' s t r a c t 
makes c l e a r , the r o l e of n a t u r a l r i g h t i s to enable us to deny the 
T i g h t n e s s of some r i g h t s p r e s e n t l y (1792) r e c o g n i s e d i n law (eg. The 
r i g h t of patronage) and to a s s e r t the T i g h t n e s s of some t h i n g s not 
p r e s e n t l y enshrined i n law (The u n i v e r s a l r i g h t to v o t e ) . Now t h i s 
means t h a t i f we say t h a t the o r i g i n of every c i v i l r i g h t i s a 
n a t u r a l r i g h t , we cannot be g i v i n g an e x p l a n a t i o n of every r i g h t 
t h a t i s , however the appearance of our u t t e r a n c e may i n c l i n e us to 
t h i n k t h a t t h a t i s what we are doing. For n a t u r a l r i g h t s are supposed 
to enable us to d i s c r i m i n a t e between one e x i s t i n g r i g h t snd another, 
whereas an e x p l a n a t i o n would have to be an e x p l a n a t i o n of w h a t e v e r 
r i g h t s e x i s t e d . On the other hand, an e x p l a n a t i o n of the T i g h t n e s s 
of r i g h t s could not enable us to point to what was r i g h t and wrong 
i n p r e s e n t r i g h t s . R i g h t s , l o g i c a l l y , cannot be wrong. Whatever 
s e r v i c e Paine's t a l k performs, then, i t cannot be t h a t of p r o v i d i n g 
a g e n e r a l theory or e x p l a n a t i o n of r i g h t . 
R i g h t s cannot, l o g i c a l l y , be wrong, but they can, of course, 
be o b j e c t i o n a b l e and o b j e c t e d to. One way of e x p r e s s i n g one's 
o p p o s i t i o n to some r i g h t i n law i s i n the vocabulary of n a t u r a l 
1 I do not c o n s i d e r here the a d d i t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s r a i s e d by 
p o s i t i n g a system of n a t u r a l lav/. I do not do so because t h i s 
would i n v o l v e a d i s t r i c t i n g d i g r e s s i o n . But I think t h a t t a l k 
of n a t u r a l law can a l s o be seen to be enabling. I hope the 
r e s t of t h i s chapter w i l l , i n d i r e c t l y , show t h i s to be the c a s e . 
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r i g h t s . The vocabulary of n a t u r a l r i g h t s may enable us to a r t i -
c u l a t e our o p p o s i t i o n to some r i g h t i n law and t h i s vocabulary may 
be kept a l i v e by t r a c t s l i k e P a i n e ' s . 
Another example may help to make t h i s , p l a i n e r . Suppose 
t h a t under a given l e g a l system c i t i z e n s have, amongst o t h e r s , the r i g h t 
of habeas corpus and, say, the r i g h t of way along any footpath of 
more than f i f t y y e a r s r e c o g n i t i o n . A man may, without f e e l i n g very 
much one way or another, w i t n e s s and indeed t o l e r a t e the v i o l a t i o n 
of the second of these r i g h t s . He may, though he r e c o g n i s e s the 
e x i s t e n c e of t h i s r i g h t , be very l i t t l e bothered to f i n d t h a t such a 
r i g h t of way i s fenced o f f where i t goes through someone's garden. 
Though he r e c o g n i s e s t h a t he does have a r i g h t i n law, i t may not 
t r o u b l e him much t h a t he cannot e x e r c i s e i t . I t may on the o t h e r 
hand be the case t h a t f o r him, as f o r many people, the r i g h t of 
habeas corpus i s q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t matter. Here i t i s perhaps q u i t e 
i n c o n c e i v a b l e to hira t h a t he could stand by and w i t n e s s a v i o l a t i o n 
of h i s or indeed someone e l s e ' s r i g h t i n t h i s matter. Yet, i f we 
were to point out to him t h a t , i n law, the two a r e e q u a l l y r i g h t s 
and the v i o l a t i o n of e i t h e r e q u a l l y an. o f f e n c e , what we have s a i d , 
though t r u e , i s l i k e l y to be considered s h a l l o w or b e s i d e the p o i n t . 
For the man may c l a i m t h a t the r i g h t of habeas corpus i s a.much more 
fundamental r i g h t than t h a t of a r i g h t of way. 
Now when someone says t h i s , I t h i n k t h a t most of vis would 
cl a i m to know what he meant. But whatever he means, what he s a y s , 
i f taken to be the d e s c r i p t i o n of some f e a t u r e of the r i g h t to t r i a l , 
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must t u r n out to be nonsense. A l e g a l system i s not the s o r t of 
th i n g which has depths or foundations. Such t a l k as t h i s cannot, 
I t h i n k , i n c r e a s e our knowledge about the world. But what i t can 
do i s to mark a d i f f e r e n c e i n the world, namely between the impor-
tance of some r i g h t s r a t h e r than ot h e r s i n our e t h i c a l o r d e r i n g of 
the world. I t does not, however, mark i n the cense of d e s c r i b e 
what the d i f f e r e n c e s are. Nor does i t d e s c r i b e the e t h i c a l order. 
I t may provide a vocabulary i n which the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s demanded 
by t h a t order may be made, and through which t h a t order may make 
i t s e l f m anifest. When we d e s c r i b e something as a n a t u r a l o r a human 
r i g h t we do not o f f e r an ex p l a n a t i o n of or an o b s e r v a t i o n upon the 
f a c t of the t h i n g , but v/c bestow upon the contingent f a c t s of the 
world an importance which such a t h i n g must have i f i t i s to be 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y encompassed i n our e t h i c a l understanding. 
The consequence of see i n g t h a t t h i s k i n d of t a l k i s 
en a b l i n g i s , I t h i n k , to grasp t h a t i f we are to understand the 
p l a c e t h a t e t h i c a l judgment and e t h i c a l r e f l e c t i o n can have i n the 
conduct of l i f e we must ask what s e r v i c e i t performs th e r e and not 
how w e l l or badly i t d e s c r i b e s or e x p l a i n s t h a t conduct. Any com-
p l e t e l y o b j e c t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n and d e s c r i p t i o n must, I have argued 
throughout the course of t h i s t h e s i s , stand o u t s i d e conduct and 
cannot, t h e r e f o r e , a s s i s t us i n i f . 
6. No doubt the s c e p t i c w i l l give v o i c e to some impatience 
here. 'Look' he w i l l say 'When Paine says "Every c i v i l r i g h t grows 
out of a n a t u r a l r i g h t " he has o f f e r e d me a theory of r i g h t ; 
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i f what he says t u r n s out, upon a n a l y s i s , to be incoherent non-
sense, no amount of p h i l o s o p h i s i n g w i l l t u r n t h a t nonsense i n t o 
sense. I f i t s n o n s e n s i c a l c h a r a c t e r r e s u l t s from i t s being a 
s p u r i o u s mixture, a confusion of theory and p r a c t i c e , then t h a t 
i s what i t remains. I t cannot subsequently be shown, by some 
e l a b o r a t e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , to have been p a r t of a genuine form of 
r e f l e c t i o n a f t e r a l l . ' 
No amount of p h i l o s o p h i s i n g w i l l t u r n nonsense i n t o 
sense and nothing i n my argument suggests t h a t i t w i l l . My concern 
i s w ith l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y and n e c e s s i t y . I have t r i e d to chow the 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y of p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y ' s being informed by o b j e c t i v e l y 
demonstrable theory and the n e c e s s a r y form r e f l e c t i o n must take i f 
i t i s to inform conduct. My argument about Paine and indeed many 
t h e o r i s t s l i k e him i s t h a t we can be m i s l e d by the appearance of 
what Paine has to say. For one t h i n g i s c e r t a i n , the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of P a i n e ' s w r i t i n g s has been i n the p r a c t i c a l and not i n the theo-
r e t i c a l arena. H i s ' t h e o r i e s ' have l i f e as the i n h e r i t a n c e of the 
R a d i c a l t r a d i t i o n i n p o l i t i c s * and not i n the world of philosophy. 
I f we are to understand how t h i s i s p o s s i b l e , we must understand 
how such statements as P a i n e ' c may play a r o l e , perform a s e r v i c e 
which t h e i r appearance suggests t h a t they could not. I do not deny 
1 Many Fabian S o c i e t y pamphlets are c l e a r l y i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n . 
The kind of ' l i f e ' t h a t Paine may have i s shown i n the Henry 
C o l l i n s ' i n t r o d u c t i o n to the P e l i c a n C l a s s i c s e d i t i o n of 
Ri ght s o:f Man 
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t h a t a confusion between theory and p r a c t i c e may r e s u l t i n works 
of a spurious nature which do not come to occupy any p l a c e i n p r a c -
t i c a l l i f e . ( I t h i n k of Comte's P o s i t i v i s m , f o r example). But 
n e i t h e r do I suggest t h a t e t h i c a l r e f l e c t i o n must have t h i s m i s l e a d i n g 
appearance. I t i s the case t h a t many, i f not most, i d e o l o g i c a l 
r e f l e c t i o n s ape the appearance of the t h e o r e t i c a l s c i e n c e s . I t i s 
sometimes s a i d t h a t i f t h i s were not so, they would l o s e much of 
t h e i r p l a u s i b i l i t y . Be t h i s as i t may, t h e r e are some works of 
i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n which do not have t h i s appearance ( f o r 
example, Marcus A u r e l i u s ' s Meditations, H a l i f a x ' s The C h a r a c t e r of 
a Trimmer) and some which, though they have the appearance, have 
never gained p r a c t i c a l currency ( f o r example, Huxley's E v o l u t i o n and 
E t h i c s , Bolingbroke's The Use of H i s t o r y ) . 
C e r t a i n l y , p a r t of the d i f f i c u l t y i n meeting the r a t h e r 
hard-headed o b j e c t i o n s of the sceptic''" a r i s e s because of t h i s mis-
l e a d i n g appearance. The c a s e we have been c o n s i d e r i n g i s one i n 
which, when our suppor';- f o r o p p o s i t i o n to some r i g h t i n law i s i n 
qu e s t i o n , we have rec o u r s e to t a l k of n a t u r a l or human r i g h t s . Often 
t h i s t a l k , by i t s appearance, l e a d s us to suppose t h a t the debate has 
moved to a deeper or a mere general l e v e l , t h a t we are now concerned 
with the t r u t h and f a l s i t y of ' t h e o r i e s ' about a transcendent realm 
1 Perhaps i t would be wise to repeat here my e a r l i e r c a u t i o n 
t h a t t h i s ' s c e p t i c ' i s an i d e a l i s a t i o n . .T do not r e f e r i n 
p a r t i c u l a r to those whose views I c o n s i d e r e d i n d e t a i l i n 
Chapter 3. 
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of general p r i n c i p l e . We are i n c l i n e d to t h i n k t h a t t h i s i s so 
because the appearance of our u t t e r a n c e s i s th a t of ge n e r a l s t a t e -
ments. On my argument, t h i s l o g i c a l l y cannot be so. Yet, a g a i n s t 
the s c e p t i c , I want to c l a i m t h a t there may s t i l l be point i n making 
such statements. 
V'hat point t h e r e i s , or may be, can be brought out by con-
s i d e r i n g a case where we are l e s s l i k e l y to be m i s l e d by the appear-
ance, where, i n f a c t , what we say does not have the appearance of a 
s u b s t a n t i v e a s s e r t i o n at a l l . 
I f someone says to me, ' I d i d promise to go to the match 
wi t h him t o n i g h t , but I don't t h i n k I should leave her i n t h i s mood', 
I may say, 'Well, you d i d promise and a promise i s a promise'. Now, 
what have I s a i d ? I have s t a t e d a f a c t 'You did promise'. Not only 
d i d he a l r e a d y know t h i s f a c t , but i t s r e c o g n i t i o n l a y at the h e a r t 
of h i s d i f f i c u l t y . I s a i d , 'A promise i s a promise' - c t a u t o l o g i c a l 
statement of the most obvious kind, which, on anyone's reckoning, 
could s c a r c e l y be thought to i n c r e a s e h i s knowledge of the s i t u a t i o n . 
But t h a t i t could not have i n c r e a s e d h i s knowledge i s only i n t e r e s t i n g 
i f i t was ever thought t h a t i t might. I n s a y i n g 'A promise i s a 
promise' I never did and never could i n t e n d , nor would I be thought 
to, t e l l him something lie d i d not know. I f the u t t e r a n c e i s to be 
s i g n i f i c a n t , then, i t cannot be s i g n i f i c a n t i n the way that informa-
t i o n i s . My point is; t h a t even when a p r o p o s i t i o n may be thought to 
gi v e information, even when i t has the appearance of an a s s e r t i o n 
about the world, i t s r o l e may a c t u a l l y be l i k e , and more imp o r t a n t l y , 
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sometimes could only be l i k e , 'A promise i s a promise'. I t i s 
tempting to t r y and b r i n g t h i s r o l e out by s a y i n g t h a t ' I t reminds us 
of what i t i s to promise'. But even t h i s way of p u t t i n g i t may be 
m i s l e a d i n g , f o r to be reminded i s to be reminded of something we 
once knew. But knowledge, i f I am r i g h t , i s not i n v o l v e d here. I 
should p r e f e r to say t h a t i f the man s a y s 'You're r i g h t , a promise 
i s a promise' what we have s a i d has enabled him to a f f i r m h i s 
e t h i c a l understanding of promising. And I should l i k e to c l a i m 
t h a t the same i s t r u e of ' A l l men (however unequal) are equal', 
'The world i s the best of a l l p o s s i b l e worlds and e v e r y t h i n g i n i t 
i s a n e c e s s a r y e v i l ' ' A l l h i s t o r y ( t h a t matters) i s the h i s t o r y of 
c l a s s s t r u g g l e ' . A l l t h e s e , a n a l y s e d as i n f o r m a t i v e or explanatory, 
t u r n out to be vacuous or c o n t r a d i c t o r y . But t h e r e may y e t be point 
i n u t t e r i n g them. 
7. 'A promise i s a promise'. The important q u e s t i o n here i s 
not, I s i t t r u e ? ( c o u l d i t be f a l s e ? ) but I s i t h e l p f u l ? To ask 
I s i t h e l p f u l ? i s not very d i f f e r e n t from as k i n g , a f t e r the eveivl;, 
did i t help? t h a t i s , a s k i n g a contingent q u e s t i o n . Not t h a t what-
ever helps i s r i g h t . The k i n d of r e f l e c t i o n of which I spoke i n the 
1 
l a s t chapter w i l l , w i t h i n l i m i t s , determine what i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e 
1 Consider t h i s example of a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s . A C o n s e r v a t i v e p o l i -
t i c i a n s a i d of l a t e 'We support workers not s h i r k e r s . ' T h i s , 
no doubt, i s t r u e . I t i s a l s o , taken at f a c e v a l u e , unconten-
t i o u s . Who would advocate the support of s h i r k e r s ? Neverthe-
l e s s , t h e r e i s something about the u t t e r a n c e which makes i t 
a ppropriate f o r C o n s e r v a t i v e s ( i t might almost be a r a l l y i n g 
c a l l ) ,?.:iti which !i?di.es i t s a s s e r t i o n i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r those of 
a d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l p e r s u a s i o n . 
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to say and to t r y to say. Nor, i f i t i s h e l p f u l , can i t be h e l p f u l 
i n the same way t h a t those pragmatic or p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a -
t i o n s which I d i s t i n g u i s h e d e a r l i e r could be h e l p f u l . E t h i c a l con-
s i d e r a t i o n s are concerned w i t h s e t t i n g the l i m i t s to what can be done 
with i n t e g r i t y i n t h e context of a moral or p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n . 
The r e f l e c t i o n whose p o s s i b i l i t y I have sketched w i l l , at 
b e s t , provide us w i t h a vocabulary and a keen sense of how i t i s to 
be used. I n an attempt to improve h i s a b i l i t y i n the deployment of 
such t\ v ocabulary, and h i s a b i l i t y t o c o u n c i l and exhort o t h e r s i n 
matters of e t h i c s , a man may s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e f l e c t i n e t h i c a l terms 
upon a l a r g e number of s i t u a t i o n s and events. He may t r y , too, to 
make h i s judgments about each s i t u a t i o n cohere with a l l the r e s t . 
F u r t h e r , i n so doing, he w i l l , perhaps, e l a b o r a t e h i s view i n seem-
i n g l y general statements and t h e s e may, i n t h e i r t u r n , come to be 
adopted as orthodox d o c t r i n a l f o r m u l a t i o n s . But i f we imagine t h a t 
i n so doing the man i s t h e o r i s i n g about r a t h e r than w i t h i n h i s 
f a i t h , t h a t h i s r e f l e c t i o n s are, so to speak, out of or beyond the 
conduct of l i f e , whether as a r a t i o n a l p r e c u r s o r of a c t u a l a c t i v i t y , 
or as a d i s t i l l a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s of the t r a d i t i o n to which he 
belongs, we s h a l l f a i l to understand how i t i s t h a t what he says has 
any s i g n i f i c a n c e at a l l . F or understood on e i t h e r of these raodels, 
h i s t a l k must tur n out to be vacuous or nonsense. 
Such a man i s a t h e o r i s t and I have t r i e d to show the con-
d i t i o n s under which such t h e o r i s i n g can be a genuine e x e r c i s e of 
r e f l e c t i v e reason. But the p r e c i s e nature of i t s involvement i n 
a c t u a l conduct has y e t to be explored. I t i s to t h i s t h a t 
should l i k e to t u r n i n a concluding chapter. 
CHAPTER 8 
R e f l e c t i o n i n Conduct 
"Writing i s an admirable a c t i v i t y f o r 
arousing the sense of system t h a t l i e s 
dormant i n every man, and anyone who 
has ever done-any w i l l have found t h a t 
i t always awakens something which we 
d i d not c l e a r l y r e c o g n i s e before, even 
though i t was l y i n g w i t h i n us." 
LICHTENBERG 
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I n a long and e l a b o r a t e proclamation i n which he 
a s s e r t e d , w i t h a l l the elegance of O r i e n t a l 
r h e t o r i c , both the s a n c t i t y of h i s m i s s i o n and 
the i n v i n c i b i l i t y of h i s troops, he /The Mahdi/ 
c a l l e d upon the i n h a b i t a n t s /of Khartoum/ to 
s u r r e n d e r . Gordon read aloud the summons to the 
assembled townspeople. With one v o i c e they dec-
l a r e d t h a t they were ready to r e s i s t . T h i s was 
a f a l s e Mahdi, they s a i d . God would defend the 
r i g h t ; they put t h e i r t r u s t i n the Governor-
Gene r a l . The most le a r n e d s h e i k i n the town drew 
up a t h e o l o g i c a l r e p l y , p o i n t i n g out t h a t the 
Mahdi d i d not f u l f i l l the requirements of the 
a n c i e n t prophets. At h i s appearance, had the 
Euphrates d r i e d up and r e v e a l e d a h i l l of gold? 
Had c o n t r a d i t i o n and d i f f e r e n c e ceased upon the 
e a r t h ? And, moreover, did not the f a i t h f u l know 
t h a t the t r u e Mahdi was born i n the year of the 
Prophet 255, from which i t s u r e l y followed that 
he must now be 1,046 years old? And was i t not 
c l e a r to a l l men t h a t h i s pretender was not a 
t e n t h of t h i s age? These arguments were c e r t a i n l y 
f o r c i b l e ; but the Mahdi's army was more f o r c i b l e 
s t i l l . 1 
I n t h i s l a s t sentence, Strachey n e a t l y summarises f o r us 
what has been c a l l e d the problem of ideology. The Mahdi did indeed 
win Khartoum, and, a p p a r e n t l y R e g a r d l e s s of the t h e o r e t i c a l coherence 
or o t herwise of h i s c l a i m to be the Mahdi. The problem a r i s e s when 
we t h i n k , as i t i s tempting to do, i n the manner of the commonplace 
model of ideology, t h a t t h e r e i s a c l e a r and c l o s e connection between 
the ' t r u t h ' of our 'theory of p o l i t i c s or m o r a l i t y ' (or of L i f e , per-
haps) and the s u c c e s s which attends our endeavours i n the world, and 
when, moreover, we suppose t h i s k i n d of r e f l e c t i o n to be supplementary 
1 Lytton S t r achey: 'The End of General Gordon' i n 
Eminent V i c t o r i a n s Penguin Modern C l a s s i c s e d i t i o n , London 1969 
or p r e l i m i n a r y r e a s o n i n g which, i f sound, w i l l guide us through the 
co n t i n g e n c i e s of e x i s t e n c e . When we see t h a t t h i s i s not so, when 
i t i s apparent t h a t these r e f l e c t i o n s are n e i t h e r the way to avoid 
's o r r y statesmanship' nor the ' o r i g i n s of the most important changes 
i n the commercial r e l a t i o n s of the world', i t i s e q u a l l y tempting to 
embrace ( as I t h i n k S t r a c h e y does) a s c e p t i c i s m which holds such 
r e f l e c t i o n to be, i n some sense, a su p e r f l u o u s a d d i t i o n to the con-
c r e t e or r e a l i s t i c conduct of l i f e . The problematic c h a r a c t e r of 
ideology i s not, however, averted thereby. For we must now ask why 
men engage i n such r e f l e c t i o n s and i n the propagation of t h e i r con-
c l u s i o n s at a l l . 
At a c o n s e r v a t i v e e s t i m a t e , 200,000^ copies of P a i n e ' s 
R i g h t s of Man were p u b l i s h e d and d i s t r i b u t e d , o f t e n by men who i n 
doing so r i s k e d a very great d e a l . And men of c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l 
experience v i g o r o u s l y sought to prevent i t s p u b l i c a t i o n and to des-
t r o y i t s p o p u l a r i t y . Were a l l t h e s e men mistaken? Did t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s s p r i n g simply from a confusion over what i s and what i s 
not l o g i c a l l y possible., or from an ignorance c f the ways of the 
world? Wo must agree w i t h the s c e p t i c , I t h i n k , t h a t many of t h e s e 
men, and t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s i n numberless ot h e r s i t u a t i o n s , both 
misunderstood the tr u e c h a r a c t e r and overestimated the r e a l s i g n i f i -
cance of t h e i r a c t i v i t y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , we cannot s e n s i b l y agree, 
.1. The ex-ample i s drawn f r o m K P Thompson's f a s c i n a t i n g s t u d y 
A H i s t o r y o f the; E n g l i s h Working C l a s s . London .1063 
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as I hope I have shown, t h a t t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s of arguing, w r i t i n g 
and propagating, and the d o c t r i n e s around v/hich the a c t i v i t i e s 
f ocussed, were not a genuine p a r t of the f a b r i c of morals and p o l i -
t i c s . We cannot agree, i f f o r no other reason than t h i s , t h a t f o r 
many ,on t h e s e and s i m i l a r o c c a s i o n s , such a c t i \ ' i t i e s formed the major 
p a r t of t h e i r e t h i c a l conduct and presented to them d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
doubts, dilemmas and achievements c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of moral l i f e . 
I n consequence, n e i t h e r can we agree, even when we have 
r e j e c t e d a m o n i s t i c or u n i t a r y view of the r a t i o n a l i t y i n v o l v e d i n 
ideology, t h a t such r e f l e c t i o n s are s u b j e c t to no canons of 
reasoning at a l l . I t i s t r u e t h a t we have seen good reason to r e -
p l a c e a m o n i s t i c account with an a p p r e c i a t i o n of the p l u r a l i s m i n -
herent i n e t h i c a l and r e l i g i o u s l i f e . But the acknowledgement of 
p l u r a l i s m does not e n t a i l , and indeed denies, the non-existence of 
r a t i o n a l i t y a l t o g e t h e r . 
S t i l l , though we may with confidence abandon both the 
commonplace and the s c e p t i c a l account, we may y e t be u n c l e a r as to 
the p r e c i s e c h a r a c t e r of the involvement of i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n 
i n human conduct. I t i s the purpose of t h i s chapter to c l a r i f y j u s t 
t h i s q u e s t i o n . S i n c e i t takes the form of a c o n c l u s i o n to the 
argument presented i n the preceding c h a p t e r s i t i s , n e c e s s a r i l y , 
r e p e t i t i v e to a degree. What I hope to do here i s to r e s o l v e a few 
of the remaining a m b i g u i t i e s and to draw together some of the s t r a n d s 
of my argument inisuch a way as to answer the q u e s t i o n with which t h i s 
chapter i s p e c u l i a r l y concerned. 
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I 
1. To do t h i s , i t may be best to r e t u r n f o r a moment to 
S t r a c h e y ' s example, I t i s n a t u r a l t h a t the i n h a b i t a n t s of Khartoum, 
faced w i t h the immanence of the Mahdi's f o r c e s , should have asked 
themselves 'What ought we to do?' By i t s e l f , the q u e s t i o n i s ambig-
uous. Despite what some phil o s o p h e r s have s a i d , 'ought' i s not a 
s o l e l y moral term. I n t h e sense i n which i t i s not, the q u e s t i o n 
•What ought we to do?' i s the q u e s t i o n 'What needs to be done?'. 
T h i s i s a t e c h n i c a l q u e s t i o n and as such i t i s purposive i n form, 
'What ought we to do i f we are to achieve . . . ? ' An answer need not, 
however, presuppose some one purpose, but may be h y p o t h e t i c a l , ' I f 
you want to achieve X, do Y'. I n t h i s sense, the qu e s t i o n c a l l s f o r 
t h a t k i n d of c o n s i d e r a t i o n which I e a r l i e r c a l l e d p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l . 
S i n c e I have already spoken at some length on the nature of the s e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , I s h a l l not do so again now. 
I n the second sense, the sense which i s of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r -
e s t to t h i s t h e s i s , the q u e s t i o n 'What ought we to do?' i s the ques-
t i o n 'What i s i t r i g h t to do?' And at t h i s p o i n t our a t t e n t i o n must 
focus upon the other k i n d of c o n s i d e r a t i o n which I have c a l l e d con-
s i d e r a t i o n s of r i g h t n e s s . I n the example we have before us, the 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s advanced by the l e a r n e d s h e i k may s t r i k e us (and per-
haps Strachey intends t h a t they should) as a l i t t l e f a n c i f u l , but 
they are not, I t h i n k , d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d to those we might f i n d 
more cogent. The q u e s t i o n here i s whether the i n h a b i t a n t s ' r e s i s t a n c e 
208 
would or would not amount to o p p o s i t i o n to the t r u e Mahdi. I t i s 
c l e a r t h a t such o p p o s i t i o n would be q u i t e abhorrent, whatever i t s 
s u c c e s s , to the devout, so t h a t the q u e s t i o n of c r u c i a l importance 
i s whether t h e contender i s a t r u e or a f a l s e Mahdi. The s h e i k i n 
the example b r i n g s forward reasons f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t t h i s i s a 
f a l s e Mahdi. 
These are reasons w i t h regard to h i s e n t i t l e m e n t to be 
c a l l e d The Mahdi. I n other words, the q u e s t i o n r e s o l v e s i t s e l f 
i n t o the a p p l i c a t i o n of a term or t i t l e (the Mahdi) and such a p p l i c -
a t i o n must be made accor d i n g to the r u l e s o p e r a t i n g over the use of 
the term. These r u l e s are d i s c o v e r e d and mastered i n the use of 
the terms handed down to us, hence the s h e i k ' s r e f e r e n c e to the 
w r i t i n g s of the prophets. 
To r e s o l v e such q u e s t i o n s as t h e s e i n t o matters of the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of a term may seem a l i t t l e dry, g i v e n the i n t e n s i t y of 
f e e l i n g which normally accompanies s i t u a t i o n s of t h i s s o r t . I put 
i t l i k e t h i s , however, i n order to r e v e a l the c h a r a c t e r of the 
q u e s t i o n both as being one of a c e r t a i n s o r t of understanding of 
the contingent f a c t s w i t h which v/e are confronted and as a q u e s t i o n 
a l l o w i n g some p o s s i b i l i t y o f reasoned r e f l e c t i o n . The moves i n such 
reasoning would be both a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f those c a s e s where we 
are hot i n doubt about the use of the term and o f the use of the 
term i n those t e x t s which have a u t h o r i t y f o r us. 
I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t we w i l l a r r i v e at any very c e r t a i n con-
c l u s i o n s i n such matters, and ev-?n i.f we d i d , t h e i r c e r t a i n t y would 
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be of q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t k i n d from t h a t i n , say, mathematics or 
p h y s i c s . T h i s , however, does not i n any way show t h a t reason i s 
impotent here. I t i s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e j u d i c e to suppose t h a t i f 
two p a r t i e s do not agree upon some i s s u e , one or both of thera must 
be unreasonable. To begin w i t h , t h e r e i s a c e r t a i n open t e x t u r e to 
a l l language and to e t h i c a l language more than most. Secondly, i n 
matters of e t h i c s and r e l i g i o n t h e r e i s an u n e l i m i n a b l e p e r s o n a l 
element. Some f e a t u r e of a s i t u a t i o n may s t r i k e cne person as 
important or c r u c i a l w h i l e to another i t may not peera to have any 
very great weight at a l l . And s i n c e i n the making of e t h i c a l judg-
ments i t i s the agent h i m s e l f who must decide, i f they are to be of 
any moment i n h i s l i f e , t h i s p e r s o n a l element i s very o f t e n of the 
utmost importance. 
Those who r e f u s e to be s a t i s f i e d with anything l e s s than 
a s i n g l e s e t of p r i n c i p l e s v e r i f i e d i n the l i g h t of a u n i t a r y , u n i -
v e r s a l and i n d u b i t a b l e Reason, f l y i n the f a c e of both l o g i c and 
e x p e r i e n c e . They f l y i n t h e f a c e of l o g i c because there i s every 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l reason to t h i n k t h a t such a u n i v e r s a l Reason i s 
i m p o s s i b l e , and j n the f a c e of experience because i t p r e s e n t s an 
appearance of great d i v e r s i t y and not u n i f o r m i t y i n the b u s i n e s s of 
r e l i g i o u s and e t h i c a l a l l e g i a n c e and sentiment. 
2. The second c o n c l u s i o n to be drawn from the case we have 
beer examining i s t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i s indeed p r a c t i c a l i n 
c h a r a c t e r , t h a t i s , wholly i n v o l v e d i n the world of conduct. The 
q u e s t i o n , 'What ought wo to do?' i s about, what i s to be done. Hut 
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i t i s not concerned w i t h what i s to be done i n the same way t h a t 
q u e s t i o n s of a p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l or t e c h n i c a l v a r i e t y are. The people 
of Khartoum concluded w i t h the l e a r n e d s h e i k t h a t t h i s was a f a l s e 
Mahdi. P l a i n l y , t h i s determines what i s to be done, f o r t h e r e can 
be no doubt among the f a i t h f u l t h a t a f a l s e Mahdi i s to be r e s i s t e d . 
He i s to be r e s i s t e d because of what compliance with h i s demands would 
amount to. But t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which bear upon the determination 
td r e s i s t have nothing to say about i t s l i k e l y s u c c e s s or f a i l u r e . 
Even i f that r e s i s t a n c e f a i l s , even i f the l i k e l i h o o d of i t s f a i l u r e 
i s widely r e c o g n i s e d i n advance, i t does not show the d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
to r e s i s t to have been i l l - c o n s i d e r e d . For the important poiivc i s 
t h a t compliance with the demands of a f a l s e Mahdi would i t s e l f be 
a kind of b e t r a y a l , defeat and f a i l u r e . 
For many b e l i e v e r s i t i s not the outcome, the 
course of events which determines whether God 
i s v i c t o r i o u s , but f a i t h i n God which d e t e r -
mines what i s to be regarded as v i c t o r y . 1 
From the o t h e r point of view, the Mahdi, assuming he 
genuinely b e l i e v e d h i m s e l f to be t h e t r u e Mahdi, had a confidence 
i n h i s r i g h t which may have l e n t him a c e r t a i n confidence i n h i s might. 
But i t would be a mistake to t h i n k , and he would be f o o l i s h to suppose, 
t h a t t h e confidence i n r i g h t assured him of s u c c e s s i n might. Con-
versely,, even though the chances of m i l i t a r y s u c c e s s might be s m a l l , 
he may v / c l l t h i n k h i m s e l f obliged to make the attempt. F c r a f a i l u r e 
1 D 7, P h i l l i p s : F a i t h arid P h i l o s o p h i c a l Enquiry p. 03 
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to do so would be a f a i l u r e on h i s p a r t to p r e s e r v e the i n t e g r i t y 
of h i s identity as the Mahdi. 
The point i s t h a t , from e i t h e r s i d e , s u c c e s s and f a i l u r e 
are d i f f e r e n t i n c h a r a c t e r here from i n the p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l con-
t e x t . They are independent of the a c t u a l course of e v e n t s . I t i s 
h i s awareness of t h i s independence t h a t o f t e n makes the man of 
f a i t h appear, to the more p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l l y o r i e n t e d man, to be 
r u t h l e s s and i n c a p a b l e of compromise. 1 But whether lie be t h i s or 
no, the man of f a i t h may r i g h t l y d i s r e g a r d the l i k e l i h o o d of 
m a t e r i a l s u c c e s s or f a i l u r e i n a r r i v i n g at moral d e c i s i o n s . 
The case we are c o n s i d e r i n g here i s one where a r e l i g i o u s 
understanding i s i n v o l v e d , and nonetheless r e l i g i o u s because i t 
may be u n f a m i l i a r to us. As I argued e a r l i e r , the r e l i g i o u s s i g n i -
f i c a n c e of an act must be t o t a l l y independent of the p r a c t i c a l 
l e s s o n s of contingent experience. I d e o l o g i c a l or e t h i c a l under-
s t a n d i n g s , on the o t h e r hand, cannot have t h i s t o t a l independence. 
Though they are not a f f e c t e d by c o n t i n g e n c i e s as the understanding 
of p r a c t i c a l wisdom i s , they are a f f e c t e d by what happens i n a 
d i f f e r e n t way. For example, the p o l i t i c a l events of the E n g l i s h 
R e v o l u t i o n of 1688, though they did not and could not show the 
3. 
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arguments of F i l m e r ' s P a t r i a r e n a to be i n v a l i d or h i s judgments 
mistaken, and d i d not prove the c o r r e c t n e s s of Locke's view of the 
world i n the Two T r e a t i s e s , did n e v e r t h e l e s s i n c l i n e Englishmen! 
who concerned themselves with such matters ,to t a l k i n the manner 
of Locke and to cease to t a l k i n the manner of F i l m e r . ^ 
T h i s was not because F i l m e r ' s t h e s i s had been r e f u t e d 
by the subsequent course of events, but because h i s view of the 
a u t h o r i t y of the crown r e s i d i n g i n the person of the monarch did 
not ' f i t ' very w e l l w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s under which Y / i l l i a m and 
Mary succeeded to t h e throne. I t i s not t h a t any man, i f he were 
reasonable, would be compelled upon r e f l e c t i o n to r e j e c t F i l m e r ' s 
account of the matter, but t h a t circumstances and the way t h i n g s 
turned out i n c l i n e d men to cease t a l k i n g i n the language of 
P a t r i a r c h s , and, perhaps, made i t e a s i e r to t a l k i n the terms of 
Locke's T r e a t i s e s . 
I n t h i s way, though p a r t i c u l a r contingent c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
cannot bear d i r e c t l y upon our e t h i c a l judgments, they may prompt 
or provoke some change i n the terms c f some men's e t h i c a l under-
standing. As Paine says at one p o i n t : 
a long and v i o l e n t abuse of power i s g e n e r a l l y 
the Means of c a l l i n g the r i g h t of i t i n t o 
q u e s t i o n (and i n Matters, too, which n i g h t 
never have been thought of bad not the S u f f e r e r s 
1 See 
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been aggravated I n t o the i n q u i r y ) . 
The i n d i r e c t n e s s of the connection between our e t h i c a l understanding 
and the contingent f a c t s of experience may be c o n t r a s t e d w i t h t h e s e 
p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s where the r e s u l t or outcome of our 
a c t i o n s i s the t e s t of the wisdom of our judgments and d e c i s i o n s . 
F i l m e r ' s v/ay of understanding t h e world was, so to speak, l e f t behind, 
but i t v/ss l e f t behind j u s t because men ceased to t a l k and thus to 
understand i n t h a t way. And men ceased to t a l k i n t h a t way p a r t l y 
because of the turn events had taken. I t i s f u t i l e to wonder, as 
many have done, whether i d e a s cause events or events i d e a s . The 
q u e s t i o n i s based on a f a l s e dichotomy. The world i s , i n p a r t , a 
world of i d e a s . 
3. Someone might ask: 'Surely, r e l i g i o u s language and b e l i e f 
may be c o n t i n g e n t l y a f f e c t e d i n t h i s manner a l s o ? ' Perhaps i t may, 
but the important d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t the changes i n men's understanding 
are, i n cases l i k e F i l m e r ' s > i n e v i t a b l e . For the language of F i l m e r 
and Locke are languages i n which p o l i t i c a l sentiments are expressed, 
t h a t i s , sentiments which inform but which do not c o n s t i t u t e the 
sphere of p o l i t i c s ; . Because t h i s i s so, because, i n the main, 
r e l i g i o u s understanding a l s o c o n s t i t u t e s the a c t i v i t i e s i t informs;, 
i d e o l o g i c a l understanding may be i n f l u e n c e d by contingent events i n 
a way t h a t r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f i s not. We may mark the d i f f e r e n c e , 
Thomas Paine; Common S-;:nye i n Leonard Kric-gel (od) 
E s s e n t i a l Work.3 of the 'f-'o uniting F a t h e r s New Ycrk. 1064 
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perhaps, by s a y i n g t h a t i d e o l o g i e s are independent of p a r t i c u l a r 
circumstances but do not, and could not, enjoy a. g e n e r a l independ-
ence. U n l i k e r e l i g i o n s they are not t o t a l l y at war with the world 
of contingency. 
I n summary, then,I hope I have s a t i s f a c t o r i l y shown t h a t 
i d e o l o g i e s , e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , are understandings which have a 
genuine p l a c e i n human conduct, which i s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , a d i s t i n c -
t i v e p l a c e . 
I I -
1. I n the examples we have considered so f a r , r e f l e c t i o n s 
of the k i n d i n which we are i n t e r e s t e d have been occ a s i o n e d by 
p a r t i c u l a r and c r i t i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I s i t not p o s s i b l e , we might 
wonder, to r e f l e c t i n a s i m i l a r manner in__g°_^£r5.1 > t h a t i s to t r y 
to s e t an e t h i c a l p a t t e r n of r i g h t n e s s f o r a c t i o n s , r a t h e r than 
merely to determine the e t h i c a l c h a r a c t e r of t h i s or t h a t a c t i o n ? 
Someone i n sympathy w i t h the commonplace model d i s c u s s e d at the 
o u t s e t of the t h e s i s might f e e l t h a t there was some cause here to 
r e c o n s i d e r t h a t account. C e r t a i n l y , we can think of c a s e s which 
are c l e a r l y of a general c h a r a c t e r and which show up the commonplace 
model i n the best l i g h t . 
For example, C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g i a n s of time past were 
o f t e n occupied with the q u e s t i o n of whether r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t the 
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s o v e r e i g n i s or i s not c o n t r a r y to the w i l l of God. Aquinas, 
L u t h e r , C a l v i n and,to a l e s s e r degree, Augustine, a l l turned t h e i r 
a t t e n t i o n to t h i s problem. And the problem i s not about t h i 3 or 
t h a t p a r t i c u l a r r e b e l l i o n but about r e b e l l i o n i n g e n e r a l . 'Nothing 
could be p l a i n e r ' i t might be s a i d , 'than t h a t i n order to determine 
whether some p a r t i c u l a r r e b e l l i o n i s an act of impiety, i t i s p e r -
t i n e n t to ask whether r e b e l l i o n s as such a r c a c t s of impiety'. 
I t i s t r u e t h a t there i s a measure of g e n e r a l i t y here 
v/hich has to be accounted f o r . I t must be s a i d , however, t h a t i f 
my argument i n t h i s t h e s i s has been sound, th e r e are two forms 
which t h i s g e n e r a l i t y cannot take. F i r s t , f o r reasons advanced 
i n Chapter 2, the g e n e r a l i t y i n r e f l e c t i o n cannot take the form of 
general p r i n c i p l e s or aims determined i n advance of an a c t i v i t y , 
which c o n s i s t s i n p u t t i n g them i n t o p r a c t i c e . Nor, f o r reasons 
advanced i n the l a s t chapter, can i t take the form of g e n e r a l propo-
s i t i o n s of e t h i c s . T h i s p o i n t has a l r e a d y been f a i r l y thoroughly 
e x p l o r e d but i t r e q u i r e s c a r e f u l e l u c i d a t i o n i f i t i s to be f u l l y 
a p p r e c i a t e d . At the r i s k of tedium, t h e r e f o r e , I s h a l l r e t r a c e 
come of the f a c e t s of the argument. 
2. I should l i k e to do so by r e t u r n i n g , b r i e f l y , to the 
example of Mr Dove and the E u s t a c e Diamonds. I t w i l l be remembered 
t h a t Mr Dove concluded, a f t e r some r e f l e c t i o n , t h a t a diamond neck-
l a c e may not be considered an heirloom. Now h i s c o n c l u s i o n could be 
expressed i n e i t h e r of two ways. He could say: 'Necklaces cannot be 
heirlooms' or he could say 'This ( r e f e r r i n g to the p a r t i c u l a r neck-
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l a c e ) cannot be c a l l e d an heirloom'. The point I want to make 
here i s th a t both t h e s e amount to the same c o n c l u s i o n . The f i r s t 
way of p u t t i n g the c o n c l u s i o n mo.kes i t look l i k e a g e n e r a l r u l e 
or p r i n c i p l e from which we d e r i v e the p a r t i c u l a r . We could say 
'Necklaces are not heirlooms, t h e r e f o r e Lady E u s t a c e ' s n e c k l a c e 
i s not an h e i r l o o m 1 . But i f we were to t h i n k t h a t t h i s was a move 
from a ge n e r a l understanding to a p a r t i c u l a r - judgment we should be 
mistaken. For i n t h e context of the case, to conclude i n e i t h e r 
way i s to give a r u l i n g . And i n whichever form the r u l i n g i s 
expressed, i t w i l l have been a r r i v e d at by the same process of 
reasoni n g , namely, an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o past a p p l i c a t i o n s of the 
term 'heirloom'. F u r t h e r , the two statements do not stand i n any 
p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n to each other. The general 'Necklaces are not 
heirlooms' does not e x p l a i n or inform the p a r t i c u l a r ; i t i s simply 
another way of s a y i n g the same t h i n g . 
We can see t h i s more c l e a r l y by c o n t r a s t i n g i t with 
another f a m i l i a r s o r t of g e n e r a l statement, a s c i e n t i f i c h y p o t h e s i s . 
The p a r t i c u l a r statement 'This o b j e c t f a l l s at 32 f e e t per second 
per second' i s to be determined as t r u e or f a l s e by e m p i r i c a l 
o b s e r v a t i o n . But the g e n e r a l statement 'Objects f a l l at 32 f e e t 
per second per second' cannot be e i t h e r confirmed or r e f u t e d by 
e m p i r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n , s i n c e we. cannot observe the world i n g e n e r a l . 
True, as Popper has shown, I t h i n k , the ge n e r a l statement i s 
r e f u t e d i f we observe a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e of an o b j e c t f a l l i n g 
at some other speed, but t h i s i s not because we observe the g e n e r a l 
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statement to be f a l s e but because our o b s e r v a t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r 
i s l o g i c a l l y i ncompatible w i t h an a s s e r t i o n of the g e n e r a l . I t i s 
t h e argument i n v o l v i n g the f a c t of the p a r t i c u l a r , however, and not 
the o b s e r v a t i o n i t s e l f which r e f u t e s the h y p o t h e s i s . Moreover the 
two statements s t a n d i n a p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n to each other. The 
p a r t i c u l a r o b s e r v a t i o n may l e a d us to wonder why the o b j e c t f a l l s 
i n the way i t does and the answer i s 'Because of the law of g r a v i t y ' . 
I n other words, the g e n e r a l hypothesis ' A l l o b j e c t s f a l l at 32 f e e t 
per second per second' s e r v e s to e x p l a i n the pax-ticular phenomenon 
we observe. 
I t w i l l be c l e a r t h a t the general and the p a r t i c u l a r 
e x p r e s s i o n s of the l e g a l judgment a r c not r e l a t e d i n t h i s maimer. 
They are, notwithstanding, c e r t a i n l y d i f f e r e n t i n some way. But 
the d i f f e r e n c e dees not l i e i n what they a s s e r t or i n the manner 
i n which they are a r r i v e d a t , but i n the ways t h a t each may be used. 
The p a r t i c u l a r judgment i s a s p e c i f i c a f f i r m a t i o n of the r u l e 
governing the a p p l i c a t i o n of the term 'heirloom'. The general 
judgment i s an a f f i r m a t i o n of t h i s r u l e i n g e n e r a l , t h a t i s , i n 
any given case. I n s h o r t , the general e x p r e s s i o n i s an a f f i r m a t i o n 
which i s i t s e l f a f o r m ulation of the r u l e . 
3. I t i s tempting to t h i n k t h a t when we formulate a r u l e 
we are d e s c r i b i n g or r e p o r t i n g upon the r u l e t h a t a c t u a l l y operates 
i n conduct. I f we do t h i n k t h i s i t i s a s m a l l s t e p to conceding the 
suggestion t h a t I have c o n s i s t e n t l y and c o n t i n u o u s l y argued a g a i n s t , 
t h a t e t h i c a l r e f l e c t i o n l e a d s to a d i s c o v e r y or determination of 
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the b a s i c r u l e s or aims or p r i n c i p l e s which govern an a c t i v i t y . 
But t h i s i s not so. When Mr Dove concludes that 'Necklaces cannot 
be heirlooms', he does not d e s c r i b e the r u l e f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
the term, which he has di s c o v e r e d i n the pre v i o u s cases he i n v e s t i -
gates. He i n v e s t i g a t e s previous c a s e s i n order t h a t he may go on 
i n the same way. H i s general statement, then, i s not only a formu-
l a t i o n of the r u l e but i s i t s e l f one way of f o l l o w i n g the r u l e . And 
i n f o l l o w i n g i t he a f f i r m s i t . That i s what makes h i s statement a 
r u l i n g , a statement capable of l e g a l import. 
The f o r m u l a t i o n of a r u l e i s not a d e s c r i p t i o n of the 
r u l e , f o r r u l e s are i n no sense 'there' to be d e s c r i b e d . They are 
transcendent i n p r e c i s e l y the f a s h i o n i n which I argued e a r l i e r 
t h a t f a i t h s are transcendent. Rules govern what we rlo, and because 
of t h i s knowledge of r u l e s can only be manifested i n a c t i o n . They 
inform our a c t i v i t y . For any r u l e , then, i t i s the case t h a t we 
can conform w i t h i t or break i t , but we cannot d e s c r i b e or e x p l a i n 
it . ' ' ' For example, to speak a language is to engage i n a r u l e -
f o l i o w i n g a c t i v i t y . I mean to say t h a t only i f we f o l l o w the r u l e s 
which govern the use of a language can we make i n t e l l i g i b l e u t t e r -
ances. To know the r u l e s of a language, t h e r e f o r e , w i l l c o n s i s t 
i n being able to speak i t . But t h i s knowledge i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t 
1 T h i s obviously c o n f l i c t s with the p e r f e c t l y ordinary sense i n 
which we say ' E x p l a i n the r u l e s to me'. But t h i s means 'Teach 
me the r u l e s ' ( I go on to e l a b o r a t e on t h i s ) . When I say t h a t 
e x p l a n a t i o n i s not p o s s i b l e here, 1" mean e x p l a n a t i o n a f t e r the 
f a s h i o n of the h i s t o r i a n or s c i e n t i s t . 
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from t h a t i n v o l v e d i n knowing the fo r m u l a t i o n s of r u l e s . I t does 
not f o l l o w from the f a c t t h a t we can speak a language t h a t we can 
gi v e some f o r m u l a t i o n of the r u l e s which govern our speaking i t . 
Conversely, knowledge of the formulations of those r u l e s does not 
c o n s i s t i n being a b l e to fo l l o w the r u l e , but i n being a b l e to 
repeat the formula. 
I t may seem so obvious t h a t we can s t a t e the r u l e s of an 
a c t i v i t y ( l i k e t e n n i s or chess) t h a t what I say appears to be 
h i g h l y i m p l a u s i b l e . There i s no reason why we should not use the 
e x p r e s s i o n ' S t a t i n g t h e r u l e s ' so long as we are c l e a r about what 
i s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s . To formulate a r u l e i s not to r e v e a l the 
b a s i s or informing p r i n c i p l e of some a c t i v i t y which i n v o l v e s the 
f o l l o w i n g of a r u l e . I t i s i t s e l f one way of a f f i r m i n g the r u l e . 
Even when we determine what r u l e s s h a l l apply, even t h a t i s to say, 
where our fo r m u l a t i o n s are s p e c i f i c a l l y intended as c o n s t i t u t i v e 
and r e g u l a t i v e f o r some sphere of a c t i v i t y ( a s i n the promulgation 
of laws, f o r example) our form u l a t i o n s cannot be determinate, s i n c e , 
i n order to inform a c t i v i t y , t h e r e must be i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a p p l i c a -
t i o n and m o d i f i c a t i o n i n the l i g h t of c o n t i n g e n t l y changing ci.vcuia-
1 
s t a n c e s . 
1 I t i s worth remembering at t h i s p o i n t t h a t Mr Dove's 
'Necklaces cannot be heirlooms' i s occasioned by the 
need to apply the law i n a h i t h e r t o unconsidered 
i n s t a n c e . 
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The r u l e - f o l l o w i n g a c t i v i t y of speaking a language i s 
again a good example here. The r u l e s of language may be formulated 
but the way language may be used and may come to be used i s not 
determined thereby. Rather i t i s we who, i n those f o r m u l a t i o n s , 
determine to use' i t t h i s way or t h a t . For example, i t might be 
s a i d to be a r u l e of language t h a t ' D i s i n t e r e s t e d does not mean 
uninterested'." 1" But can v/e be s a i d , i n s a y i n g t h i s , to have 
s t a t e d a f a c t ? The statement does not i n v o l v e any c l a i m about how 
people a c t u a l l y do use the words u n i n t e r e s t e d and d i s i n t e r e s t e d . 
And i f , by and l a r g e , they do regard them as being synonymous, must 
we not say t h a t very o f t e n they do mean the same? I do not i n t e n d 
to say t h a t the statement ' D i s i n t e r e s t e d does not mean u n i n t e r e s t e d ' 
i s f a l s e , not a f a c t , but t h a t i t i s a mistake to suppose t h a t i t 
could s t a t e a f a c t . Statements of t h i s s o r t are g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s 
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w i t h i n an on-going l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e . They are themselves 
i n s t a n c e s of f o l l o w i n g the r u l e and as such cannot be the indepen-
dent r e v e l a t i o n of the r u l e t h a t i s followed. 
What the s e f o r m u l a t i o n s do do i s enable us to a f f i r m 
c e r t a i n norms i n the context of the conduct of a p r a c t i c e . Suppose 
1 An example suggested to me by Mr Geoffrey Hunter i n a 
d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s p o i n t . 
2 Here v/e touch again on the main burden of P r o f e s s o r Oakeshot t ' s 
account, and at t h i s point we can, I t h i n k , a p p r e c i a t e it?; 
g r e a t p l a u s i b i l i t y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , as I t r i e d to shov/, t a l k 
of a b s t r a c t i o n w i l l not capture the c h a r a c t e r of the r e l a t i o n -
s h i p . 
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someone uses ' u n i n t e r e s t e d ' to mean without p a s s i o n or p a r t i a l i t y . 
We might say: 'You mean d i s i n t e r e s t e d , don't you?' I f he r e p l i e d 
' Uninterested, d i s i n t e r e s t e d , they're much the same, a r e n ' t t h e y ? ' 
we should say 'No, U n i n t e r e s t e d does not mean d i s i n t e r e s t e d ' . I n 
doing t h i s , we would be a f f i r m i n g a norm i n the use of language, 
perhaps with a view to p r e s e r v i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of making j u s t 
those d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s which a c o n f l a t i o n of the two terms p r o h i b i t s . 
But our statement would not be made i n the realm of p o s s i b i l i t y , 
( i t i s q u i t e c o n c e i v a b l e that u n i n t e r e s t e d and d i s i n t e r e s t e d 
should come to mean the same) or i n the realm of a c t u a l i t y , (on 
many o c c a s i o n s the words are so used as to have the same meaning) 
but i n the realm of norm a l i t y (we ought to use the words l i k e t h i s ) . 
4. I hope I have shown t h a t c e r t a i n u t t e r a n c e s of a g e n e r a l 
form are one way i n which a norm may be a f f i r m e d i n the context of 
some on-going sphere of conduct. When we put i t l i k e t h i s , i t i s 
p r e t t y obvious where a l l the argument has brought us. For i t i s 
c l e a r t h a t the statements we c a l l b e l i e f s and d o c t r i n e s are j u s t 
of t h i s kind. F or example, the c l a i m t h a t ' A l l h i s t o r y i s the 
h i s t o r y of c l a s s s t r u g g l e ' i s not, as i s almost always supposed, a 
r a t h e r grand explanatory theory of the p a s t . L o g i c a l l y , i t could 
1 Consider the statement 'Fabulous does not mean f a n t a s t i c ' . 
Undoubtedly, there was a time when the two words were gener-
a l l y used i n such a way t h a t they meant q u i t e d i f f e r e n t 
t h i n g s . But. nowadays they are used synonymously. T h i s pro-
h i b i t s us, very o f t e n , from making those d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s which 
such a d i f f e r e n c e i n meaning would allow. 
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not be t h a t . I n f a c t , i t i s a g e n e r a l a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t what i s of 
most importance i n t h e past are the c l a s s - s t r u g g l e s we f i n d t h e r e . 
T h i s importance can be shown, but i t cannot be proven. Importance 
i s not a q u a l i t y which i n h e r e s i n the events of the p a s t and l i e s 
w a i t i n g to be d i s c o v e r e d , but something we a t t a c h or a t t r i b u t e to the 
f a c t s of the p a s t . And the statement ' A l l h i s t o r y i s the h i s t o r y of 
c l a s s s t r u g g l e ' i s one way of bestowing or a f f i r m i n g t h i s importance. 
I n s h o r t , then, i d e o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e s are g e n e r a l a f f i r -
mations of the r u l e s and norms which may govern the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
the concepts of the e t h i c a l v o c a b u l a r i e s 1 by which wc bestow v a l u e 
upon the contingent f a c t s of experience. 
I l l 
1. I have argued t h a t there i s no d i f f e r e n c e i n the kind of 
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r and seemingly g e n e r a l judgments are, 
The manner i n which we a r r i v e at them and the r e f l e c t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
1 Someone w i l l no doubt say t h a t I have reduced a l l e t h i c a l 
questions- to mere matters of words. I do not know what i s 
meant by mare here. The i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of a l l experience 
i s dependent upon language. T h i s i s not to say t h a t l a n g -
uage i s e x p e r i e n c e . But without language the experience 
remains ' p r i v a t e ' and t h e r e f o r e u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Words, and 
the r u l e s f o r t h e i r use, a r e , then, c r u c i a l i n a l l human 
i n t e r c o u r s e and fundamental to the e l a b o r a t i o n of the 
nature of that i n t e r c o u r s e . 
upon which we may base them are one and the same. And I have 
al r e a d y e l a b o r a t e d at some length upcn the nature and manner of t h i s 
r e f l e c t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , p l a i n l y t h e r e are d i f f e r e n c e s between 
g e n e r a l and p a r t i c u l a r a f f i r m a t i o n s of r u l e s and norms. The d i f f e r -
ences, however, do not l i e i n the l o g i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s 
f o r each, but i n the advantages which accompany the use of each. 
F i r s t , and o b v i o u s l y , among these i s t h a t the g e n e r a l or d o c t r i n a l 
f o r m u l a t i o n , u n l i k e the p a r t i c u l a r , i s not r e s t r i c t e d to the s p e c i f i c 
case which may have prompted i t . I t can, so to speak, be used again 
and more r e a d i l y lends guidance to f u r t h e r a p p l i c a t i o n than does the 
p a r t i c u l a r . I t i s not i n any sense u n i v e r s a l 1 , but i t i s not con-
f i n e d to a s p e c i f i c s e t of circumstances i n the same way that p a r t i -
c u l a r judgments may be. I t i s , of course, both p o s s i b l e and n e c e s s a r y , 
as I have a l r e a d y argued, to apply the r u l e s f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
a term i n the l i g h t of previous p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n s , but t h i s 
does not prevent the deployment of g e n e r a l f o r m u l a t i o n s making the 
1 I do not mean to e n t e r the debate about the u n i v c r s a l i s a b i l i t y 
of moral judgments d i r e c t l y . My argument, however, i s t h a t 
the g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s of which I speak do not add anything to 
the p a r t i c u l a r . T h i s can be seen i n the f a c t t h a t when a par-
t i c u l a r judgment i s completely u n i v e r s a l i s e d , i t t u r n s out to 
be 'When in any s i t u a t i o n e x a c t l y l i k e t h i s (and t h i s must 
amount to a v i r t u a l l y unique s p e c i f i c a t i o n ) act e x a c t l y as you 
would i n t h i s one ' . General formulations may a s s i s t us i n 
some measure i n the a p p l i c a t i o n of a r u l e , but they cannot 
determine the a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n advance of p a r t i c -
u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
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t a s k e a s i e r . 
T h i s r e l a t i v e independence of the s p e c i f i c o c c a s i o n , o r 
more p r o p e r l y , the f a c t t h a t general d o c t r i n a l formulations are not 
a f f e c t e d as immediately as p a r t i c u l a r judgments are by the s p e c i f i c -
i t y of c i r c u m s t a n c e s , allows them, on o c c a s i o n , to s u s t a i n an e t h i c a l 
vocabulary over space and time. More e s p e c i a l l y , they hold t h i s 
advantage over any p u r e l y a c t i v e e x p r e s s i o n of i d e o l o g i c a l adherence. 
For the p u r e l y a c t i v e e x p r e s s i o n , c o n s i s t i n g as i t does i n deeds, i s 
confine d i n i t s a f f i r m a t i o n of e t h i c a l f a i t h to the o c c a s i o n upon 
which i t i s performed. I f , then, we ask, as t h i s t h e s i s i s concerned 
to do, whether i d e o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e s have any p e c u l i a r or d i s t i n c t i v e 
p a r t to play i n the conduct of ethic:-;.! l i f e , we s h a l l f i n d the answer 
here. 
2. To stude n t s of ideology, f a s c i s m p r e s e n t s some d i f f i c u l t i e s 
p e c u l i a r to i t s e l f . Despite the ubiquitous use, or abuse, of the 
l a b e l ' f a s c i s t ' , the ideology of f a s c i s m had a r e l a t i v e l y b r i e f l i f e , 
c o nfined i n both time and space. During t h i s l i f e , i t generated 
very l i t t l e t h e o r e t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e and what works were w r i t t e n tend 
to be uns y s t e m a t i c and i n c o n s i s t e n t . T h i s has l e d some people to 
1 I t i s , f o r example, often e a s i e r to give a l e g a l r u l i n g i n the 
l i g h t of t h e law i t s e l f , than i n the l i g h t of precedent. Hence 
the advantages of c o d i f i c a t i o n . I t goes without saying almost, 
t h a t on n e a r l y every o c c a s i o n both are i n v o l v e d . 
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conclude that perhaps f a s c i s m i s not an ideology at a i l . S i n c e , 
however, as I haye argued, t h e o r e t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e i s not a n e c e s s a r y 
p a r t of an i d e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n , we need not concur i n t h i s con-
c l u s i o n . P a r t of the reason f o r t h i s comparative p a u c i t y of r e f l e c -
t i v e l i t e r a t u r e was undoubtedly the f a c t t h a t the F a s c i s t s p r i d e d 
themselves on being men of a c t i o n , not of theory. Furthermore, much 
of the support f o r the movement sprang from a general f e e l i n g t h a t 
I t a l y ' s p o l i t i c a l and economic problems arose out of a c e r t a i n n a t -
i o n a l d i s u n i t y , r a t h e r than from any very p o s i t i v e or d e f i n i t e i d e a 
of c o r p o r a t e u n i t y . The ideology, t h e r e f o r e , found i t s c h i e f 
e x p r e s s i o n i n a very a c t i v e response to a s p e c i f i c s e t of circum-
s t a n c e s . I n consequence, when those c i r c u m s t a n c e s changed and the 
a c t i o n was no longer p o s s i b l e (The Marches on Rome were o v e r ) , the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of adherence to the ideology went with i t . For the 
I t a l i a n s of the time the ch o i c e was r c - a l l y whether to j o i n the move-
ment or not. And t h i s was not a choice t h a t could be r e f l e c t e d upon 
very much, except i n the terms of some competing ideology. I f a 
man has doubts about whether to j o i n , those doubts had to be expressed 
i n the language of Marxism or L i b e r a l i s m , s i n c e the F a s c i s t s had no 
very e x t e n s i v e vocabulary i n which to pr e s e n t or r e s o l v e the q u e s t i o n , 
so t h a t i n t h e i r eyes, simply by having doubts, he had already 
d e c l a r e d h i m s e l f not to be a F a s c i s t . 
But when the tiiue's had changed, as times i n e v i t a b l y w i l l 
change, when th e r e was no longer a great and a c t i v e movement to j o i n , 
the F a s c i s t s were l e f t with no d o c t r i n a l p o s i t i o n s and no d i s t i n c t i v e 
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e t h i c a l vocabulary i n which to a f f i r m t h e i r i d e n t i t y over a g a i n s t 
those of other p e r s u a s i o n s and i n which to perpetuate t h e i r under-
s t a n d i n g of the world. 
The point may be emphasised by comparing t h i s case w i t h 
the c a s e of an ideology which has and always has had a wealth of 
r e f l e c t i v e l i t e r a t u r e , namely Marxism. A f t e r t h e i r f a i l u r e to accom-
p l i s h any s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l achievements i n the R u s s i a n R e v o l u t i o n 
of 1905, the M a r x i s t s , c h i e f among them L e n i n , were forced to abandon 
t h e i r a c t i v e involvement i n the p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e s i n R u s s i a . But 
t h i s did not s i g n a l the demise of the ideology, f o r i t s adherents 
were able (and saw themselves as being compelled) to t u r n t h e i r 
a t t e n t i o n to d o c t r i n a l q u e s t i o n s , L e n i n t a k i n g up some of the most 
abst r u s e of a l l . * ' the e x i s t e n c e of a corpus of l i t e r a t u r e p e c u l i a r l y 
t h e i r ow.ri provided them with an e t h i c a l vocabulary i n which both the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of the defeat they had s u s t a i n e d was to be grasped and 
the p l a n s and hopes f o r the f u t u r e were to be expressed. In. t h i s 
way, the i d e o l o g i c a l 1J"v.srature s u p p l i e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of s u s t a i n i n g 
a f f i r m i n g and indeed developing t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y , 
d e s p i t e t h e i r enforced e x c l u s i o n from a c t i v e engagement i n R u s s i a n 
p o l i t i c s . And the p r e s e r v a t i o n and development of t h i s i d e n t i t y 
took the form of an e l a b o r a t i o n of and argument over v a r i o u s d o c t r i n a l 
Hit", two most 1 p h i l o s o p h i c a l ! works : M a t e r i a l i s m am\_ Empiri o-
C r i t i e i s i n and P h i l o s o p h i c a l Notebooks were w r i t t e n during the 
y oars~i9~6'S~ 10 Iff' 
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f o r m u l a t i o n s by which the r u l e s f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the terms 
of t h e i r vocabulary were affirmed. I n s h o r t , the i d e o l o g i c a l l i t e r -
a t ure which they i n h e r i t e d s u s t a i n e d the background of understanding 
i n which they conceived the f a c t s and events of the world. I t was 
i n t h i s way t h a t the w r i t i n g s of Marx and E n g e l s were of s e r v i c e 
i n the l i f e of the ideology of Marxism. 
The second advantage which may attend i d e o l o g i e s and 
r e l i g i o n s w i t h a corpus of l i t e r a t u r e p r o v i d i n g some d o c t r i n a l f o r -
mulations l i e s i n t h e i r power of communicability. There i s nothing 
more n a t u r a l , when we are t o l d t h a t a man i s , say, a Marxist or a 
C h r i s t i a n than t h a t we should ash hira what ho b e l i e v e s . I f h i s 
i d e o l o g i c a l or r e l i g i o u s understanding i s made manifest s o l e l y or 
c h i e f l y i n an a c t i v e response to the world, t h a t i s . p u r e l y i n a 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c manner of behaving and a c t i n g , i t i s p r e t t y v/el] i n -
a r t i c u l a t e . Though we may, by f o l l o w i n g h i s example, l e a r n to under-
stand the world as he does, t h i s way of l e a r n i n g w i l l be dependent 
on h i s f a i r l y constant presence. The p r o c e s s may, so to speak, be 
s h o r t - c i r c u i t e d , by an a r t i c u l a t i o n of h i s understanding. I f t h i s 
takes the form p r i m a r i l y of p a r t i c u l a r e t h i c a l judgments ('I b e l i e v e 
t h a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s X and t h e r e f o r e we must do Y ' ) , though we 
may, and i n p a r t must, l e a r n to employ h i s vocabulary by such 
u t t e r a n c e s , they o f t e n appear to be confined to the s p e c i f i c . 
I f , on. the other hand, he t e l l s us t h a t , f o r example, 'The 
s i n f u l n e s s of men can be atoned i n the s a v i n g power of C h r i s t ' , w h i l e 
without some p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n s of the terms ' s i n n e r ' and 
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' s a l v a t i o n ' we s h a l l be unable to come to understand the world i n 
the same way, y e t what he says may more r a p i d l y and more e a s i l y 
i n t r o duce the vocabulary i n terms of which he makes h i s experi e n c e 
s i g n i f i c a n t . 
We should be mistaken, however, i f we thought t h a t i n 
what he s a i d he had r e v e a l e d to us the foundations of h i s understanding 
or, worse, t h a t he had simply made another general c l a i m about the 
world which could be a s s e s s e d alongside a l l those of h i s com p e t i t o r s , 
i n some g e n e r a l framework of human understanding. To come to s h a r e 
h i s understanding of the world i s not to have been s a t i s f i e d of the 
c o r r e c t n e s s of h i s p i c t u r e of the world, but to come to p i c t u r e the 
world i n t h a t way o n e s e l f . For the man h i m s e l f too, there may be some 
advantage i n e x p r e s s i n g h i m s e l f i n t h i s manner. We are a l l , I am 
i n c l i n e d to t h i n k , the adherents of some e t h i c a l ov r e l i g i o u s t r a d i -
t i o n , but we are not a l l capable of the f o r m u l a t i o n of b e l i e f or 
of the s o p h i s t i c a t e d process of r e f l e c t i o n which such f o r m u l a t i o n may 
i n v o l v e . I d e o l o g i s t s and t h e o l o g i a n s are, g e n e r a l l y , men and women 
of i m p r e s s i v e a b i l i t y and e r u d i t i o n . To those who are not so capable, 
the f o r m u l a t i o n s of the t h e o r i s t s may supply a way of a f f i r m i n g our 
p o s i t i o n i n the world of m o r a l i t y , p o l i t i c s and r e l i g i o n which, 
without those t h i n k e r s , we would l a c k . F u r t h e r , they may i n t r o d u c e 
i n the mind of the b e l i e v e r or adherent, e s p e c i a l l y i f he demands a 
c e r t a i n i n t e l l e c t u a l s t r e n g t h i n t h i s f a i t h , a confidence which it; 
the accompaniment of th a t sense of system ox which L i c h t e n b e r g speaks 
i n the passage quoted at the head of t h i s chapter. T h i s , s u r e l y , i s 
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the p l a c e which t h e o l o g i a n s have played i n the l i v e s and conduct of 
o r d i n a r y b e l i e v e r s ? I t i s easy both to ov e r e s t i m a t e and to b e l i t t l e 
t h i s p l a c e . Perhaps I may, to some degree, have s e t the matter r i g h t . 
We have a r r i v e d , then, at a c o n c l u s i o n to the ques t i o n 
which t h i s t h e s i s s e t out to ask and to answer, 'What i s the r o l e of 
i d e o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i n human conduct?' I n so doing we have, I hope, 
r e s o l v e d those d i f f i c u l t i e s which were encountered by the other, 
p l a u s i b l e answers which I have r e j e c t e d . What must not be l o s t s i g h t 
of, however, i s the dependence of t h i s r e f l e c t i o n upon what might be 
c a l l e d the general stream of human a c t i v i t y . T h i s l a s t chapter has 
been e s p e c i a l l y concerned w i t h the p l a c e of r e f l e c t i o n i n th a t a c t i v -
i t y . R e f l e c t i o n , by i t s e l f , can n e i t h e r c r e a t e nor i n d e f i n i t e l y 
s u s t a i n an e t h i c a l understanding. Such an understanding must always, 
at l e a s t i n some measure, be manifested i n a c t i v i t y , f o r i t i s , 
a f t e r a l l , an understanding which informs conduct. Moreover, where, 
as i n the ca s e of a n a r c h i s t l i t e r a t u r e , the r e f l e c t i o n i t s e l f pro-
h i b i t s any concrete a c t i v i t y , i t must be vacuous and impotent, f i t 
only to be a s u b j e c t of some i n t e r e s t to the detached i n q u i r y of 
academics. A n a r c h i s t l i t e r a t u r e may, from time to time, have 
prompted someone to throw ah o c c a s i o n a l bomb but s i n c e , upon 
examination, i t cannot enable us to a t t a c h to the throwing a g r e a t e r 
s i g n i f i c a n c e than to any other p o l i t i c a l a c t , i t must remain,and has 
230 
remained, an empty a b s u r d i t y . 
The burden of my t h e s i s has been the i n e x t r i c a b i l i t y of 
thought and conduct i n any understanding which i s to be of p r a c t i c a l 
import. I f i t has done nothing other than t h i s , i t ' w i l l have served 
to point out some of the e r r o r s i n the way we commonly t h i n k about 
the q u e s t i o n s i t has r a i s e d . And, perhaps i t has l e n t some p l a u s i -
b i l i t y to the view which I have t r i e d to s u b s t i t u t e . 
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P O S T S C R I P T 
Throughout the t h e s i s , I have t r i e d to answer the most 
obvious c r i t i c i s m s t h a t may be made a g a i n s t what I have been s a y i n g , 
but doubtless t h e r e are many p o i n t s i n my argument which are open 
to s e r i o u s , though unforeseen, o b j e c t i o n s . P a r t l y , t h i s i s because 
I have had cause to touch upon fand sometimes merely touch upon,so 
many of the t r a d i t i o n a l problems of philosophy. I t i s improbable, 
too, t h a t I have c o n t r i b u t e d anything very o r i g i n a l t o the a n a l y s i s 
of t h e s e problems. What o r i g i n a l i t y t h e r e i s i n the t h e s i s l i e s i n 
i t s s y n t h e s i s r a t h e r than i t s a n a l y s i s . 
The t w e n t i e t h century has been her a l d e d as the time of a 
gre a t r e v o l u t i o n i n philosophy. I do not myself t h i n k t h i s to be 
the c a s e . Nothing can be very r e v o l u t i o n a r y which does not i n v o l v e 
a profound and unmistakable break w i t h the p a s t , and P l a t o , A r i s t o t l e , 
D e s c a r t e s , Hume and Kant are of as much i n t e r e s t t o and s t u d i e d by 
phi l o s o p h e r s now as at any time. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e has been an 
obvious d i v i s i o n i n philosophy. S i n c e Moore's famous ' R e f u t a t i o n 
of I d e a l i s m ' , Moore, R u s s e l l , Ayer, Ryle, A u s t i n and W i t t g e n s t e i n 
(though I an not sure t h a t he would have been happy w i t h the 
i n c l u s i o n of h i s name) have formed a t r a d i t i o n q u i t e s e p a r a t e from 
the s e l f - c o n f e s s e d i n h e r i t o r s of the c o n t i n e n t a l I d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n , 
among whom we may number Bra d l e y , Bos anquet, MacTaggei't, Collinywood 
and Oakeshott. 
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The s u b j e c t of my i n q u i r y has Jed me to ignore t h i s 
d i v i s i o n and to read the p h i l o s o p h e r s of both t r a d i t i o n s . I n con-
sequence, s i n c e a p h i l o s o p h i c a l education c o n s i s t s i n nothing other 
than r e a d i n g and f o l l o w i n g the minds of previous p h i l o s o p h e r s , the 
outcome of t h a t education i s i n sympathy w i t h and sh a r e s something 
of t h e appearance of both. 
I should l i k e to t h i n k t h a t such a s y n t h e s i s i s to a 
degree both o r i g i n a l and t i m e l y . 
"Even though my philosophy i s not equal to 
the d i s c o v e r y of anything"new, yet i t may 
have courage enough to regard venerable 
b e l i e f s as unfounded." 
LICHTENBERG 
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